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VERTICAL SPECIALISATION AND NEW REGIONALISM 
 
SUMMARY 
 
The increased spread in the location of value added coupled with the growing 
impetus for new forms of bilateral integration are re-shaping international economic 
activity. The world is becoming more regional and more fragmented but little 
empirical work has been dedicated to examining the nature of the links between these 
processes. This thesis aims to fill this gap in the literature.  
 
The primary aim of the first essay of this thesis is to extend current indicators of 
international production so that the bilateral degree of vertical specialisation can be 
captured. This has been one of the major hurdles in examining the links between 
vertical specialisation and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). The comparative static 
analysis of this first essay reveals that there appears to be a high incidence of 
regional value chain activity and this motivates the aims of the second essay. It 
attempts to isolate the impact of an FTA on these flows through a theoretically 
derived gravity model of input trade. The results suggest that an FTA increases the 
use of intermediate inputs that are part of a bilateral value chain by 65%. Moreover, 
the results identify the presence of ‘magnification’ which implies that this type of 
trade is also more responsive to changes in trade costs and income variables. The 
third essay then looks at how the changing nature of trade affects the formation of 
new FTAs. It suggests that the propagation of international production alters the 
political economy dynamics of countries towards favouring further liberalisation. It 
also identifies regulatory quality and a growing FTA ‘contagion’ as determinants of 
new FTAs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Two important processes have characterised global economic activity during the last 
decades. The first is a new unbundling (Baldwin, 2006a and 2011) that has seen the 
unpacking of factories across international borders and has resulted in a greater 
spread in the location of value added. The second is a regionalisation of world trade 
evidenced by the growing number of countries participating in Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs). Although these processes are concurrent and appear to be 
linked, as the rise in ‘Factory Asia’ (Baldwin, 2006b) coupled with the growing 
demand for deeper trade agreements in the region suggests; there has, hitherto, been 
little empirical work dedicated to examining the nature of these links. The purpose of 
this thesis is to fill this gap in the literature. 
 
Vertical specialisation (VS) – or the international fragmentation of production1, is 
driving a new wave of globalisation2. Production is increasingly being split into finer 
processes across international borders and this is leading to a greater spread in value 
added where comparative advantages are being exploited along more segments of the 
value chain. According to Feenstra and Hanson (1996); Feenstra (1998); Yeats 
(2001); Hummels et al. (2001); Yi (2003); WTO (2008); and OECD (2010) these 
new modes of production are rising rapidly and occupying a growing share of 
international trade. Yet each of these papers uses different measures to capture the 
incidence of this phenomenon and this reflects one of the main challenges in its 
empirical analysis: it is hard to quantify3.   
 
One measure that has gained prominence is the indicator of vertical specialisation 
proposed by Hummels et al. (2001); it identifies the import content of exports. This 
more narrow proxy for value chain activity captures a production sequence where 
intermediate imports are used to produce output destined to other countries. 
However, this indicator does not disentangle the origin of imports or the destination 
                                                 
1 The term ‘offshoring’ is commonly used to refer to this phenomenon (WTO, 2008). 
2 Blinder (2006) calls this the new industrial revolution. 
3 The World Trade Report (2008) identifies the salience of this phenomenon and a recent venture 
between the OECD and the WTO seeks to address unsolved issues relating to measures of this 
phenomenon which make this thesis quite timely (OECD-WTO, 2011). 
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of the corresponding export flow which implies that, in this form, it is not well suited 
to analysing the links between the spread of production and the rise in regionalism.  
This has been a major hurdle in the empirical analysis of these concurrent processes.  
 
This motivates one of the primary aims of the first essay of this thesis which is to 
construct a bilateralised indicator of vertical specialisation. This is approached 
through an extension of Hummels et al.’s (2001) indicators via the combination of 
technical coefficients, derived from input-output tables, and trade data4. The resulting 
database then enables the use of more sophisticated empirical methods of analysis 
through which one can investigate the causal links between vertical specialisation 
and new regionalism which is the focus of the two remaining essays of this thesis. 
 
One of the other aims of this first essay is to identify the nature of patterns of 
specialisation. It has often been argued that countries move up the value added ladder 
as they engage in further specialisation along a value chain, but evidence of this has 
been rather elusive. The case study of Bergin et al. (2008) suggest that since the 
establishment of the maquiladoras during the 60’s, Mexico moved beyond assembly 
provisions towards more sophisticated modes of production which are characterised 
by higher value adding activities. In an effort to capture such specialisation patterns, 
this essay decomposes vertical specialisation into backward and forward linkages. 
The former identifies the foreign value added of exports whereas the latter captures 
the value of domestic intermediates that are used for further processing by other 
countries. This decomposition is useful because countries specialising at different 
stages of the value chain are expected to exhibit different intensities in these 
linkages. For example, countries that engage in assembly activities are likely to 
display a growing backward linkage, or a rising import content of exports, as they 
import more and more components for processing. However, as specialisation 
unfolds, these countries may begin to specialise in higher value adding activities 
leading to reductions in their backward linkages and consequent increases in their 
forward linkages. But capturing this through indicators of vertical specialisation is 
challenging because their calculation is limited by the relatively small temporal 
coverage of input-output tables. Hence to identify long-run patterns of specialisation 
                                                 
4 The very recent work of Johnson and Noguera (2011) uses a similar approach. 
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this essay looks at how different country linkages behave at varying levels of per 
capita GDP. It finds evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between levels of 
development and these linkages lending support to the notion that countries do 
appear to move up the value chain.  
 
Another aim of this first essay is to identify the channels through which FTAs may 
affect vertical specialisation. Although the traditional shallow integration effects of 
FTAs are thought to be well understood, grasping the consequence of removing 
tariffs, on a preferential basis, in the presence of vertically specialised modes of 
production is quite complicated. The increased dimensionality of international value 
chain transactions, which involve both an importing and an exporting component, 
introduces the possibility for trade creation and diversion occurring at either or both 
the input and output elements of production. Hence although FTAs are expected to 
increase bilateral trade, the global welfare implications of these, in the presence of 
vertically specialised modes of production can be hard to grasp. 
 
One of the predictions made by Yi’s (2003) theoretical model of vertical 
specialisation is that the removal of tariff barriers to trade should lead to ‘magnified’ 
increases in the trade flows that are occupied in vertically specialised production. 
Because these modes of production involve back and forth movements of products 
along a single border the removal of a tariff barrier to trade can lead to an important 
reduction in the costs of production. This leads to ‘magnification effects’ which 
imply that this type of trade should be more responsive to changes in trade costs and 
economic size than traditional trade flows. Yi argues that these effects may help 
explain why world trade has grown at a faster pace than world GDP. 
 
The second essay of this thesis looks at the impact of FTAs on vertically specialised 
trade and attempts to see whether Yi’s predictions can be substantiated empirically. 
To this end, the determinants of this type of trade are identified via the derivation of 
a country’s demand for intermediate imports. This is then used to develop a gravity 
model of input trade through which the impact of an FTA on these flows can be 
captured. The estimation procedure draws on the recent literature that highlights the 
challenges faced in estimating gravity models with an endogenous FTA variable. 
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) suggest that biases in the coefficient estimates of a 
16 
 
gravity mode arise from unobserved heterogeneity which is caused by the presence 
of unobserved characteristics that simultaneously affect both the degree of trade 
between countries and the incentives for these to engage in an FTA. They propose 
the use of bilateral pair-wise fixed effects as control mechanisms but these have the 
undesirable consequence of restricting the variance of the FTA variable. This implies 
that this variable captures the impact of switching into an FTA which is problematic 
when the sample used in the estimation includes many agreements that were 
established before the beginning of the sample period. 
 
The use of less restrictive country-year fixed effects that do not place such 
constraints on the variance of the FTA variable is proposed as an alternative 
estimation technique. But their use has to be supported with evidence that these 
controls appropriately deal with the problems caused by unobserved heterogeneity. If 
this is the case, then current trade flows should not be affected by the presence of a 
future FTA, and this can be tested empirically. The results from this test suggest that 
this condition holds when using these fixed effects and hence that this is an 
appropriate empirical strategy to capture unbiased estimates of FTA effects. 
However, in the process this test also raises an interesting question. Could the 
changing nature of trade be leading to a greater demand for new agreements? 
 
The third essay of this thesis tackles this question. Baldwin (2011) suggests that a 
new wave of 21st century regionalism is unfolding. It involves more countries 
negotiating on ‘deeper’ issues (see also WTO, 2011; and Orefice and Rocha, 2011). 
His arguments lend themselves to the idea that the increased spread of production is 
generating new incentives to form new agreements. The third essay of this thesis 
attempts to investigate this empirically. It identifies changes in the characteristics of 
countries involved in the various waves of regionalism where the latest wave appears 
to involve countries that are more distant and more dissimilar in their factor 
endowments than in the past. It is then suggested that this could be a manifestation of 
changing conditions in the game of regionalism. 
 
The analysis draws on the political economy literature of FTA formation (Grossman 
and Helpman, 1995; and Ornelas, 2005a,b,c) to suggest that the changing nature of 
trade, or the spread in vertically specialised modes of production, leads to changes in 
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the internal political economy dynamics within countries. As production becomes 
internationalised, lobbies within countries should increasingly favour liberalisation in 
an attempt to access cheaper intermediates inputs and to obtain market access for 
their exports. This internationalisation of production can be captured through 
measures of vertical specialisation introduced into a ‘traditional’ empirical model of 
FTA formation (see Baier and Bergstrand, 2004). They are expected to be significant 
determinant of new FTAs. But in testing this proposition particular care needs to be 
taken in the empirical strategy. The use of measures of trade in an FTA formation 
model introduces the possibility of biases arising from unobserved heterogeneity (as 
was seen in the second essay of this thesis) and simultaneity. This essay applies 
cross-sectional and panel data techniques to control for these biases.   
 
Two other propositions are also tested in this essay. The first is derived from 
Baldwin’s (1993) domino theory of regionalism which suggests that new FTAs 
might arise as a response to the spread of neighbouring FTAs. This claim has 
recently been justified through the empirical findings of Baldwin and Jaimovich 
(2010). This third essay incorporates a new form of FTA ‘contagion’ that is distinct 
from that used in Baldwin and Jaimovich (2010) in that it captures contagion forces 
arising from the spread of production. It then tests whether these measures affect the 
likelihood of an FTA being formed. The other proposition arises from the recent 
literature on offshoring and FTAs (Antras and Staiger, 2011; and Ornelas and 
Turner, 2008). These papers suggest that value chain activity might require the 
presence of appropriate regulatory provisions so as to avoid inefficient ‘hold-ups’. 
This suggests that the desirability of engaging in a new trade agreement could be tied 
to the prevailing regulatory environment between countries. This proposition is 
tested through the introduction of measures of governance in an FTA formation 
model. It contributes to the growing literature on the links between intermediate 
goods trade, regulatory provisions and FTAs (see Orefice and Rocha, 2011). 
 
The thesis concludes by detailing the results obtained and highlighting the 
methodological contributions made in the process. It also identifies some avenues for 
future research and some of the key implications of the results.  
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ESSAY ONE 
 
 
 
THE NATURE AND SPREAD OF BILATERAL VERTICAL 
SPECIALISATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The concurrent international fragmentation of production structures with the 
regionalisation of world trade suggests the possibility of a link between these 
processes. This essay develops a new approach to capture the bilateral element of 
vertical specialisation so that its nature and evolution can be investigated. Vertical 
specialisation is decomposed into backward and forward linkages. On aggregate, the 
nature of these linkages varies significantly according to the position of a country in 
the value chain. Preliminary evidence of countries ‘moving up the value added 
ladder’ is presented and a statistically significant correlation between this type of 
activity and positive changes in productivity growth is identified. Where regionalism 
is concerned there appears to be marked differences between European, North 
American and Asian patterns of specialisation. The former two tend to be more 
inward oriented, whereas the last remains highly dependent on European and North 
American demand. 
 
 
 
19 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The unprecedented reduction in barriers to trade (bilateral and multilateral) combined 
with reduced communication and transportation costs  (Death of Distance – 
Cairncross, 1997) has presented firms with new opportunities to fragment processes 
of production across international borders. This has spurred a new wave of 
globalisation which is re-shaping the way we think about trade and the borders of 
production both at the country and firm level (Baldwin 2006a). Concurrently, there 
has been a deepening and widening of preferential trade agreements which suggests 
that these processes could be linked. The recent emergence of ‘Factory Asia’ 
(Baldwin 2006b) and the subsequent growth in the demand for new preferential 
agreements in the region supports this idea as do the specialisation patterns between 
the US and Mexico since the establishment of the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA)5. 
 
Yet there appears to be a gap in the empirical literature. Very little work has been 
undertaken in capturing either the impact of trade agreements on this type of trade or 
the role that the changing nature of trade plays in the formation of new trade 
agreements. This is due neither to a lack of interest nor of available tools in analysing 
these issues, but rather because of difficulties in quantifying this phenomenon. The 
seminal work of Hummels et al. (2001) highlighted the importance of the growth in 
this type of trade through an indicator that used Input-Output tables to track the 
import content of exports, or the degree of vertical specialisation (VS)6. However 
this indicator does not disentangle the origin of imports or the destination of the 
corresponding export flow which implies that it is not well suited to the task of 
identifying the spread of vertical specialisation across preferential partners.  
 
This essay aims to provide a first step in filling this gap by extending these indicators 
geographically so that the degree of bilateral vertical specialisation can be 
identified. This is done by combining information from the technical coefficients of 
production, obtained from Input-Output tables, with trade data. The resulting 
                                                 
5 See Hanson and Robertson (2003). 
6 The indicator captures a particular sequence of production that involves a country importing 
intermediate products that are then used to produce exports. 
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indicator is then used to measure the extent and spread of ‘international production’ 
across countries. It identifies a production sequence where domestic resources are 
combined with imported intermediates to produce exports and hence can be thought 
of as a proxy measure of bilateral value chain activity. Whereas the traditional 
indicators of VS would allow one to capture the foreign value added of Mexican 
exports, this new measure identifies the origin of this value added so that one can 
track the US content of Mexican exports to any destination. 
 
The primary purposes of this essay are: 
1. To discuss the theoretical underpinnings of vertical specialisation and provide 
a workable definition which captures the extent, spread and evolution of this 
phenomenon; and 
2. To shed light on the role that trade agreements might play in promoting the 
fragmentation of production structures.   
The secondary aim is to prepare the ground for more sophisticated empirical analysis 
on the link between vertical specialisation and free trade agreements (FTAs). 
 
The surge and importance of international production has been well documented in; 
Feenstra (1998); Yeats (2001); Hummels et al (2001); Yi (2003); and OECD (2010). 
It is concurrent with an unprecedented growth in the number of FTAs concluded as 
Figure 1.1 shows. However the links between these processes remain hard to pin 
down. 
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Figure 1.1: Vertical Specialisation and FTAs 
 
Source: Data on FTAs from WTO FTA database. VS calculated for aggregate sample of 39 OECD 
countries using Hummels et al.’s (2001) indicator the method used is explained in greater detail in 
subsequent sections. 
 
This essay provides a short review of the theoretical approaches that have been used 
to describe vertical specialisation. It argues that ‘new paradigms’, explaining the 
drivers of this phenomenon, are perhaps not needed. Vertical specialisation certainly 
increases the quantity of products traded across borders, but the existing body of 
trade theory should be capable of grasping its implications. What is particularly new 
about this phenomenon is that trade is becoming complementary rather than 
competing (see Samuelson, 2001; and Bas and Strauss-Kahn, 2011), this may then 
have unusual consequences in how it interacts with trade policy7. 
 
Analysing the impact of FTAs on this type of trade, in the context of the traditional 
trade creation and diversion framework proposed by  Viner (1950) may become 
more complex owing to the presence of both importing and exporting elements in 
value chain interactions. Trade creation or diversion can occur at either end of the 
value chain and, with complementary trade, trade creation at one end may lead to 
further trade creation at the other. This introduces the possibility of there being 
complex feedback mechanisms. Moreover, if magnification effects (Yi 2003) arise, 
                                                 
7 Trade is complementary, as opposed to competing, when the competitiveness of a foreign producer 
benefits domestic production rather than reducing its market share. It arises when products can be 
used as inputs in the productive process (as shown in Samuelson, 2001).    
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through the impact of the removal of tariffs on trade flows in the presence of multiple 
border crossings, then these forces may be further amplified.  
 
This essay also attempts to highlight the role of deep integration in shaping the 
spread of international production. It argues that the increasing complexity of 
production is likely to demand greater private and public coordinating mechanisms. 
This implies that standardisation and the enforcement of the rule of law, or 
contractual obligations, might become increasingly important in determining patterns 
of value chain activity. 
 
The indicator of vertical specialisation is herein divided into two main components; 
backward and forward international production linkages. These capture different 
facets of value chain activity. The backward linkage identifies the use of intermediate 
imports in the production of exports whereas the forward linkage captures the use, by 
other countries, of a reporting country’s intermediate goods to produce exports. 
Hence Mexico’s backward linkage with the US is the value of intermediate imports 
from the US in Mexico’s total exports whilst its forward linkage is the share of 
Mexican intermediate goods that the US uses to produce exports as a proportion of 
Mexico’s total exports. 
 
This separation is convenient because it facilitates tracking a country’s position in an 
international value chain (i.e. as assembler or as supplier of intermediates). This 
essay suggests that a non-monotonic relationship arises between levels of 
development and the position of countries in a value chain. At low levels of 
development, countries appear to enter global value chains in assembly activities 
which are characterised by low domestic value adding activities. This implies that 
their exports tend to have a high, and rising, foreign value added component. 
However, as specialisation unfolds and countries become more integrated in value 
chain activity, the share of domestic value added to foreign value added increases 
and hence the vertical specialisation indicator that captures backwards linkages falls. 
This gives rise to a specialisation pattern that exhibits an inverted-U relationship 
(between development and backward linkages). On the supply side, as countries 
engage in the assembly of final goods their share of intermediate exports to total 
exports initially falls, but as they specialise in higher value adding activities this 
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share begins to rise driving a U shaped relationship between levels of development 
and forward linkages8.  
 
Such specialisation patterns lend support to the notion that countries ‘move up the 
value added ladder’ which is important because it presents a path through which 
developing countries can benefit from integrating into global value chains. 
Furthermore, this essay identifies a positive correlation between value chain activity 
(both backward and forward linkages) and productivity growth suggesting a possible 
link between these processes. This may reinforce the importance of engaging in such 
activities not least for development purposes. 
 
In terms of the spread of bilateral vertical specialisation, the observations of this 
essay confirm many perceived wisdoms. There is a lot of vertical specialisation 
taking place within traditional regional blocks (EU, NAFTA and East Asia). 
However the rise of China as a source of intermediate products also suggests that one 
needs to look carefully at the determinants of this type of trade to disentangle the role 
that trade policy might play in this process. Regional partners are close in proximity 
and exhibit similar per capita GDPs (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004). These factors 
should also be conducive to higher degrees of vertical specialisation and hence need 
to be controlled for so that the trade policy element can be isolated.  
 
This essay is divided into 8 sections. Section 1.2 provides a review of the literature 
on vertical specialisation. Section 1.3 then focuses on a discussion on how FTAs may 
impact degrees of vertical specialisation. In the fourth section, the challenges in 
measuring this type of trade are presented. Section 1.5 then provides a new method 
that can be used to capture vertical specialisation across bilateral partners and divides 
international production into forward and backward linkages. The sixth section 
presents some preliminary observations on the nature of these linkages. Section 1.7 
highlights the spread of bilateral vertical specialisation across different geographical 
regions. The final section concludes and sets the agenda for future research in this 
field. 
                                                 
8 These patterns are also in line with the evolution of Maquiladora specialisation where the giant 
assembly lines of the 60’s have given way to new generation plants engaged in higher value adding 
activities and have led to a tripling of value added between 1994 and 2005 as suggested in Bergin et 
al.(2008). 
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1.2. VERTICAL SPECIALISATION IN THEORY 
 
Many names have been given to the disintegration of production structures across 
national boundaries, such as; ‘slicing up the value-added chain’ (Krugman 1996); 
‘offshoring’; ‘outsourcing’; ‘fragmentation’ (Jones and Kierkowski 1990 and 2001, 
Deardorff 2001); ‘delocalisation of production’ (Leamer 1996); and ‘vertical 
specialisation’ (Balassa 1967 and Hummels et al. 1998, 2001). Each captures a 
different facet of the grander, and recently evolving, second unbundling (Baldwin 
2006a). This international unpacking of production processes has led to an increase 
in the spread of the location of value added so that this is now performed in different 
countries and at different stages of the value chain. Henceforth, the term vertical 
specialisation will be used to refer to this phenomenon. 
1.2.1. THEORETICAL MODELS 
 
Models providing theoretical underpinnings to this type of trade are also numerous. 
They fall along the traditional trade theory divides. The Ricardian models see this 
process as being motivated by comparative advantages that arise from differences in 
technologies across countries (Sanyal and Jones 1982, Feenstra and Hanson 1996, 
Deardorff 2001, Yi 2003). The H-O frameworks are then driven by comparative 
advantages which arise from differences in factor endowments (Jones and 
Kierzkowski 2001, Deardorff 2001, Arndt 2002, Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2010). 
The new trade theory models see imperfect competition, product differentiation and 
‘international economies of scale’ as the drivers of such trade (Ethier 1982, Burda 
and Dluhosch 2002, Lüthje 2001 and 2003, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008 and 
Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2010)9. A well rounded understanding of vertical 
specialisation passes through a discussion of the insights of each theoretical 
approach. 
 
Yi’s (2003) Ricardian model is particularly perceptive. It suggests that, in the 
presence of vertically specialised modes of production, the removal of border 
measures can ‘magnify’ bilateral trade flows and technological differences across 
                                                 
9 These economic approaches have used partial equilibrium, general equilibrium and econometric 
estimation. 
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countries. This results in a greater responsiveness of trade flows to tariff reductions10. 
Egger and Pfaffermayr (2005) lend support to the presence of such magnification 
effects in their empirical study of Austrian intra-firm trade. They show that falling 
trading costs encourage multinationals to fragment production and identify a 
magnification effect associated with two-way trade in components. Similarly, Chinn 
(2005), who looks at import and export flows in the US, argues that the presence of 
vertically specialised trade, combined with decreasing tariff rates, yields more 
plausible estimates for income elasticities. This, a priori, implies that the removal of 
barriers to trade on a preferential basis may generate distinct magnification effects 
that reinforce the propagation of vertically specialised trade across preferential areas. 
 
The factor endowment approach to vertical specialisation presented in Deardorff 
(1998) sees differences in factor intensities motivating specialisation across 
countries. The US exports goods which are intensive in the use of skilled-labour to 
Mexico where these are assembled using unskilled labour into finished products 
destined for the US (e.g. Maquiladoras trade). Here firms take advantage of the 
lower costs of labour to decrease overall costs of production. Similarly, but in the 
context of FTAs, Arndt (2002) argues that entering into an agreement with a country 
with differing factor intensities, and allowing for vertical specialisation in tasks, 
results in a more efficient allocation of processes of production.The welfare effects 
of engaging in this type of trade are equivalent to technical progress in both the 
labour-intensive and the capital-intensive tasks. When countries are allowed to vary 
in size, terms of trade gains may also arise so that: “the combined effect of 
investment liberalisation and cross-border production sharing is to raise wages in 
both countries and to increase area-wide output” (Arndt, 2002:p8). 
 
New trade theory approaches owe much to the seminal work of Krugman (1979 and 
1981) and Ethier (1982). The latter models a world where all trade takes place in 
intermediate products. Firms combine inputs through a CES production function and 
derive ‘international economies of scale’ from the use of new varieties that become 
available through trade. A contrasting approach to this ‘love of input variety’ setting 
                                                 
10 Yi (2003) argued that the responsiveness of trade flows to the most recent reductions in tariffs could 
not be explained by traditional trade models unless a counterfactually large elasticity was used. He 
then suggests that magnification effect arising from the removal of barriers provide a good 
explanation for the large growth in world trade. 
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is the ‘ideal input variety’ approach that follows Lancaster’s (1979) insights in 
Lüthje’s (2001 and 2003) theoretical models. These general equilibrium models of 
intra-industry trade in intermediate products put forward the idea that for every final 
good, an ideal intermediate good that perfectly fits its production requirements exists. 
If this ideal variety is not available, firms buying intermediate goods will need to 
devote resources to moulding (transforming) the available intermediate good before 
they can assemble a finished product. Because this transformation requires the use of 
labour and capital, it affects the production of final goods. An increased variety of 
intermediate goods raises the probability of finding an ideal variety, but the 
combination of non-ideal intermediate goods does not increase production as is the 
case in Ethier type models. 
 
Supply side models of vertical specialisation are motivated by the observation that 
trade in producer goods has advanced at a significantly faster pace than trade in 
consumer goods. Burda and Dluhosch (2002) argue that fragmentation is driven by 
cost-competition and the international division of labour through a monopolistically 
competitive framework with economies of scale. An index, z, captures the degree of 
fragmentation across stages of value added within a value chain. Increasing this 
degree of fragmentation reduces production costs but also incurs a fixed cost that 
arises from the coordination, or management, of shared production processes. The 
model then identifies market size as the guiding force in this process. A growing 
market leads to increased pressures to cut costs of production and results in 
competition taking place across methods of production. This suggests that, to the 
extent that FTAs increase the size of the market, they may have important pro-
competitive effects through cost savings opportunities. Furthermore “an enlarged 
market associated with trade drives an endogenous evolution of technology, which in 
turn affects the international division of labour” (Burda and Dluhosch 2002:432)11.  
 
 
                                                 
11 The more credible the commitment to an FTA the more securely a firm may afford to outsource. 
Eichengreen (2006) suggested that, before 1945, European firms could simply not guarantee security 
of supply if they sought to base production on imported parts. However the deep provisions associated 
with the EU’s process of integration may then have reinforced the division of labour across Europe by 
guaranteeing the contestability of markets. 
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1.2.2. A CHANGE IN PARADIGM OR BUSINESS AS USUAL? 
Despite vertical specialisation being touted as a new phenomenon, it may just be a 
global up-scaling of Adam Smith’s (1776) pin factory where international 
competition happens not in the final pin market but rather in the tasks that lead to the 
production of the pin. The international division of tasks across processes of 
production is desirable because it can give rise to productivity increases that generate 
important welfare gains that can ultimately drive economic growth. It introduces 
scope for additional gains arising from; ‘learning by doing’ effects; technology 
transfers; or increased international competition at the finer process level. Gains can 
also be amplified through ‘natural selection forces’ that follow global comparative 
advantages and these are likely to drive a re-shaping of global economic activity. 
 
What is particularly new about this phenomenon is that it may affect a wider array of 
goods, services and people in a way that traditional trade theory could be ill-
equipped to predict (Blinder 2006). Baldwin (2006a:p6), in an effort to summarise 
the second unbundling paradigm in which vertical specialisation falls, argues that 
whilst “the first unbundling allowed the spatial separation of factories and consumers 
[...] the second unbundling spatially unpacked the factories and offices themselves”. 
Hence the first unbundling facilitated the consumption of products originating from 
distant locations whereas the second unpacked the different tasks that lead to the 
manufacture of these products.  
 
Such a view of the world has led to the creation of a new theoretical approach to 
vertical specialisation that focuses on trade in tasks rather than products (Blinder, 
2006 and 2009; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006 and 2008; Baldwin, 2006 and 
2010; and Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2010). Although this may appear as a new 
idea, it seems that Adam Smith had already understood the importance of tasks in the 
production process: 
“The woollen coat, for example, which covers the day-labourer, as coarse 
and rough as it may appear, is the produce of the joint labour of a great 
multitude of workmen. The shepherd, the sorter of the wool, the wool-
comber or carder, the dyer, the scribbler, the spinner, the weaver, the 
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fuller, the dresser, with many others, must all join their different arts in 
order to complete even this homely production.”(Adam Smith 1776:p.8). 
 
Grossman and Hansberg (2006 and 2008), later backed by Baldwin (2006), were first 
to advocate this new theory of task trade. In their model, declining costs of task trade 
result in productivity boosts “for the factor whose tasks become easier to move 
offshore”. In parallel Blinder (2006) suggested that under the new industrial 
revolution, the distinction between tradable and non-tradable goods and services 
becomes blurred as do trade theory predictions based on the traditional factor 
endowment dichotomy of skilled and unskilled labour. As an economy becomes 
more service oriented, the dichotomy for the new paradigm should focus on personal 
versus impersonal services where the latter are more easily offshoreable than the 
former (Blinder, 2006)12. This poses new problems for economists given the 
heterogeneous mix of skilled and unskilled labour embodied in tasks and makes the 
distributional implications harder to predict. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2010) then 
argued that the new paradigm could be incorporated into mainstream trade theory by 
considering offshoring as a productivity gain achieved through technological change 
(“factor specific technical progress” Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2010 p.5). This 
would suggest that current trade theory may not be as ill equipped to deal with this 
process as initially thought13. 
 
This new literature seems to have gone full circle leaving us where we started. At 
one level there is little need for a paradigm shift because trade in intermediate goods, 
or trade in tasks, is like any other form of trade, although the ability to outsource 
parts of a production process does potentially enlarge the scale of the tradable sector. 
These new modes of production are also likely to greatly increase the complexity of 
international transactions (Baldwin, 2011). But there is a point that is rarely 
remarked on. Vertical specialisation involves trade in complementary goods. Most of 
the traditional micro theory of trade works because goods are more or less close 
substitutes but when we have trade in intermediates we are in a world of 
                                                 
12 Levy and Murnane (2003) propose distinctions along the lines of routine and non-routine tasks. 
Where these distinctions are not without consequence for important Balassa-Samuelson type effects 
(i.e. wage (productivity) differentials across types of goods; traded/non-traded, personal/impersonal 
and routine/non-routine). 
13 It is possible to argue that the insights of the theoretical models remain relevant but that the unit of 
analysis is changing. 
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complementarity where price effects can have unusual consequences. If the price of 
Chinese intermediates falls, this could make producers of final goods more rather 
than less competitive, until the point where a flip occurs and final production 
relocates. On the other hand what is good for final producers may be bad for 
intermediate producers, recalling tensions between spinners and weavers in Smith’s 
time. 
 
A short and sharp paper by Samuelson (2001) highlights the positive implications of 
complementary trade arising from a rudimentary Ricardian model14. He shows that 
the traditional gains from trade can be greatly enhanced through specialisation when 
countries can use each others’ produce as inputs. His numerically simple example 
sees specialisation in one country leading to enhanced production possibilities in the 
other and hence that one country’s specialisation may induce another’s. Therefore, if 
products can be used in conjunction with other products to produce output, 
specialisation leads to a sizeable expansion in the production possibility frontier15. 
This then delivers increased welfare gains, compared to a scenario where trade only 
occurs in final products, for countries involved in such specialisation. Empirical 
evidence of complementary trade can be found in the work of Coulibaly (2008) and 
Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2011). The former identifies a cross-country link between 
imports of intermediate products and exports16 whereas the latter provide evidence of 
similar links for a more focused study of French firms17. 
 
1.3. TRADE AGREEMENTS AND VERTICAL SPECIALISATION 
The presence of complementary trade may have important implications for trade 
policy. It means that tariff barriers to trade, and indeed non-tariff barriers to trade, 
may increasingly act as production taxes rather than as intended protectionist 
measures. As more and more products become intermediate inputs into a productive 
                                                 
14 It is Ricardian even in the products that Samuelson uses to explain complementary trade (wine and 
cloth). 
15 Somewhat analogous to a technological efficiency enhancing change much like that of Baldwin and 
Robert-Nicoud (2010). 
16 It provides evidence of Granger causality with threshold effects. 
17 The study suggests that gains can arise through the extensive margin of exports and also that the 
origin of intermediate products seems to matter where more specialised inputs, originating from richer 
countries, may impact export flows to a greater degree. 
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process, through the growth in vertically specialised modes of production, old tariff 
systems that have not adapted to new conditions may penalise production. This is 
well understood through the effective rate of protection logic which suggests that 
tariffs on intermediate products can act as taxes on production18. Hence, as countries 
become more vertically specialised, tensions between the gains and losses from trade 
for consumers and producers may fall so that support for protectionism may also 
weaken. New channels through which trade policy can shape the spread of 
production may then arise. However, the welfare implications of preferential 
liberalisation may become harder to grasp.  
1.3.1. SHALLOW INTEGRATION EFFECTS 
Trade creation may be defined as a switch in the supply of products from less 
efficient domestic sources to more efficient foreign ones as a result of 
liberalisation19. Because the process of international fragmentation involves a similar 
replacement of domestic inputs by foreign ones, then international outsourcing is 
likely to be trade creating and hence deliver similar positive welfare gains. However, 
if processes of production are already fragmented internationally, and sources of 
inputs switch across different foreign suppliers as a result of preferential 
liberalisation, then trade diversion is likely to arise. Understanding the welfare 
implications of such a switch may be harder. 
 
The traditional trade creation and trade diversion dichotomy is expected to be less 
clear cut in the presence of vertically specialised trade (WTO 2011). Because such 
international modes of production involve both an import and an export element then 
there is a possibility of there being trade creation and diversion at either end of a 
value chain (input or output). Moreover, if there are complementarities in trade, then 
trade creation on the input side may lead to trade creation on the export side which 
may lead to complex feedback mechanisms20. 
                                                 
18 See Kasahara and Lapham (2006) for a theoretical appraisal of this. 
19 Note that trade creation can also arise when countries import more intermediate products from the 
most efficient producers of these. 
20 For example, if Mexican firms are able to become more competitive by importing cheaper 
intermediates from the US as a result of NAFTA (through a reduction in input costs), then this 
competitive boost may give rise to a greater demand for Mexican products in other countries. If these 
products consequently become a cheaper source of intermediates for the US too, then this may spur 
further trade creation. 
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In parallel, trade diversion on the input side may have unusual trade creating effects 
on the output side. Preferential liberalisation may lead to efficiency gains in the 
export industry if the prices of intermediates are reduced as a result, and this can 
arise even when this is the result of trade diversion. Consider 3 countries A, B and C. 
Country A imposes an MFN tariff on all imports and currently sources all of its 
intermediates from country C to produce exports to all destinations. This suggests 
that C is the most efficient producer of these intermediates. Signing a trade 
agreement with country B, despite this country not being the most efficient producer 
of the inputs, then induces a source-switching trade diversion effect whereby 
Country A passes to import all its intermediates from B21. Because these intermediate 
imports are now cheaper than before, as a result of the preferential reduction in the 
tariff, country A may achieve a gain in efficiency in the production of its exports 
through a reduction in the cost of its inputs22. If this gain in efficiency is larger than 
the loss of tariff revenue, then the agreement could be welfare enhancing even 
though there has been no direct trade creation23. Furthermore, if this efficiency gain 
results in the reduction of the price of country A’s exported product, this might, in 
turn, spur further fragmentation (trade creation or diversion). 
 
But there may be an associated cost to this. Under vertically specialised trade, having 
access to cheaper, but not the cheapest, intermediate goods may generate an 
opportunity cost which can translate into a loss in global competitiveness in other 
export markets. Hence although firms gain from a cheaper price for the intermediate 
products, the price of these may still be higher than those set by the most competitive 
producer outside the FTA. This means that an identical vertically specialised 
exporting firm, in a nation that has embraced unilateral liberalisation, may have a 
                                                 
21 Again it is implicit that country A does not produce any of these and hence there is no trade creation 
from this agreement. 
22 This presumes that there will be a reduction in the price of the intermediate product which would be 
consistent in a perfectly competitive world. The gain in efficiency arises because keeping the 
production function unchanged, country A can now produce more output with the same amount of 
inputs. Alternatively under other assumptions about the competitive setting (monopolistic or indeed 
oligopolistic) the firm in country A can also increase profits but this case is not considered at this 
stage.  
23 A preferential agreement can reduce the implicit export tax that arises from levying tariffs on 
intermediate products. Although this can result in trade diversion, the removal of the distortion created 
by the high MFN may result in the partner’s price approaching the world price and hence gains can 
arise for domestic producers. 
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cost advantage in a third market over the exact same firm in a nation with an FTA24. 
The FTA may then have ‘penalised’ the competitiveness of the export industry in 
third markets. 
 
This example illustrates the complexities that arise in capturing the welfare 
implications of trade agreements in the presence of vertically specialised trade. 
Moreover, it may also help provide an understanding of some empirical observations 
on how countries tackle their liberalisation strategies. Mexico, for instance, is heavily 
engaged in vertical specialisation with respect to the US25. It can be argued that this 
fragmentation has come to pass through the effects of closer integration associated to 
the creation of NAFTA. However, once Mexico secured its market access into the 
US, it has been seen to more fully embrace MFN liberalisation26. This could be in an 
effort to capture cheaper intermediates from China and therefore enhance its 
competitiveness in the US or indeed the world market. Because trade diversion can 
lead to opportunity costs that may result in a loss of competitiveness in export 
markets, engagement in value chain activity can change the liberalisation incentives, 
or the political economy forces that motivate these, in complex ways too27. Although 
the optimal policy that mitigates the aforementioned possible losses in 
competitiveness in export markets is one that pursues unilateral (multilateral) 
liberalisation, it may only be optimal when the tariff faced by the exporting industry 
is the same across destinations. This is to say that a cost disadvantage can be 
mitigated by a preference in a particular market. 
 
Adding to the increased complexity that the traditional trade creation and diversion 
effects are expected to display in the presence of vertically specialised trade is the 
role of ‘magnification’ in this process (Yi 2003). The bilateral reduction in tariffs 
across preferential partners is likely to amplify the trade creating and diverting forces 
at play which may then promote a further spread of vertical specialisation across 
preferential partners. If economies of scale also play a role in this process, the 
expansion of markets, achieved through preferential liberalisation, could yield 
                                                 
24 Assuming that neither of them have an FTA with this third country. 
25 Evidence of this is shown in subsequent sections.  
26 Mexico’s weighted average MFN tariff declined from 11.4 in 1995 to 5.6 in 2010 whilst its 
weighted bound tariff remained largely unchanged at around 35% (data from Trains). Its unweighted 
MFN tariffs also declined but by a little less.  
27 This is the subject of the final essay of this thesis.  
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additional gains. It may increase the probability of finding ‘ideal varieties’ (Luthje 
2001 and 2003) and encourage a further division of labour (Burda and Dluhosch 
2002). The link between vertical specialisation and regionalism may be more far 
reaching if VS plays a role in productivity growth as suggested in Baldwin and 
Robert-Nicoud (2010) and Arndt (2002)28. 
 
However the propagation of value chain activity may also depend on the depth of 
integration achieved within a preferential area29. This is because such activity is 
likely to demand considerable coordinating efforts so as to ensure that a sub-standard 
quality of inputs, in a particular stage of production, does not hold the entire value 
chain production to ransom. Furthermore, upholding the rule of law so that contracts 
can be enforced between buyers and sellers should also become increasingly 
important. Value chain activity may operate best in more integrated markets where 
default uncertainties and transaction costs are low. The recent world trade report 
argues that “In order for cross-border production networks to operate smoothly, 
certain national policies need to be harmonized across jurisdictions. This generates a 
demand for deep forms of integration” (WTO, 2011:p.112).    
1.3.2. DEEP INTEGRATION AND VERTICAL SPECIALISATION 
The role of deep integration in promoting vertical specialisation may be analogous to 
recreating the pre-conditions that motivated the division of labour in Adam Smith’s 
pin factory. The establishment of a common working space where workers could 
interact in the process of producing a final good may have provided the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for specialisation30. This initial separation of production 
across processes within a factory was later followed by an unbundling where the 
division of labour unpacked the factories across domestic economic spaces. This 
process may then have been facilitated by the common sets of laws that govern 
interactions within a country. This then suggests that this new unbundling, or the 
                                                 
28 In addition, the literature on heterogeneous firms developed by Melitz (2003) and extended by 
Helpman and Yeaple, 2004 and Antras and Helpman (2004) may provide further supportive evidence 
of such links. 
29 And, although not mentioned explicitly, on the degree to which FTAs can adjust Rules of Origin 
(RoO) to cater for such production processes. A particularly interesting avenue for future research is 
how the increased spread of international value added is affected by the presence of restrictive rules of 
origin or how ‘cummulation’ can be used to encourage regional modes of production. 
30 And also a manageable space in which to track the quality of each sequence of production. 
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division of labour across international borders, could be tied to the depth of the 
regulatory provisions that are created between countries31. Or to the set of policies 
that create ‘thick’ markets (Leijonhufvud 2007) across national borders32.  
 
Broadly speaking deep integration can play an important role in the propagation of 
international fragmentation through two key channels33. The first is via the provision 
of minimum standards that enable the identification of the quality of inputs and the 
second through mechanisms that enforce the rule of law that governs contractual 
obligations between buyers and sellers. Whilst deeper integration through the first 
channel can be achieved by means of private or public involvement, the second 
channel is likely to be the remit of public institutions and their efforts in creating an 
appropriate rules-based system of enforcement mechanism across international 
borders.  
 
Standardisation can be achieved through public policy coordination or through the 
creation of mandatory private standards or quality controls for products circulating 
across a value chain34. It can act as a facilitator of trade, as well as a barrier to trade, 
and can be drawn up nationally, regionally and multilaterally35.  In a world of 
imperfect and asymmetric information and considerable transaction costs, standards 
provide information on the quality of inputs36. If buyers face costs in assessing the 
quality of inputs and these are increasing in the degree of fragmentation, then 
standards can create important positive externalities that facilitate the flow of inputs 
and reduce the incidence of failures that could jeopardise the entire production of the 
value chain. 
 
                                                 
31 The term unbundling is used somewhat differently here than in Baldwin (2006a). 
32 The creation of such markets is, in part, a transposition of Coase’s Theorem to value chain 
interactions where recognising the existence of both positive and negative externalities affecting 
transaction costs suggests that contractual arrangements matter and may indeed be preferable to arms 
length dealings. 
33 This section draws heavily from a co-authored working paper of this essay in Lopez Gonzalez and 
Holmes (2011). It paraphrases some of the key aspects of the links between VS and deep integration 
that were highlighted by Peter Holmes in this working paper. 
34 The contrasting evidence of the paths of integration between East Asia and the EU are examples of 
how private and public policy can be substitutes in the formation of area wide standards. A discussion 
of which is more efficient is well beyond the scope of this essay. 
35 The term ‘standard’ is used loosely here and refers to the process of setting technical standards or 
certification procedures. 
36 In a world of perfect information and no transactions costs, standards should not be necessary. 
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The extensive literature on transactions costs (see Williamson, 1975) argues that 
overcoming these costs can be accomplished through the internalisation of economic 
activity. Hence a ‘factory system’ emerges where ownership is maintained within a 
parent firm and in close proximity so that quality controls, at each step of the 
production process, can be monitored. However, new developments in information 
technology systems and management structures may revitalise the subcontracting and 
outsourcing relationship by making quality controls easier to implement at lower 
costs. This may then lead to further outsourcing which can motivate ‘niche’ 
specialisation in finer segments of production and benefit from economies of scale 
and learning by doing gains. Such privately led standardisation seems to be 
characteristics of the East Asian experience where institutions appear to have initially 
taken a laissez-faire attitude to regional economic integration. However as 
specialisation unfolds, new mechanisms for the enforcement of contracts between 
upstream and downstream producers may become increasingly pressing, as a 
consequence, the demand for a greater involvement of public institutions should rise. 
This might explain the recent surge in new and deeper agreements in East Asia 
(WTO, 2011).  
 
The new theoretical literature on offshoring in the presence of incomplete contracts 
(Antras and Staiger, 2011) highlights a similar link. It argues that an inefficient 
allocation of economic activity arises due to the presence of incomplete contracts. A 
‘hold-up’ occurs when asymmetric information induces sunk searching costs 
between buyers and sellers and contractual obligations may be reneged on. This 
strand of literature (see also Ornelas and Turner, 2008) suggests that regulatory 
quality, across preferential areas, could be an important factor in the propagation of 
international value chains. This could help explain why new trade agreements appear 
to negotiate provisions beyond reductions in tariff schedules such as competitions 
policy, investment and intellectual property rights (see Baldwin, 2011).   
1.3.3. RELATED EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
Empirical investigations into the impact of FTAs on vertical specialisation are far 
and few between. This is because the empirical literature has struggled to disentangle 
vertical specialisation across bilateral partners. One notable attempt at capturing the 
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spread of fragmentation within FTAs is that of Daudin et al (2008). They develop a 
method for identifying the origin of value-added trade and compute intra and extra 
regional value-added trade aggregates37. They track domestic value added through 
stages of processing in different countries and show that 56% of the EU’s value-
added trade comes from other EU partners. For the Americas and Asia the intra 
regional figures stand at 44% and 34% respectively. Whilst the study offers an 
innovative approach for disentangling the location of value added, it does not focus 
on vertical specialisation per se and hence does not look at either the determinants of 
this type of trade or the link between vertical specialisation and trade agreements. A 
recent paper by Johnson and Noguera (2011) also attempts to disentangle value 
added trade to track its spread across bilateral origins and destinations. To do so they 
compile a world input-output table which allows them to capture the indirect use of 
domestic value added embodied in exports produced by other countries. However, 
this paper does not look at the spread of production across preferential partners38. 
Rather, it is concerned with exposing how bilateral trade balances, such as that 
between the US and China, are very different when one considers indirect exports (or 
the US value added embodied in Chinese imports that is then embodied in Chinese 
exports to the US). Most saliently, they show that the current trade balance between 
the US and China is 30% lower that gross trade figures suggest because China 
imports high US value added products from Japan and Korea.  
 
Nordas (2004) provides one of the first empirical studies on the determinants of 
aggregate vertical specialisation. This paper suggests that economically small 
countries with high per capita GDP and low tariffs tend to exhibit higher levels of 
vertical specialisation. It suggests that infrastructure variables such as telephone 
density and port efficiency may be key drivers of vertical specialisation. These 
variables act as proxies for delivery times and rates of fault which have been 
identified as important in the value chain literature. This, in turn, suggests that the 
‘thickness’ of the market could play a decisive role in vertical specialisation recalling 
Leijonhufvud’s (2007) claims. However Nordas’ investigation is also not extended to 
                                                 
37 Value added trade is measured as the amount by which a good has increased in value while passing 
through a specific process in a country.  
38 Some of the key differences between the strategies used in these papers to track value added trade 
and those proposed in this essay are discussed in subsequent sections. 
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the role of FTAs in the propagation of VS as the indicator used does not disentangle 
bilateral flows of vertically specialised trade.  
 
Hence there appears to be a gap in the empirical literature treating the role of trade 
agreements on vertical specialisation. These processes are likely to be interrelated in 
complex ways where causation may run from increased integration of bilateral value 
chains to trade agreements or from trade agreements to increased bilateral vertical 
specialisation. An appropriate econometric setting will be needed to disentangle 
these issues where the work of Baier and Bergstrand (2007), on the impact of FTAs 
on final goods trade, and that of Baier and Bergstrand (2004) on the determinants of 
FTAs is likely to be key due to the possible endogeneity of these processes. But 
before turning to more sophisticated econometric analysis, as is done in subsequent 
essays of this thesis, the first hurdle, and a key objective of this essay, is to identify 
ways of capturing vertical specialisation across bilateral partners. 
 
1.4. CAPTURING VERTICAL SPECIALISATION 
 
In practice, vertical specialisation has proven to be a difficult phenomenon to 
measure. This is because, without prior knowledge of production processes, the 
identification of what constitutes an intermediate product is not straightforward. 
Adding to this, the ‘double counting’ of trade, arising from the gross valuation of 
trade flows at each border crossing, may make the evaluation of its spread even 
trickier39. This section focuses on the challenges and implications of these issues. A 
more detailed discussion of other indicators that can be, or have been, used to capture 
this phenomenon is left for the appendix A1.1. 
1.4.1. IDENTIFICATION AND VALUATION PROBLEMS IN TRADE BASED 
MEASURES 
 
Many empirical studies have used trade based measures to capture vertical 
specialisation (see for example Feenstra 1998; Yeats 2001; Egger and Egger 2005; 
and Gasiorek et al., 2010). This is because trade data is widely available and affords 
                                                 
39 See Daudin et al. (2008) and Johnson and Noguera (2011) for a wider discussion of the implications 
of double counted trade. 
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a very detailed geographical and temporal coverage of trading structures. Commonly, 
intermediate goods are identified through the United Nation’s Broad Economic 
Categories (BEC) classification. It delineates, at a fairly disaggregate level (i.e. up to 
6-digits), products according to supposed end-use from which it is possible to 
identify intermediate goods. However the identification of intermediate goods is not 
always straightforward and hence such classifications may be arbitrary (Hummels et 
al., 200140). Products can often act as both intermediates and final goods implying 
that they may not be exclusive to one particular end-use. For example, milk can serve 
both as a final product, or alternatively as an intermediate input into the production 
of dairy produce such as yogurts. Similarly a tyre can be a final good in some uses, 
such as a replacement tyre, or an intermediate when it is used as an input into the 
production of a car. Hence classifications that list intermediate products, such as the 
BEC nomenclature, could be inaccurate in capturing the true extent of vertical 
specialisation since they do not differentiate across final use. 
 
Valuation issues may also arise from the way that national trade statistics are 
computed. Traditionally these track the entire value of a product, and not the value 
added, at each border crossing. This implies that, in a world where fragmentation is 
rife and value added is being carried out in many different locations, ‘double 
counting’ of a good’s value is likely to occur (see Johnson and Noguera, 2011). A 
simple example illustrates this. Consider a final product that is sequentially produced 
in the US and Mexico. The sequence of production is one where the US exports an 
intermediate good that then undergoes a series of transformations in Mexico and is 
then re-imported for final consumption41.The value of the intermediate good 
originating in the US is of $2 and the value added in Mexico is of $1. The total value 
of net trade between the US and Mexico should then be $1 (the value added 
performed by Mexico on the intermediate product that the US exported to Mexico). 
However, trade statistics will inflate the actual value of trade by capturing the $2 
value of exit of the product from the US to Mexico and then the re-import of the 
product at $3 dollars (The US’ intermediate product, $2, plus Mexico’s value added 
                                                 
40 “Data on intermediate goods trade could be examined, but this would require relying on rather 
arbitrary classifications of goods into intermediate and final” (Hummels et al., 2001:p76). 
41 This type of production sequence is representative of maquiladora trade. 
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of $1). The gross value of trade between these two countries, as captured by the trade 
statistics, is then $5. 
  
This valuation problem has recently received growing attention, most notably at the 
WTO by Pascal Lamy (2010) who is now pushing for a change in the way national 
trade statistics are computed towards a ‘value added’ method42. However the direct 
implications of undertaking empirical analysis on the basis of gross instead of net 
flows, as has been the tradition, is uncertain. To a large extent, gross trade flows can 
be deceptive in the attribution of comparative advantages as suggested in Koopman 
and Wei (2012). A country may be seen as having a comparative advantage in high 
tech products when in fact its advantage is only in the final assembly stage of this 
product43. Moreover, gross trade valuations will distort actual bilateral trade deficits 
as shown in Johnson and Noguera (2011). But the implications of using one type 
rather than another in empirical economic models, such as the gravity model, are still 
not well understood44. 
 
Trade-based measures of fragmentation may also be problematic since they do not 
allow one to differentiate across the use that is given to intermediate products. This 
may be towards the production of final goods for the domestic market or for further 
processing in another country. This latter form of production may be more 
representative of value chain activity and firms engaged in such modes of production 
may be ‘different’ to those engaged in supplying the domestic market as Bas and 
Strauss-Kahn (2011) highlight45. Trade based measures of VS cannot be used to 
differentiate across the use given to intermediates because trade classifications do not 
provide information on inter and intra industry linkages within countries. However, 
indicators based on I-O tables do capture such linkages and hence may provide more 
accurate measures of value chain activity. They may also bypass identification issues 
and offer a benchmark against which to compare the precision of these trade based 
measures. 
                                                 
42 See Daudin et al (2008) and Johnson and Noguera (2011). 
43 Think of iPads being produced in China when the hi tech comparative advantage is held in the US 
44 Some insights into the implications of using these types of flows in an econometric specification 
can be found in Appendix A2.1. 
45 This literature argues that firms that are engaged in export markets tend to be more productive than 
those that are engaged in selling to the domestic market. 
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1.4.2. INPUT OUTPUT BASED MEASURES 
 
Input-Output (IO) based measures of vertical specialisation have gained prominence. 
Hummels et al. (2001) propose a Vertical Specialisation Indicator (VSI) which 
captures the share of foreign value added embodied in exports. The VSI is identified 
when a country imports products which it then uses in some productive process to 
export. Because this indicator does not include imported intermediates used in the 
production of output destined for home consumption it is an indicator of 
international interconnectedness via production chains. It captures the backward 
linkage of a country with respect to the world through the use of inter and intra 
industry production connections which should make it a more precise measure of 
value chain activity. 
 
However this precision comes at the expense of breadth of coverage. The calculation 
of the indicator hinges on the availability of input-output tables which tend to be 
obtainable only for a selection of more developed countries. Moreover, these 
generally have a limited temporal coverage and the relatively low level of 
disaggregation can hide important sub-sector specific linkages. Nevertheless, its 
ability to capture the interplay between foreign and domestic value added make it an 
invaluable tool in analysing the surge in vertically specialised trade46.  However the 
VSI, as it stands, is unable to differentiate across the origin and destination of trade 
flows and hence it does not lend itself to the analysis of the spread of vertical 
specialisation across preferential partners. 
 
The recent papers of Daudin et al. (2008); Koopman et al. (2011); and Johnson and 
Noguera (2011) provide important advances in disentangling the location of value 
added. Using I-O tables merged with trade data the latter attempt to capture the value 
added content of gross exports (the VAX ratio). This measure represents the inverse 
of the VSI (the import content of exports) since it focuses on the domestic rather than 
the foreign value added component of exports. It also goes one step further by taking 
into consideration the domestic content of re-imports. Its calculation hinges on a 
proportionality assumption through which the use of imported intermediates across 
                                                 
46 In the discussion of Table 1.1 we argue how grasping the spread of vertical specialisation may hinge 
on tracking the location of value added. 
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domestic and foreign sources is distributed. This assumption sees domestic and 
imported inputs as being used in fixed proportions across all origins. If country A 
requires 0.5 units of inputs to produce one unit of output, then it will source inputs in 
this proportion from any origin, whether domestic or imported. The proportionality 
assumption is also extended to the destination of output where technologies used to 
produce domestic and foreign output (exports) are also assumed to be the same 
(although Koopman et al., 2008 relax this assumption). 
 
This set of assumptions is common in the IO literature (see Johnson and Noguera, 
2011 for a wider discussion), they result in a strong shortcoming that arises from the 
use of IO tables for the calculation of such measures. This is that the indicators are 
computed rather than observed measures. Although the implications of relying on 
these assumptions are hard to pinpoint, as they will depend on how different the 
actual use of intermediates is across origins, these measures provide a strong asset in 
tracking the spread of production. 
1.4.3. COMPARING INPUT-OUTPUT AND TRADE DATA 
Capturing the extent and spread of vertical specialisation is challenging because, as 
anticipated, products can often act as both final and intermediate goods hence it is 
instructive to look at what we learn from using different methods to identify the 
extent of intermediate goods trade. One tends to assume that the rise in vertically 
specialised trade should lead to a rising share of intermediate imports over total 
imports47. However, looking at the evolution of world trade, in Figure 1.2, shows 
little change in the underlying trends48. This contrasts with the perceived notion that 
the last decades have witnessed a rise in vertical specialisation and may suggest that 
the BEC nomenclature is an imperfect identifier of this phenomenon. Alternatively it 
may imply that tracking intermediate goods trade is not an appropriate metric for 
capturing international production49. 
                                                 
47 see Feenstra (1998) and Yeats (2001). 
48 Similar results are found in Hummels et al. (2001), OECD (2010) and Chen et al. (2005). 
49 There are important price effects taking place. Prices have fallen substantially for intermediate 
goods in the last decades. This is an important issue and comes as a corollary to our hypothesis. The 
allocative effect of VS would suggest that intermediates will be produced where they become 
cheapest, hence there will be a generalised reduction in their price. This is not captured in the figure as 
we are dealing with nominal trade flows. If the price of intermediates has fallen faster than the price of 
final goods, we will not capture much change in intermediate trade patterns even if the volume of 
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Figure 1.2: Evolution of world imports by use 
 
Source: Author’s calculations, WITS- COMTRADE 
 
In an effort to elucidate two separate but related issues; firstly the (true) extent of 
vertical specialisation and secondly to see how well the BEC nomenclature is able to 
identify vertical specialisation, it is possible to look at I-O tables and draw 
preliminary observations on the levels and evolution of intermediate goods trade. 
Comparing the evolution of the IO identified intermediates to those identified using 
the BEC nomenclature should provide some insights into how well this classification 
captures international fragmentation.  
 
The OECD STAN database provides sectorally harmonised I-O tables for 42 
countries. These are divided into domestic intermediates and imported intermediates 
at three points in time (circa 1995, 2000 and 2005)50. In order to draw preliminary 
observations on the spread and evolution of imported intermediates an aggregate 
OECDX table is created by summing up all individual IO tables51. This allows one to 
bypass trade classifications and identify the value of world intermediate goods trade 
                                                                                                                                          
these has increased. Irrespective of these price changes, the figure suggests that using trade data alone 
to track the process of vertical specialisation may be misleading.  
50 The time delimitation of the tables is not as clear cut as presented given that some countries report 
slightly different years or do not report in a given year. For these countries, we assume that the values 
reported are similar to those reported in earlier years where there might be a one-two year gap.  
51 The tables are in national currency and at producer prices, hence these are transformed into Dollars 
using exchange rates extracted from the Penn World Tables. The countries in the sample account for 
over 80% of World trade in 2008.  The 42 countries are 1) OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 2) +12: Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, China, Estonia, India, Indonesia, Israel, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Taiwan, South 
Africa.  
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by the ‘actual’ use of these in the economy rather than by ‘suggested’ end use as in 
the BEC classification. Panel (A) of Table 1.1 shows the evolution of imported 
intermediates for this OECDX aggregate during the three periods above delimited. It 
also shows the evolution of the use of domestic intermediates; total output; 
domestically consumed output; total exports and domestic value added. The final two 
panels (B and C) serve the purpose of comparing the identification of non-service 
sector intermediate goods across the I-O data (B) against those identified through the 
BEC nomenclature (C)52. This will give insights into how well the BEC 
nomenclature performs at this task. 
 
The input-output data reveal that, for the OECDX aggregate, the share of 
intermediate imports to total exports has been increasing over time; however, the 
share of intermediate imports to total imports has witnessed a slight decrease53. In 
parallel, the share of intermediate imports in total or domestic output remains low. It 
has nevertheless witnessed increases which seem to be driven by the faster rise in 
imports than in output. The marked increase in the share of imported intermediates to 
domestic intermediates may be indicative of a source switching trend which is 
corroborated by the increase in imported intermediates as a share of domestic value 
added (which has increased by 24% in ten years). These trends lend themselves to 
the idea that vertical specialisation is not necessarily an additive process equating to 
increases in intermediate goods trade, but rather one where domestic value added is 
being substituted by foreign value added (corroborated by the decline in domestic 
value added over total output). This observation is not without consequence. Firstly it 
may be evidence of true gains from trade, where production is following comparative 
advantages and the world economy is becoming more efficient in allocation. 
Secondly, and following from the first point, this may be presenting developing 
countries with new opportunities to engage in value chain activity; and thirdly it may 
also mean that distributional concerns in the developed world may not  be 
unfounded. 
 
                                                 
52 For the same OECDX aggregate. 
53 Recall that this table is an OECD aggregate and hence does not represent a closed system where 
imports equal exports. 
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Turning to the trade figures, identified through the BEC nomenclature in the final 
panel of Table 1.1, a similar pattern emerges. The share of imported intermediates 
over total imports is declining. It also seems that the evolution of intermediate 
imports, as identified using the BEC nomenclature (C), follows a similar path to that 
found using the I-O data (B). Whilst it seems that the BEC nomenclature understates 
the ‘true’ value of intermediate imports, it appears to do so equally for the value of 
total imports, hence the share of intermediate imports to total imports are comparable 
across the two identification methods. This in turn could suggest that the BEC 
nomenclature may not be a bad identifier of intermediate goods trade54.  
 
Table 1.1: Evolution of Intermediate Imports  
    1995 2000 2005 Change 
I-
O
 T
a
b
le
s 
(A
) 
 
Intermediate Imports 3428615 3689957 5916942 72.60% 
Total Imports 5382318 5999260 9404367 74.70% 
Domestic Intermediates 21770966 22900801 31787329 46.00% 
Total Output 52610565 54516731 75799556 44.10% 
Total Exports 5394328 5859587 9140678 69.40% 
Domestic Value Added 27050084 27133761 37404913 38.30% 
Int Imps/Tot Exps 0.636 0.63 0.647 1.80% 
Int Imps/ Tot Imps 0.637 0.615 0.629 -1.20% 
Int Imps/ Tot Output 0.065 0.068 0.078 19.80% 
Int Imps/ Dom Output 0.073 0.076 0.089 22.20% 
Int Imps/ Dom Ints 0.157 0.161 0.186 18.20% 
Int Imps/ Dom VA 0.127 0.136 0.158 24.80% 
Dom VA/ Tot Output 0.514 0.498 0.493 -4.00% 
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ss
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) 
 (
B
) 
Intermediate Imports 2883820 3162342 5022251 74.15% 
Total Imports 4759419 5282321 9191093 93.11% 
Total Exports 4243046 4500627 6889849 62.38% 
Int Imps/ Tot Imps 0.605919 0.598665 0.546426 -9.82% 
Int Imps/ Tot Exps 0.679658 0.702645 0.728935 7.25% 
            
 C
o
m
tr
a
d
e 
(C
) 
Intermediate Imports 2413416 3223762 4873073 101.90% 
Total Imports 3889375 5227267 8423249 116.60% 
Total Exports 3855838 4916457 7921085 105.40% 
Int Imps/ Tot Imps 0.621 0.617 0.579 -6.80% 
Int Imps/ Tot Exps 0.626 0.656 0.615 3.90% 
Source: Own calculations from OECD I-O STAN database and Comtrade. Values are in million $ 
 
Whilst it is important to note that the above analysis hides country and sector specific 
effects in its aggregate representation, it nonetheless poses an important question on 
the possible erroneous perception of vertical specialisation. It underlines the 
importance of carefully defining the phenomenon before proceeding with a more 
detailed analysis of its role amongst preferential partners. As a starting point, the 
                                                 
54 This statement has to be read with caution as the underlying trade and output data come from 
different sources and are subject to different collection techniques and/or estimations. 
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above table shows that foreign value added has outgrown domestic value added by a 
factor of 2. This can be seen by comparing the change in domestic value added to 
that of intermediate imports (panel A) and also by the rise in the share of 
intermediate imports to domestic VA which, even if averaging 16% in 2005, has 
grown by 25% in a decade. This implies that, in looking at the spread of production, 
a greater focus should be placed on the location of value added rather than on the 
movement of intermediate goods across borders. This may be accomplished by 
looking at an indicator of vertical specialisation. 
1.4.4. THE VERTICAL SPECIALISATION INDICATOR 
The vertical specialisation indicator, as defined in Hummels et al. (2001), captures a 
sequence of production that sees a good being produced in at least two stages 
involving at least two countries where value is added to imported intermediates and 
the resulting output is exported. The value of the direct import content of exports for 
country i in sector k is defined by Hummels et al. (2001) as: 
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(1.1) 
The sum of these sectoral values gives the aggregate measure of the value of 
imported intermediates used to produce exports which can be calculated using input-
output tables as follows: 
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		


			  . 	


= 	 
(1.2) 
Where µ is a 1 x s summation vector of 1’s, AM is an s x s technical coefficient 
matrix with elements an,m (n=m) capturing the share of imported intermediates from 
sector n used by sector m needed to produce one unit of output and X is an s x 1 
vector of exports. Hummels et al. (2001) presents these values as a share of total 
exports so that: 
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(1.3) 
Here Xi is a scalar representing the sum of country i exports. This expression 
captures the direct import content of exports (expressed as the share of intermediate 
imports over total exports) but it does not reflect how imported intermediates are 
used indirectly throughout the economy. To capture the indirect use of imported 
intermediates at different stages of domestic production, before these are embodied 
in an export flow, Hummels et al. (2001) introduce the Leontief inverse matrix ([I-
AD]-1 to the above expression. Here AD is an s x s domestic technical coefficient 
matrix which reflects the value of domestic intermediates over total output (rather 
than imported intermediates as was the case in the AM matrix). The Leontief inverse 
captures the use of imported intermediates across each stage of domestic 
production55. Hummels et al.’s (2001) vertical specialisation indicator is then: 
  = 		 	 − 
 ⁄  
 (1.4) 
As the vertical specialisation indicator captures the content of intermediate imports 
embodied in exports and not in final output, it is a measure of interconnectedness 
with respect to the world. It is effectively the amount of imported intermediates 
needed to satisfy a given export demand vector at current technologies. Hummels et 
al. (2001) underline the importance, in recent decades, of this type of trade. They 
show that, for the period 1970 to 1990, 30% of the growth of 10 OECD countries’ 
exports is explained by this type of trade. Yi (2003) then suggests that vertical 
specialisation accounts for 50% of growth of OECD exports. However this measure 
is not bilateral, and hence, in its current form, it is unable to capture the possible 
links between vertical specialisation and preferential trade56. 
                                                 
55 Equation (1.4) gives the sum of all VS indices by I-O sector. To get the sectoral VS one can remove 
the vector of 1’s represented by µ and diagonalise the export vector.  
56 Recently, measures of bilateral value-added trade (Daudin et al., 2008; Koopman et al., 2010; and 
Johnson and Noguera, 2011) have emerged. These rely on a similar technique to that proposed in the 
following section and can also be used to track production sharing. These measures were developed as 
this essay was being finalised, they are used to look at trade imbalances across countries and in 
particular to highlight differences between gross and net trade flows in a world with increased 
fragmentation of production. They identify the domestic value-added content of exports which is the 
inverse of the foreign value added of exports that is identified in the measures proposed by Hummels 
et al. (2001). Nevertheless there is still plenty that can be learned from the construction of a bilateral 
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1.5. AUGMENTING THE VERTICAL SPECIALISATION INDICATOR  
 
Adding a bilateral dimension to the VSI is problematic in terms of data requirements 
but not in terms of method. It can be done by following Hummels et al.’s (2001) 
original equation (1.4) and changing the export vector and the imported technical 
coefficient matrix so that these reflect bilateral rather than aggregate flows. The 
problem is that the bilateral element of the Am matrix is not observed and has to be 
constructed. This can be done by combining readily available trade data with the 
technical coefficients of the aggregate import matrix using a proportionality 
assumption to create an intermediate technical coefficient matrix by origin country57. 
1.5.1. THE INTERMEDIATE TECHNICAL COEFFICIENT MATRIX BY ORIGIN 
COUNTRY 
 
To identify imported intermediate inputs by origin one can exploit the information 
contained in I-O tables that describe the linear interlinkages between sectors within 
an economy58. Consider the reduced I-O imported intermediate square matrix M that 
is presented below: 
 
  Agriculture Industry Services 
total 
imports 
Agriculture IM11  IM 12 IM 13 TM1 
Industry IM 21 IM 22 IM 23 TM2 
Services IM 31 IM 32 IM 33 TM3 
Total 
Output Z1 Z2 Z3  
 
 
Here IM11, represents the value of imported intermediates used by the domestic 
agricultural sector from the foreign agricultural sector in the production of output. 
                                                                                                                                          
measure of vertical specialisation. In particular from the decomposition of this measure into backward 
and forward linkages. 
57 Different identification strategies are used in the literature. Johnson and Noguera (2011) rely on the 
proportionality assumption and assume that imports are used in the same proportion as domestic 
inputs. They post multiply the IO matrices by imports to obtain a bilateral imported intermediate 
matrix. Koopman et al. (2010) use the BEC nomenclature. 
58 Different identification strategies to capture the amount of imported intermediates by origin country 
were attempted. One of these used BEC identified products matched to the I-O classification in a 
similar framework as Koopman et al. (2010). However the match between I-O identified global 
intermediate inputs and BEC identified inputs was relatively imperfect where great differences were 
the norm rather than the exception.  
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IM12 then shows the value of imported intermediate products from the foreign 
agricultural sector used by the domestic industrial sector to produce output and so 
forth. This matrix, M, represents the aggregate use of imported intermediates, by 
each sector from all j countries and is readily observed from I-O tables. It follows 
that this total import use matrix must be the sum of the individual imported 
intermediate matrices with each partner; imj, so that M=∑imj
59. In order to calculate 
the degree of bilateral vertical specialisation one has to construct these unobserved 
bilateral matrices. This can be done by assuming that countries use intermediate 
imports from each origin in the same proportion that they use total intermediate 
imports; or in other words that the technologies used to produce products are the 
same irrespective of the origin of intermediate products. This proportionality 
assumption is commonly used in the IO literature60. To implement it one can 
calculate a set of coefficients that capture the average use of total imports across each 
sector by dividing each IM entry in the M matrix by total imports (TM) to produce a 
P matrix (the reporter country i is omitted from this exposition for presentational 
purposes):  
 
P	= 	1,1 ⋯ 1,⋮ ⋱ ⋮
	,1
⋯ 
	,
 with elements i defined as:    
, = ,  
(1.5) 
This matrix shows how one unit of total imports from a given sector is used (on 
average) in production sequences across the different sectors within an economy. By 
multiplying the P matrix, element by element, by a vector of country specific total 
imports tmj (s x 1 vector from country j) one can construct the imj matrix: 
 
 = 	,, ⋯ ,,⋮ ⋱ ⋮
,
, ⋯ 
,
, 
(1.6) 
                                                 
59imj is an s x s matrix. Each element shows the value of imported intermediates from country j. 
60 In Daudin et al. (2009) it is noted that a similar technique is used in Campa and Goldberg (1997) 
and Feenstra and Hanson (1997). Johnson and Noguera (2011:p20) note that these “assumptions 
imply that all variation in total bilateral intermediate and final goods flows arises due to variation in 
the composition of imports across partners”. 
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This then enables the computation of an imported intermediate technical coefficient 
matrix by origin country, Amj, through the division of each element of the new imj 
matrix by the total output of each sector so that:  
 
 = 	 , ⋯ ,⋮ ⋱ ⋮
, ⋯ 
, where   
, =
,	,

 
(1.7) 
This matrix captures the amount of imported intermediates, from a given partner, that 
are needed to produce one unit of output. The elements of this matrix are the 
technical coefficients  which show the amount of imports from a given origin and 
sector (tmn,jin,m ) that are used in proportion to the output of that sector (Zn). In an I-O 
framework, these imported intermediates have to be combined with domestic 
intermediates and domestic value added in order to satisfy a given demand vector61.  
1.5.2. CALCULATING BILATERAL VERTICAL SPECIALISATION: THE BACKWARD 
LINKAGE 
 
The bilateral vertical specialisation indicator of country i with country j, VS_Bij, or 
the backward linkage, can be calculated by combining the bilateral imported 
intermediate technical coefficient matrix, Ami,j, and the domestic technical 
coefficients matrix ADi with a vector of exports,  Xi,j, through the following equation 
derived from an extension of Hummels et al. (2001): 
 
 _, = , 	 − 
, ,  
(1.8) 
The indicator captures the value of intermediate imports from country j used by 
country i to produce exports, it is the export weighted average of the sectoral degrees 
of vertical specialisation and ranges between zero and one. The s x 1 export vector 
Xi,j, and the Xi,j
TOT scalar which is the sum of this export vector, can reflect either 
                                                 
61 An issue might arise in the calculation of indicators of vertical specialisation, from the fact that the 
mj matrices are a fraction of the aggregate M matrix. If a country does not import, from a given 
partner, a particular product needed to produce output, then a shortfall in the provision of inputs may 
arise. It has to be compensated by either using more inputs from the domestic economy or 
alternatively by increasing the domestic value added. This issue is discussed at greater lengths in the 
Appendix A1.2.  
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exports of country i to country j or alternatively exports to the world. The use of 
world exports will capture the contribution that country j makes, in terms of 
intermediate imports, to country i’s total exports whereas a bilateral export vector 
will measure the contribution of country j imports to country i’s exports to country j.   
The extension of this indicator enables tracking varying dimensions of vertical 
specialisation which contrast with the original Hummels et al. (2001) indicator which 
only traced the backward linkage of a country with respect to the world.  
 
It is important to highlight that this indicator is not a direct observation of actual 
vertical specialisation but rather a computed measure, or approximation, of the 
imported intermediate content of output that is needed to satisfy a demand vector. 
Because I-O tables allow one to capture the amount of domestic and imported 
intermediates that are required in the production of one unit of output, then it is 
possible to determine the value of imported intermediates that will be required to 
produce however many units of output are demanded by any partner country (an 
export vector). 
 
This bilateral extension is also open to tracking the forward linkages of a country 
with respect to the world. These capture how intermediate exports feed into the 
production processes of other countries. In addition it provides a way of calculating a 
fully bilateral indicator that identifies the amount of intermediate goods from a 
country that are used in servicing that same country’s demand for our exports (here 
the country of origin and destination of the import and export flow is the same). Such 
bilateral production methods are similar to the division of labour witnessed between 
the US and Mexico - i.e. maquiladora trade - where the US exports intermediate 
products to Mexico for assembly and then re-imports the assembled products. The 
extension made to this indicator also offers the possibility of capturing trilateral 
relationships between countries or how imports from one country are used to produce 
exports to a different country. Some of these combinations are summarised below. 
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  Exports 
   Partner World 
Im
p
o
r
ts
 Partner 
Partner intermediate imports used 
to service partner 
(e.g. maquiladoras trade) 
partner intermediate imports used 
to produce total exports  
World 
total intermediate imports 
embodied in exports to a given 
partner 
Total intermediate imports used to 
produce total exports (Hummels et 
al 2001) 
 
The calculation of this type of indicator hinges on being able to connect trade data by 
origin/destination to production data which can be easily done for merchandise trade. 
However complications arise from the absence of comprehensive trade data on 
services. Non merchandise inputs from the service sector feature heavily in I-O 
tables. However bilateral trade statistics for these sectors are not readily available 
which creates an additional hurdle in the calculation of the bilateral VS indicator. 
This requires making further assumptions about the remaining non-merchandise 
sectors in the economy. This is because the calculation of the indicator requires that 
the matrices be invertible (and hence square). To surmount this issue the entries of 
the bilateral imported intermediate technical coefficient matrix for non-merchandise 
sectors are assumed to be zero. This implies that the import vector used to derive the 
Amj matrix is reduced to merchandise sectors only
62. Analogously, the export vector 
(Xij) will also have the same format with values reported for merchandise trade but 
zero values for non-merchandise trade. This implies that there is no ‘external’ service 
activity, i.e. no imports or exports, but that internally intermediate imports are still 
used to produce domestic service output63. 
 
Whilst it is somewhat problematic to only be able to capture vertical specialisation in 
merchandise trade, some initial investigations into the nature of vertical 
specialisation by sector suggests that this phenomenon is more prevalent in sectors 
                                                 
62This means that the imported technical coefficient matrix continues to be square, but has zero values 
for sectors in non-merchandise trade (The import vector used to devise the imported intermediate 
technical coefficient by origin matrix will have positive values for merchandise trade only).  
63 A second method of approaching this restriction is that of subsuming all non-merchandise sectors 
into an aggregate sector. This means that we reduce the size of the I-O matrices (both imported (AM) 
and domestic (AD)) to a matrix where the last row/column represents the simple sum of the missing 
sectors. We then conjecture about these sectors using varying hypotheses. i.e. we can proxy for trade 
in these sectors by assuming that it follows a similar distribution to merchandise trade. So if the USA 
imports an average of 30% of its intermediate merchandise goods from NAFTA, it will import 
roughly the same proportion of its non-merchandise intermediate goods from NAFTA. Alternatively, 
we can try to proxy for bilateral service trade flows by use of aggregate service trade data. 
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that are engaged in manufacturing trade64. Furthermore, because most agreements 
involve merchandise trade liberalisation rather than comprehensive agreements on 
services it is hoped that this shortcoming will not be too problematic. 
  
In order to ‘test’ how well this method captures the degree of vertical specialisation it 
is possible to compare how the computed VS figures vary against those of an 
indicator computed from an I-O table that details the origin and destination of trade. 
The Eurostat I-O tables decompose imports and exports into aggregate intra and 
extra EU destinations and hence provide a benchmark against which to ‘test’ the 
above developed method of capturing bilateral VS. The results from this robustness 
check are presented in the Appendix (A1.3) and show that whilst the values of the 
VS indicator vary somewhat across different methods, the proportions of intra and 
extra EU bilateral vertical specialisation remain close. The case of Denmark serves 
as an illustrative example. Here the total degree of VS calculated using the Eurostat 
tables alone is 0.277. The degree of VS calculated from the technical coefficients of 
this table merged with trade data, by the method above outlined, is 0.27165. 
 
This suggests that the above developed method of capturing bilateral vertical 
specialisation is in line with what one would obtain from bilateralised IO tables. The 
data also reveals that intra EU vertical specialisation is higher than extra EU vertical 
specialisation. Although this  lends some supportive evidence to the idea that 
countries that are engaged in preferential agreements may exhibit a wider 
fragmentation of production structures than those that are not, EU countries also 
share other characteristics such as proximity or similarity in income which may also 
be driving these results66. 
 
                                                 
64 See Appendix A1.6. And also Johnson and Noguera (2011) who suggest that manufactures have 
lower domestic value added than service activities as is suggested in the results of this essay. 
65 Decomposing this degree of vertical specialisation with respect of EU15 countries reveals that 
Denmark sources 71% of its intermediate imports from these preferential partners in a measure 
calculated solely with the Eurostat IO tables. The computed measure that uses the method developed 
here suggests that 71.9% of imported intermediates used in the production of exports are sourced from 
other EU15 countries. These shares represent the degree of bilateral vertical specialisation over total 
vertical specialisation hence these numbers do not imply that Denmark’s degree of vertical 
specialisation with the EU is 0.7 but rather that 70% of the 0.27 VS is from the EU i.e. Denmark’s 
degree of BVS with the EU is 0.196. 
66 Disentangling the FTA effect from other common factors between FTA partners is the subject of the 
second essay of this thesis. 
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1.5.3. THE FORWARD LINKAGE AND TOTAL VERTICAL SPECIALISATION 
 
Grasping the full extent of vertical specialisation also requires quantifying the 
forward linkages that arise between countries. This linkage captures the supply of 
intermediate inputs that another country uses to produce exports as a proportion of 
originating country exports. Since the US’ forward linkage with China, in value 
terms, is effectively the value of intermediate imports that China buys from the US to 
produce exports (the backward linkage), the forward linkage is  the mirror of the 
bilateral backward linkage ( also known as the VS1 in Hummels et al., 2001): 
 
, = 	 , = , − −1, 
(1.9) 
Where VSFi,j (VSBj,i) is an s x 1 vector of country j’s use of country i’s intermediates 
in the production of exports. Rather than expressing this value as a share of 
destination country exports, it is computed as a share of origin country exports. The 
value of imported inputs used by China from the US divided by total US exports 
yields the forward linkage of the US with respect to China: 
 
_, = , ,⁄ = ,  − , ,  
 (1.10) 
The combination of the forward and backward linkages gives a metric of the total 
degree of bilateral vertical specialisation (VS_T). This is the sum of the backward 
and forward linkages net of the backward and forward linkages so that country i’s 
total vertical specialisation with respect to country j is:  
 _!, = _,"1 − _,#+ _,"1 − _,# 
 (1.11) 
The linkages are netted to avoid a double counting of inputs that arises from the 
presence of domestic and foreign intermediates in import and export flows. The 
intuition behind this calculation is that the backward linkage of the US with respect 
to China may already contain some American inputs that can be identified through 
the forward linkage (and vice versa for the forward linkage). Hence equation (1.11) 
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nets out the domestic input content of the backward linkage and the foreign input 
content of the forward linkage67. 
 
1.6. AGGREGATE VERTICAL SPECIALISATION 
 
The Input-Output database of the OECD is used to compute the different measures of 
vertical specialisation. It contains information on the use of domestic and imported 
intermediate for 42 countries at various intervals in time (see Appendix A1.2). In an 
effort to create comparable indicators of vertical specialisation spanning a longer 
period of time several transformations are applied to the database tables. First, the 
tables, which are available in domestic currency, are transformed into dollars using 
exchange rates from the OECD database. These are then extended (or extrapolated) 
under the assumption that variance in technology is small in years close to the base 
tables. Hence IO tables circa 1995 are extended till 1997. The 2000 tables are 
extended from 1998 to 2002 and the 2005 tables from 2003 to 2007. All values are 
then deflated to a base price in the year 2000 (using OECD aggregate producer price 
deflators for each country)68. The information from these tables is then concorded 
with trade data through the ISIC rev3 nomenclature which is extracted from the UN’s 
Comtrade database. The indicators of vertical specialisation are then calculated 
following the above developed method. 
 
The use of IO tables for the calculation of indicators of VS requires some cautionary 
words. Firstly, given that the OECD tables are based on countries’ voluntary 
submissions, the harmonisation of these requires applying various transformations 
which may reduce their individual precision for the benefit of collective 
harmonisation. For example, countries use different collection methods and sectoral 
classifications hence harmonisation is sometimes difficult69. Some report Supply-Use 
tables at purchasing prices rather than basic prices and transformations need to be 
implemented to remove VAT and any subsidies. Secondly, the compilation of I-O 
tables is costly and is thus carried out across large time intervals. They provide a 
                                                 
67 The Appendix A1.6 details how one can go about calculating bilateral sectoral vertical 
specialisation. 
68 Sector and country specific deflators would have been preferable but were not readily available. 
69 Adding to this, sometimes there are holes in the I-O tables which are filled using different 
estimation techniques. This means that for some sectors values are estimated rather than recorded. 
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‘snapshot’ of economic activity in a given year making the extension of these, to 
obtain a panel, highly reliant on restrictive assumptions.  
 
Extrapolating I-O tables can be done through a ‘double deflation’ methodology or 
alternatively by assuming that technical and interdependence coefficients vary little 
over time. For the purpose of this analysis the latter technique is chosen. According 
to UN (1999), variation in technological coefficients can arise; from changes in 
technology; changes in relative prices; and from imperfect data. The first is 
impossible to control for because the only information at our disposal is based on the 
technology present in the base year of the I-O table. The second can be dealt with by 
using deflators to produce tables in constant price values given a base year whilst the 
third is also beyond our control. Following a method that extends technology 
coefficients across time is not without implications. First, it constrains technological 
changes in the sample to three base years implying that variations in the captured 
linkage indicators only occur via changes in export and import values near the base 
year. Whilst this is a limiting factor, annual variation in technologies may be small. 
Vaccara (1986) suggests that technical coefficients vary annually in the region of 2% 
and UN (1999) also suggest that changes are fairly gradual70. Second, and a more 
general limiting factor of I-O analysis, is that technology is assumed to be linear 
(Leontief). This implies that intermediate imports are required in fixed proportions to 
output or alternatively that there is no substitution between the inputs used to 
produce output. 
 
Nevertheless, the advantages of using the OECD IO tables are twofold. First, they 
provide an attractive temporal coverage and sectoral harmonisation; and second, they 
delimit the use of inputs according to origin; whether domestic or international (i.e. 
imported). This feature is exploited to identify the origin of inputs which is distinct 
from the methods used in Koopman et al. (2011) and Johnson and Noguera (2011). 
These rely on the GTAP database which does not always differentiate between 
foreign and domestic sources of inputs71. The use of the OECD database affords a 
                                                 
70 However, the variations in Vaccara (1986) are calculated during the 50’s and 60’s. There is reason 
to believe that the 90’s saw much higher variation through the introduction of new information 
technology (IT) such as the internet. 
71 A look at the difference between domestic and international use of inputs through the OECD tables 
reveals marked differences and suggests that such distinction may be important. 
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less restrictive proportionality assumption where the use of inputs is allowed to differ 
across domestic and external sources but remains constant within the foreign sources. 
Koopman et al. (2011) use the BEC nomenclature for their identification strategy but 
as already anticipated this may be problematic due to the arbitrary nature of this 
classification. Another advantage of using the OECD database is that the temporal 
variance of the OECD tables is larger which implies that changes in the indicator of 
vertical specialisation are driven by both changes in technology and also changes in 
the shares of exports and imports. The GTAP database produces single IO tables that 
are, at times, quite outdated and hence indicators calculated using this database only 
vary in time according to changes in trade shares (although the GTAP database does 
afford a larger sample of countries). 
1.6.1. SPECIALISATION PATTERNS 
Country A’s backward link to the world is defined here as the amount of 
intermediate imports that it uses from all partners to service the demand for its 
exports. Its forward linkage is then defined as the amount of intermediates it exports 
which are subsequently used by other countries to service world export demand. The 
indicators of these linkages present these figures as a share of country A’s total 
exports.  
Figure 1.3: Backward and Forward linkages 
 
Distinguishing across types of linkages may be important. These may identify 
different types of specialisation and thus where a country locates within a value chain 
(i.e. as an assembler or as a supplier of intermediate products). Countries that engage 
in assembly activities should increasingly import intermediate products as they 
specialise in such activities and hence should witness a rising backward linkage with 
respect to the world. However, as specialisation unfolds and learning by doing takes 
place, assemblers may ‘shift up the value added ladder’ and internalise the 
production of some intermediate products. This implies that they will reach a point 
where domestic value added begins to increase and hence the intermediate import 
content of export may begin to fall. Such specialisation patterns suggest that an 
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inverted U relationship, between the backward linkage and the position of a country 
in a value chain, may arise. As domestic value added increases, so too should the 
measure of the forward linkages as countries begin to shift towards higher value 
adding activities. This then suggests that a U shaped relationship would emerge 
between the forward linkages with respect to the world and the position of a country 
in a value chain. 
 
These specialisation patterns may help explain the evolution of Mexican maquiladora 
trade. Originally, in the 1960’s, maquiladoras were set up as giant assembly lines for 
US intermediate products. As Mexico specialised in assembling components into 
final goods for the US market one would expect that the foreign value added of 
exports would increase (i.e. a rising backward linkage indicator). However, as further 
specialisation takes place, new generation maquiladoras evolved into higher value 
adding activities - Bergin et al., 2008 suggest that maquiladora value added has 
tripled from since the early 90’s. Hence the foreign value added content of exports 
should diminish in favour of greater domestic value added as Mexico shifts away 
from being a mere assembler. This would be in line with a falling backward linkage 
indicator and a rising forward linkage as is suggested above. Testing whether there is 
any evidence of such dynamic specialisation requires separating backward and 
forward linkages which can be achieved using the method developed in this essay.  
1.6.2. THE BACKWARD LINKAGE (VS_B) 
This section discusses how backward linkages (VS_B) have evolved in time72. 
Figure 1.4 maps the evolution of the backward linkages for selected countries with 
respect to the world across regional clusters for the years 1995 and 200573. The 
graphical representation facilitates looking at both the level and evolution of this 
measure across countries. Points lying above the 45 degree line represent countries 
which have witnessed an increase in the level of VS_B in time (and vice versa for 
points below this line). The results show an increasing trend in VS_B in time for all 
countries except Brazil, Indonesia, Norway, New Zealand and Romania. EU-15 
countries exhibit strong backward linkages with respect to the world where in 2005 
one fourth to one third of export value added in these countries was foreign. In 
                                                 
72 This measure is the VSI developed by Hummels et al (2001). 
73 In the appendix this figure is presented in tabular form in Table A1.4. 
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contrast, EU-NMS countries show even higher backward linkages. The foreign value 
added of exports of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia is 
close to the 50% mark. In the Asian cohort Japan and China more than double their 
backward linkages with respect to the world in a decade. On the other hand Indonesia 
exhibits a significant reduction in its backward linkages. Korea has the highest levels 
of VS_B in the region with Japan and India showing more modest values. The 
figures for China suggest that over a fourth of its exports are made using foreign 
sourced parts. In the North American region Canada and Mexico show high degrees 
of VS_B however these linkages have grown most for Mexico. 
 
Figure 1.4: Backward Linkages 1995 and 2005 
Source: Own calculations OECD I-O STAN database. For Table see Appendix Table A1.4 
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Certain preliminary observations on the nature of these linkages can already be 
made. In particular, and as anticipated by Nordas (2004), it seems that smaller 
countries show higher degrees of VS_B than larger ones74. The latter tend to have 
bigger domestic markets from which to draw intermediates from and appear to be 
less reliant on international backward linkages. Because the strength of the backward 
linkage (and also the forward linkage) is expected to vary according to the position 
of a country in an international value chain, a non-monotonic relationship is expected 
to emerge between income and backwards linkages.  
 
Entry into a value chain, for less developed countries, is likely to occur at the 
assembly level. This type of activity requires importing large amounts of 
intermediate goods and then shipping finished products. As countries begin to 
specialise in assembly, they also begin to import more and more intermediate goods 
and hence see a rising backward linkage (rising VS_B). This continues till they have 
developed enough supply capacity to move up the value chain and start producing 
their own intermediates. At this stage countries will start reducing their assembly 
activities and hence will reduce their backward linkages (falling VS_B). What will 
then arise is an inverted U relationship between position in a value chain and levels 
of backward linkages. Figure 1.5 provides evidence of this inverted U relationship. It 
plots the fitted values from a regression of the VS-B indicator against per capita GDP 
and the square of this term75. The patterns of specialisation that emerge are consistent 
with the story presented however they appear to diverge from the results obtained in 
the previous figure which saw that backward linkages were rising for most countries. 
One can reconcile these by thinking of the inverse U-shaped relationship as a long-
run pattern of specialisation which is composed of many short term rising levels of 
backward linkages. The figure allows one to track the evolution of linkages 
according to levels of development which cannot be observed with the time frame of 
the sample that is used. However this raises the issue of whether countries move 
                                                 
74 In the EU-15 panel the larger countries (Germany, UK, France, Italy and Spain) cluster closer to the 
origin. This is also true for the USA and Brazil in the Americas whereas the smaller Eastern European 
countries show very high levels of VS-B. 
75 The coefficients of this regression are reported in the appendix table A1.7. Both independent 
variables are highly significant. The sample size is of 39 countries for 12 years giving 468 
observations and an R-squared of 0.11. 
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through the curve or whether this curve is shifting upwards in time through 
technological advances76. 
 
Figure 1.5: Inverted U relationship between VS-B and GDP per Capita 
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Source: Own calculations based on OECD STAN and Penn World Tables77.  
 
The new theoretical approaches to vertical specialisation (cf Grossman and 
Hansberg, 2008; Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2010) suggest that the process of 
international fragmentation of production may be associated with productivity gains. 
One can then look at the correlation between these two processes to determine 
whether there is prima facie evidence of such a link78. Figure 1.6 maps the 
correlation between aggregate backward linkages by country in 2005 and changes in 
output per worker from 2000 to 2005 obtained from the OECD STAN database. It 
                                                 
76 Looking into this is beyond the scope of this essay but it provides an interesting exercise. Future 
work on this should exploit the OECD IO system to look at how technology drives changes in vertical 
specialisation. A preliminary idea on how to tackle this issue would be to calculate indicators of 
vertical specialisation using 1995 technologies only and then compare these to indicators of VS using 
2005 technologies. The difference between these would then reveal the degree to which technology 
has driven the process of vertical specialisation. 
77 The introduction of a cubic polynomial does not alter the shape of the curve. 
78 However, in light of the above results, it seems that looking at changes in backwards linkages and 
their correlation with changes in productivity might be misleading given that VS-B is non-monotonic. 
Hence we look at the correlation between our backward linkage indicator in the last available year and 
productivity growth. 
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shows a statistically significant and positive correlation suggesting that countries that 
are more vertically specialised seem to witness bigger positive changes in 
productivity growth79. 
 
The link between these processes may arise through two channels. Firstly, 
outsourcing uncompetitive segments of production can liberate resources into more 
productive sectors. This could increase overall productivity through a statistical 
effect where non-productive sectors exit the economy. Furthermore, a pro-
competitive effect may arise from the introduction of international competition in 
finer segments of production. In addition, and given complementarities in value 
chain activity, it is possible that increasing the efficiency of one segment of the value 
chain increases the productivity of the entire productive process. Secondly, a gain 
may emerge through the Smithian channel. The creation of tighter backward linkages 
may result in finer and more efficient specialisation, greater technology transfers and 
learning by doing effects. 
  
Figure 1.6: Productivity and Backward Linkages 
 
Source: Own calculations of VS. Labour productivity, output and employment from the OECD 
STAN indicators (labour productivity indexed to base year 2000) 
 
The correlation between the backward linkage indicator and changes in productivity 
should be interpreted with caution. Correlation does not imply causation. It may be 
the case that the most productive sectors of the economy operate in activities that are 
more easily offshoreable or indeed that productivity increases lead to a wider 
                                                 
79 The correlation coefficient between these measures is a statistically significant 0.54 with a t-stat of 
3.57. 
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participation in value chain activities. Additionally it may also be the case that these 
two processes are driven by a common ‘variable’ and hence not related. 
Nevertheless, much of the literature points towards the idea that these processes 
could be interrelated which has positive implications for the way we think about 
vertical specialisation and for assessing the welfare consequences of such modes of 
production. In particular, it provides a channel through which trade may lead to 
economic growth.  
1.6.3. THE FORWARD LINKAGE (VS-F) 
 
The forward linkage indicator (VS-F) captures the intermediate export content of a 
country’s exports and hence is, in some sense, the mirror flow of the backward 
linkage. It measures the use of a reporting country’s inputs in the production of 
exports by all other countries (as opposed to the use of foreign input in the 
production of foreign output). Its quantification requires tracking the bilateral 
component of vertically specialised trade so that the aggregate value of the forward 
linkage of a country is the sum of the backward linkages of all countries with respect 
to that same country (i.e. Mexico’s aggregate forward linkage is the sum of the use of 
its intermediates to produce exports by all other countries expressed as a proportion 
of Mexico’s total exports).  
 
Figure 1.7 summarises the evolution of forward linkages for the years 1995 to 2005 
using the same set-up that was used to present the backward linkages. The figure 
shows that these linkages are increasing in time, and quite considerably, for all 
countries. EU-15 individual country forward linkages grew by 30% whilst the EU-
NMS countries witnessed a more modest increase. In Asia; Indonesia and Korea 
appear to have doubled their forward linkages with respect to the world. China and 
Japan have also seen these linkages rise albeit at a slower pace. Russia stands out as 
the country with the largest forward linkage, but this may be driven by the increase 
in the price of petrol during the period under investigation. This explanation is also 
likely to apply to Norway’s inflated forward linkage. In the case of Chile the driving 
factor should be the hike in the price of copper which is one of Chile’s largest export 
products. Increases in commodity prices are also likely to be driving Australia’s 
important forward linkage growth. Apart from these outliers, a noticeable trend that 
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emerges is that higher income countries tend to exhibit larger positive changes in 
their forward linkages.  
 
Figure 1.7: Forward Linkages 1995 and 2005 
  
  
  
Source: Own calculations OECD I-O STAN database. For Table see Appendix Table A1.5 
 
Because the forward linkage may be seen to represent the counterpart of the 
backward linkage, one could expect that the nature of this linkage is inversely 
proportional to that found for the backward linkage. Hence as the foreign content of 
exports falls, the domestic content of exports could be seen to rise so that a non-
monotonic relationship between VS-F and GDP per capita also emerges. Building on 
the earlier example, if countries at lower positions in the value chain are increasing 
their use of intermediate imports and engaging in assembly, then they will be 
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exporting larger proportions of final goods over intermediates. This will result in an 
initially decreasing forward linkage. As a country moves up the value chain, it will 
leave assembly lines for the production of higher value adding intermediates and 
hence will see forward linkages increase accordingly. In the case of the forward 
linkages, the relationship between this linkage and per capita GDP is expected to be 
quasi U-shaped. Figure 1.8 confirms this hypothesis through a similar plot of the 
fitted values from the regression of the forward linkage indicator (VS-F) with respect 
to GDP per capita and its squared term80. Comparing this figure to that obtained for 
the backward linkages (Figure 1.5), shows how the indent in the U is less 
pronounced. What emerges is that countries that have higher GDP per capita do have 
much larger forward linkages than countries that show lower levels of development.   
 
Figure 1.8: U relationship between VS-F and GDP per Capita 
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Source: Own calculations OECD I-O STAN database81 
 
In addition, and bearing strong similarities with the backward linkage case, a positive 
and statistically significant correlation between these linkages and changes in 
                                                 
80 Here again our sample is of 38 countries for 12 years giving us 468 observations. The GDP per 
capita variables explain 10% of the variation in VS-F. The coefficients of the regression are reported 
in the appendix table A1.7. 
81 Fitting a third degree polynomial does not substantially alter the shape of the curve.  
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productivity is identified (as shown in Figure 1.9)82. This again lends further 
supportive evidence to the earlier posited hypothesis of a possible link between 
vertical specialisation and economic growth83. The mechanisms through which these 
processes interact are likely to be similar to those discussed in the previous section. 
  
Figure 1.9: Productivity and Forward Linkages 
 
Source: Own calculations of VS. Labour productivity, output and employment from the OECD 
STAN indicators (labour productivity indexed to base year 2000). (T-stat 3.12) 
 
1.6.4. TOTAL VERTICAL SPECIALISATION 
 
Putting the forward and backward linkages together requires adding these up and 
subtracting the forward linkage component of the backward linkage and the 
backward linkage component of the forward linkage following equation (1.6) (to 
avoid double counting inputs). One should however be cautious in interpreting this 
indicator. It captures both the foreign value of exports and the domestic value of 
intermediate exports and hence identifies the total amount of a country’s exports that 
are involved in value chain activity. Therefore, for the US, the total level of vertical 
specialisation with the world is the amount of intermediate inputs used from the 
world to service the world market, plus the amount of intermediate exports that the 
                                                 
82 The correlation coefficient between these measures is a statistically significant 0.52 with a t-stat of 
3.12. 
83 Russia, Norway and Chile are removed from the calculations due to their reliance on petroleum or 
commodity exports.  
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world uses from the US to produce exports net of domestic and partner inputs84. In 
the appendix a table mapping the evolution of total vertical specialisation from 1995 
to 2005 is presented (See Table A1.6). As expected, total vertical specialisation is 
rising in time. On average, 40% of EU-15 countries’ trade is vertically specialised in 
the year 2005, for the EU-NMS countries this average jumps to 50%. In Asia, Korea 
and Indonesia show the highest levels of vertical specialisation with over 50% of 
their exports being engaged in international value chains. China and India follow 
closely with a share of 40%85. In the Americas, Canada and Mexico exhibit the 
highest share of trade involved in value chain activity (around 50% of total exports). 
Argentina, Brazil and the US are closer to the 40% mark. 
 
Figure 1.10 plots the relationship between the total vertical specialisation indicator 
and GDP per capita. To accommodate for the different shapes that were captured 
when looking at the relationship between the backward and forward linkages with 
respect to development, a third degree polynomial function (i.e. a cubic function) is 
introduced to look at the nature of this linkage86. Total vertical specialisation exhibits 
a sideways S shaped curve composed of an initial inverted U form at lower levels of 
development, followed by a quasi U shaped curve at higher levels. This provides 
further supportive evidence to the story that sees countries specialising in different 
segments of production according to their position in the value chain. Interestingly, 
countries at higher levels of development (beyond a certain GDP per capita where 
the function is increasing) may be increasingly driving the process of fragmentation 
and selling their intermediates to countries in the bottom end of the GDP per capita 
spectrum. The rise in VS-T could be caused by the growing supply of intermediates 
towards countries located at the lower end of the spectrum. This could signify that 
the upward trend in total VS might be spurring a greater spread of value added across 
geographical locations. 
 
 
 
                                                 
84 The backward linkage is netted from domestic inputs whereas the forward linkage is netted from 
partner inputs as per equation 1.11. 
85 See Table A1.5 in the appendix.  One has to bear in mind that petrol exporters will tend to have 
higher forward linkages but also that petrol importers will have larger backward linkages. 
86 The estimation is carried out on 468 data points. The GDP per capita variables explain 15% of the 
variation in VS-T. The coefficients of the regression are reported in the appendix table A1.7. 
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Figure 1.10: VS-T and GDP per Capita 
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Source: Own calculations OECD I-O STAN database 
 
The above figure is an aggregate representation of the countries in the sample and 
may help capture the long-run path of specialisation of countries. Individual 
countries will cluster along different points in the GDP per capita spectrum and 
exhibit different short-run specialisation patterns. These are further investigated in 
Figure 1.11 which tracks the evolution of forward and backward linkages for a 
selection of 6 countries with different economic characteristics.  
 
The evolution of Chinese linkages with the world suggests that China is increasingly 
importing and exporting intermediates which would be in line with a position around 
the middle part of the value chain. As some sectors begin to climb the value chain 
others remain in assembly activities. However the data suggests that China is still a 
net importer of intermediates. At the high end of the per capita GDP spectrum, taking 
the example of the US and the UK, a different pattern of specialisation emerges. The 
more developed countries seem to have larger forward linkages than backward 
linkages and these also appear to move in a similar direction (i.e. they are both 
increasing). These countries seem to be net suppliers of intermediates but are also 
increasingly offshoring albeit at a slower pace. An interesting result is that of Japan 
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which initially saw stronger forward linkages which, in time, give way to higher 
backward linkages. A possible fitting story to this evolution is that Japan specialised 
in selling intermediate products to its East Asian partners which were then exported 
to western countries as finished products. As these East Asian countries begin to 
climb the value chain, Japan increases its backward linkages with these countries87. 
The Indonesian (IDN) case is an interesting one. Although the patterns of 
specialisation presented seem to indicate a possible move up the value added ladder 
(i.e. falling backward linkage and rising forward linkage), looking at Indonesia’s 
trading patterns reveals that this is not the case. The rise in intermediate exports is 
driven by exports of mineral products rather than by processed intermediates.  
 
Figure 1.11: Backwards and Forwards linkages for a selection of countries 
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Source: Own calculations OECD I-O STAN database 
 
Given the correlation found between the different linkages and changes in 
productivity, it comes as no surprise that a positive, and statistically significant, 
correlation also arises between total vertical specialisation and changes in 
productivity. The driving factors could again be a mix of allocative efficiency gains 
through increased exposure to international competition; economies of scale; niche 
                                                 
87 Another fitting story is that Japanese multinationals are locating in East Asian countries and hence 
no producing from Japan but rather from offshore locations. 
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specialisation; and technology transfers. In Figure 1.12, a graph mapping this 
correlation is presented providing continued support to the idea that vertical 
specialisation and productivity growth could be linked88. 
 
Figure 1.12: Productivity and Total Vertical Specialisation 
 
Source: Own calculations of VS. Labour productivity, output and employment from the OECD 
STAN indicators (labour productivity indexed to base year 2000) 
 
1.7. BILATERAL VERTICAL SPECIALISATION 
The technique for capturing vertical specialisation developed in this essay affords 
looking at how these linkages have evolved bilaterally. This means that it is possible 
to compare specialisation paths within and between regional blocks. This section 
provides a comparative static analysis of bilateral vertical specialisation across three 
broad regional areas; NAFTA, the EU and East Asia. It concludes with some 
observations about inter-regional vertical specialisation patterns. The indicator used 
for this analysis is one that measures the bilateral content of total exports rather than 
a fully bilateral measure89. This implies that the denominator of the calculation of the 
linkages is total exports rather than exports to a particular destination. This facilitates 
a cross-country comparative analysis. 
                                                 
88 The correlation coefficient between these measures is a statistically significant 0.57 with a t-stat of 
3.51. 
89 This indicator is used rather than a full bilateral measure because it allows one to decompose flows 
of intermediate goods along a common denominator and this facilitates the comparative analysis. 
Using a full bilateral measure would imply using different denominators and it would be hard to 
ascertain whether cross country differences would arise from changes in the numerator, i.e. the value 
of intermediate trade, or changes in the denominator (bilateral exports). 
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1.7.1. NORTH AMERICA 
 
NAFTA is a good and tractable example with which to begin. Figure 1.13 looks at 
US bilateral vertical specialisation with respect to its main preferential partners 
(Mexico and Canada) and other non-preferential partners (China, Germany, Japan, 
Korea and the UK)90. The vertically specialised linkages mapped in this figure 
capture the bilateral component of intermediates used to service world demand for 
exports. Hence, in Figure 1.13, the first graph shows the share of imported and 
exported intermediates to and from Canada as a proportion of US total exports to the 
world. What is particularly interesting in this figure is the evolution of the linkages 
between the US and its Northern American preferential partners. For Canada and 
Mexico the forward linkage is initially falling whilst the backward linkage is rising. 
This suggests that patterns of vertical specialisation across these preferential partners 
are changing. Whilst, a decade ago, the US was seen to export intermediates to these 
destinations, possibly for assembly, nowadays and increasingly, the patterns of 
specialisation are tending more and more towards the USA buying intermediates 
from these countries. This, again, may be evidence of a move up the value chain for 
these preferential partners.  
 
Also interesting is the rising dependence on Chinese intermediate imports in 
comparison to intermediate exports. It is often assumed that the US imports finished 
products from China and exports intermediates for assembly which makes these 
results appear counterintuitive. Two explanations may help explain these. First, the 
results may be driven by the rising share of Chinese imports in total US imports91. 
Second, US exports of intermediate products may reach China through different 
countries. Johnson and Noguera (2011) highlight that US imports from China contain 
significant US value added but that this value added comes indirectly from exports of 
intermediates to other East Asian countries. Linden et al. (2009) support these 
findings in their case study on the production process of the iPod where complex 
                                                 
90 Korea only became a preferential partner very recently and has been included in the example to see 
if we can already discern any increasing linkages before the agreement was put into force. 
91 The actual use of intermediate imports by origin country is not observed, and the indicators are 
computed measures which serve as proxies. They rely on a proportionality assumption and this means 
that the use of imported intermediates is proportional to aggregate bilateral trade (import) flows. 
Hence if these are rising rapidly, so too will the backward linkage indicator. 
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multi-country production networks are highlighted92. Figure 1.13 also shows that the 
linkages with respect to European economies remain small, whereas those with Japan 
and Korea have seen little movement in time.   
 
Figure 1.13: USA’s bilateral backwards and forward linkages 1995-2007 
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Source: Own calculations OECD I-O STAN database.  
bvs=VS-B and vs1=VS-F 
 
The case of Mexico is presented in Figure 1.14. Whilst it remains highly reliant on its 
backward linkages with the US, it is also increasingly developing forward linkages 
with the US. This might be evidence of a move up the value added chain as is also 
suggested in Bergin et al. (2008). The importance of the US in Mexico’s aggregate 
vertical specialisation is quite overwhelming with 25% of its total exports being 
produced with American value added in 2005. Similarly, over 20% of its exports are 
seen to be incorporated into production sequences in the US for further re-exports. 
However the story does not, a priori, appear to be a completely preferential one as 
Mexico is increasingly reliant on intermediate imports from China and Korea93. In 
particular, as the backward linkages with the US fall, those with China seem to be 
rising. One can then conjecture that there might be a substitution taking place where 
Mexico is increasingly importing Chinese intermediates and then exporting 
processed products to the US94. Mexico’s backward linkages with Canada are lower 
                                                 
92 Johnson and Noguera’s (2011) indicator nets out direct and indirect value added and hence might be 
better at capturing the real trade imbalances between countries. 
93 Koopman et al. (2011) show similar results and also highlight the growing importance of China and 
Korea as sources of intermediates. 
94 Bergin et al., 2008 also find some evidence of a growing dependence on Chinese and Korean trade. 
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than its forward linkages but the values are both low and stable in time suggesting 
that patterns of specialisation in the region are largely dominated by relations with 
the US.  
 
Figure 1.14: Mexico’s bilateral backwards and forward linkages 1995-2007 
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 Source: Own calculations OECD I-O STAN database 
bvs=VS-B and vs1=VS-F 
 
The Canadian example (Figure 1.15) also reveals the dominance of the US as a 
source and destination of intermediates. In 2005 around 22% of total Canadian 
export value added came from the US whilst 22% of total Canadian exports were 
being used by the US in export oriented production sequences. Here too bilateral 
vertical specialisation appears to be changing with a rise in forward linkages with 
respect to the US. Canada also seems to be more reliant on its backward link with 
Mexico than on its forward link although the share of trade that this occupies is 
relatively small. Canada’s bilateral vertical specialisation with respect to China is 
larger and increasing on the back of a rising backward linkage.  
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Figure 1.15: Canada’s bilateral backwards and forward linkages 1995-2007 
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Source: Own calculations OECD I-O STAN database 
bvs=VS-B and vs1=VS-F 
 
1.7.2. THE EU AND THE NEW MEMBER STATES 
Looking at the patterns of bilateral vertical specialisation in Europe is done through a 
more focused analysis of two countries in the region: Germany and Poland. Figure 
1.16 maps the evolution of German linkages with respect to a selection of countries. 
Germany appears to be a leading supplier of intermediate products to other EU-15 
partners. The main forward linkages are with Austria, France, Italy, Netherlands and 
Spain. There is also evidence of substantial growth in forward linkages with respect 
to Eastern European countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia. Nordas (2007) highlights that the German automotive sector has 
increasingly relied on these countries for assembly purposes and these reported 
trends may be capturing such value chain activity. Where backward linkages are 
concerned, there is an increasing reliance on China as a source of intermediate 
inputs. Equally, Russia appears as an important partner in this respect. However, the 
nature of the linkages with China and Russia are likely to differ. The former should 
be more engaged in supplying intermediate manufactured products whilst the latter is 
an important source of petroleum.  
 
There seems to be a strong preferential element in Germany’s patterns of vertical 
specialisation. But European partners are also geographically close and hence 
distance could be driving these linkages. Disentangling the drivers of these flows 
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may then require a more rigorous empirical analysis. However, a noteworthy 
observation is that the growing importance of Eastern European countries in German 
links appears to occur circa 2004 i.e. after the accession of these countries to the EU. 
This may, in turn, provide some supportive evidence pointing to a strong role for 
deep integration in the stabilisation and creation of value chains. Tariff barriers to 
trade having already been dismantled prior to these years, the big change between the 
relations of these eastern countries and the EU was the implementation of the acquis 
communautaire or the body of EU law into national legislation. The new laws and 
standards governing the internal market may have had an effect on the creation of 
new value chain activity. 
 
Figure 1.16: Germany’s bilateral backwards and forward linkages 1995-2007 
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Source: Own calculations OECD I-O STAN database 
bvs=VS-B and vs1=VS-F 
 
It is also instructive to look at the evolution of backward and forward linkages from 
the perspective of an Eastern European country. Figure 1.17 presents the patterns of 
specialisation for Poland. It confirms the continued dominance of the EU15 cohort as 
both source and destination of intermediates. However there are differences in the 
patterns of specialisation between these traditional EU partners and the new member 
states. The growing backward linkage with EU15 countries are concurrent with a 
relatively stable forward linkage pointing to an increasing backward dependence 
with these partners. In contrast patterns of specialisation with other new member 
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states show a prevailing forward linkage where Poland exports more intermediate 
products to these partners than it uses from them. In addition, and turning to changes 
in trends with respect to the EU-15 partners, there is evidence that the rate of growth 
of backwards linkages has been greater in the period after 2004 than in the previous 
years. This provides further anecdotal evidence supporting a link between deep 
integration and vertical specialisation. In terms of the evolution of Polish linkages 
with respect to the rest of the world there seems to be little action where the forward 
linkages are concerned but a rising dependence in backward linkages which is driven 
by imports of petroleum from Russia.   
 
Figure 1.17: Poland’s bilateral backwards and forward linkages 1995-2007 
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Source: Own calculations OECD I-O STAN database 
 
1.7.3. EAST ASIA: CHINA AND KOREA  
It is often remarked upon that there are significant differences between the processes 
of integration in East Asia and those of the EU. In Asia, private firms are at the 
forefront of specialisation patterns and trade policy ends up playing catch-up (see 
Baldwin 2006b). This contrasts with the process of integration in the EU which 
seems to be predominantly led by public institutions (i.e. the European Commission 
and other supra national institutions such as the European Court of Justice). A priori, 
the results show high rates of vertical specialisation within both these regions. Hence 
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a salient question to look at in future work might be whether there exists scope for an 
interventionist trade policy or whether a laissez-faire policy might be more effective 
in promoting this type of trade. 
 
Figure 1.18 tracks China’s vertical specialisation patterns. Earlier analysis showed 
that China was increasingly becoming a source of intermediate goods for both the 
EU and NAFTA. This trend is confirmed in Figure 1.18 where China’s forward 
linkages are high and growing with respect to these partners. What is striking is the 
unidirectional nature of these intermediate flows highlighted by the difference 
between the very low intermediate use and the very high intermediate supply to these 
destinations. The rise in the latter is important but it is also worthwhile noting that 
China remains a large exporter of final goods to the EU and NAFTA. It may be the 
case that China sources its intermediate inputs from other East Asian countries rather 
than from the EU or the US as is generally thought. The study of Johnson and 
Noguera (2011:p27) find similar patterns of specialisation where “triangular 
production sharing” patterns emerge with Japan and Korea feeding intermediates to 
China to produce exports to the US95. However, the growing influence of Chinese 
intermediate products in these markets purports a possible change in specialisation 
pointing to an up-scaling of Chinese activities in global or indeed inter-regional 
value chains. In terms of linkages with other partners within the region, Japan and 
Korea emerge as the strongest partners. These appear to be important sources of 
intermediate products where the backward linkage is higher than the forward linkage 
even though both are rising. However the levels of these linkages remain small when 
compared to those with the EU and NAFTA. In fact, these links also appear to be of 
a different nature as differences between backward and forward linkages tend to be 
small and possibly intra-industry in nature. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
95 Similar results are found in Linden et al. (2009) who conduct a case study on the location of the 
value added of an iPod. They too find that a significant amount of intermediate goods come from 
Japan and Korea. Although a large part of the profits remain with American firms. 
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Figure 1.18: China’s bilateral backwards and forward linkages 1995-2007 
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Source: Own calculations OECD I-O STAN database 
 
 
When considering Korea’s vertical specialisation patterns in Figure 1.19 it is noted 
that these have changed most with respect to China where both forward and 
backward linkages are growing fast and at similar paces. Within the region, Korea 
also shows strong backward linkages with respect to Japan, Indonesia and to a much 
lesser extent India. These patterns of specialisation suggest that it is an important 
supplier of intermediates to China, but it is dependent on intermediate inputs from 
Japan and Indonesia. Forward linkages are also strong with respect to partners 
outside the region, in particular the EU and NAFTA. The advanced negotiations of 
an FTA with the EU and the recent conclusion of an agreement with the US also 
suggest possible links between vertical specialisation and the formation of FTAs.  
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Figure 1.19: Korea’s bilateral backwards and forward linkages 1995-2007 
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1.7.4. INTER AND INTRA REGIONAL OBSERVATIONS 
Several salient observations emerge from the above regional treatment of forward 
and backward linkages. These are easier to understand when subsumed into two 
broad categories. The first is a consolidation of linkages where existing trends are 
amplified. The second sees changing patterns in specialisation where the dominance 
of one link over another switches. The first type, where links follow a consolidating 
pattern, seems to be characteristic of the EU (i.e. Germany increasingly supplies 
intermediate products to its preferential partners). The second, where patterns of 
specialisation see a reversal of the dominant link, is more characteristic of the 
NAFTA region with Mexico and Canada becoming suppliers of intermediates to the 
USA rather than users. Intra-regionally, what emerges is that the EU process of 
integration is at a stage of inward consolidation whilst that of Asia and NAFTA is 
witnessing important changes in specialisation. Where inter-regional flows are 
concerned, China is consolidating its role as a supplier of intermediate products 
where these are predominantly towards the EU and NAFTA.   
 
East Asia itself is increasingly vertically specialised. Evidence suggests that Japan 
and Korea are feeding inputs into China which is then selling products to North 
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America and the EU so that specialisation is also occurring extra-regionally. Just as 
Mexico has progressively become a source of intermediates to the rest of NAFTA, so 
China is also increasingly looking like a source of components rather than a mere 
assembler, which Korea is still for Japan. Meanwhile within the EU, Germany is 
increasingly importing intermediates from Japan and China and using them for its 
exports to other countries, notably developed EU partners. Poland remains an 
assembler96. 
 
1.8. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
 
This essay’s contribution to the literature on vertical specialisation is threefold. The 
first is through the development of a method that enables the extension of available 
indicators to capture the bilateral element of vertical specialisation which treats 
forward and backward linkages separately. This approach combines the use of trade 
data and input-output data in an innovative way. The second is the provision of a 
discussion on the non-monotonicity of these linkages which highlights some 
evidence purporting that countries appear to be moving up the value added ladder. 
The third is an appraisal of the interrelationship and spread of this process across 
preferential areas. 
 
Some important new dynamics in the specialisation patterns across regions have been 
identified. Traditionally lower wage economies are expected to be net importers of 
intermediates which they can re-export to developed countries as assembled goods. 
However, in the case of US, China, Mexico relations, it is no longer the case that less 
developed regions just act as mere assembly lines for high value intermediate goods 
produced by more developed partners. The lower wage countries are increasingly 
becoming exporters of intermediates.  Moreover prima facie substantiation of the 
                                                 
96 A word of caution in the interpretation of these measures is worth repeating. The measure of 
vertical specialisation, and indeed ‘value added trade’ in Johnson and Noguera (2011), are computed 
rather than observed. In particular, the proportionality assumption applied in this essay, and in 
Johnson and Noguera (2011), implies that the use of imported intermediate is directly linked to 
changes in the composition of aggregate imports. Hence if the US increases its aggregate imports from 
China by 10%, the use of intermediates from China will increase by similar proportions (determined 
by the technical coefficients). This is limiting because the increase in imports may be driven by a rise 
in final good purchases. The advantage of Johnson and Noguera’s (2011) indicators is that if the US 
increases its exports to Japan, and these feed into Chinese manufacturing, then they can net out US 
value added although their indicators remain computed rather than observed measures.  
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thesis that engaging in international value chains may be linked with changes in 
productivity has been presented. 
 
The initial evidence presented in this essay also suggests that countries which are 
engaged in preferential trade deals show higher degrees of bilateral vertical 
specialisation. However the emergence of East Asian countries as sources of 
intermediate goods suggests the presence of other drivers of specialisation. 
Furthermore, countries engaging in regional trade agreements tend to be 
geographically close; hence the higher degrees of bilateral vertical specialisation may 
come as a result of proximity and not necessarily as a result of the agreements. It is 
equally possible that countries choose their bilateral partners well in that they exploit 
complementarities (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004). Nevertheless, one cannot discard 
the possibility that the perceived higher vertical specialisation within preferential 
partners is borne from the spread and depth of trade agreements. The empirical 
treatment of this question may reside in the endogenous trade policy realm where one 
tries to see whether trade agreements emerge as a result of increased integration of 
international value chains or whether these arise as a result of the trade agreements. 
Tackling these questions will require looking at the drivers of both regionalism and 
vertical specialisation in a more formal econometric setting. This is the focus of the 
remainder of this thesis.  
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ESSAY TWO 
 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS ON 
VERTICAL SPECIALISATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The concurrent international fragmentation of production structures and 
propagation, in recent decades, of FTAs suggests the presence of a link between 
these processes. In this essay, the impact of an FTA on this type of trade is 
investigated through a theoretically augmented gravity model of input trade. 
Controlling for the endogenous formation of trade agreements, through a set of 
country-year fixed effects, the empirical results suggest that an FTA increases the 
value of intermediate imports by 25%. However, when a more targeted measure of 
bilateral value chain activity is considered, capturing the value of intermediate 
imports used to service exports to the same country of origin, the FTA effect more 
than doubles to 65%. The results also suggest the presence of magnification effects 
which see bilateral value chain activity being more sensitive to changes in trade 
costs than traditional trade flows. They highlight that trade policy may play an active 
role in the propagation of such modes of production.  
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2.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This essay provides an empirical analysis of the impact of Free Trade Agreements 
(FTA) on vertically specialised trade97. The concurrent rise in the number of FTAs 
with the unprecedented growth in this type of trade (see Hummels et al., 2001; Yeats, 
2001; Yi, 2003; and OECD, 2010 inter alia), strongly suggests that these processes 
are linked as does the evidence presented in the previous essay of this thesis. 
However, to capture the impact of an FTA on vertically specialised trade one has to 
isolate the trade policy element from other factors, such as proximity or income, 
which are also likely to determine the degree of bilateral vertical specialisation. 
 
To this end, a theoretically motivated gravity model of input trade, similar to 
Baldwin and Taglione (2007 and 2011), is developed. The model draws on Ethier’s 
(1982) concept of ‘international economies of scale’ where the division of labour is 
addressed through a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function on the 
production side. This functional form transposes the concept of ‘love of variety’ 
(Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) to production in an attempt to capture the output gains that 
are described in Adam Smith’s (1776) pin factory (see also Chakraborty, 2003). In 
the same way that consumers gain utility from consuming more varieties of products, 
firms may be seen to increase output through a greater spread in the use of 
intermediate input varieties (see Ethier, 1982 and Bas and Strauss-Kahn, 2011). This 
provides a representation of the gains that can be achieved from the fragmentation of 
production. 
 
The impact of an FTA on this type of trade is then investigated through the 
estimation of the resulting gravity model of input trade. The empirical strategy draws 
on the endogenous trade policy literature to eliminate the biases that arise from the 
endogenous formation of trade agreements (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). 
Unobserved heterogeneity is the likely source of bias and is caused by the presence 
of unobserved characteristics that simultaneously determine bilateral trade flows and 
the incentives to form trade agreements. It is suggested that a country-year Fixed 
Effects approach provides an adequate tool for capturing unbiased estimates of the 
FTA effect. The results then show that, on average and ceteris paribus, overall 
                                                 
97 FTAs as defined in art. XXIV of the GATT/WTO. 
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imports of intermediate products are 25% higher between preferential partners. But 
the impact of an FTA is found to be 5 percentage points higher on intermediate 
imports used to produce exports, or, in other words, when these are part of an 
international value chain. The FTA impact is larger still (65%) on intermediate 
imports which are part of a bilateral value chain (i.e. where both the origin of the 
intermediate and the destination of the consequent export is the same country98). 
 
These results suggest that imports belonging to a bilateral sequence of production are 
more responsive to changes in trade costs and income than traditional trade flows. 
This may be indicative of the presence of ‘magnification’ effects (Yi, 2003) which 
arise in vertically specialised sequences of production which are characterised by a 
back and forth movement of products across borders99. Because the removal of 
border barriers to trade can lead to sizeable reductions in the trade costs of such 
production sequences, FTAs can play an active role in promoting bilateral value 
chain activity. In the context of Romer’s (1987) endogenous growth model, this puts 
forward a path through which trade policy may promote economic growth. 
 
The methodological contributions of this essay are two-fold. First, it suggests that 
country-year fixed effects may be used to resolve issues of unobserved 
heterogeneity. These are less restrictive than the pair-wise fixed effects that are 
proposed by the literature (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). These findings are 
particularly relevant for studies that use short panels where the variance of the FTA 
variable may be limited in time100. Second, this essay shows that a more widespread 
measure of intermediate goods trade, which relies on the identification of 
intermediate products through the BEC (Broad Economic Classification) 
nomenclature, performs as well as a measure that captures similar flows but is 
informed from Input Output tables. However, these measures do not serve as proxies 
for value chain activity as well as the more targeted measures developed in the 
previous essay of this thesis. It is found that the use that is given to imported 
intermediates is important in determining the impact that an FTA has on this type of 
                                                 
98 An example of this type of trade can be found in the patterns of specialisation witnessed in the 
NAFTA region where Mexico exports intermediate products to the US who subsequently imports the 
finished processed good i.e. maquiladoras trade. 
99 Yi (2003) argues that the presence of these magnification effects help explain why world trade has 
increased at a faster rate than world GDP. 
100 This is likely to become problematic as trade agreements proliferate. 
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production. In particular, trade policy has a greater impact on value chain activity 
than it does on the import of intermediate products that are used to satisfy total 
output (domestic or exported).  
 
The remainder of this essay is organised as follows. The second section provides a 
conceptual note on the role that trade agreements can play in shaping vertical 
specialisation. The third section then gives an overview of the challenges that are 
faced in capturing bilateral measures of vertical specialisation. It also discusses the 
empirical approaches used in the literature to analyse the impact of trade agreements 
on trade flows. Section four provides an appraisal of the theoretical literature 
focusing on how it can be applied to the case of vertically specialised trade. The fifth 
section presents a derivation of an empirically testable model of input trade. Section 
2.6 discusses the empirical strategy, the data and the results obtained. Conclusions 
and a discussion of the main findings and shortcomings are given in the final section. 
 
2.2. A CONCEPTUAL NOTE ON THE IMPACT OF FTAS ON VERTICAL 
SPECIALISATION  
There are two main channels through which FTAs may impact vertical 
specialisation. The first is through the shallow integration effects that arise from the 
removal of tariff barriers to trade. The second is through the removal of ‘behind the 
border’ measures which is commonly associated with elements of deep 
integration101. 
2.2.1. MAGNIFICATION AND SHALLOW INTEGRATION EFFECTS 
The removal of tariff barriers to trade between preferential countries could have a 
two-fold impact on vertically specialised trade. This is because VS involves both an 
import and an export process. Because FTAs are reciprocal, this form of 
liberalisation may stimulate both a wider use of intermediate products from a 
preferential partner and also increase the market access for the associated exported 
                                                 
101 To avoid repetition this section discusses different aspects of the possible role of FTAs on 
vertically specialised trade. It also provides a discussion of some of the issues that were highlighted in 
the previous essay but the reader is referred to that essay for a more in depth discussion.   
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product. This would occur when the reduction in trading costs leads to a reduction in 
the landed prices of both the intermediate good used and the final good produced. It 
then follows that the impact of an FTA on the amount of trade between two 
countries, in the presence of vertically specialised modes of production, should be 
positive (leaving issues of the extent to which this may be trade creating or trade 
diverting aside for now). 
When production structures are shared between two countries and intermediate 
goods go back and forth numerous times between these, magnification effects may 
arise (Yi, 2003). Goods that cross borders multiple times incur import taxes at each 
border crossing. Hence the removal of tariffs could affect trade flows by a multiple 
of the amount of times that the product crosses a border. A simple mathematical 
example can help illustrate this point. Consider the value (v) of a product in any 
given country (A or B) to be represented by the simple equation v = pτnQ where p is 
the price of the product and is equal to one, τ is 1 plus the ad-valorem tariff barrier 
and represents iceberg trading costs, n is the amount of times that this product 
crosses a border and Q represents the quantity of this product which is also assumed 
to be unity102. Now consider this product moving across borders but not receiving 
any value added at any border crossing (this means that all values are held constant 
except the number of times the product crosses a border). Upon its first border 
crossing, i.e. when it is exported from country A to country B, n takes the value of 
one and the landed price in nation B is pτQ. But if this product is then re-exported to 
country A, the value of the product in market A becomes pτ2Q. It can then be shown 
that the change to the value of the product is an increasing function of n; the amount 
of times the good crosses a border (holding all other things constant).  
This crude example of tariff magnification effects suggests that removing a tariff 
barrier between two countries which are already heavily vertically specialised can 
have an important cost reducing effect tied to the degree of fragmentation, or border-
crossings, between these countries103. Yi (2003) formalises this idea in a Ricardian 
framework. He argues that vertical specialisation can help explain the growth of 
world trade better than ‘standard models’. These have to assume “counterfactually 
                                                 
102 Assuming positive values and no drawback provisions.  
103 Although one can argue that drawback provisions will stop this magnification effect the idea still 
holds if you add a sequence of production involving three countries. 
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large elasticities of substitution between goods” (Yi, 2003:p.1) to reconcile the slow 
reductions in tariff with the large growth in trade flows in recent decades. 
 
Hummels et al. (1999 p.25) hint that “as vertical specialization tends to magnify the 
effects of barriers, it may also magnify the welfare consequences, malignant or 
benign, of preferential barriers”104. Hence if there is indeed a higher responsiveness 
of trade flows to tariff cuts under more internationally fragmented production 
structures, then the Vinerian effects of FTAs, in the presence of vertical 
specialisation, could become more pronounced (i.e. magnified). And this will add to 
the fact that fragmentation may increase the base of tradables so that there will not 
only be more border crossings per product but also more products crossing borders. 
There might also be qualitative changes to how trade creation and trade diversion 
arises rendering their grasp even more complex. Because of the nature of vertical 
specialisation, there is room for trade creation and diversion occurring at both ends 
of the VS chain (import and/or export). If trade creation on the import side results in 
the reduction of input prices, it may then make the export industry more competitive 
and hence induce further trade creation on the export side. This introduces the 
possibility of complex feedback mechanisms. Additionally, there can be a 
simultaneous trade creating element on the export side and a trade diverting effect on 
the import side (or the reverse).  
 
This increased dimensionality in transactions considerably complicates the 
traditional welfare analysis of trade creation and diversion (WTO 2011). Moreover, 
the new literature on offshoring and FTAs in the presence of incomplete contracts 
indentifies further channels of influence (Ornelas and Turner, 2008 and Antras and 
Staiger, 2011). Ornelas and Turner (2008) argue that the interaction between specific 
assets and incomplete contracts leads to a ‘hold-up’ problem that results in an 
inefficient amount of trade taking place. This hold-up problem arises because 
investment in production is carried out before payments are realised. The “ex-post 
haggling over prices leads suppliers to capture only a fraction of the return to their 
                                                 
104 This was in the working paper that led to Hummels et al (2001). It seems that this statement did not 
make the cut for the final revision!  However in light of the evidence presented in Yi (2003) this quote 
may remain relevant. 
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investment” (Antras and Staiger 2011:p10). This results in conventional trade models 
underestimating the responsiveness of trade flows to trade liberalisation. 
2.2.2. WHAT ABOUT THE ROLE OF DEEP INTEGRATION? 
Where linkages between countries go beyond simple arms-length dealings and 
processes of international production demand common regulatory frameworks that 
ensure appropriate governance structures for value chain activity, deep bilateral trade 
agreements may prove even more beneficial. The creation of common economic 
spaces where institutional integration, market contestability, and regulatory 
cooperation are feasible may result in the establishment of positive externalities that 
facilitate the propagation of regional value chains. Although hard to define, deep 
integration generally involves some form of international cooperation in removing 
behind the border measures that restrict bilateral trade. These non-tariff measures 
(NTMs) generally arise from cross-country differences in regulatory frameworks.  
 
It is hard to quantify the impact that deeper integration may have on value chain 
activity. This is because deep integration involves the creation of positive 
externalities which have wide-ranging effects. Conceptually, the formation of 
common economic spaces can set in motion mechanisms that enhance collaboration 
between firms. By reducing uncertainty in the realisation of contractual obligations, 
or through the creation of a favourable environment that bolsters investment, deep 
integration may not only reduce transaction costs but also provide an environment 
that is conducive to greater and more efficient economic interactions105. This may 
then lead to a wider propagation of technologies within an integrated area and may 
set in motion learning by doing mechanisms which can result in productivity gains 
and hence economic growth. Deep integration may also lead to larger trade flows 
between countries arising through the promotion of finer specialisation; a greater 
exploitation of economies of scale; or from the introduction of competition at finer 
levels of production. 
                                                 
105 One example of deep ‘institutional’ integration is the EU’s single market. It functions under a set 
of common regulations where the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), 
supra-national institutions, defend the principles of the single market. If these are violated, the ECJ 
has the power of overturning a country or a firms’ actions so that the regulations are adhered to. 
Similarly, the European Commission retains supra-national powers in issues related to competition 
policy. A common rule of law across an integrated area should result in a reduction in uncertainty and 
hence can promote area wide investment or cooperation between firms located in different MS. 
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An interesting feature of deep integration is that it need not necessarily involve deep 
institutional cooperation. The aforementioned gains can be achieved by private 
enterprises through self-imposed governance mechanisms (or standards). There are 
two interesting and contrasting examples of how the integration path and vertical 
specialisation can meet. The EU’s deep integration initiatives that resulted in the 
creation of the Single Market may have played a pivotal role in the propagation of 
regional value chains. This is corroborated by the high degrees of vertical 
specialisation between EU members as seen in the previous essay. However the fast-
paced integration initiatives in South East Asia seem to have come as a result of the 
widespread fragmentation taking place in the region. Regionalism in South East Asia 
seems to be playing catch-up to the rising demand for institutional harmonisation that 
has arisen from the regional spread of production networks (WTO, 2011). This then 
suggests that the process of vertical specialisation may come either as a result of, or 
lead to, further and indeed deeper institutional integration. This, in turn, raises issues 
relating to the endogeneity of these processes where vertical specialisation can lead 
to a greater demand for deeper trade agreements or alternatively deeper trade 
agreement can further promote vertically specialised trade106. 
  
2.3. CAPTURING THE EFFECTS OF AN FTA ON VERTICAL 
SPECIALISATION: PRELIMINARIES 
 
The empirical analysis of the impact of trade agreements on vertical specialisation 
faces many hurdles; some of these were anticipated in the previous essay of this 
thesis. The first is that identifying products that are used as intermediates is not 
straightforward. Then there might also be issues arising from the valuation of these 
products where the ‘double counting’ of trade flows in trade statistics may be 
problematic. These issues result in the presence of a wedge between observed and 
‘actual’ intermediate trade flows. They suggest that one needs to approach the use of 
indicators that serve capture vertically specialised trade with care. 
 
                                                 
106 This issue is treated in a recent paper by Orefice and Rocha (2011). 
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The near absence of research into the impact of trade agreements on vertical 
specialisation is partly due to the elusive nature of what actually qualifies as an 
intermediate good – the identification problem. And also from the valuation of trade 
flows in national trade statistics – the valuation problem. These issues are discussed 
at greater lengths in the previous essay of this thesis and hence section focuses on 
some of the consequences that these issues might have on empirical analysis.  
 
The identification of intermediate products is not straightforward. Despite the Broad 
Economic Classification (BEC) giving some guidance, complications in identifying 
intermediate products remain owing mainly to the non-exclusive use of these 
products. When products can be used as either intermediates or final consumption 
goods, these classifications can lead to an over or an under identification of the actual 
amount of trade in intermediates taking place. This suggests that different 
identification methods should be pursued in an empirical analysis.  
 
The valuation problem then adds to this through a possible ‘inflation’ of the value of 
trade that is taking place between countries. Trade statistics are computed in such a 
manner that the entire value of a product, and not the value added, is captured at each 
border crossing. Resulting from this is a possible ‘double-counting’ of trade (see 
Daudin et al., 2008; and Johnson and Noguera, 2011). As there is little knowledge on 
the decomposition of value added between countries, it is hard to identify the 
severity of this problem. However the net/gross distinction in the way trade statistics 
are computed may have implications in the estimation of gravity models (this is 
discussed at greater lengths in the Appendix A2.1). But this only becomes an issue if 
the theoretical models suggest that net trade flows rather than gross trade flows need 
to be considered. The expenditure functions that are typically used to derive gravity 
point to the use of neither in particular and arguments for using net or gross flows 
can be equally defended.  On the one hand, the realisation of an import involves 
paying the gross value of the product, however on the other, if this imported product 
contains domestic value added then one can argue that part of the product is already 
‘accounted for’. Much of the research in the field of the net/gross distinction has 
been concerned with obtaining net valuations of trade flows (Johnson and Noguera, 
2011; Koopman et al 2008; and Daudin et al, 2008), but the implications of using one 
over the other in gravity estimations has received little attention to date.  
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But even if intermediate goods can be appropriately identified and valued, it is also 
possible that FTAs have an impact on these flows that is contingent on the use that is 
given to these products. Intermediate inputs can be used to supply the domestic 
market or alternatively export markets, and this distinction may be important. In the 
heterogeneous firm literature (Melitz, 2003), firms engaged in export markets 
possess a productivity advantage over firms that satisfy domestic markets. The work 
of Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2011) hints at the existence of similar differences between 
firms engaged in production for domestic markets and those participating in value 
chain activity. Because FTAs are likely to promote the activity of such firms to a 
greater extent than those solely engaged in domestic sales (see previous discussion 
on magnification), then it might be expected that the impact of an FTA is different 
across the use that is given to intermediate products. The use of indicators of bilateral 
vertical specialisation, as developed in the previous essay, may mitigate some of 
these problems and allow one to capture different facets of international production. 
2.3.1. THE BILATERAL VERTICAL SPECIALISATION INDICATOR 
The indicator favoured in this essay tracks bilateral vertical specialisation. Up until 
now, the main hurdle in looking at the role of trade agreements in enhancing 
vertically specialised trade has been that current measures of this phenomenon have 
only been able to capture total degrees of VS with respect to the world rather than 
with respect to bilateral partners. The extension of the VS indicator made in the 
previous essay of this thesis presents the opportunity of capturing the degree of 
vertical specialisation across country pairs. This then paves the way for an estimation 
of the role of trade agreements in this process. In its raw form, the indicator is based 
on Hummels et al. (2001) but it is extended so that the bilateral element of value 
chain activity can be identified. It is computed using input-output tables merged with 
trade data from the following equation: 
 
_, = ,  − 	, 	,
  
	(2.1) 
Where µ is an 1 x n vector of 1’s, Ami,j is the n x n imported technical coefficient 
matrix of country i from partner j, [I-AD]-1 is the n x n Leontief inverse, Xij is an n x 1 
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vector of exports of country i to country j, and Xi,j
TOT is a scalar representing the sum 
of the values of this export vector (i.e. total exports to country j).  
 
The indicator captures the value of imported intermediates, from a given origin, that 
are used in the production of exports to a chosen destination as a share of exports to 
that destination (the backward linkage). By embodying a production sequence where 
intermediate products are sourced from abroad, combined with domestic value added 
and subsequently exported, the measure captures the conveyor-belt nature that 
typifies international value chain activity. It is different from other measures that 
have been used in the empirical literature because it tracks the use given to 
intermediate products (rather than the overall value of intermediate goods trade as in 
Feenstra (1998) and Yeats (2001) which rely on the BEC nomenclature). The use is 
identified from the combination of the bilateral imported input coefficient matrix 
(Ami,j) with different output vectors. If the output vector where to reflect total 
demand (domestic and international), the indicator would just be the proportion of 
intermediate imports from country j over total output. However when the output 
vector reflects exports, as in 2.1, it should represent a measure of value chain 
activity.  
 
It will be convenient, in the empirical section, to differentiate across three uses, or 
indeed types, of intermediate products. The first is the value of intermediates that are 
used by the economy, irrespective of the final use that is given to these. Such flows 
will be indexed with the suffix ‘_tot’ throughout. The second captures the 
intermediate products that belong to a process of vertical specialisation, and are thus 
used to produce exports to any international destination (i.e. total exports). The suffix 
that identifies this instance will be ‘_bvs’. The final use that can be given to 
intermediate imports also involves an exporting activity, but this export is towards 
the country from which the imported intermediates originated (i.e. exports to country 
j). This will be identified through a ‘_bvsbil’ suffix. This captures a fully bilateral 
element of value chain interactions where countries use each other’s output in a 
series of sequenced production steps.  A real world example of such production 
sequences arises in maquiladora trade where Mexico imports intermediate products 
from the US and subsequently exports finished products back to the US. 
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Although input-output measures of vertical specialisation are very useful, they also 
have their limitations. The country coverage of IO tables is restricted and so is the 
coverage in time so that these indicators can only be calculated for a selection of 
relatively developed countries during a rather short time span. The fairly aggregate 
sectoral aggregation of these tables also hides important sub-industry level linkages 
that cannot be captured107. In addition, the measures of vertical specialisation are 
computed, or inferred, rather than observed and can hence be driven by some of the 
restrictive assumptions that are needed for their calculation (see previous essay for 
further details). Nevertheless, these measures allow one to disentangle the use of 
intermediate products and hence are more in tune with ‘actual’ production linkages 
than trade based measures. These might then provide a more accurate depiction of 
value chain activity which motivates the use of this indicator in looking at the impact 
of FTAs on vertical specialisation108. 
2.3.2. EMPIRICAL METHODS: THE GRAVITY MODEL 
Looking at the impact of FTAs on trade has generally been approached through a 
gravity model. It draws on Newton’s law of gravity which sees the force between 
objects as a function of a gravitational constant times the product of the combined 
mass and the squared distance. Economists have taken the objects of this equation to 
be countries and used GDP measures to capture their mass in an effort to explain 
bilateral trade flows. The strong empirical explanatory power of this set-up has led to 
its widespread use despite a lack of initial theoretical grounding109. It was Anderson 
(1979) who was first to provide a theoretical backbone to Tinbergen’s (1962) novel 
empirical application. The empirical success of the gravity model is now partly 
attributed to the fact that its derivation can be achieved on the basis of many different 
theoretical models (see Evenett and Keller (2002); Helpman et al. (2008); and 
Anderson (2010)). Over 30 years after his original contribution, Anderson (2010:p1) 
states that the model is no longer an “intellectual orphan”. 
    
                                                 
107 Leontief ‘technologies’ are aggregated across a very narrow set of sectors. 
108 See the previous essay of this thesis for a wider discussion on the extension of this indicator to 
capture bilateral interactions and also a survey of the extent of vertical specialisation across countries 
and regional partners. 
109 Some of the most influential theoretical justifications can be found in Anderson (1979), Deardorff 
(1985), Bergstrand (1985, 1989), Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). 
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The gravity model can be derived from an expenditure system where the amount of 
exports a country sells to another is a function of how much the partner country 
spends on tradable goods (from all destinations) times the share the partner country 
spends on a typical good variety in the origin country. This share then depends on the 
real price of the goods which then varies with the costs of transactions. As way of 
example, a first approximation to the derivation of a gravity model with complete 
specialisation and homogeneous consumer preferences in a frictionless world can be 
shown (following Anderson, 1979)110. Consider a world composed of two countries 
where trade is costless. Exports of country A to country B are determined by country 
B’s marginal propensity to consume country A’s products (sA) so that XAB=sAYB. 
Country A’s total income (YA) is the sum of domestic sales and exports to country B. 
Where preferences are homogeneous (sA=sB=s) the following condition will hold 
YA= s(YA+YB). Solving for s and substituting back into the export equation the 
simple frictionless gravity model is obtained111: 
 
		
 = 	 	
  
 (2.2) 
Adding trade frictions (τ) to this model is relatively simple and yields a gravity 
specification much like equation (2.2) but where a τ parameter, capturing trade costs, 
is introduced in the denominator. Extending this to include a set of countries, and 
maintaining the complete specialisation and homogeneous preference assumptions, 
enables the estimation of the log-linearised gravity equation which has the following 
form: 
  
LnXij=β0 + β 1lnYi.j + β 2lnYi,j –β 3 τi,j + ui,j 
(2.3) 
where β 0=-ln(Yw) and ui,j is i.i.d. Trade frictions (τ) between countries are generally 
captured through geographical indicators (great circle distances; contiguity) and 
institutional dummies (FTAs for example). Anderson and Van Wincoop’s (2003) 
contribution was to augment this equation by incorporating ‘multilateral resistance’. 
                                                 
110 See Evenett and Keller (2002) for a discussion of the derivation of the gravity model under 
different assumptions such as imperfect specialisation. 
111 Where Yw is equal to YA + YB. 
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They found that trade flows between two countries were not only affected by their 
proximity, but also by how remote these were from the rest of the world. They 
rationalised McCallum’s (1995) puzzling findings that saw the border effects 
between Canadian provinces and US states reduce trade by over 2000% by adding 
relative price indices. They found that the inflated border effect fell to 60% when 
multilateral resistance is accounted for112.  
 
The gravity model of trade has since been extended and used in many ways. Rose 
(2003) sought to capture the impact of monetary unions on trade flows, and the use 
of these models to capture the effects of FTAs on trade flows is widespread; Soloaga 
and Winters, 2001; Carrere, 2006; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; and Magee, 2008, are 
but a few notable examples. Through Helpman et al. (2008), the gravity model can 
now be derived in a world of ‘heterogeneous firms’ (Melitz, 2003) so that export 
market selection can be modelled (which deals with the presence of zeroes in the 
trade matrix). Chaney (2008) then uses a similar set-up to include the intensive and 
extensive margins of trade.  
 
Extending the gravity specification to a world with intermediate goods trade has 
received little attention. One notable exception is found in Baldwin and Taglione’s 
(2011) working paper. Although they are primarily concerned with the role of the 
‘mass’ variables in a world with increased trade in parts and components, their 
approach sets an important precedent for the use of gravity models in looking at trade 
in intermediates. Baldwin and Taglione (2011) use the shorthand assumption, 
common in the economic geography literature, that trade in final goods is isomorphic 
to trade in intermediate goods, hence they derive their gravity model of intermediate 
goods trade from a consumer expenditure function that follows Baldwin and 
Taglione (2007). They argue that the mass variable in the estimation should be gross 
output rather than the value added measures of GDP that are commonly used. In a 
world that is interconnected and where demand comes from varying locations net 
                                                 
112 McCallum’s inflated results were also being driven by the size of the different regions. 
Although AvW’s model requires information on relative prices, which is often not available, and it 
assumes that trade costs are symmetric across partners, Feenstra (2002) shows that a similar 
specification can be obtained without the restrictive symmetric trade costs assumption. Additionally, 
Feenstra (2004) argues that multilateral resistance does not require data on relative price differences 
because multilateral resistance can be controlled for, in an econometric specifications, using reporter 
and partner country dummy variables. 
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measures of output are less representative of the interactions that take place and 
hence gross measures would be preferable. If indeed trade is measured gross, then so 
too should income owing to the general equilibrium conditions of the model where 
total imports, from all origins, including the domestic economy, are equated to total 
income. 
 
Although only implicitly derived, Baldwin and Taglione’s (2011) paper appears to 
suggest that trade in intermediates is motivated by similar factors that encourage 
trade in final goods. Hence if the derivation of gravity can be achieved through a 
production function, in lieu of the expenditure function approach used by Anderson 
(1979), then it should show similar attributes to its total trade cousin. However, such 
a derivation will demand greater emphasis on production functions. In particular one 
may need to consider that if the output of a given country can be used in the 
production sequence of another, then one is moving away from a world of competing 
trade to one where trade becomes complementary.  
 
2.4. A REVIEW OF THE RELATED THEORETICAL LITERATURE. 
Vertical specialisation, but more generally trade in intermediate goods, has been 
approached using an array of theoretical models. These have been grounded in the 
confines of traditional and ‘new’ trade theory and serve to explain different facets of 
what is a similar phenomenon. They range from; standard Ricardian models (Sanyal 
and Jones, 1982; Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Deardorff, 2001; and Yi, 2003); H-O 
frameworks (Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001; Deardorff, 2001; Arndt, 2002; Baldwin 
and Robert-Nicoud, 2010); new trade theory approaches (Ethier, 1982; Burda and 
Dluhosch, 2002; Lüthje, 2001 and 2003); to New Economic Geography settings 
(Venables, 1996; Krugman and Venables, 1996; Fujita et al., 1999; Baldwin and 
Taglioni, 2011)113. Many of these approaches are theoretical in nature and not readily 
                                                 
113 More recently, a theory of offshoring based on trade in tasks (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008) 
rather than goods gained prominence. It supports Blinder’s (2006) call for a new paradigm suited to 
the new unbundling (Baldwin 2006 and 2010) phenomenon under which vertical specialisation falls. 
But Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2010) suggest that there might not be need for such a new paradigm. 
They argue that offshoring can be incorporated into the mainstream of trade theory through induced 
productivity gains arising via technological change. 
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testable but they provide the foundations of the model that will be presented in the 
next section.   
 
A new theory explaining the causes and consequences of vertical specialisation is 
probably not needed. This is a new phenomenon, but it may still be driven by similar 
comparative advantages and economies of scale forces. They may have just become 
more apparent since they occur at finer levels and involve different units of 
analysis114. McKinnon (1966) was first to argue that trade in intermediate products 
“led a rather shadowy existence in the formal pure theory of international trade”, this 
despite accounting for 60 - 70% of world trade. Ethier’s (1979 and 1982) theoretical 
underpinnings then provided a first attempt at incorporating intermediate products 
into mainstream ‘new’ trade theory. In parallel, Sanyal and Jones (1982) also 
produced a model of trade in ‘middle products’ where, as in Ethier’s (1982) 
derivation, all trade took place in intermediate goods115. Ethier justifies this approach 
by arguing that traded products tend to receive some form of domestic value added 
before they reach final consumer. What these papers suggest is that tackling vertical 
specialisation may best be approached from a producer’s perspective. Indeed Ethier 
(1982:p391) argued that “producer’ goods are in fact much more prominent in trade 
than are consumers’ goods”. And it seems that this observation is possibly more 
relevant today than when it was written116. 
2.4.1. TRADITIONAL TRADE THEORY APPROACHES 
Owing to growing empirical evidence on the prevalence of this type of trade, 
intermediate products and indeed vertical specialisation have received mounting 
attention. Yi (2003) was first in underlining the importance of vertical specialisation 
in explaining the growth of trade. Using a Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977) 
dynamic Ricardian model, he showed how tariff dismantlement could motivate 
vertically specialised sequences of production arising through the increased 
exploitation of technological differences across countries. In contrast, the H-O 
                                                 
114 see Blinder’s (2006) new dichotomy arising from offshoreable and non-offshoreable tasks. 
115 Sanyal and Jones’ (1982) model assumed a very specific form of production occurring in input and 
output tiers. The former saw the combination of resources (local) to produce output that would 
subsequently enter the world market. The latter would see domestic use of intermediate products 
combined with local value added to produce final consumption goods. 
116 see Feenstra 1998; Yeats 1998, 2001 and Hummels et al 2001 amongst others for accounts of the 
rise in intermediate goods trade and vertical specialisation. 
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approach to vertical specialisation (Deardorff, 1998) sees countries specialising in 
the segments of production which use their relatively abundant factor of production. 
Fragmentation introduces scope for further specialisation across segments requiring 
different factor inputs and hence this type of production yields the classical gains 
from trade but in greater magnitudes given that specialisation occurs over a larger 
array of products. Arndt (2002) linked this set-up to regional integration and argued 
that entering into an agreement with a country with different factor intensities could 
result in a more efficient allocation of tasks (resources) across countries. 
Most of the new approaches to vertical specialisation rely on such cross-country 
differences as drivers of fragmentation. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg’s (2006 and 
2008) theory of offshoring introduces the concept of trade in tasks supporting 
Blinder’s (2006) call for a new paradigm suited to the second unbundling (Baldwin 
2006 and 2010) phenomenon under which vertical specialisation falls. The basic idea 
is that fragmentation leads to gains that are akin to factor augmenting technological 
change. Fragmentation is beneficial because it exploits cross country differences in 
factor intensities. In this line, Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2010) argue that there 
might not be a need for a new paradigm as offshoring is akin to productivity gains 
that arise through technological change.  
However, evidence suggests that much vertically specialised trade takes place 
amongst similarly endowed economies (see previous essay) and hence that models 
that incorporate product differentiation may be important too. 
2.4.2. ‘NEW’ TRADE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS – THE LOVE OF INPUT 
VARIETY  
The ‘new’ trade theory models of Krugman (1979 and 1981), and Helpman and 
Krugman, (1985) are set in a monopolistically competitive world where product 
differentiation satisfies consumers’ ‘love of variety’ (Dixit Stiglitz 1977). This set-up 
proved to be more in line with the patterns of trade of modern economies where the 
simultaneous import and export of similar final products was commonplace. In such 
models, consumers demand different varieties of products and gain ‘utility’ from 
consuming more varieties. However, recent evidence suggests that intra-industry 
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trade is nowadays increasingly taking place in intermediate rather than final products 
(Yeats, 2001). 
In the same way that traditional ‘love of variety’ models cater for consumers 
attaining a higher utility through the consumption of extra varieties, similar setups 
can also model how firms may attain lower costs of production through the use of 
more intermediate inputs. This may reflect the gains that can be derived from vertical 
specialisation. If the entry of a new product variety identifies an increase in the 
degree of fragmentation, then, it can be shown that, like in the case of the utility of a 
consumer, firms should be able to increase the output they produce holding 
everything else constant117.  
 
The ‘love of variety’ that drives models of product differentiation is intuitively easy 
to grasp, however transposing this modelling framework into a firm’s demand for 
inputs requires a little more thought. One would need to identify how, and if, firms 
gain from having access to a greater landscape of intermediate products. A priori, a 
greater availability and demand for intermediate products presents firms with new 
opportunities to more narrowly specialise along finer defined comparative 
advantages. The fragmentation of production structures may also liberate resources 
occupied in the inefficient production of in-house intermediates. An increase in the 
amount of intermediate products available may also act as an insurance mechanism 
against an over-reliance from a particular supplier. It may also increase the diffusion 
of technology or indeed afford producers the option of buying a particular input that 
they would not have been able to produce themselves118. This points to the possible 
existence of a ‘love of input variety’. And this has desirable modelling properties. It 
implies that the production function can be modelled using a CES aggregate of inputs 
in the classical Dixit-Stiglitz setting as in Ethier (1982)119. The division of labour can 
                                                 
117 They can operate at a lower iso-cost line. 
118 See Goldberg et al (2009) for empirical evidence on the links between an increase in input varieties 
contributing to the expansion of product scope (as discussed by Bas and Strauss-Khan (2011) who 
also provide evidence of such links for a sample of French firms). 
119 Luthje’s (2001 and 2003) adaptation of Lancaster’s (1979) concept of ‘ideal varieties’ may also be 
important. This approach is borne from the assumption that for every final good, there exists an ideal 
intermediate good/input that fits the production sequence perfectly. If this ideal variety is not 
available, then firms will have to devote resources to the transformation of an input so that it matches 
the required ideal specifications. Contrary to the love of variety approach, the ideal variety approach 
posits that an increased use of intermediate goods does not translate directly into greater production 
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then be captured by the degree of fragmentation or the use of input varieties in 
production and can benefit from ‘international economies of scale’ (Ethier, 1982). 
 
However, under such frameworks, the introduction of a new intermediate variety 
leads to a proportional marginal reduction in the use of all other inputs. This is a 
consequence of the monopolistic competition assumptions which require there to be 
a common price for all inputs used. Given the common elasticity of substitution and 
the fixed budget constraint which typifies these models; as the number of varieties 
tends to infinity, the quantity of each variety used tends to zero. This restriction 
implies that the technological requirements needed to produce a unit of output are 
uniform in the use of all available intermediate varieties. This stands at odds with 
what we learn from how firms operate or indeed what we see in Input-Output tables 
where technical coefficients vary and industries use inputs in different proportions. 
This suggests that these models may need to be altered in an effort to capture a 
heterogeneous use of input varieties. Indeed Krugman’s original model (1979, 1981) 
included a preference parameter that served a related purpose. Using a similar set-up, 
where the preference parameter becomes a technological requirement, can bring 
these models closer to the realities of modern production.  
 
In keeping with trying to reconcile these models with the realities of production, 
another addition may also be warranted. The traditional Dixit-Stiglitz approach to 
love of variety is unbounded. This implies that consumers derive the same amount of 
extra utility from the consumption of any extra variety, irrespective of how many 
varieties are already on offer. Transposing this concept to the case of a CES 
production function that aggregates intermediate inputs implies the existence of an 
unlimited ‘love of input variety’. Such an outcome is much less desirable, and indeed 
defendable, in the presence of cost rather than utility functions. But it is possible to 
follow Ardelean (2006) in creating a bounded love of variety. The introduction of a 
parameter that identifies the number of varieties on offer and which is dependent on 
the elasticity of substitution can be used for such a purpose. This is akin to saying 
that when inputs are highly substitutable, then the addition of an extra product is less 
                                                                                                                                          
possibilities. Although a greater availability of intermediate varieties increases the probability of the 
ideal good variety being produced and hence gains may be achieved through this channel too. 
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beneficial to the production of output (the reverse also holds where the output gains 
from an extra variety are higher if products are not close substitutes). This reflects 
the fact that less specialised products, which might be more similar, are less valuable 
to the production process. Or similarly; that more specific inputs may be better 
adapted to production than more generic ones.  
 
A monopolistic competition approach to intermediate goods trade implies the 
existence of an extensive margin of inputs as is implicit in the models based on 
Ethier’s (1982) conjectures. More intermediate varieties used in production imply a 
finer division of labour which then suggests that the scope for vertical specialisation 
may be tied to the amount of intermediate varieties that partner countries produce. 
Countries that produce more varieties may then trade more with each other. This idea 
is similar to the ‘vertical linkages’ (Venables, 1996) that arise in the economic 
geography literature where firms’ location is, in part, determined by how easily 
accessible downstream markets are.  
2.4.3. NEW ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY INSIGHTS 
New Economic Geography (NEG) models may also be well suited to the analysis of 
vertical specialisation. Venables’ (1996) model identified the linkages between 
upstream and downstream firms within an economic space. Krugman and Venables 
(1995; henceforth KV) captured the same relationship but they allowed a 
representative firm to take on the role of both upstream and downstream activities. 
The difference between economic geography and new trade theory models is that 
firms in the former are allowed to relocate across regions. Hence this literature is 
concerned with the forces that determine this location rather than with the origins of 
the flows of products. Nevertheless, its modelling insights are important as these 
incorporate sequences of productions where intermediate inputs are processed to 
produce output.  
The KV model predicts that an increase in the number of firms within a spatial 
location brings about three important effects (Krugman and Venables 1995;p.864). 
The first is a reduction in the price of manufactured products, which, by construction, 
can serve as both intermediate and final products. The introduction of a new firm, or 
variety, reduces market power and hence sees a shift in the demand curve, implying a 
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loss in firm profitability, for all producers. However, if manufacturing firms use 
manufactured inputs as intermediates, the reduction in price also reduces the total 
and marginal costs of firms. This may then reverse the loss in profitability. KV term 
this the forward linkage effect. Additionally, there is also a corresponding increase in 
the demand for products and this gives rise to increases in the total expenditure on 
manufactures. This is the backward linkage effect120.  
This approach to production may be relevant in the analysis of vertical specialisation 
for two reasons. Firstly, because the emphasis on the linkages between firms and the 
role of transport costs resembles the link between vertically specialised trade and 
regional integration. This is to the extent that trade agreements play a role in 
reducing transaction and/or trading costs. The second reason relates to the ‘conveyor 
belt’ approach which closely reflects value chain activity. More traditional 
delimitations of production generally assume that intermediate inputs always serve 
the purpose of producing final output, but if one is part of a sequenced production 
chain, then the output of one firm becomes the intermediate input for the next 
segment of production. If this is the case, then the efficiency of production of 
suppliers matters for your own efficiency of production (see Samuelson, 2001 for a 
simple implication of this in a Ricardian setting). 
 
The NEG framework is useful in modelling vertical specialisation because this 
process involves the geographical dispersion of production. However, incorporating 
multiple locations to this type of set-up can be particularly tricky because of unstable 
or multiple equilibriums. Hence instead of augmenting the NEG models, one can 
draw on their characteristics to inform a theoretical approach to vertical 
specialisation as in Baldwin and Taglione (2011). This involves taking the separation 
of production as given rather than trying to explain how it arises. This is convenient 
because this investigation is not interested in how firms locate in different markets, 
but rather in the role of trade policy in promoting the process of fragmentation or 
indeed the origins of intermediate inputs.  
2.4.4. OTHER APPROACHES  
                                                 
120 Note that these linkages are different from those defined in the previous essay. 
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Whilst the models discussed above tend to be based on the traditional Krugman 
assumption of firm homogeneity, recent findings, from the heterogeneous firm 
literature, pioneered by Melitz (2003), suggest that this may be an unreasonable 
assumption. It is now well established that firms operate under different costing 
structures and that not all firms in an economy engage in export markets. This strand 
of literature incorporates this empirical regularity into a theoretical framework. It 
posits that firms within a country draw their productivity from a distribution. Those 
whose draw is above a certain threshold are able to engage in export markets because 
they can face a fixed cost that is required to enter these markets. A productivity draw 
below this threshold confines a firm to producing either for the domestic market or 
not at all121. 
One direct empirical implication of this literature, which might be relevant to the 
case of vertically specialised trade, is that the amount of traded varieties is a subset 
of total world varieties. This is consistent with the observation that countries which 
have larger domestic markets tend to exhibit lower degrees of vertical specialisation 
(Nordas 2004)122. A wider array of readily available intermediate products at home 
implies less dependence on world markets for inputs and hence the introduction of 
heterogeneities in the degrees of vertical specialisation across countries. The 
theoretical backbone of Helpman et al.’s (2008) model is of particular relevance 
here. They derive a gravity model using insights from the heterogeneous firm 
literature. In this model heterogeneity arises from the presence of a marginal cost 
with two components. The first is firm specific and its inverse identifies a firm’s 
productivity in the production process. The second is country specific and identifies 
the productivity of the factors of production of a country. These marginal costs then 
determine how a firm can face the fixed costs associated to entering export markets. 
If income per capita can reflect the productivity of the factors of production in a 
country then richer countries should be able to sustain more exporting firms. This 
would imply that they would export more intermediate varieties. 
                                                 
121 This is in line with the accepted notion that it is only the most productive firms that engage in 
export markets. However issues of causality remain unresolved. Are firms productive because they 
export or do they export because they are productive? 
122 Although some firms may also be able to fragment more. 
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Another possibility is that countries that use more imported components, or whose 
firms engage in wider international vertical specialisation, derive a productivity boost 
from this activity and hence are more prepared to engage in export markets. These 
productivity effects could be achieved through various channels. First through 
Ethier-type international economies of scale, and perhaps secondly through the 
backward and forward linkages predicted by the NEG models. The lower marginal 
costs that may be achieved through a better utilisation of inputs could then provide 
increased resources to face the fixed costs to exporting. This mechanism is not 
directly discussed in the heterogeneous firm literature which remains relatively silent 
on the origin of these productivity differences. A very recent paper by Bas and 
Strauss-Kahn (2011) suggests the presence of such a link between participation in 
value chain activity and productivity gains. Furthermore, the correlation between 
productivity growth and vertical specialisation observed in the previous essay of this 
thesis also lends some supporting evidence to this idea. 
 
The above discussed theoretical approaches can guide an understanding of vertical 
specialisation. However, there is a parallel strand of literature that deals with the 
organisational aspects that arise from such modes of production which is also likely 
to be important. Supply side models such as that of Burda and Dluhosch (2002), 
discussed in the previous essay, are good half way steps between these. Here cost 
competition drives Smithian specialisation and fragmentation is modelled through an 
index, z, which denotes specialisation across stages of value added across within a 
value chain. Although fragmentation reduces production costs, it incurs a 
coordination cost arising from the larger complexities of the shared production 
sequences. The interplay between these costs then determines the desirability of 
engaging in vertically specialised trade.  
 
This concept of a cost to the coordination of value chain activities comes from the 
literature pioneered by Ronald Jones and Henryk Kierzkowski123. They motivate a 
narrative on fragmentation based on producer service costs which fits in the broader 
context of the analysis of the organisational choices of firms and Multinational 
Enterprises (MNEs). It is concerned with the organisation of transactions and/or the 
                                                 
123 See Jones and Kierzkowski (1990, 1997 and 1999) Also see Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001). 
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governance of value chains in the presence of international fragmentation. Here a 
distinction is made between various forms of transactions that occur either between 
or within firms (or MNEs) situated in different countries. These can take forms such 
as arms-length dealings or parent-affiliate trade. The organisational choices of firms 
may play a role in shaping vertical specialisation through, for example, the diffusion 
of technology across affiliate firms. In this line Markusen’s (1989) Knowledge-
Capital model involving investment flows is of particular relevance. More recently 
Antras and Staiger (2011) also identify other sets of costs that arise from the 
customisation of inputs and the lock-in effects arising from incomplete contracts 
between importing and exporting firms in the presence of offshoring. 
 
One of the main challenges with approaching the analysis of the role of trade 
agreements on vertical specialisation through these organisational models is that the 
empirical analysis generally requires detailed data on firm activity and ownership 
which is not readily available or indeed comparable across countries124. 
 
Looking back at the different approaches that one can draw upon to model value 
chain activity suggests that there is no lack of tools to deal with this type of trade. 
However, tackling the determinants of vertical specialisation from one approach 
rather than from another will result in locking the model to the approach’s dominant 
assumption. It is important to underline that the traditional frictions between the 
older trade theories of comparative advantages and those of product differentiation 
are likely to remain. The one favoured in this essay is the latter both for its 
convenience and its characterisation of value chain activity. Although this does not 
mean that traditional trade theory forces, in the form of comparative advantages, 
derived from either technological or factor endowment differences, are not going to 
play a role. 
 
It is also worth mentioning that the organisational choices of firms, and to a broader 
extent the interactions between these, are also going to be important. The 
institutional arrangements governing transactions and the environment in which these 
operate will be chief. This is where trade policy, and particularly international 
                                                 
124 Another notable contribution on the organisation of firms and production across national borders 
can be found in Grossman and Helpman (2004). 
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institutional cooperation, or regulatory harmonisation, is likely to play a role. Firstly 
through the elimination of tariff barriers to trade or the shallow integration effects, 
but perhaps more importantly through the role that deeper integration can play in 
bolstering value chain activity. The creation of stable trading environments need not 
only facilitate the search for appropriate partners, but should also provide a legal 
basis for economic interactions and disputes. A coherent rules-based system would 
then be conducive to the creation of ‘thicker’ markets which may play an active role 
in reducing transaction costs (see Antras and Staiger 2011).  
 
2.5. A GRAVITY MODEL OF INPUT TRADE 
The impact of FTAs on trade flows has traditionally been captured through the 
introduction of various dummy variables, delimiting the presence (or absence) of an 
FTA between two partners, to a gravity equation125. The goodness of fit of these 
models leads Anderson (2010:p.1) to argue that the gravity model is “one of the most 
successful empirical models in economics”. However, these models are usually 
derived from consumer theory through an expenditure system (see Anderson (1979) 
and Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003)). This is an inappropriate setting for a model 
of input trade which should be approached from the production side. Baldwin and 
Taglione (2011) bypass this step by assuming that the demand for intermediate goods 
is isomorphic to final demand which is derived from consumer theory. This is a 
convenient and not unreasonable assumption, but some important insights may be 
lost in the process126.  
The aim of this section is to provide a model of input trade from the perspective of 
the producer. This is accomplished by relating input demand to typical gravity 
variables. It does not seek to provide an exhaustive theoretical framework of supply 
conditions across different countries in the presence of vertically specialised trade 
but rather to justify the use of a gravity model in subsequent estimations. In the 
process, the model draws on elements from Ethier (1982); Fujita et al (1999); 
                                                 
125 There are many examples of papers that have used gravity models to look at the impact of trade 
agreements on trade flows but perhaps the most salient are Soloaga and Winters (2001) Carrere (2006) 
and Baier and Bergstrand (2007).  
126 It is also a very common assumption of the NEG literature. 
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Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003); Ardelean (2006); and mainly Baldwin and 
Taglione (2007, 2011). 
A gravity model of input trade can be approached from the supply side, as in 
Helpman et al (2008) and Channey (2008), or alternatively from an input demand 
function. The former approach is chosen for its similarity with the traditional 
derivations of gravity (i.e. Anderson, 1979, Anderson and Van Wincoop. 2003 and 
Baldwin and Taglione 2007 and 2011) and also for its simplicity127.   
2.5.1. THE MODEL 
A representative producer in country i produces output (Xi) by combining 
differentiated intermediate inputs (x). These are sourced from an array of origins M 
(M= j=1, 2, ....), who produce a heterogeneous number n of differentiated varieties. 
The substitution between inputs is captured by the parameter σ so that the production 
function is additively separable and exhibits a constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES). This is assumed to be above unity so as to reflect the international economies 
of scale of Ethier’s (1982) model. The efficiency with which inputs are combined is 
captured by a country specific term Ai leading to the following representative 
production function: 
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(2.4) 
The CES aggregator captures the gains that can be achieved from the fragmentation 
of production structures. A particular case of this production function serves 
illustrate this point. If there are no technological constraints in the use of varieties; 
and all countries produce a homogenous amount of inputs because firms are 
symmetric across countries (i.e. identical cost structures in the production of 
intermediates), then it can be show that the above expression collapses to128:  
                                                 
127 A supply side approach to the derivation of gravity with vertical specialisation, although highly 
desirable, is beyond the scope of this study. The demand side approach requires less limiting 
assumptions and serves capture the most important facets of intermediate goods trade. 
128 The identical cost hypothesis implies that the Ai term in this instance is the same across all 
countries and can be thought of being equal to 1. This simplification is for expositional purposes. 
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	 = 	   
(2.5) 
This implies that holding everything else constant, output (Xi) is an increasing 
function of the number of intermediate products n that are used (assuming that the 
substitution parameter is above unity). If the number of intermediates used goes hand 
in hand with the degree of fragmentation of a production sequence, then this set-up 
mimics the gains originally depicted in Adam Smith’s Pin Factory. This is because 
each ‘task’ leading to the creation of a pin can be seen to yield a ‘new’ intermediate 
product. So that the sharpening of the iron produces an intermediate good that is a 
‘sharpened iron piece’; and the process of adding the head of the pin then produces 
another intermediate product which is a ‘sharpened pin with a head’. Then each step 
of the production of a pin can then be associated with the use of a new intermediate 
product.  
 
The use of such a CES production function follows Ethier (1982) and is also similar 
to Romer (1987) and Chakraborty (2003). However, this type of production function 
is limited. On the one hand, it does not incorporate factor endowments and assumes 
that products are costlessly assembled. On the other, Ethier (1982:p391) noted that 
this type of function, in a monopolistically competitive setting, leads to an optimal 
production sequence where an “infinitesimal amount of each intermediate product is 
used over an infinite number of processes”. This occurs because the assumed 
symmetries in the cost structures of firms across countries lead to a common price 
for any input variety and hence to a common use of the value of inputs from all 
origins129. The resulting counterfactually large (infinite) ‘love of input variety’ does 
not reflect the realities of production.  
 
For the model to more accurately reflect these realities, the use of inputs in the 
production sequence is restricted through the introduction of two new parameters. 
The first is a technological parameter (φ) which reflects different uses of inputs 
                                                 
129 This coupled with a budget constraint will imply that as more varieties are added to the system the 
value of each variety used will tend towards zero (i.e. spread across more varieties). So that as n tends 
to infinity then x tends to zero. Hence Ethier’s statement of an infinite number of processes and an 
infinitesimal amount of input value.  
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across countries in the production sequence130. The second is a parameter (n) that 
captures heterogeneities in the quantity of intermediate varieties produced across 
countries131. Both these terms will enter the production function and will be 
decreasing in the degree of substitutability. Hence as σ increases (higher 
substitutability) the value associated to an extra variety n will fall132. Similarly the 
influence of the φ parameter will also fall as substitutability between inputs increases 
reflecting that producers will be able to substitute across varieties the more similar 
these are perceived to be (hence attributing less value to a particular input). 
Incorporating these variables yields the following production function133:  
 
	 =   	,






 
(2.6) 
A representative firm in country i produces output by combining inputs from 
different origins (these origins include the domestic economy). It uses more inputs 
from the origins that produce a greater number of varieties, n, and also from 
countries that produce the varieties that are most in line with the production 
technologies available. Although not derived, it is assumed that the supply conditions 
and the efficiency parameter generate the production of a heterogeneous amount of 
inputs by country134. Similarly it is assumed that all produced output is either 
consumed or enters into a production process as an input. One can then obtain the 
                                                 
130 This parameter ranges from zero to infinity and identifies the production technologies in a 
particular country. It is similar to Krugman’s original preference parameter for varieties. Furthermore, 
because producers aim to satisfy demand and consumers can be seen to prefer some varieties over 
others, this term can also capture the taste for a particular variety from a representative consumer. 
131 Because the interest of this model is in the demand for intermediate products, a supply model is not 
explicitly presented, however the presence of different efficiency variables, homogeneous within 
countries but different across countries, can lead to a structure where some countries can sustain more 
firms than others when there is a fixed cost to producing or indeed exporting (as in the Melitz (2003) 
heterogeneous firm literature). 
132 Intuitively this implies that the love of variety exhibits diminishing returns as substitutability 
increases. This set-up is similar to that of Ardelean (2006) although an additional parameter that 
captures the love of variety has not been introduced here as there is little interest in tracking the love 
of input variety. Rather the aim is to reduce this so that it reflects a more realistic production 
sequence. 
133 The CES structure implies that the production function is additively separable and homogeneous. 
134 The presence of efficiency variables adjusts so that more efficient countries supply greater varieties 
of products. This is similar to the NEG models. 
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input demand function by minimising costs subject to the above production 
function135. These costs are the sum of the purchases of inputs from all destinations.  
 
 = 	,,

	 
(2.7) 
It can then be shown that the associated input demand function for products 
originating from country j is136:  
 
, = ,()∑ ( 	)   
 
(2.8) 
The demand for products from country j is then a function of the relative cost of 
inputs from a particular country and C which captures the amount spent on inputs in 
country i (If all trade were to occur in intermediate products, C would need to 
capture gross output Xi
137). The price term can be defined as follows: 
 
, = 	 ,  
(2.9) 
Where pj is the producer price, aj is the common mark-up in monopolistically 
competitive models (above unity and dependent on the elasticity of substitution 
term); and τi,j captures the bilateral iceberg trade cost which is above unity and 
represents the trade and transport barrier mark-up between countries. Much of what 
follows draws heavily on Baldwin and Taglione’s (2007) derivation of gravity. 
Substituting the price equation (2.9) into the demand equation (2.8) and multiplying 
by the price term on the left hand side so as to capture the total value of inputs (Vi,j) 
yields; 
                                                 
135 Under monopolistic competition, total costs will be equal to total revenue due to free entry and exit 
of firms driving down profits to zero in each country. This means that it is also possible to approach 
the minimisation problem through the revenue function that is the sum of all sales in all destination 
markets. 
136 See Appendix A2.2 for a step by step derivation. 
137 This would reflect the concerns of Baldwin and Taglione (2011) which suggests that, where 
intermediate goods trade is concerned, measures of GDP in value added terms may be inappropriate. 
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, = (,)∑  	(,)   
(2.10) 
Where Vi,j= nj φj pj aj τj xi,j is the value of the input flow from country j. Assuming 
symmetry across firms so that there is a common producer price, and noting that the 
sum of all imported and domestic intermediate varieties must equate to the value of 
total costs so that  = ∑ 	  , the above function can be expressed as follows 
  
 	

=  	= 1− 
2−

2−(,)1−
∑ 2−	2−(,)1−   
 (2.11) 
Solving for the price term yields138: 
 
 = 	 Ω 	 ,ℎ	Ω = 
(,)∑  	(,)    
 (2.12) 
Substituting this expression into the demand equation (2.10) to eliminate the 
producer price and rearranging then gives a gravity type equation of the following 
form139: 
, =  !(,) Ω" 
(2.13) 
The above equation is similar, in form, to most derivations of gravity (namely 
Anderson and Van Wincoop 2003, Feenstra 2004, Baldwin and Taglione 2007, 2011 
and Helpman et al. 2008) except that it incorporates the number of varieties that each 
                                                 
138 The term Ωi is often referred to as market openness (AvW 2003). 
139 Here the price term is defined by: 
 
 = 	(	,)

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country produces and a technological parameter140. These enter the gravity 
specification in a similar fashion as Anderson and Van Wincoop’s (2003) 
‘multilateral resistance’ term. It is actually an augmented multilateral resistance term 
that reflects a world where countries produce a heterogeneous amount of varieties 
and are constrained by production technologies. Another difference with respect to 
the traditional gravity literature is that the general equilibrium condition only 
occupies the value that countries spend on inputs rather than the more common 
income term141.  
 
The model presented has its caveats which are worth noting. Firstly, it does not take 
into consideration the possible impact of the emergence of new varieties on the price 
index. Feenstra (1994) suggests that not accounting for this in aggregate import price 
indices can be problematic. He proposes the use of ‘exact’ price indices that account 
for entry and exit of varieties between years. Broda and Weinstein (2006) then 
provide an empirical implementation of these new price indices showing how gains 
from new imported varieties arise. The trouble with these approaches is that they 
require an in depth knowledge of trading structures and are complicated to aggregate 
to reduced-form scenarios. Feenstra (1994), Broda and Weinstein (2006) and 
Goldberg et al (2009) exploit the trade aggregation systems to identify new varieties 
arising in a single country, extending this to many countries in a generalised gravity 
structure raises a series of theoretical and empirical complications. 
 
Secondly, the model has avoided an exact definition of the cost functions and in 
particular how these interact with market conditions so that different countries can 
sustain a different number of varieties. Although this would be highly desirable, it is 
beyond the scope of this essay. It is worth noting that the heterogeneous firm 
literature (Melitz, 2003), and in particular the cost structures of firms as determinants 
of participation in export markets as in Helpman et al.’s (2008) gravity model would 
be a good place to start with such a model142. If the productivity parameter could be 
associated to the degree of vertical specialisation then there would be a case for 
                                                 
140 A similar specification can be derived in the case where there are no technological constraints as 
shown in the appendix A2.2. 
141 Because the value spent on inputs is likely to be lower than total income, one would expect that, 
upon estimation using GDP variables, the coefficients on this measure will be below unity. 
142 Chaney (2008) also provides a gravity model for heterogeneous firms but focuses more closely on 
intensive and extensive margins. 
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countries which are more vertically specialised being able to sustain higher 
productivity firms which engage in export markets. However such a structure would 
imply the presence of different price mark-ups across countries thus complicating the 
derivation of gravity. 
 
Despite these shortcomings, the model presented provides a justification for using a 
gravity model to estimate input trade. It suggests that particular care need be placed 
on what is regularly termed as ‘the mass variables’; where these should reflect gross 
purchases of inputs rather than the typically used total income (i.e. GDP) variable (as 
noted by Baldwin and Taglione 2011).  
2.5.2. VERTICAL SPECIALISATION 
To relate the indicator of vertical specialisation to the above derived input demand 
equation it is useful to recall the different components of the indicator. As defined in 
equation (2.1), vertical specialisation captures the imported input content of exports. 
More specifically it is the value of imported inputs from a chosen partner as a share 
of total exports to that same partner143. Hence the numerator of this expression is an 
input demand that is similar to that derived in equation (2.13). The denominator of 
this indicator is then a total demand for exports equation. Assuming that total import 
demand from a partner country is isomorphic to the input demand equation (as in 
Baldwin and Taglione, 2011), it can be shown that equation (2.13) can be modified 
to generate an export demand equation with the following specification: 
, = ,(,)
Ω∑  	(,)  
  
 (2.14) 
Here the subscripts are reversed from specification (2.13) to reflect that country i’s 
exports to country j are country j’s imports from country i (Vj,i
T). This function has 
similar determinants to those of the input demand equation. However a few changes 
arise. The technology constraints (φ) now represent taste parameters for consumers 
                                                 
143 In its fully bilateral form although it can also be presented as a share of total exports rather than 
exports to the same country where the inputs originated. 
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but exhibit similar properties in terms of substitution i.e. the degree of substitution 
between goods used for final consumption and those used for input demand is 
assumed constant and the same. The number of varieties that each country produces 
also enters the specification in the same way. The main difference between (2.13) 
and (2.14) is found in the income terms that appear in the latter equation but not in 
the former. This is because income is assumed to be fully exhausted in the purchase 
of final and intermediate products whereas in equation (2.13) the assumption was 
that only a share of this would be exhausted by intermediate demand (Ci that is 
derived from (2.7)).  
 
Deriving an expression that captures vertical specialisation in its share format can 
then be done by dividing (2.13) by (2.14) so that:  
 
, = 	 ,, = 	 #
$
 %,,&
   
(2.15) 
This equation suggests that the degree of vertical specialisation between two partners 
will depend on the relative amount of varieties that each produce; the relative 
preferences for these varieties; the share of output that is spent on intermediates; and 
the relative mark-ups and trade costs between partners144. What is particularly 
convenient about this set-up is that it lends itself to the elimination of unobservable 
factors that may bias estimated coefficients in a typical gravity setting. This is 
because some of the time invariant bilateral characteristic between partners will 
cancel out. Effectively, the multilateral resistance (P) and Openness (Ω’s) terms have 
been eliminated145. These expressions can then be used to inform the empirical 
strategy.  
 
 
 
                                                 
144 For simplicity it is assumed that mark-ups are the same across countries and hence are not 
presented in equation 2.15. 
145 The specification where the world becomes the destination of exports changes the above 
expression somewhat in the sense that the denominator is expressed with respect to the world rather 
than with respect to country j. 
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2.6. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
Estimating the impact of a trade agreement on vertically specialised trade has to be 
approached with care. Traditionally, FTA impact effects have been captured through 
dummy variables introduced into a gravity model. However, Baier and Bergstrand 
(2002, 2004, and 2007) warn us that such an approach will need to account for the 
endogenous formation of FTAs. Countries select into agreements, and possibly for 
reasons that also drive their current level of trade. If two countries sign a trade 
agreement as a result of factors which are unobservable to the econometrician and 
which are correlated with current trade flows, then standard cross-sectional OLS 
estimations will be biased and the effects of a trade agreement may not be 
appropriately captured by the FTA coefficient.  
 
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) argue that preferential partners tend to share similar 
characteristics that should theoretically enhance the gains from a concluded FTA. 
This implies that they have chosen their partners ‘well’ and also that there is a strong 
case for rejecting the hypothesis that the FTA variable is exogenous. Magee’s (2003) 
work supports this idea. He finds that high levels of bilateral trade increase the 
probability of an FTA being concluded146. Using a cross sectional gravity model for 
the year 1980, Magee finds a positive FTA coefficient for agreements that were only 
present in the period 1985-2001. Hence countries engaging in preferential trade deals 
were already heavily engaged in ‘above average’ trade. In a similar vein, Holmes 
(2005) uses the minimum export share between two partners to predict the 
probability of these forming a trade enhancing FTA. Compelling evidence of 
endogeneity is also found in Baier and Bergstrand (2007) who show a strong 
instability both in the magnitude of the FTA coefficient and in its sign when running 
a series of cross sectional gravity estimations at varying time intervals. They argue 
that unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be the main cause for this. 
 
To grasp the problem, it is useful to consider a ‘true model’ of intermediate goods 
trade taking the following form147: 
                                                 
146 This is sometimes known as the ‘natural trading partner’ hypothesis. It sees countries engaging in 
above normal trade as more prone in concluding trade agreements.  
147 Time subscripts are dropped for presentational purposes. 
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Vij = Xijβ + vij    
vij = ci + uij 
 (2.16) 
The value of intermediate goods trade between two countries (Vij) is determined by a 
set of observable covariates Xij and an error structure vij. The latter is formed of an 
unobservable component that is individual country specific, ci, and a random error 
component exhibiting the usual properties (E(xij| uij) = 0). If the unobservable term ci 
is uncorrelated with the covariates then one can estimate equation (2.16) using 
traditional OLS. This is because the composite error term comes to exhibit normal 
properties (i.e. is a random disturbance). However if Cov (xij,ci) ≠ 0 then OLS will 
yield biased estimates of the β coefficients. In the case of vertical specialisation, as in 
the case for normal trade flows, this unobserved heterogeneity is likely to arise 
through the correlation between the unobservable variable, ci, and the FTA dummy 
introduced in the covariates. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) argue that this arises from 
country specific characteristics which drive both selection into trade agreements and 
also the value of current trade flows148. 
 
An example can serve illustrate how unobserved heterogeneity arises. Consider the 
case where Country A has a larger than normal import flow from Country B because 
it has an ‘affinity’ for the set of products that this country produces. Symmetrically, 
Country B also exhibits similar affinities for Country A products so that these 
countries are close trading partners in terms of volumes of trade. Because these 
affinities cannot be observed by econometricians and affect both the degree of trade 
between countries and possibly the selection forces to form an FTA (i.e. its 
desirability), then not accounting for these, when estimating the impact of an FTA on 
trade flows, will yield biased estimates on the FTA coefficient149. Unobserved 
heterogeneity can also arise from differences in regulatory frameworks across 
countries. Again, if two countries have different standards for the production of 
                                                 
148 Baier and Bergstrand (2007) suggest that biases in the estimation of FTA effects are likely driven 
by unobserved heterogeneity rather than omitted variables or errors in measurement. 
149 In this example, the bias is likely to be positive. This is because the FTA variable will be capturing 
the positive effect of the agreement but it will not control for the affinities that make country A and B 
trade more with each other. If these were appropriately controlled for, or if these were observed, one 
would expect the FTA coefficient to be lower. 
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automobiles, but share the complementary characteristics needed for value chain 
interactions, then they may wish to engage in bilateral regulatory harmonisation 
through an FTA. This difference in regulatory frameworks will be both a reason to 
engage in a preferential trade deal and also a factor that affects current, and indeed 
past, trade flows.  
 
Consider the outcome variable VS with subscript 1 to be the observed degree of 
bilateral vertical specialisation between two countries that share an FTA and VS with 
subscript 0 to occur where there is no FTA. Ideally, if one could observe both VS 
levels with and without an FTA for a given dyad of countries for a particular year, 
then the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) of belonging to an FTA could be 
calculated as the difference in the means of the observed outcomes conditional on a 
set of covariates x150: 
 
ATE= E(VS1- VS0 |x) 
(2.17) 
Such an approach would yield consistent estimates under the assumptions that; i) the 
outcomes variables are independent so that the degree of VS between two countries 
does not affect that between others; ii) observations are drawn from a random 
sample; and iii) the treatment indicator (FTA) is mean independent of both VS1 and 
VS0 (ignorability of treatment). For the first assumption to hold general equilibrium 
effects, which are likely to be important where vertical specialisation is concerned, 
would need to be ruled out 151. The second and third are similar in nature and are 
likely to be violated because of the aforementioned selection effects. It implies that 
there are variables which may be unobserved that determine both the participation 
and the outcome variable. If these can be controlled for, through observable 
                                                 
150 Clearly it is impossible to observe the degree of vertical specialisation with a given partner in the 
presence and absence of an FTA, but this set-up is for expositional purposes so that one can delimit 
the problem that arises in the estimation procedure. 
151 The independence assumption is a very strong one that has been made in the literature and that is 
likely to be violated in this type of estimation. Not only are trade flows not likely to be independent, 
i.e. if I am sourcing my intermediates from one country I am not doing so from another, but also the 
FTA variable may not be independent either. Baldwin (1993) suggests that engaging in an FTA comes 
as a result of a dynamic process where ‘juggernaut’ and ‘domino’ effects arise. These reflect the fact 
that being left out of a large FTA can change incentives to form or join FTAs. There is also a growing 
literature that is concerned with spatial correlation in gravity models. A thorough analysis of these is 
beyond the scope of this essay, but it is important to note that this may be an issue in the estimation. 
117 
 
covariates (i.e. selection), then it is possible to estimate the ATE as follows (provided 
independence holds)152.  
 
E(VS| x,FTA) = E(VS0|x,FTA) + FTA[E(VS1|x,FTA) - E(VS0|x,FTA)] 
(2.18) 
Dealing with this unobserved heterogeneity in cross-sectional estimations has been 
approached in a variety of ways. For instance, Magee (2003) and Baier and 
Bergstrand (2004) use an IV (Instrumental Variables) approach. But the reliability of 
their results hinges on finding suitable instruments that are correlated with the FTA 
variable but not with the unobservables that are driving trade flows. Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007) argue that this condition is not satisfied in these papers and indeed 
that any IV approach is going to be complicated on account of the selection variables 
being highly correlated with gravity variables153. A Heckman control function may 
also be problematic due to such strong correlations between the determinants of 
FTAs and trade flows. Hence more recently, non-parametric, matching techniques 
have been employed. Baier and Bergstrand (2009) do this for trade flows whilst 
Egger et al. (2008) look at the impact of trade agreements on the structure of trade 
(i.e. intra industry trade). These techniques are well suited to a cross sectional 
approach and are also accommodating because they do not impose constraints on the 
distributions of the covariates154.  
 
However, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) argue that cross-sectional estimations do not 
generally lend themselves to treating the endogeneity bias as well as panel data 
approaches do. If the ‘true’ model of intermediate goods trade in (2.16) has an 
unobservable, ci, which is country specific, then it is possible to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity through the use of country specific dummy variables or 
fixed-effects (FE)155. Alternatively, if unobserved variables are also time specific, a 
                                                 
152 We are equally interested in the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) which specifies the 
effects of an FTA on vertically specialised trade in the presence of an FTA. 
153 Baier and Bergstrand (2007) argues that Magee’s (2003) use of GDP similarities or intra industry 
trade in the selection equation does not remove the problems associated with unobserved 
heterogeneity given that the instruments used do not satisfy the independence conditions. These are 
likely to be correlated with the formation of FTAs and also the factors that cause trade.  
154 Such techniques are also useful because they can capture non linearities that may arise as discussed 
in Baier and Bergstrand (2009). 
155 Fixed effects are directly introduced because it is implicit that a model where the unobservables are 
allowed to be correlated with the covariates is preferable. Random effects models assume no 
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panel data approach with country-time fixed effects would also be appropriate. 
Hence one should be able to “draw strong and reliable inferences about the ATE of 
FTAs using the gravity equation applied to panel data” (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007: 
p.84). Feenstra (2004) also favours such an approach arguing that it is an appropriate 
technique to control for multilateral resistance (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003). 
One can then test whether such methods appropriately control for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) suggest that if appropriate controls have 
been implemented, then current trade flows should be uncorrelated with future FTAs, 
and this can be easily tested econometrically. 
 
Estimating gravity models conjures other challenges. One is the presence of zeros in 
the trade matrix. This affects the log-linearisation of the model and results in zero 
trade flows being indeterminate. Generally, the ad hoc solution of dropping the 
observations where trade flows are inexistent, or adding a marginal value to these is 
used156. But this approach does not deal with the reason behind the presence of zeros. 
The severity of the problem is proportional to the amount of zero’s in the sample and 
to the underlying reasons for the presence of these. Although Silva and Tenreyro’s 
(2006) Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator facilitates the 
estimation of gravity in the presence of zero trade flows, it does not get to the bottom 
of the reasons for the presence of zero trade between countries. Helpman et al. 
(2008), in a gravity model that is derived from the heterogeneous firm literature, use 
a Heckman (1979) selection equation where the first step models the probability of 
trade occurring between two partner countries and the second step then uses the 
mills-ratio from this first step in a gravity equation.  
 
Another challenge that has recently surfaced in the gravity estimation literature is to 
do with spatial correlation. In particular, most gravity models assume that the FTA 
variable is independent so that the formation of a trade agreement between two 
countries is determined by the characteristics of these countries alone. However there 
is a growing literature on the impact of trade agreements on third countries and 
                                                                                                                                          
correlation. Which is preferable can be determined on econometric grounds through a Hausman test. 
Another approach is the use of difference in difference techniques. 
156 Given that the natural logarithm of zero is undefined, adding a small value of trade to all 
observations can resolve this issue. Although this simple fix is useful, it does not take into 
consideration the fact that zero trade flows are indeed important because they can come as a result of 
selection effects. 
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indeed some models of FTA formation (Baldwin, 1993) suggest that the incentives to 
form, or join, a trade agreement change as a result of neighbours’ engagement in 
preferential trade deals. Behrens et al. (2007) suggest that spatial autocorrelation 
models may be useful in dealing with such issues157.   
2.6.1. DATA 
Several measures of vertically specialised trade, which track the use of intermediate 
imports in the production of exports, are used in the empirical analysis. These are 
calculated from equation 2.1 using the Input-Output (IO) tables of the OECD STAN 
database. Without going into great detail on how these are calculated (see previous 
essay of this thesis for this), a few salient characteristics of the dataset are recalled. 
First, all IO matrices used are reduced to 25 sectors (25x25) which are homogeneous 
across all countries. This is done so as to match the trade data to the IO tables. The 
outcome largely reflects a manufacturing world where all service sectors are 
condensed into one sector158. Data is available for a selection of 39 countries and a 
period of 14 years (1995-2008)159. Because the IO tables are only available in 
periodic (generally 5 year) intervals, they are extended annually so as to obtain 
yearly estimates of the desired dependent variables. The extensions are based on the 
1995 tables for observations from 1995 to 1997; those between 1998 and 2002 come 
from the 2000 base year tables; and the observations for 2003-2008 are from the 
2005 tables. Values are deflated to 2000 prices using specific country deflators from 
the OECD and converted into dollars using exchange rates from the Penn World 
Tables.  
The extension of the technological coefficients across years close to the base tables 
has certain implications. The first is that the technological coefficients are assumed 
                                                 
157 The incorporation of spatial correlation into gravity estimations is implicit in AvW who suggested 
that trade flows depended not only on the proximity of a partner but also on the distance to other third 
markets. 
158 This means that there is no service trade between countries. Given that the aggregate indicator is a 
weighted average of the sectoral VS, removing these can cause either an upward or downward bias in 
the actual degree of VS depending on the importance of service sectors in i) total trade and ii) 
vertically specialised trade. Preliminary observations suggest that VS in services seems to be lower 
than that of manufacturing. 
159 The countries in the sample are Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
United States, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Estonia, India, Indonesia, Israel, Romania, Russia, 
Slovenia, and South Africa. 
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to remain relatively stable in periods close to the base years. Although the Input 
Output literature suggests that this is a reasonable assumption (see Vaccara, 1986 and 
UN, 1999), one might expect changes in technological coefficients to be more 
pronounced as a result of the growing international fragmentation of production. This 
might result in a downwards bias in the measures of vertically specialised trade. 
However, the advantage of using the OECD database, as opposed to other sources of 
IO data such as the GTAP database, is that it covers more base years and hence 
allows calculated measures of VS to vary through changes in technology and also 
through changes in trade shares160. 
 
The technological constraints of the system, dictated by the proportionality 
assumption used, see the use of intermediate imports across origins as the same 
irrespective of the origin of the intermediate imports. Hence if Mexico requires 0.3 
units of imported intermediates to produce one unit of output, it will import inputs in 
this proportion from all countries. This assumption is common in the literature and is 
also used in Johnson and Noguera (2011). One of the implications arising from the 
reliance on such assumptions is that the measures of vertically specialised trade are 
computed rather than observed measures. This implies that they are proxies for value 
chain activity. 
2.6.1.1. MEASURES OF VERTICALLY SPECIALISED TRADE 
 
The empirical analysis will begin with a calibration exercise that will use total 
bilateral trade flows, extracted from COMTRADE, to identify the most appropriate 
empirical approach to eliminating biases arising from unobserved heterogeneity. 
Once the appropriate empirical specification has been identified, the role of an FTA 
on several measures of vertical specialisation will be investigated. This will initially 
be done on the basis of the value of intermediate imports (equation 2.13) and 
subsequently on the share of intermediate imports over exports (equation 2.15)161. 
                                                 
160 Unlike the indicators calculated by Johnson and Noguera (2011) which only exhibit variations 
through changes in trade shares. 
161 The rationale for looking at the role of trade agreements on the value of vertically specialised trade 
is that it allows one to track how an FTA affects backward and forward linkages simultaneously. It is 
convenient to recall, from the previous essay, that the backward linkage of Mexico with the US is the 
same, in value terms, as the forward linkage of the US with Mexico. Additionally, using values as 
dependent variables also facilitates identifying the role of an FTA as a share measure could be 
affected by FTA impacts on the numerator and also on the denominator. 
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Four different measures of the value of intermediate goods trade between countries 
will be looked at. These capture the three different uses that can be given to imported 
inputs where each of these identifies different involvements in value chain activity. 
1. Intimps_bec: captures the value of total intermediate imports, from a partner 
country, identified suing the BEC nomenclature. It does not differentiate across 
the use of imports which here may serve to satisfy either domestic demand or 
exports. (see Diagram A in Figure 2.1) 
2. Intimps_tot: is the same measure as above but uses IO tables to identify the 
value of intermediate imports rather than the BEC nomenclature162. (see 
Diagram A in Figure 2.1) 
3. Intimps_bvs: measures the value of intermediate imports, from a partner 
country, that are used in the production of world exports. This measure is 
calculated using the OECD IO tables and trade data from Comtrade as per 
equation 2.1. (see Diagram B in Figure 2.1)  
4. Intimps_bvs_bil: then captures the value of intermediate imports from a partner 
country that are used in the production of exports to that same country. This 
measure is calculated using equation 2.1 but with a different destination for 
export flows. (see Diagram C in Figure 2.1) 
 
Figure 2.1 provides a visual representation of how intermediate imports can be used 
in productive processes using Mexico and the US as examples. The red arrows show 
the different intermediate import flows that the above measures capture. The 
difference between these is in the use that is given to the intermediate inputs which 
depends on the destination of the output flow here shown through the blue arrows. 
The first two measures (1) and (2) are depicted in the first diagram (A) of this figure. 
They both capture Mexico’s total intermediate imports from the US but use a 
different identification criterion to identify imported inputs (the first using the BEC 
nomenclature the second using IO tables). They represent Mexico’s total use of 
imported intermediates from the US irrespective of whether these inputs serve to 
produce domestic output or exports to any destination. Differentiating across 
identification strategy is useful because the BEC nomenclature has often been 
                                                 
162 This is essentially the sum of the calculated bilateral intermediate import matrix. 
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described as arbitrary and hence comparing BEC identified intermediate imports 
with intermediate imports identified from IO tables will help test how arbitrary this 
nomenclature really is. The third measure is then associated with diagram (B). It 
captures the value of a subset of Mexico’s intermediate imports from the US, namely 
those that Mexico uses to produce total exports. The final measure of intermediate 
imports, diagram (C), then captures yet another subset of Mexico’s intermediate 
imports from the US but in this instance those which are used to produce products 
that are exported back to the US. As can be seen by the size of the red arrows, the 
value of imported intermediates declines as a more narrow use for imported inputs is 
identified.  
Figure 2.1: Value of Intermediate Imports Differentiated by Use 
 
 
 
In addition to looking at the impact of an FTA on the value of intermediate imports, 
it is also relevant to look at how an FTA affects the structure of trade. This is done by 
using an indicator of bilateral vertical specialisation, bvs_bil. The numerator of this 
measure is the value of intermediate imports (in measure (4)) and the denominator is 
the exports to the destination from which these inputs originated (see also equation 
2.15). In looking at the role of an FTA on the structure of trade it will be important to 
bear in mind that an FTA is likely to affect both the numerator and the denominator 
of this expression and hence caution will need to be taken in its interpretation. 
 
The rationale for differentiating across the use of intermediate products is that these 
can identify different facets of production sharing. The first two measures capture the 
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aggregate use of intermediates, but the final two measures may be more 
representative of international and bilateral value chain activity respectively. This is 
because both the origin of the input and the destination of the resulting output is 
international. FTAs may impact such flows differently. 
2.6.1.2. OTHER VARIABLES 
 
The typical gravity variables are drawn from CEPII’s gravity database. It provides 
the time invariant geographical indicators as well as the bilateral identifiers of the 
presence or absence of an FTA. This variable is coded so that it is equal to unity 
when there is an FTA between two partners in any given year and zero otherwise. It 
is extended to include the two extra years in the sample; 2007 and 2008 through 
imputation informed from the WTO RTA database (see appendix A2.3 for further 
details). This variable only captures reciprocal FTAs and hence does not identify 
unilateral preferences.  
 
The theoretically derived gravity model of input trade (2.13) suggests that input 
varieties and technological constraints are also likely to be important in determining 
the value of intermediate imports. Partner country GDP per capita will be used as a 
proxy for the amount of varieties partner countries produce and non-linearities in this 
term will be introduced through the log of this variable squared163. The Finger-
Kreinin (FK) indicator will be used to proxy for reporter country preferences for 
partner country goods or for the technological parameters (φ)164. This is a bilateral 
measure that captures the similarity in the composition of reporter and partner 
exports to the world. To the extent that a more similar composition of exports might 
be evidence of similar factor intensities in the production structures, this indicator 
can be used to gauge whether trade predominantly occurs between similarly endowed 
countries or not. Many gravity models use a GDP per capita variable for this very 
                                                 
163 This is, in effect, a transposition of the Linder (1961) hypothesis which postulates that countries 
that have higher income demand more new varieties. Additionally, the correlation between varieties 
and GDP per capita is documented in Saure (2009) who uses Feenstra and Kee (2004) for the 
identification of varieties and correlates this measure with per capita GDP. Funke and Ruhwedel 
(2001) also suggest that varieties and GDP per capita are highly correlated. 
164 Finger Kreinin indicator represents the similarity in exports to the world between country i and j: 
( )∑=
c
ctwldjctwlditwldiFK ,,,,,,,, ,min δδ . Where ctwldi ,,,δ  and ctwldj ,,,δ  are the share of exports from 
country i in product c to the world and the share of exports from country j in product c to the world, 
respectively. It captures the similarity of exporting structures across two countries and hence may be 
indicative of similarities in the factor content of exports. 
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purpose165, hence including the FK variable should allow GDP per capita coefficient 
to more fully capture the variety effect rather than the factor endowment composition 
effect. The main variables used in the estimation are summarised below. 
 
Table 2.1: Variables used in Gravity Model Estimation 
Variable Description Source 
Vertical 
Specialisation* 
The import content of exports. Calculated using 
expression (2.1). (the variables used in the estimation 
are described in more detail below)  
OECD STAN database 
and Comtrade. (see 
details in Appendix 
A2.3) 
intermediate 
goods* 
Calculated using expression (2.1) but presented in 
value terms rather than as a share of exports as above. 
(see Figure 2.1.) See above. 
Trade Total exports and total imports (deflated
166
) Comtrade using WITS  
GDP PPP Constant 2000 prices (country deflators)  WDI 
GDP per capita PPP Constant 2000 prices (country deflators)  WDI 
FK 
Used to capture the production technologies of 
countries  
Comtrade, calculated 
using TradeSift  
Distance 
variables (trade 
costs) 
-Contiguity =1 for contiguity 
-Comlang_off= 1 if same official language 
-Dist = Distance from capitals 
-Dist_w = weighted distance 
-Pop = population 
-area = area in sq kms  CEPII gravity database 
FTA  -FTA=1 if countries in FTA, else =0 
 CEPII gravity database 
(extended for 2007 and 
2008 using RTA 
database in WTO 
webpage) 
 Notes: * values deflated using OECD PPI
167
 
 
2.6.1.3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DATABASE 
 
The incidence of trade agreements in the sample is captured in Table 2.2. In 1995, 
around 25% of countries are part of a trade agreement where 192 dyad agreements 
are identified. This figure rises to 48% by 2008 with 357 dyads in an agreement 
showing the well documented rise in regionalism. Table 2.2 also suggest that the 
temporal variance in the FTA variable may be small. Indeed only 22% of dyads 
switch into an agreement during the sample period so that 77% of the possible dyads 
                                                 
165 See a broader discussion of including GDP per capita in Markusen (2011). 
166 Baldwin and Taglione (2007) suggest that deflating trade data using a common country’s price 
index, such as the US deflator (commonly used in the literature) can induce biases. An appropriate use 
of FE may also reduce biases from using nominal values. 
167 The OECD PPI is used to deflate the trade data although it is acknowledged that the choice of 
deflator is important. An alternative option would have been to use country specific deflators but it is 
possible that these are more revealing of changes in domestic non-tradeable goods rather than 
internationally traded products. Given that there is little information about trade deflators we will rely 
on econometric techniques to minimise price effects in the estimations (i.e. through the use of 
country-year effects). 
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are either in an agreement for the entirety of the sample time (25% of the sample) or 
in no agreement throughout (52% of the sample)168. Agreements with no temporal 
variation include the EU-15, NAFTA, EFTA, ANZCERTA and MERCOSUR. In 
addition, the sample is relatively euro-centric where, of the 196 dyad agreements in 
1995, 105 involve the EU-15 agreements169. This may be problematic if 
unobservable characteristics of EU countries drive the results of the estimation. This 
can arise if differences in the depth of integration are important. Because an FTA 
between Chile and Japan is more ‘shallow’ than one between Germany and France, 
having a large set of ‘deep’ agreements in the sample may inflate the impact of an 
FTA on trade170.   
 
Table 2.2: Count of FTA variable by dyad 1995 - 2008 
YEAR 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
F
T
A
 
No 545 526 519 514 501 473 459 456 442 391 389 386 385 384 
Yes 196 215 222 227 240 268 282 285 299 350 352 355 356 357 
Notes: The values show the number of dyadic agreements.   
 
Although the sample is largely composed of developed countries from the OECD, it 
also comprises several emerging economies such as Brazil, China, Russia, India, 
South Africa and Indonesia. There are however no LDCs (due to data limitations) 
which implies that the analysis is constrained to a particular set of countries that have 
achieved a certain level of development171. Nevertheless, the 39 countries in the 
sample used in this essay represent just over 80% of world trade in 2008 where the 
EU-27 alone represents around 37% of world trade172. One of the positive 
consequences of using such a largely industrialised-country sample is the near 
absence of zero trade flows. Out of over 20,000 observations there are 79 zero’s in 
                                                 
168 Table A2.2. in the appendix, detailing the characteristics of the variables of interest, confirms a 
much lower within than between variation for the FTA variable in the sample. 
169 Note that this number is smaller than what would be expected if all EU countries were in the 
sample (i.e. 15*14=210) because Belgium and Luxembourg do not feature. 
170 Various robustness checks of the results are presented so as to ascertain that the results are not 
being driven by EU effects. 
171 Although we expect little value chain activity arising with these countries, not having them in the 
sample can be constraining. It would have been an interesting exercise to include these to relate 
usefulness of trade policy in promoting value chain participation in these types of countries. With our 
current sample we can only draw broad generalisations on such issues. 
172 The EU represents 48% of the trade data in the sample in 2008. 
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the trade matrix173. This suggests that the estimation of the gravity model should not 
concern itself too much with the presence of zero’s in the trade matrix.  
The geographical dispersion of the countries in the sample is shown in Figure 2.2. 
The left hand panel suggests that preferential partners tend to be geographically 
concentrated. However there is certainly evidence of a cluster of more distant 
countries engaging in preferential agreements174. To the extent that the gravity model 
will control for distance effects this should not be overly problematic. 
Figure 2.2: Distance and FTA formation 
 
Notes: The left panel shows the distance between FTA partners whereas the right panel shows the 
distance between countries that do not share an FTA. This is over the entire sample. 
2.6.2. MODEL SPECIFICATION; CHOOSING THE FIXED EFFECTS  
The theoretical model derived in the previous section is an augmented gravity model 
which can be used to capture the impact of a trade agreement on intermediate goods 
trade. However, the empirical specification will need to be approached with care so 
that it accounts not only for the ‘multilateral resistance’ (Anderson and Van 
Wincoop, 2003) and ‘openness’ terms but also for the endogenous formation of trade 
agreements (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). Furthermore, variety and technology 
constraints, which are not generally present in traditional gravity models, also need 
to be incorporated into the estimating equation. Not including these variables when 
looking at the impact of an FTA on intermediate goods trade could also give rise to 
                                                 
173 38 of which occur due to the lack of data for Russia in 1995. 
174 This cluster involves the FTAs of Mexico, Chile and South Africa with more distant countries and 
in particular with the EU. Essay 3 shows that there are many new ‘distant’ FTAs being signed and 
investigates some of the reasons behind this relatively new phenomenon.  
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incidences of unobserved heterogeneity (if these variables are correlated with 
incentives to form trade agreements). 
One can mitigate, or even eliminate, many of the biases that arise from unobserved 
heterogeneity through the use of an appropriate set of fixed effects (see Baier and 
Bergstrand, 2007; Feenstra, 2004; and Baldwin and Taglione, 2007). Such models 
are preferable to random effects (RE) approaches because they accommodate for 
correlations between the unobserved variables and the FTA variable, which, 
according to Baier and Bergstrand (2007 - henceforth BB), are the source of the 
biases in such estimations175. BB estimate the following gravity model of trade: 
lnM,	,
 = β +β(lnRGDP,
 ∗ lnRGDP,
) + β(lnDIST,	) +β(CONTIG,	) + 	βLANG,	 +
 β5FTAi,j,t +  ui,j,t  
β

= 	 , + 	, + 	,  
(2.19) 
Imports of country i from country j at time t (Mijt) are explained by covariates that 
capture economic mass (GDPs of reporter and partner country); geographical barriers 
(distance, contiguity and language); and trade policy variables (FTA). The economic 
mass variable represents the demand and supply conditions whereas the remaining 
variables reflect trading costs. BB introduce country-year and country pair fixed 
effects as control measures for unobserved heterogeneity (captured here in β0)
176. 
 
Following an assumption that sees the consumer demand for imports as isomorphic 
to a country’s demand for inputs, the model derived in equation 2.14 can be log-
linearised into the following estimable gravity model of total trade:  
 
,, =  + (, ∗ ,) + (,) +, + , +
 , + !. + ,, + 	 ",,  
 
β

= 	 , + 	,  
                                                 
175 Support for the use of a FE model over a RE is also established in the basis of a Hausman test. 
176 See Egger (2000) for a discussion of the superiority of FE estimation over RE models in a gravity 
setting. 
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(2.20) 
The main difference between (2.19) and (2.20) is that the latter includes a variety and 
a consumer ‘preference’ variable. However, when estimated, these models are very 
similar. This is because BB’s model incorporates country-year FEs which are 
collinear with the variety and ‘preference’ variables. This goes to show that using an 
appropriate set of FE can compensate for omissions in the gravity specification. 
 
But the selection of the FE in these models needs to be approached with care. The 
choice of one set of FE over another will affect the variance of the variables and 
hence the interpretation of the FTA coefficient. The fixed effects in (2.19) include 
country pair controls which introduce a variable that fixes, or is collinear with, all 
country pair characteristics; hence if the cause of unobserved heterogeneity is 
bilateral and time invariant in nature then this serves as an appropriate control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. However, the use of such FE also restricts the FTA 
variable so that it only varies in time across a given dyad. Therefore the estimated 
FTA coefficient will capture the impact of switching into a trade agreement177. If the 
temporal variance of the FTA variable is large enough, then this is tantamount to 
calculating the impact of an agreement, and this is the case in BB’s sample which 
ranges from the year 1960 to the mid 90’s178. However in shorter panels, where many 
FTAs are in place throughout the entire sample period, the use of these FE will result 
in the FTA coefficient not being estimated for FTAs that are in place and do not vary 
in time. 
 
The sample used in this essay contains data from 1995 to 2008, it comprises many 
agreements that were already in place at the beginning of the sample period and 
hence for which there is no temporal variance179. Therefore, estimating (2.20) using 
this sample and bilateral fixed effects would only capture the impact of new FTAs on 
trade flows, or the impact of ‘switching’ from no agreement to an agreement. This 
would imply that the effects of the EU-15, NAFTA, EFTA, MERCOSUR and 
ANZCERTA agreements would not be captured because these FTAs where in place 
before the beginning of the first year of the sample and there has been no ‘switch’ in 
                                                 
177 This transpires by virtue of the within variation estimator that is characteristic of FE models. 
178 Although it is worth stressing that BB would ‘miss’ the effects of the original EEC agreement. 
179 It is limited because indicators of vertically specialised trade require the use of IO tables which are 
not available before 1995 in harmonised formats. 
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these in time (i.e. FTA=1 throughout sample period). This then suggest that tackling 
endogeneity issues may be preferable, in this instance, through a model that does not 
use pair-wise FE180. For this purpose, a set of interacted FE that control for reporter-
year and partner-year characteristics is proposed181.  
 
The use of these is justified on various grounds; first, on the basis that these control 
for the traditional country specific and time varying multilateral resistance terms. 
Second, that they also provide appropriate controls for other important time varying 
unobserved characteristics such as the amount of varieties produced across countries 
and specific country technologies. This choice of FEs implies that one adheres to the 
assumption that the determinants of FTAs are country-year specific. Or that selection 
into agreements and trade flows are determined by common parameters that are 
country year specific. But the use of these controls has to be justified, particularly in 
light of BB’s proposed use of bilateral fixed effects. Moreover, it is also important to 
understand how these country-year FEs affect the variance of the FTA variable, or in 
other words what the FTA coefficient captures in the presence of these controls. 
 
The introduction of country-year FE implies the use of different intercepts for each 
reporter-year and partner-year observation. Hence, for any given reporter-year 
observation, the FTA variable varies across partners in that same year. So the FTA 
coefficient should capture differences in trade, intermediate or not, between say 
Mexico’s preferential partners and those with whom Mexico does not share an 
agreement. Effectively, one would be comparing how much more Mexico imports 
from the US, a preferential partner, to how much it imports from a non preferential 
partner such as China in a given year and controlling for the different characteristics 
of these partner countries182.  
 
                                                 
180 Another issue that arises from the use of pair-wise FE is that if the FTA variable does not exhibit 
temporal variance, then effectively an estimation that uses these is comparing a treated group of 
countries which have switched into an agreement against a control group of countries that have not 
switched. This control group will include countries that have not switched their preferential status but 
that are in an agreement throughout the sample and also countries that have not switched but are not 
part of an agreement. This may generate a downwards bias in the estimated FTA coefficient. 
181 Baltagi et al. (2003) use these in conjunction with reporter, partner, year and bilateral FE, but they 
are not interested in the FTA coefficient. Ruiz and Vilarrubia (2008) then suggest that country-year 
FE are appropriate controls for multilateral resistance terms. 
182 i.e. the within variance is country year specific with respect to partners. 
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Table 2.3 shows the results obtained from estimating equation (2.20) for total trade. 
The first column identifies the OLS estimates; the second column adds bilateral and 
time fixed effects (FE1); the third column includes individual country (reporter and 
partner) and time fixed effects (FE2); and the fourth column is the specification that 
includes reporter-year and partner-year fixed effects (FE3). Focusing on the FTA 
coefficient; the first column shows that the impact of an FTA on trade flows is of 
around 29%. Here there are no controls for unobserved heterogeneity or multilateral 
resistance and hence these estimates are likely to be biased. In the second column, 
the FTA coefficient captures the impact of switching into an agreement through the 
use of bilateral FE. This is associated with an 11% increase in bilateral trade183. In 
the third column, using individual reporter, partner and year effects, an FTA is seen 
to increase bilateral imports by 26%. The large difference between the results 
obtained in the previous columns may reflect the aforementioned constraints on the 
variance of the FTA variable imposed through the use of different FE. 
 
The final specification then uses country-year FE. Here the sign and size of the 
coefficients are in line with the literature. The mass coefficient is positive and close 
to 1 and trade flows are decreasing in distance but increasing with contiguity and a 
common official language184. The FTA coefficient in this specification sees the 
impact of an FTA increasing the value of total imports by around 27%185. This is 
somewhat lower than the FTA effect found in the OLS estimation which may reflect 
an upward bias in the OLS estimates. This is consistent with Baier and Bergstrand’s 
(2004) hypothesis that countries that engage in trade agreements have chosen 
‘well’186. The variety variable here only fluctuates across partners and hence is 
capturing relative differences in the varieties that partners produce so that more 
                                                 
183 This is calculated by taking the exponential of the coefficient. 
184 The mass variables take on a coefficient of 1 although many empirical studies find different 
coefficients for these. Baldwin and Taglione (2007) suggest that this may arise because of the 
inappropriate use of FE or indeed to an erroneous (or theoretically inconsistent) deflation of the 
independent variables. Other justification for coefficients above or below unity have been attributed to 
the importance of non-tradables within an economy.  
185 The results in this column also appear to yield lower standard errors on the time varying 
coefficients when compared to column (3). Although the standard errors are bigger on the GDP per 
capita variable. This is due to the fact that this variable is only fluctuating across partners in this 
specification. 
186 i.e. the FTA coefficient is higher in the OLS estimates because countries that share trade enhancing 
unobserved characteristics are more likely to engage in FTAs. Because the OLS estimation does not 
control for these factors, it attributes the higher trade flows to the FTA and hence the coefficient is 
upward biased.  
131 
 
varieties seem to increase trade flows but at a decreasing rate. The consumer 
‘preference’ variable, which is captured by the FK and is bilateral and time-varying, 
appears not to be significant. This is perhaps because production structures matter 
predominantly for intermediate goods trade rather than total trade.  
Table 2.3: The impact of FTAs on total imports 
  
 
Dependent Variable: lnimports 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS FE1 FE 2 FE 3 
(repart) (rep, par, year) (repyear, paryear) 
Lncombgdp 0.890*** 1.014*** 1.003*** 1.060*** 
(0.00407) (0.0244) (0.0466) (0.0329) 
Lndist -0.761*** -1.063*** -1.065*** 
(0.00982) (0.0544) (0.0171) 
Contig 0.576*** 0.244** 0.246*** 
(0.0340) (0.111) (0.0316) 
comlang_off 0.647*** 0.564*** 0.567*** 
(0.0274) (0.0984) (0.0276) 
FTA 0.254*** 0.104*** 0.234*** 0.240*** 
(0.0196) (0.0322) (0.0676) (0.0331) 
lngdpcap_d -1.289*** 1.215*** 1.200*** 1.187*** 
(0.0841) (0.183) (0.145) (0.386) 
lngdpcap_d2 0.0676*** -0.129*** -0.128*** -0.0881*** 
(0.00478) (0.0102) (0.00859) (0.0218) 
Lnfk 0.0920*** 0.254*** 0.00318 -0.0340 
(0.0180) (0.0663) (0.135) (0.0411) 
Constant -21.69*** -40.39*** -31.84*** -37.84*** 
(0.466) (1.333) (2.107) (2.851) 
FE: reporter NO NO YES NO 
FE: partner NO NO YES NO 
FE: Year NO YES YES NO 
FE: bilateral NO YES NO NO 
FE: reporter-year NO NO NO YES 
FE: partner-year NO NO NO YES 
Observations 20,631 20,631 20,631 20,631 
R-squared 0.801 0.540 0.836 0.843 
r2_o . 0.388 0.867 0.809 
r2_w . 0.540 0.836 0.843 
r2_b . 0.383 0.951 0.799 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered across groups (G). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Coefficients on Dummy variables not reported for brevity 
 
The results presented in this final column are fairly standard. They will serve as a 
benchmark for future reference and also as a tool for testing whether the proposed FE 
resolve problems that arise from the endogeneity of the FTA variable. Recalling that 
BB used bilateral FE in addition to the country-year effects raises the question of 
whether the latter alone provide appropriate controls for the biases caused by 
unobserved heterogeneity. It is possible to test whether these biases are accounted for 
by re-estimating equation 2.20 with the incorporation of a future FTA variable 
(FTA+5 – which captures FTA status five years into the future). Baier and 
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Bergstrand (2007:90) suggest that “if FTA changes are strictly exogenous to trade 
flow changes, [a future FTA (FTA+5)] should be uncorrelated with the concurrent 
trade flow”187. Hence appropriate controls will have been provided if the future FTA 
variable is not significantly correlated with current trade flows. 
 
Implementing this test requires some additional thought, particularly when the FTA 
variable exhibits a small temporal variance. If the FTA and the FTA+5 variables are 
highly correlated then the test may not capture whether the set of FE used control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. This is because a high correlation between these variables 
results in the FTA+5 variable behaving like the FTA variable which should be 
associated with positive trade effects. An example can help illustrate this. In 1995 
Mexico shares an agreement with both the US and Canada and hence the FTA 
dummy is equal to one with each of these countries. Because Mexico still shares 
these agreements in the year 2000 then effectively the FTA and the FTA+5 variables 
are the same and this leads to a high correlation between FTAs and their future lags 
as shown in Table 2.4 (think of a similar issue also arising with the EU countries). 
This implies that the test might fail to capture whether the issue of unobserved 
heterogeneity has been resolved and that this failure will be due to the 
implementation of the test on a sample with a large prevalence of trade agreements 
before the sample period. 
 
Table 2.4: Correlation Coefficients between FTA variable and its forward lags 
Fta fta+3 fta+4 fta+5 fta+6 fta+7 
fta 1 
fta+3 0.830 1 
fta+4 0.791 0.953 1 
fta+5 0.759 0.914 0.959 1 
fta+6 0.736 0.886 0.930 0.970 1 
fta+7 0.717 0.864 0.907 0.946 0.975 1 
Source: Own calculations 
Note: number of observations 15260 
 
When this test is carried out on the full sample, the FTA+5 coefficient is indeed 
positive and significant (see Appendix A2.4)188. And this may occur even when 
issues related to unobserved heterogeneity have been resolved. The question that is 
being asked from the data is whether a future FTA affects current trade flows, hence 
                                                 
187 This is effectively a test for reverse causality. 
188 See appendix A2.4 for a full sample table and a discussion 
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it seems reasonable that such a test be carried out on countries where the FTA 
variable has some temporal variance (i.e. for countries that are not in an agreement at 
the beginning of the sample)189. Effectively, refining the above question, what needs 
to be asked is whether countries that were not in a trade agreement exhibited high 
trade volumes with each other before an agreement was implemented. This suggests 
that the test should be carried out on a sample of countries that did not share an 
agreement at the beginning of the sample period. If appropriate controls for the 
sources of unobserved heterogeneity are provided, or controls for the reasons that 
cause countries to trade more or less with each other before and agreement, then the 
FTA+5 coefficient should not be significantly different from zero.  
 
The results of this test, for this reduced sample of countries which were not in an 
agreement in 1995 are shown in Table 2.5. The positive coefficient on the FTA+5 
variable in the first column suggests that countries that trade more are also more 
likely to form trade agreements. This OLS estimation does not control for the reasons 
behind countries trading more with each other pre-agreements and hence unobserved 
heterogeneity remains. The remaining columns of Table 2.5 show the results of 
incorporating the future FTA variable to the same estimations that were presented in 
Table 2.3. It shows that the two first sets of FE, namely bilateral FE combined with 
year dummy’s (FE1) and individual country and time effects (FE2), continue to yield 
a positive FTA+5 coefficient and hence provide inappropriate controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity. However when the FE are country-year specific (FE3), 
the FTA+5 loses significance and the FTA variable recaptures its significance190. 
This implies that this type of FE control for the reasons that make countries trade 
more pre agreement and hence that suitable controls for the problems arising from 
unobserved heterogeneity have been provided, at the very least for the sample that is 
used in this essay191. 
                                                 
189 The selection criteria that are used identifies countries that had not signed an agreement by 1995. 
This includes country pairs that have no agreement throughout and also those that switch into an 
agreement during the sample period. 
190 A set of sensitivity test, using other future lags for the FTA variable can be found in the appendix 
(A2.4).  
191 Removing countries from the sample to carry out such a test may be problematic; it involves some 
form of selection. If this selection is driven by common factors then this test may be invalidated as it 
might not reflect whole sample properties. However the fact that the FTA+5 variable exhibits the 
desired insignificant coefficient implies that the proposed FE are appropriate for the sample that is 
used in this essay. 
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Table 2.5: Exogeneity test with FTA forward lag 
Dependent Variable: lnimports 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS FE1 FE 2 FE 3 
VARIABLES (repart) (rep. Par, year) (repyear, paryear) 
Lncombgdp 0.893*** 0.909*** 0.898*** 0.815*** 
(0.00944) (0.0458) (0.0744) (0.0814) 
Lndist -0.853*** -1.411*** -1.415*** 
(0.0193) (0.101) (0.0365) 
Contig 0.611*** 0.240 0.233*** 
(0.0873) (0.193) (0.0656) 
comlang_off 0.943*** 0.838*** 0.841*** 
(0.0655) (0.132) (0.0425) 
FTA 0.146*** 0.00597 0.0918 0.224*** 
(0.0351) (0.0324) (0.0548) (0.0681) 
FTA+5 0.262*** 0.183*** 0.228*** 0.0183 
(0.0498) (0.0615) (0.0810) (0.0777) 
lngdpcap_d -4.974*** 0.794* 0.675 
(0.303) (0.433) (0.599) 
lngdpcap_d2 0.265*** -0.103*** -0.0960*** -0.00751 
(0.0166) (0.0230) (0.0334) (0.00660) 
Lnfk -0.200*** 0.237 0.289** 0.284*** 
(0.0357) (0.155) (0.140) (0.0651) 
Constant -4.649*** -33.30*** -22.02*** -17.11*** 
(1.512) (2.650) (4.702) (4.099) 
Observations 4,550 4,550 4,550 4,550 
R-squared 0.745 0.517 0.847 0.864 
r2_o . 0.395 0.797 0.764 
r2_w . 0.517 0.847 0.864 
r2_b . 0.389 0.735 0.671 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered reporter-year, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
2.6.3. RESULTS 
The previous section was concerned with establishing the credentials of using a 
country-year FE approach to resolve issues that might arise from unobserved 
heterogeneity. In this section, this model is used to estimate the impact of a trade 
agreement on vertically specialised trade192.First this will be done for measures that 
capture the value of intermediate trade flows and subsequently the impact of an FTA 
on the structure or trade, captured through an indicator measure of vertical 
specialisation, will be investigated. 
2.6.3.1. THE IMPACT OF AN FTA ON THE VALUE OF INTERMEDIATE IMPORTS 
The impact of an FTA on the value of intermediate goods trade is considered first 
through the log-linearisation of equation (2.13):  
                                                 
192 A test for endogeneity is also undertaken when the dependent variable is intermediate goods trade 
and can be found in the appendix A2.4 tables A2.6 and A2.7. 
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(2.21) 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the value of intermediate imports 
of country i from country j. This is a function of; supply and demand forces, Cj,t and 
Ci,t respectively; the amount of varieties that countries i and j produce, n; and their 
technologies, φ. The rest of the terms capture the typical trade cost variables 
subsumed in τ, and the multilateral resistance and openness terms. One of the first 
hurdles faced in this estimation is the choice of the ‘mass’ variables that capture the 
supply and demand conditions for intermediates. Baldwin and Taglione (2011) 
suggest that using the log of the reporter and the partner GDP is likely to be an 
inappropriate measure because “trade is measured on a gross sale basis whilst GDP is 
measured on a value added basis”. Additionally, the theoretical model herein derived 
suggested that the mass variables need to be chosen with care as the general 
equilibrium conditions were set with respect to the gross use of inputs rather than a 
net measure of income which is calculated from the OECD IO tables193. Using per 
capita GDP to capture the number of input varieties and the FK indicator to measure 
differences in technologies suggest the estimation of the following gravity model of 
input trade: 
 
 = , + , 	+ (&'',,) + ((,)	+),, + (,) +
	 , + 	(!.) + 	,, + 	 ",,  
(2.22) 
Table 2.6 presents the results of the estimation of equation (2.22) for four separate 
measures of intermediate imports that were discussed in the data section. The 
dependent variable in the first column is the log of the value of total intermediate 
imports identified using the BEC nomenclature (lnintimps_bec). In the second 
column, a similar dependent variable is used but it captures the log of the value of 
total imported intermediates identified using IO tables (lnintimps_tot). It is expected 
that differences in the reported coefficients of these estimations reveal the presence 
of systematic problems in the use of the BEC nomenclature. The third column then 
                                                 
193 It is calculated by subtracting the value added of the economy from its gross output. 
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uses the log of the value of intermediate imports that are used to produce total 
exports to the world as the dependent variable (lnintimps_bvs). In the final column 
the dependent variable is the log of the value of intermediate imports that are used to 
produce exports to the same partner from which the inputs originated 
(lnintimps_bvsbil). Differences in the coefficient estimates between the estimations 
of these measures are expected to reflect how the use of intermediate imports might 
matter and in particular if there are differences between participating in an 
international value chain or in a bilateral value chain. The final measure is expected 
to show some evidence of ‘magnification’ because it reflects production sequences 
characterised by a back and forth movement of products.  
 
Comparing the first two columns of Table 2.6 reveals little differences between the 
coefficient estimates in a model that uses the BEC nomenclature to identify 
intermediate products and one that uses IO tables. This suggests that there is little 
evidence of the BEC nomenclature being a ‘bad’ identifier of intermediate 
products194. Although this point may seem trivial, it provides a degree of comfort to 
the studies that rely heavily on this identification method. The FTA coefficient in 
both equations is of a similar size and suggests that countries import 25% more 
inputs, in value, from preferential partners than from non-preferential partners all 
else being equal. The comparison of these results with those obtained in Table 2.3 
reveal that there are little differences in the impact of an FTA on total and 
intermediate imports and that, if anything, FTAs affect total imports more than they 
affect intermediates imports (this is in line with the results obtained by Orefice and 
Rocha, 2011). 
 
Turning then to column (3), which reflects international value chain activity with 
respect to the world, it can be seen that the impact of an FTA exceeds that which was 
earlier reported. The effect of an FTA is 5 percentage points higher when 
intermediate products are used as part of an international value chain195. This, a 
                                                 
194 Notionally, perhaps both identification strategies are as bad as each other though! The correlation 
coefficient between these measures is 0.97. 
195 Chaney (2008) predicts that the elasticity of substitution across products affects the responsiveness 
of trade to changes in trade barriers differently due to opposing effects on the intensive and extensive 
margins of trade. The simple explanation for this is that when one allows for firm heterogeneity, a 
high degree of substitution reduces the associated profits that a firm can derive due to the intense 
competition in the market. Lowering trade barriers would then result in more competition which 
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priori, suggests that vertically linked trade is more sensitive to trade policy than 
normal trade in intermediates or that an FTA promotes this type of activity more than 
it promotes total or intermediate imports. Turning then to column (4), where the 
dependent variable is the value of the import content of exports from the same 
origin/destination, the effects of an FTA are seen to be much more pronounced. Here 
the FTA coefficient doubles so that an agreement increases the value of the 
intermediate imports used in a bilateral value chain by over 65%. The mass and 
distance coefficients also increase considerably which may reflect that this type of 
trade might be more sensitive to supply and demand conditions, as well as trade 
costs, than the other types of intermediate goods trade. Moreover, the positive 
coefficient on the variable capturing technology differences, the FK indicator, 
suggests that this term is a significant determinant of this type of trade where more 
similar exporting structures are associated with higher levels of vertically specialised 
trade. 
 
These results are consistent with Yi’s (2003) magnification effects. The large 
coefficient on the mass variable suggests a higher elasticity between this type of 
trade and GDP than that of normal trade. Yi argues that the presence of these 
magnification effects, which arise in vertically specialised modes of production, can 
help explain why world trade has grown faster than world GDP during the last 
decades. The coefficient on the mass variable is consistent with these predictions. Yi 
also suggests that these types of flows should be more sensitive to changes in trading 
costs and this is also supported by the data. Hanson et al. (2005) also provide 
evidence of this, in the case of multination activity in the US, as do Egger and 
Pfaffermayr (2005) and Chinn (2005) who identify magnification effects associated 
with two way trade in components.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
would in turn dampen the intensive margin of trade. In parallel a reduction in tariff barriers to trade 
increases the possibility of new entrants to capture market shares through higher associated profit 
prospects. This implies that “the elasticity of substitution magnifies the sensitivity of the intensive 
margin to changes in trade barriers, whereas it dampens the sensitivity of the extensive margin”. If 
there are differences between elasticities of substitution across intermediate and final goods then the 
above is relevant for this investigation. To the extent that the elasticity of substitution of intermediate 
inputs may be lower than that of the associated final good then we can expect a higher responsiveness 
of new varieties entering the market through the reduction of tariff barriers. This may explain why 
intermediate goods trade is more sensitive to the FTA variable. 
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Table 2.6: The impact of an FTA on the value of intermediate imports 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 lnintimps_bec lnintimps_tot lnintimps_bvs lnintimps_bvsbil 
Lnmass 1.062*** 1.016*** 1.018*** 1.919*** 
  (0.0299) (0.0298) (0.0316) (0.0420) 
Lndist -1.041*** -1.093*** -1.107*** -2.176*** 
  (0.0189) (0.0176) (0.0184) (0.0373) 
Contig 0.253*** 0.257*** 0.207*** 0.413*** 
  (0.0315) (0.0328) (0.0333) (0.0581) 
comlang_off 0.534*** 0.541*** 0.561*** 1.082*** 
  (0.0272) (0.0282) (0.0305) (0.0514) 
lngdpcap_d 1.133** 0.648* 0.500 1.302** 
  (0.504) (0.365) (0.384) (0.600) 
lngdpcap_d2 -0.0798*** -0.0488** -0.0384* -0.0874** 
  (0.0276) (0.0213) (0.0224) (0.0341) 
Lnfk 0.142*** 0.0483 -0.0721 0.217*** 
  (0.0447) (0.0441) (0.0506) (0.0717) 
FTA 0.221*** 0.225*** 0.266*** 0.503*** 
  (0.0378) (0.0346) (0.0378) (0.0682) 
Constant -15.67*** -19.04*** -19.23*** -46.45*** 
  (2.747) (2.111) (2.223) (3.253) 
Observations 20,624 20,631 20,631 20,590 
R-squared 0.839 0.831 0.817 0.87 
Number of repyear 545 545 545 545 
r2_o 0.786 0.797 0.737 0.763 
r2_w 0.839 0.831 0.817 0.87 
r2_b 0.725 0.762 0.626 0.696 
Notes: The mass variable is the log of the product of purchases of inputs in the reporter and partner 
countries, standard errors are clustered by reporter-year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The difference between the dependent variable in column (3) and that of column (4) 
lies in the use that is given to the imported intermediates. Differences in the 
coefficient estimates suggest that traditional gravity variables affect intermediate 
imports in different ways according to the use that is given to these. The results 
suggest that the purchase of intermediate imports from preferential partners is more 
pronounced when the resulting output is destined to the same preferential partner. Or, 
that trade policy seems to have a large effect on bilateral vertical specialisation and 
hence that FTAs may be able to effectively promote the propagation of bilateral 
value chains across preferential areas. 
 
Another possible explanation for these large effects is that they might arise from the 
complementarity of trade flows as discussed in the previous essay and in Samuelson 
(2001) and Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2011). These papers suggested that importing 
complementary intermediate products could lead to positive effects on the 
competitiveness of the associated exported product. This might imply that the 
reduction in the cost of intermediates, accomplished though the FTA, may be 
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increasing the efficiency of vertically specialised sequences of production and hence 
promoting a greater propagation of bilateral value chains.  
 
These results may also be consistent with the recent theoretical literature that 
discusses offshoring in the presence of FTAs (Ornelas and Turner, 2008 and Antras 
and Staiger, 2011). If FTAs can mitigate ‘hold-ups’, through the creation of deeper 
agreements where common regulatory frameworks are created, then it is plausible 
that these have a stronger effect on vertically specialised trade than they do on 
normal trade (see Ornelas and Turner, 2008). Because new trade agreements involve 
the negotiation of deeper provisions (see WTO 2011), then they may be better at 
tackling the causes of these hold ups. 
 
Two sensitivity checks are implemented in an effort to test the robustness of these 
results. First, it can be argued that the magnification effects identified arise from a 
‘double counting’ of trade, or are a statistical construct. One would want to test 
whether these results remain when net flows, rather than gross flows, are used. 
Second, it is possible that the euro-centricity of the sample may be driving these 
results or that vertically specialised trade is only magnified in deeper pre-established 
agreements. One would then want to investigate whether these results remain when 
using a sample that does not include the large and pre-established trading areas.  
 
The first column of Table 2.7 looks at whether ‘double-counted’ trade is driving 
these results by regressing a measure of intermediate goods trade that is netted from 
the domestic value that is embodied in the intermediate imports 
(lnnetintimps_bvsbil) against the same explanatory variables as above196. The results 
suggest that magnification effects remain and hence that these results appear not be 
driven by the ‘double-counting’ of trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
196 Details on how this measure is obtained can be found in the Appendix A2.5.3. 
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Table 2.7. Sensitivity tests, net flows and sample without large agreements  
(1) 
NET 
(2)                       (3) 
NO EU15, NAFTA, MERCOSUR 
VARIABLES lnnetintimps_bvsbil lnintimpsbvs Lnintimpsbvsbil 
lnmass 1.920*** 0.953*** 1.824*** 
(0.0418) (0.0552) (0.0942) 
lndist -2.166*** -1.245*** -2.413*** 
(0.0374) (0.0173) (0.0358) 
contig 0.393*** 0.279*** 0.622*** 
(0.0579) (0.0450) (0.0749) 
comlang_off 1.080*** 0.671*** 1.293*** 
(0.0513) (0.0318) (0.0447) 
lngdpcap_d 1.287** -4.150*** -1.943 
(0.600) (1.118) (1.191) 
lngdpcap_d2 -0.0863** 0.245*** 0.111 
(0.0340) (0.0660) (0.0734) 
lnfk 0.217*** -0.168*** 0.0244 
(0.0716) (0.0539) (0.0680) 
FTA 0.497*** 0.357*** 0.612*** 
(0.0679) (0.0456) (0.0590) 
Constant -46.67*** 7.942 -17.04*** 
(3.268) (5.005) (6.212) 
Observations 20,590 15,143 15,184 
R-squared 0.870 0.813 0.855 
r2_o 0.734 0.538 0.586 
r2_w 0.870 0.813 0.855 
r2_b 0.627 0.296 0.338 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The final two columns of Table 2.7 then attempt to identify whether the results 
obtained in Table 2.6 hold in a sample that is less EU centric. It removes all 
agreements that existed in 1995 so that the EU15 agreement as well as NAFTA and 
MERCOSUR are no longer in the sample and then re-runs the estimation of the final 
columns of Table 2.6. The results also show evidence of magnification effects. The 
impact of an FTA on bilateral value chain activity (lnintimps_bvsbil) is twice as 
large as that found for the measure of international value chain activity 
(lninimps_bvs). Moreover, the magnification effects remain with respect to the other 
coefficients. But the removal of these large pre-existing agreements also seems to 
affect the coefficient estimates on some of the trade cost measures. In Table 2.7, the 
coefficients on the distance measures are found to be significantly larger than those 
reported in Table 2.6. This might hint at differences in the partners that are engaging 
in new FTAs. This will be researched further in the next essay of this thesis. 
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2.6.3.2. THE IMPACT OF AN FTA ON VERTICAL SPECIALISATION 
 
This section looks at the impact of an FTA on the structure of trade through the  
bilateral vertical specialisation indicator – bvs_bil197. To this end, it is convenient to 
go back to the initial definition of the indicator (in equation 2.1). In its share format, 
it captures the import content of exports and has two components. The numerator is 
the value of intermediate imports used from a partner country to produce exports to 
that same partner - the intimps_bvsbil measure estimated in Column (4) of Table 2.6. 
The denominator is then the value of exports to the same partner where the imported 
intermediates originated. This is a structural measure of the degree of bilateral 
vertical specialisation and it can rise through:  
1. Increases in the value of intermediate imports (holding the denominator 
constant); or 
2. Reductions in export sales (holding the numerator constant); or 
3. A faster growth in intermediate trade than in total trade 
 
An FTA is likely to affect both the numerator and the denominator of this expression 
and hence the estimated FTA coefficients is to be interpreted as the degree to which 
agreements affect bilateral intermediate imports relative to bilateral total exports. 
Table 2.6 suggested that FTAs increase the value of intermediate imports used to 
produce exports to the same destination by 65%. The earlier results from Table 2.4 
showed that total bilateral trade increased by 27% as a result of a trade agreement. 
Because the former effect is larger than the latter, then the impact of an FTA on the 
degree of VS is expected to be positive, i.e. larger positive impact on intermediate 
imports than on exports (case 3 above presented). The reduced-form equation 
capturing the determinants of bilateral vertical specialisation derived in equation 
(2.15) can be log-linearised to produce the following estimating equation: 
 
*+'_*, = , + , + #&''$ + ((-,..,,) +),,
+ (,) +  , + (!.) + (,,) + ",, 
(2.23) 
                                                 
197 An estimation using a measure that tracks the import content of world exports is analogous in form 
to the estimation in Column 3 of Table 2.6. This is because total exports, which would represent the 
denominator of the expression, do not vary across reporter-year and hence are collinear with the set of 
FE used.  
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The mass variable that is used in this instance should capture the share of output that 
the reporter and partner country uses for purchases of intermediates198. Such a 
measure is computed by multiplying the gross output of the country by the share of 
inputs that are used by the economy. The GDPcapdiff variable is the log of the ratio 
of the GDP per capita of reporter and partner countries and the rest of the variables 
are the same that were used in previous estimations. Table 2.8 shows the coefficient 
estimates for this measure of vertical specialisation. The indicator of vertical 
specialisation is rising in economic mass and falling in distance. Lower trade costs, 
captured by the distance, contiguity and language variables also increase degrees of 
vertical specialisation. The positive coefficient on the FK variable suggests that 
technology differences between countries matter and that the more similar exporting 
structures are the large then degree of bilateral vertically specialised trade. Turning to 
the FTA coefficient, the results support the initial claim which posited that the 
impact of an FTA on the degree of VS between two countries should be positive. The 
bilateral vertical specialisation of preferential partners is 28.5% higher than that of 
non preferential partners. This give continued support to the idea that trade 
agreements can help in the propagation of bilateral value chains199. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
198 This is to reflect the mass variables in equation 2.15: 


. 
199 The estimates of an equation that places the bilateral use of intermediates to produce total exports 
as a proportion of total exports is omitted. This is because, with the use of the country-year FE, this 
expression is exactly like the one presented in the results of Table 2.6 column (3). This is because 
these fixed effects are collinear with the denominator of this expression and hence that the estimated 
model would be exactly the same is in that table. 
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Table 2.8: The impact of an FTA on Vertical Specialisation 
bvs_bil 
lnmassbvs_bil 1.146*** 
(0.0411) 
lndist -1.119*** 
(0.0191) 
contig 0.168*** 
(0.0328) 
comlang_off 0.522*** 
(0.0286) 
lngdpcapratio -0.0270 
(0.0386) 
lnfk 0.241*** 
(0.0466) 
fta 0.250*** 
(0.0381) 
Constant -23.80*** 
(1.033) 
Observations 20,590 
R-squared 0.815 
r2_o 0.389 
r2_w 0.815 
r2_b 0.0573 
Notes: standard errors are clustered by reporter-year,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
2.7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Much has been written about the proliferation of trade agreements or the rise in 
vertically specialised trade. However this literature has not focused on looking at the 
role of trade agreements in this process. This essay set out to fill this gap. The results 
suggest that countries involved in a preferential agreement import more intermediate 
inputs from each other than from non-preferential partners. This is not a surprising 
result but this essay is one of the first to provide solid econometric evidence on the 
magnitude of this effect. What is perhaps surprising is that the impact of an FTA on 
total and on intermediate imports (irrespective of their use) is of a similar magnitude, 
and this highlights that, in general, trade agreements do not impact one type of trade 
more than another. However, when one differentiates across the use of imported 
intermediates, or when one identifies the trade flows that may be part of a value 
chain, this result no longer holds. An FTA has a larger impact on imported 
intermediates that are part of an international value chain and the impact of an FTA 
is larger still on intermediate imports that belong to a bilateral value chain. 
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Imports that belong to a bilateral value chain also appear to be much more sensitive 
to changes in traditional gravity variables (i.e. trade policy, trade costs and economic 
mass) than other types of trade as Yi’s (2003) theoretical paper predicted. Such 
magnification effects occur only when production sequences exhibit multiple border 
crossings and suggest that the removal of barriers may have large effects on this type 
of production sequences (evidence of similar magnification effects can be found in 
Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2005 and Chinn, 2005). What is most important about these 
results is that these effects appear to be driven by the presence of an FTA and not by 
other characteristics of partners which predisposes them to engage in an FTA or to 
have higher degrees of vertically specialised trade. This then points to an important 
role for trade policy in shaping patterns of bilateral vertical specialisation. 
  
Although the derivation of a gravity model of intermediate goods trade from the 
perspective of the producer is novel, the theoretical contribution of this essay in this 
area is modest. Some of the base assumptions require a little more theoretical 
treatment. One of the weaknesses of the model is that the assumption that countries 
produce different numbers of varieties has not been backed by an appropriate supply 
side model that explains how these heterogeneities in production arise. Such a supply 
side model of vertical specialisation is desirable although beyond the scope of this 
essay. However, it seems reasonable that such a model would be based on the 
heterogeneous firm literature drawing on insights from the Economic Geography 
literature. This model would link the process of vertical specialisation to the 
productivity differences that firms exhibit within countries and would see more 
vertically specialised firms as having higher productivity draws. The recent paper of 
Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2011) is a good starting point for looking into this.  
  
This essay would benefit from a greater focus on issues of spatial correlation and 
how this affects the dependent and the FTA variable. The rise in vertically 
specialised trade should lead to a greater co-movement of international business 
cycles and this should lead to elements of spatial correlation. Furthermore if the 
process of VS and FTAs is indeed highly linked, then signing an FTA with one 
partner and not another is likely to have repercussions that go beyond the two 
countries involved in the FTA. Capturing the average treatment effect of an FTA 
rests on the assumption that the FTA variable is independent but evidence on the 
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contrary is increasingly coming to light. Indeed Baldwin’s domino theory of 
regionalism is a good example of how the independence assumption is violated. 
Similarly, because fragmentation takes place between more than two countries, it is 
possible that dynamic effects arise and that exports to a third destination determine 
the demand for imports from any given partner. The incorporation of FDI flows into 
this type of analysis would also be desirable, particularly in light of Markusen’s 
(1989) Knowledge-Capital model and the role of investment in the incomplete 
contract theory of offshoring and FTAs (Antras and Staiger, 2011). This essay has 
not focused on FDI on the basis that it is hard to differentiate between investment 
flows that serve create a production platform for value chain activity or those that 
serve relocate entire production processes in an effort to ‘jump’ barriers to trade 
(tariff or non tariff measures). This essay has also said very little about the 
organisational choices of firms which are likely to matter considerably, and 
particularly if the impact of deep integration is to be captured. Looking into these 
issues generally requires detailed firm level data. 
 
Nevertheless, this essay makes some important methodological contributions to the 
literature. The first is that it shows that the use of country-year fixed effects provides 
appropriate controls for the unobserved heterogeneity that afflicts the estimation of 
the effect of FTAs on trade flows. The more traditional method that has been 
proposed by the literature deals with these issues through the use of additional pair-
wise fixed effects (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007), however this may not be appropriate 
when the variance of the FTA variable is temporally limited. This is particularly 
important when using shorter panels. It is likely that newer proxies for vertically 
specialised trade cannot be calculated for as long a period as trade flows are available 
for and hence that the temporal variance of the FTA variable is going to become an 
issue in future studies. As more and more countries engage in regionalism, the 
temporal variance of bilateral FTAs is going to decrease. To the extent that bilateral 
pair-wise fixed effects only capture variance if there is a ‘switch’ from no agreement 
to an agreement, such a technique for controlling for unobserved heterogeneity has 
its days counted.  
 
Another methodological contribution is that two different identification strategies for 
capturing the value of bilateral intermediate goods trade have been tested. The more 
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traditional BEC nomenclature approach has often been criticised as an ‘ad hoc’ way 
of identifying these products (Hummels et al., 2001), but it is shown that it performs 
relatively well when compared to a method that identifies intermediate products 
through Input-Output tables. However, insofar as this essay suggests that the use that 
is given to the intermediate inputs is important, the BEC nomenclature, which fails to 
differentiate across the use of intermediate imports, may miss these important 
subtleties and hence is not a good identifier of value chain activity. 
  
This essay has provided a solid econometric analysis of the role of trade agreements 
in the propagation of vertical specialisation but the reverse causality is equally 
interesting. Is it the presence of a trade agreement that leads to higher vertical 
specialisation or does prior vertical specialisation set in motion further demand for 
regionalism? The contrasting paths of integration of the European Union and 
ASEAN countries suggest that either path is possible hence looking at the role of 
vertical specialisation on the formation of trade agreements will be helpful in 
understanding the full link between these two processes. An interesting result that 
emerged from this essay is that the gravity coefficients obtained from a reduced 
sample of countries that have not yet engaged in trade agreements are somewhat 
different to those of the full sample. This points to the possible existence of 
differences in the characteristics of new preferential partners. This may then suggest 
that the changing nature of trade may be affecting the determinants of new 
regionalism. 
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ESSAY THREE 
 
 
 
NEW DETERMINANTS FOR NEW FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS: GOVERNANCE, INTERDEPENDENCE AND 
VERTICAL SPECIALISATION 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The ‘traditional’ determinants of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) fall short in 
predicting the countries that are involved in the new wave of 21
st
 Century 
Regionalism. Partners are now more distant and exhibit greater differences in their 
capital labour ratios than they did in the past and this suggests that important 
changes in the political economy dynamics that determine the internal support for 
further liberalisation may be taking place. This essay argues that the changing 
nature of trade, captured through the rise in vertical specialisation, is driving these 
changes and introducing new motives for countries to engage in new FTAs. The 
presence of adequate governance mechanisms, which are conducive to a more 
efficient allocation of economic activity, and the rise in international production 
linkages are shown to motivate the formation of these new agreements.  
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The well documented rise in regionalism has motivated a growing interest in looking 
at the determinants of free trade agreements (FTAs). The traditional empirical 
models of FTA formation, inspired by Baier and Bergstrand (2004), suggest that 
larger, similar and neighbouring countries have traditionally not only exhibited 
higher trade flows but have also been more likely to engage in FTAs (Baier et al. 
2008). The fundamental hypothesis driving these models is that economic 
characteristics that make ‘good’ trading partners can predict the incentives that 
motivate the formation of successful trading arrangements. In contrast, the political 
economy models of FTA formation see agreements arising from an internal ‘bidding’ 
process between domestic interest groups (Grossman and Helpman, 1995; and 
Ornelas, 2005a,b,c). But evidence suggests that regionalism comes in waves (Ethier, 
1998; Burfisher et al. 2003; WTO, 2011; and Baldwin, 2011), and that the partners 
involved in different waves display different characteristics. This then suggests that 
the economic and political economy determinants of FTAs may be evolving200. 
 
It is herein argued that the changing nature of trade, witnessed by the recent growth 
in vertical specialisation (VS), gives rise to new incentives to form new agreements 
and that this has spurred the new wave of 21st century regionalism (Baldwin, 2011).  
The comparative static evidence presented in this essay shows that new preferential 
partners are more distant and less similar in their factor endowments than preferential 
partners involved in earlier waves of regionalism. This could be a manifestation of 
changing conditions in the game of regionalism. This essay puts forward the idea that 
the changing nature of trade, which involves complex and interconnected modes of 
international production, leads to changes in the incentives that determine the 
formation of new agreements through three distinct channels.  
1. Via changes in the internal political economy dynamics; 
2. Through a greater demand for appropriate regulatory frameworks that cater 
for the complexities of new economic transactions; and 
                                                 
200 This may suggest that a) what makes good trading partners now is somewhat different from what 
made good trading partners in the past (i.e. changes in the economic determinants of FTAs); b) that 
there are changes in the political economy forces that determine the formation of agreements; or/and 
c) that there are new and more complex channels through which FTAs and trade interact. 
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3. By way of interdependence effects that are created from the wider spread of 
production across international borders. 
These new channels of influence may help form a better understanding of the drivers 
of new trade agreements which involve not only new partners but also the 
negotiation of ‘deeper’ agreements that deal with behind-the-border measures 
(Baldwin, 2011; Orefice and Rocha 2011; and WTO 2011). 
 
The role of vertical specialisation in the formation of new FTAs is indirect; in part, it 
acts through changes in the internal political economy forces that determine the 
conclusion of FTAs (in the guise of the theoretical models of Grossman and 
Helpman, 1995 and Ornelas, 2005a,b,c). A growing dependence on intermediate 
imports over domestic intermediates, or a rising VS, goes hand in hand with a 
diminishing influence of import competing firms in veering government decisions 
towards protectionist measures. This then results in the emergence of a larger relative 
lobbying mass in favour of more liberal policies. It suggests that countries that are 
more vertically specialised should be more likely to conclude FTAs. This is 
corroborated by the results of this essay which show that a 1% increase in the change 
in bilateral vertically specialised trade raises the likelihood of countries switching 
into an agreement by 9 percentage points. It also shows that countries which exhibit 
more globally vertically specialised structures of production are more likely to 
conclude FTAs.  
 
The rising complexity of international trade transactions may also lead to a greater 
demand for bilateral regulatory harmonisation (Orefice and Rocha, 2011). This has 
made 21st century regionalism ‘deeper’ than traditional trade agreements (Burfisher 
et al. 2003; Ethier, 1998; Baldwin, 2011; and Orefice and Rocha, 2011). A link 
between vertical specialisation, regulatory structures and FTAs arises from the 
theoretical work of Antras and Staiger (2011). They suggest that hold-ups, which 
lead to inefficiently low levels of offshoring across countries, can be mitigated 
through the adoption of relationship-specific regulatory frameworks201. These can 
                                                 
201 Hold-ups occur when uncertainty impedes the efficient functioning of economic transactions. The 
customisation of inputs generates relationship specific sunk-costs which cannot be recouped when 
contracts are broken (i.e. incomplete contracts). Uncertainty then leads to sub-optimal levels of 
economic activity between countries. See Antras and Staiger (2011) Ornelas and Turner (2008) and 
Marcoullier (2002). 
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take the form of deeper trading arrangements that cater for the idiosyncrasies of 
value chain activity. Following these insights, the idea that the desirability of 
engaging in a new trade agreement could be tied to the prevailing regulatory 
environment is put forward. Evidence supporting this claim is provided where it is 
shown that the inclusion of a variable that captures the minimum quality of the 
regulatory environment between two countries helps increase the predictive powers 
of an augmented FTA formation model. Increases in regulatory quality are associated 
with higher probabilities of agreements being concluded, however low measures of 
regulatory quality may also incite countries to sign new and deeper agreements in 
order to redress shortfalls in regulatory frameworks.  
 
The wider delocalisation of segments of production also gives rise to greater 
interdependencies between agreements. The desirability of a trade agreement 
between two countries has been shown to depend on the participation of these 
countries in other FTAs (see Baldwin’s (1993) domino theory of regionalism). 
Several papers have highlighted the role of these interdependence effects in the 
formation of trade agreements (Baldwin, 1993; Egger and Larch, 2008; Baldwin and 
Jaimovich, 2010 and Baier et al, 2010). However none has looked at the impact of 
interdependencies arising from the spread of vertically specialised trade as is done in 
this essay. Here too supportive evidence on the positive impact that these play on the 
probability of an FTA being concluded is provided. 
 
Preliminary evidence of a link between the changing nature of trade and the creation 
of new FTAs is most apparent in South East Asia. Here the well documented rise in 
regional vertical specialisation, leading to the emergence of ‘factory Asia’ (Baldwin 
2006b), seems to have motivated a rising demand for new and deeper trading 
arrangements (see WTO, 2011 and Baldwin, 2011). However such links are not 
confined to this region as the work of Orefice and Rocha (2011) suggests. They find 
that, in general, countries which trade more intermediate imports also tend to form 
‘deeper’ agreements. This suggests that the changing nature of trade may be leading 
to a qualitatively different form of regionalism (Baldwin, 2011). This then highlights 
the importance of looking at new drivers of new regionalism, not least to identify 
emerging challenges that will be faced by the global trading system. 
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In capturing the impact of vertical specialisation on the probability that two countries 
engage in an FTA one is confronted with two separate issues of endogeneity which 
bias coefficient estimates. The first arises from unobserved heterogeneity whereas 
the second is caused by simultaneity. The latter occurs through the influence of FTAs 
on current trade flows and suggests the use of pre-agreement measures of trade flows 
in estimating FTA formation models. Unobserved heterogeneity then arises from the 
presence of unobserved variables (to the econometrician) which simultaneously 
affect both the probability of countries engaging in an FTA and also the levels of 
vertically specialised trade between these. This type of bias is the same that arose in 
the previous essay of this thesis when looking at the impact of FTAs on vertically 
specialised trade. However, the same solutions to these biases cannot be applied202. 
The binary nature of the dependent variable in an FTA formation model raises 
‘incidental parameters’ problems (Neyman and Scott, 1948203) which cause 
complications in the estimation of binary panel data models with fixed effects. Hence 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, in an FTA formation model, requires the 
use of different control mechanisms than those proposed in the previous essay.  
 
This essay tackles issues of endogeneity through cross-sectional and panel data 
approaches. The cross-sectional models rely primarily on a First Difference (FD) 
approach which looks at how changes in variables affect switches in FTA status. In 
addition, an instrumental variable (IV) approach is also used to introduce exogenous 
variation in the trade measures. In the panel data specifications, the unobserved 
elements that co-determine flows of vertically specialised trade and FTAs are 
isolated through; a conditional logit model; a panel IV approach; and a Mundlak-
Chamberlain transformation. The empirical results support the claim that the 
changing nature of trade is affecting the incentives that lead to the formation of new 
agreements.    
  
This essay is organised as follows. The next section reviews how the characteristics 
of countries involved in the different waves of regionalism have evolved. It argues 
                                                 
202 Some of these solutions are not desirable either. In the previous essay, the focus was on capturing 
the impact of agreements not the impact of switching into an agreement. In this essay, the goal is that 
of looking at the determinants of switching into a new agreement. Hence the focus of this essay looks 
at a qualitatively different form of reverse causality. 
203 Also see Wooldridge, 2002 Chapter 15 p 484; and Greene, 2010 Chapter 9). 
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that changes in these characteristics support the need of a more focused study on the 
determinants of new trade agreements. Section 3.3 then discusses the role of the 
changing nature of trade in the formation of FTAs. In section 3.4, details of the 
database and indicators that will be used in the empirical section are presented. 
Section 3.5 then discusses the empirical models that are used to obtain the results 
presented in section 3.6. The final part of this essay concludes and provides some 
policy implications and further avenues for research. 
 
3.2. WAVES OF REGIONALISM: OLD, NEW AND NEW NEW? 
 
Regionalism is often described as a process that unfolds across different waves. This 
characterisation implicitly supports the notion that there exist changing 
circumstances that motivate these or that these exhibit different defining 
characteristics. Four different waves of regionalism are identified by Mansfield and 
Milner (1999). The first comes about with the emergence of green-shoots of 
European bilateralism in the 19th century and lasts till the beginning of the First 
World War. The interwar period then gives rise to a second wave of short-lived 
regionalism where discriminatory practices breed contentions amongst states which 
are unable to conclude multilateral agreements (Mansfield and Milner, 1999). But it 
is the third and fourth waves of regionalism, since the end of the Second World War, 
that are most discussed in the literature. These are concurrent with multilateral 
liberalisation and are often referred to as the old and the new waves (Burfisher et al., 
2003, Baldwin, 1997, Ethier, 1998, and Baldwin 2006a)204. Although the historical 
and empirical narrative tends to be concerned with the impact of these concurrent 
processes (see Mansfield and Milner, 1999, Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2003, and 
Baldwin, 1997), the focus of this section is that of identifying the changing nature of 
the partners involved in each wave. This is to ascertain whether there are significant 
differences between old and new regional partners, and hence to establish if there is 
any prima facie evidence of new new regionalism (or 21st century regionalism 
according to Baldwin, 2011). 
 
The precise moment when new regionalism took over from old regionalism is hard to 
pinpoint. Mansfield and Milner (1999) place the third wave between the 50’s and the 
                                                 
204 Bhagwati (1993) refers to these as the first and second waves of regionalism respectively. 
153 
 
70’s with the creation and expansion of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA)205. However Baldwin (1997) places the 
birth of the new wave a little later, during the 80’s. He argues that it arises from the 
domino forces created by the earlier Eurocentric round of preferential 
liberalisation206. These motivate the US to engage in bilateral trade deals as seen 
through the agreements with Israel and Canada and the beginning of negotiations 
with Mexico (Bhagwati, 1993; Baldwin, 1997; and Mansfield and Milner, 1999)207.  
 
Instead of focusing on the origins of new regionalism, Ethier (1998) underlines its 
characteristics. He argues that new regionalism involves a more diverse set of 
countries that engage in a wider range of negotiating issues. This qualitative change 
in the issues negotiated, and indeed the deepening of the provisions between 
preferential partners, is also what constitutes the distinction between old and new 
regionalism according to Burfisher et al (2003) and Baldwin (2011)208. However, 
whereas the former focuses more to the deepening of traditional agreements such as 
EU, the latter argues that the qualitative changes in negotiating issues arises as a 
direct response to changes in the typology of international transactions or - the 
second unbundling. Baldwin (2011) places these changes outside the traditional, or 
older, preferential blocks. The increased geographical distribution of production 
sequences across international borders, facilitated by reductions in coordination 
costs, leads to a greater demand for international disciplines. These typify 21st 
Century regionalism which is distinct from new regionalism in this respect.  
 
This latest wave of regionalism involves new partners that share an increasing 
willingness to arrive at common and deeper understandings in; investment 
                                                 
205 Although the US and Canada are also participants with the 1965 Canada-US Auto Pact. This 
period also sees a large failure of many regional initiatives as Bhagwati (1993) suggests (i.e. Pacific 
Free Trade Area; North Atlantic Free Trade Area; Latin American Free Trade Area; and Latin 
American Integration Agreement). These never came to fruition. 
206 Baldwin (1997) and Mansfield and Milner (1999) also argue that the concurrent rounds of 
multilateral negotiations play an important role in motivating this wave of regionalism.  
207 Bhagwati (1993) also recognises that these agreements may have come as a response to the earlier 
wave of European integration initiatives hence lending support to Baldwin’s (1993) domino theory of 
regionalism. 
208 Burfisher et al. (2003) suggest that the qualitative difference between old and new agreements 
requires empiricists to reach further in their tools for the analysis of the impacts of agreements where 
in particular the links between trade and productivity require further theoretical and empirical 
treatment. 
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provisions; competition policy; and intellectual property rights209. Baldwin (2011) 
argues that these new found commonalities arise from a growing impetus in 
bolstering the trend that sees production locating in many different and international 
locations. He calls this the “trade-investment-services nexus” which, although 
representing a complex range of issues, manifests itself through the rise in vertically 
specialised modes of production. Baldwin’s (2011) assertions lend themselves to the 
hypothesis that the rise in this type of trade, or the rising complexity in international 
economic transactions, should increase the demand for international arrangements in 
the form of new and deeper FTAs210. 
3.2.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF FTA PARTNERS  
Before turning to a more sophisticated analysis of the impact of the changing nature 
of trade on the formation of new trade agreements, a preliminary examination of the 
key characteristics of preferential partners is warranted. The stylised facts that 
emerge can help identify the evolving features of the partners that are engaging in 
FTAs across the different waves of regionalism. 
 
Using CEPII’s gravity database, which covers the universe of available dyads from 
the late 50’s to 2006, 3 characteristics of preferential partners, whose choice is 
motivated by Baier and Bergstrand’s (2004) seminal paper on the topic, are 
charted211. These are chosen to capture: 
1)  trading costs - through distances; 
2)  economic mass - through the absolute difference in the log of GDPs; and 
3)  differences in the composition of capital labour ratios - identified by way of 
the absolute difference in the logs of GDP per capita212. 
 
Dyads are then classified according to whether they share an FTA or not in the year 
2006213. Figure 3.1 maps the differences between preferential and non-preferential 
                                                 
209 See Baldwin (2011). 
210 This very proposition is tested by Orefice and Rocha (2011). They find evidence that intermediate 
goods trade leads to a wider demand for deeper provisions in FTAs.  
211 Baier and Bergstrand (2004) suggest that preferential partners tend not to be distant, share similar 
economic mass and have small differences in factor endowments.  
212 Egger and Larch (2008) show that the correlation coefficient of the capital-labour ratios used in 
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and real GDP per capita is high (0.975). 
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partners in terms of distance. The density plots confirm a well known facet of 
regionalism – preferential partners are close in proximity. However, it also reveals 
the presence of a ‘hump’ nearing the end of the distribution of the FTA plot 
suggesting that more distant economies are also engaging in trade agreements214.  
 
Figure 3.1: Characteristics of FTA partners - Distance 
 
Source: Calculations from CEPII’s gravity database. FTA is identified if dyad shares an agreement in 
2006 
Note: Distance = log of the distance between dyads  
 
Figure 3.2 then looks at the distribution of the economic characteristics of dyads that 
share an FTA versus those that do not. The left panel (1) shows the absolute 
difference in the logs of GDP in the year prior to an agreement being signed. The 
panel on the right (2) maps the absolute difference in the logs of the GDP per capita 
across dyads in the year prior to an agreement being concluded. Panel (1) suggests 
that countries that are part of an agreement, in 2006, share a greater similarity in their 
GDP than those that did not participate in an FTA. The right hand panel then shows 
                                                                                                                                          
213 In the appendix (A3.1), the baseline year of 1960 is used to anchor the data as was done in Baier 
and Bergstrand’s (2004) estimations. This is to avoid endogeneity arising from the possible impact of 
FTAs on the observed variables (GDP and GDP per capita). The results are qualitatively the same. 
214 A kernel density plot estimates, non-parametrically, the probability density function of a variable.  
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that FTA partners also share a smaller difference in income215. The stylised fact that 
emerges from these plots is that - FTA partners tend to exhibit smaller absolute 
differences in both economic mass and income. 
 
Figure 3.2: Characteristics of FTA partners – Economic Mass and Income 
 
Source: Calculations from CEPII’s gravity database, economic data for year the agreement came into 
force. FTA is identified if dyad shares an agreement in 2006. 
 
3.2.2. CHARACTERISTICS ACROSS THE DIFFERENT WAVES OF 
REGIONALISM  
Much of the literature on new regionalism highlights the involvement of new 
partners (Ethier, 1998; and Burfisher et al., 2003). However, little has been said 
about the characteristics of these countries. Identifying the evolving characteristics of 
the countries involved in the different waves of regionalism can shed light on 
important qualitative differences in the characteristics of the different waves. These 
can be captured by looking at how, and if, the above presented stylised facts have 
changed across the waves. This requires defining the time periods that each wave 
occupies.  
Dropping Mansfield and Milner’s (1999) original first and second waves of 
regionalism due to lack of data, and following Bhagwati (1993) and Baldwin (1997); 
a first wave of regionalism is identified for the period between 1960 and 1985. A 
second wave is then defined for new agreements that enter into force in the period 
1985-1995216. The last wave of regionalism then captures new agreements signed 
                                                 
215 Appendix figure A.3.1 shows that these results do not change when using values of the economic 
variables in the year 1960. 
216 Bergstrand et al. (2010) also identify three waves of regionalism: The first from 1958-1973; the 
second from 1973-1989; and the last from 1989 onwards. The choice of cut-offs in this essay is 
different and is, in part, motivated by the availability of data in the empirical section. Nevertheless, 
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from 1995 to 2006217. Since the 1960’s 1394 dyads are identified as having signed an 
FTA out of a possible 24,976 dyads. Our first wave saw the creation of 232 
agreements; the second, the birth of 421; whilst the third, the creation of 741 
agreements218. These numbers support the well documented rise in the formation of 
FTAs during the last decades.  
Figure 3.3 presents a kernel density plot that maps the distribution of distances 
between preferential partners according to the identified waves of regionalism. The 
first observation that emerges is that the plotted distributions move towards the right 
as new waves of regionalism unfold. Although differences between the solid 
distribution, that identifies the first wave of regionalism, and the dotted one, that 
captures the second, appear to be small, the mean of the latter is somewhat higher. 
However it is the distribution of the distance between countries involved in the third 
wave which is most revealing. This is not only because it exhibits a higher mean, but 
also because it suggests that the ‘hump’ that appeared in Figure 3.1 is a new 
phenomenon219. The stylised fact that emerges from this analysis is that the different 
waves are progressively involving countries that are more distant
220. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
several robustness checks to different specification of the waves are implemented in the appendix (see 
Appendix A3.3. in particular Table A.3.4). 
217 Each wave is considered separately so that agreements that were implemented during the first wave 
are dropped from the sample in subsequent waves. Hence an agreement between Germany and France 
appears only in the first wave whilst the agreement between Germany and Spain appears only in the 
second wave. In this way, the agreements are classified by when they occurred rather than by how 
long ago they were implemented. This certainly raises issues of sequencing insofar as it is possible 
that countries sign with more distant partners as a result of having signed with all the partners that are 
close by.  
218 Agreements are identified by dyads hence the formation of the original EEC involving 6 countries 
means the creation of 15 ‘agreements’ (6x5=30 divided by 2 to capture dyads =15).  
219 New agreements between ‘distant’ partners involve several key actors: the EU with Chile, Canada, 
Mexico and South Africa; Chile with the EU, the US, and Canada; and Singapore with the US, 
Switzerland, Jordan, Korea; as well as the US with Jordan. Additionally many prospective agreements 
are also between relatively distant partners i.e. EU and US with Korea as well as EU-GCC or 
MERCOSUR or indeed the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreements between Brunei, Chile, Singapore, 
New Zealand, USA, Australia, Peru, Vietnam and Malaysia,  . This shows that the newest wave of 
regionalism appears to involve countries located in different hemispheres, whereas the early waves of 
regionalism involved North-North and some South-South agreements, the latest wave of regionalism 
may involve the creation of new North-South ties. See Manger (2009) for a discussion of this. 
220 Issues of sequencing remain important. It is possible that, once regions have been formed along 
geographic divides, subsequent waves capture expansions of regional blocks with neighbouring 
countries. However, if this were the case, then one would expect to obtain a flatter distribution with a 
higher mean. The emergence of the ‘hump’ nearing the end of the distribution and the fact that this 
was also captured in Figure 3.1, strongly suggests that there appears to be a new trend of regionalism 
involving more distant economies. 
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Figure 3.3: Distance between FTA partners across the three last waves of 
regionalism 
 
Source: Calculations from CEPII’s gravity database. First Wave identifies new agreements signed 
between 1960 and 1984. Second wave identifies new agreement signed between 1985 and 1994 and 
the third wave captures new agreements concluded between 1995 and 2006. Distance is measures as 
the log of bilateral distance. 
 
Looking at the characteristics of preferential partners in terms of their similarity in 
economic mass reveals quite an uneven pattern (Figure 3.4). The first wave seems to 
involve countries with similar GDPs, however less so than the countries participating 
in the second wave of regionalism. Those that participated in the third wave then 
appear to exhibit a flatter distribution which suggests falling similarities in economic 
mass. Although there is no clear pattern in this figure, it seems that the first wave 
was more similar to the third than to the second wave. FTA partners are still 
relatively similar, in terms of their economic mass, although less so for new 
agreements than for old ones. 
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Figure 3.4: Difference in economic mass between FTA partners across the three 
last waves of regionalism 
Source: Calculations from CEPII’s gravity database data from first year of each wave. First Wave 
identifies new agreements signed between 1960 and 1984. Second wave identifies new agreement 
signed between 1985 and 1994 and the third wave captures new agreements concluded between 1995 
and 2006. Differences in economic mass are measures through the absolute difference in the logs of 
the GDPs of the dyads. 
 
Figure 3.5 then plots the difference in incomes across the waves of regionalism. Here 
a more discernible pattern emerges. The first wave clearly involves countries which 
share stronger similarities in their incomes. However as the second and third waves 
unfold this pattern begins to break and preferential partners become more dissimilar 
in their income. The third wave clearly has a much flatter distribution suggesting that 
countries that engage in recent trade agreements tend to be much more dissimilar in 
income than in any other wave221. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
221 Earlier FTAs tended to be between countries situated in the northern hemisphere, however the 
evidence presented here suggests that there might be a greater incidence of North-South agreements 
during the latest wave (see Manger, 2009).  
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Figure 3.5: Differences in income between FTA partners across the three last 
waves of regionalism 
 
Source: Calculations from CEPII’s gravity database, data from first year of each wave. First Wave 
identifies countries that signed a trade agreement between 1960 and 1984. The Second wave requires 
there to be a new agreement between 1985 and 1994 whilst the third captures new agreements signed 
between 1995 and 2006. Differences in income are measures through the absolute difference in the 
logs of the GDP per capita of the dyads.  
 
The ‘stylised facts’ that emerge from this analysis point to evolving features in the 
characteristics of new preferential partners. Whilst the first wave involved countries 
of similar economic mass, income and distance, the third wave appears to involve 
more distant economies that are more dissimilar in their income222. These 
observations may lend supportive evidence to Baldwin’s (2011) claim for a separate 
analysis of 21st century regionalism. The implications of these changes are also 
important. Similarities in income reflect similarities in the factor composition of 
trade (Egger and Larch 2008), and hence the new wave of regionalism seems to be 
taking place between countries that are more dissimilar in their factor endowments. 
Although traditional models of trade would suggest that forming agreements between 
countries with such differences in comparative advantages makes economic sense, 
Mansfield et al. (2008) argue that political support for this type of agreement may be 
                                                 
222 Overall countries participating in the latest wave of FTAs remain a little bit more similar in income 
than those that do not however much less so than was reported in Figure 3.2 panel (2). See Appendix 
Figure A3.3. 
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complicated due to the unequal distribution of factor rewards223. This implies that, 
often “good politics drives out good economics” (Mansfield et al. 2008:p69), or that 
agreements between countries with similar factor endowments may be politically 
easier to conclude224. Hence the changing characteristics of preferential partners may 
then be manifesting changes in the political economy conditions that determine the 
formation of FTAs. These might arise through changes in the nature of international 
transactions.  
 
If the changing nature of trade is linked to changes in the desirability of engaging in 
a trade agreement then one could expect that countries that engage in new FTAs have 
seen their degree of vertical specialisation rise the most. Figure 3.6 provides prima 
facie evidence of this. It presents a kernel distribution plot of changes in the value of 
the log of vertically specialised trade, between 1995 and 2008, according to whether 
countries signed a new agreement during the third wave225. It shows that new 
preferential partners experienced a higher growth in vertically specialised trade than 
those that did not sign an agreement. This provides the prima facie link between the 
changing nature of trade and FTAs which motivates the focus of this essay226.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
223 If inter-industry reallocations are seen to be pronounced then voters may have strong views against 
such liberalisation. 
224 The large changes in factor rewards, as predicted by the traditional H-O-S theorems, can lead to 
internal frictions that garner opposition to trade agreements. Magee (2003) makes this point by 
showing the US House and Senate voting results for the FTA with Canada (CUSTA) versus that with 
Mexico (NAFTA) where the former was more easily passed than the latter. Mansfield et al. 
(2004:p69) argue that “adopting policies that antagonise important segments of society is ill advised”. 
225 This is done for a subsample of 39 countries for which the value of bilateral vertical specialisation 
could be calculated. This indicator is calculated following the method presented in the first essay of 
this thesis. The characteristics of the sample used are discussed in the data section of this essay.  
226 It is noted that this plot may be driven by the impact of FTAs on vertically specialised trade. It 
serves the purpose of illustrating some prima facie evidence of a link between these processes. 
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Figure 3.6: Change in VS and new FTAs in the third wave (reduced sample) 
 
Source: CEPII database for FTAs, Comtrade and OECD STAN database for calculation of the value 
of vertically specialised trade. Change in VS identified as the difference in the value of VS trade 
between 1995 and 2008 
 
 
3.3. THE CHANGING NATURE OF TRADE AND FTAS 
The literature on the determinants of FTAs is vast and has been concerned with an 
array of both causes and consequences. This section aims to give a non-exhaustive 
synthesis of this literature in view of determining how the changing nature of trade 
may affect the formation of new agreements227. This section begins with a more 
general discussion on how new forms of international production affect old, but still 
contentious, debates on the desirability of regionalism. This is followed by a more in 
depth discussion of the channels through which the changing nature of trade is 
expected to affect the formation of FTAs.  
                                                 
227 Several other important contributions to the literature are omitted for brevity. This mainly concerns 
the literature on the links between terms of trade and FTAs See Ethier (2007), Bagwell and Staiger 
(1997, 2002). Also the important contributions of Yi (1996) and Freund (2000) are not widely 
discussed. 
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3.3.1. OLD DEBATES, NEW INSIGHTS?  
During the 90’s, Jagdish Bhagwati emerged as the leader of a movement that 
condemned regionalism as being a malignant force in the path towards global free 
trade. His concerns about discriminatory trading arrangements were voiced through 
two major questions. Firstly, would these agreements increase or reduce world 
welfare? And secondly, would regionalism be a stepping stone (supplement) or a 
stumbling block (alternative) in the path towards “multilateral free trade for all” 
(Bhagwati 1993:p32)228. In his review, Bhagwati (1993) suggests that the first 
question is an empirical one. Global welfare should depend on the relative strength 
of the trade creating and trade diverting forces that arise from preferential trade deals 
(Viner 1950). The second question then requires assessing the political economy 
forces that motivate the internal and external support to pursue one form of 
liberalisation over another – the incentive structure.  
 
Bhagwati’s concern was that these forces would lead to a fragmented world over a 
more favourable and all-inclusive non-discriminatory one. The debate is best 
summarised by Baldwin (1997). He argues that some see discriminatory 
liberalisation and focus on the benefits of liberalisation, whereas others focus on the 
discriminatory element and voice their concerns about its negative impact. Because 
the changing nature of trade is likely to be linked to both the impact of FTAs and the 
incentives that shape their desirability, an instructive exercise emerges from 
analysing how the rise in vertically specialised trade affects Bhagwati’s concerns229. 
3.3.1.1. IMPACT OF AGREEMENTS 
 
Bhagwati’s first question related to the impact of trade agreements on global 
welfare230. Here, the early work on FTAs, initiated by Krugman (1991a, 1991b), 
provides some important insights. Krugman captured the impact of bloc formation on 
                                                 
228 See Freund and Ornelas (2010) for a comprehensive review of issues surrounding FTAs. Bhagwati, 
1990, 1993 and 2008; and Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) provide compelling arguments in favour 
of the stumbling block hypothesis. Burfisher et al (2003), Baldwin (2006), Estevadeordal et al (2008) 
propose counter-arguments. Panagariya (1999) provides a good review of the early literature and 
debate. 
229Other concerns about regionalism arise from “attention diversion” (Bergsten, 1997:p574) which 
suggests that resources are limited and focused on bilateral deals rather than multilateral negotiations. 
230 Bhagwati claimed that global welfare falls as a result of regionalism compared to a multilateral 
alternative. This is because FTAs cause trade diversion whilst multilateral tariff cutting is only 
associated with trade creation. 
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world welfare by using trade costs to identify the trade creating and diverting forces 
at play. He found global welfare to be highly sensitive to the assumed structure of 
these costs. If these were to be zero, then Krugman (1991a) showed that FTAs 
unambiguously reduce world welfare, however when inter-continental trade costs are 
assumed to be prohibitive (Krugman 1991b) these results are reversed and FTAs 
become unambiguously welfare enhancing. This ‘Krugman vs Krugman’ debate 
(Frankel et al. 1995) spurred a flurry of papers that sought to capture the role of 
varying intra and inter-continental trade costs on welfare. Frankel et al (1995) and 
Frankel (1997) were examples of this. They extended the specifications of these costs 
along a continuum only to find similar ambiguities. Hence with theoretical support to 
global welfare enhancing and reducing scenarios, the debate would require an 
empirical appraisal to be settled. 
 
Most empirical studies favour the idea that “trade creation has generally exceeded 
trade diversion” (Bergsten, 1997:p548), and hence that global welfare has risen as a 
result of regionalism. Baldwin (2011) provides a good summary supporting this view 
on the basis of the recent empirical evidence of Magee (2008) and Archarya et al. 
(2010). But he also argues that assessing global welfare, or the desirability of FTAs, 
through the quantification of the relative strength of Vinerian (1950) forces may be 
misguided. Agreements are no longer very preferential due to the high incidence of 
trade at zero MFN rates. Furthermore, high tariff, ‘sensitive’, products tend to feature 
prominently in lists of excluded goods in concluded FTAs. This leads to the 
existence of low preference margins and hence a low incidence of trade creation and 
trade diversion. Baldwin (2011) then argues that discriminatory liberalisation is no 
longer very discriminatory and hence FTAs should be seen as general liberalisation 
schemes231.  
 
However, the findings of the previous essay suggest that even low preference 
margins can lead to large trade effects when modes of production are vertically 
specialised and hence that Vinerian (1950) economics may yet be important. The 
traditional empirical analysis of trade creation and diversion has largely focused on 
the well understood welfare implications of FTAs in the presence of competing trade 
                                                 
231 Baldwin(2011:p20) “it may be more correct to view RTAs as general trade liberalisation schemes 
than as discriminatory liberalisations”. 
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in final products. However, if trade is increasingly taking place across 
complementary intermediate products, then a new understanding of how these forces 
operate, in the presence of vertically specialised sequences of production, becomes 
progressively important in assessing the global welfare implications of FTAs.  
 
Trade creation and trade diversion are likely to operate in much more complex ways 
in the presence of such modes of international production (see previous essays of this 
thesis for a more detailed discussion of this). They may impact either or both the 
importing and exporting elements of international value chain activity and thus 
introduce complex dynamics which make their welfare implications hard to grasp. 
Understanding the global welfare implications of FTAs then requires identifying how 
FTAs affect international production, and the results of the previous essays may help. 
The first essay showed that there appeared to be a correlation between the degree of 
vertical specialisation and productivity growth. This might, in turn, suggest that this 
type of trade may be associated with higher welfare gains than those associated with 
traditional trade flows (allocative efficiency). In addition, the second essay identified 
the presence of ‘magnification effects’ suggesting a higher responsiveness of 
vertically specialised trade to trade costs. This may then imply that the associated 
Vinerian (1950) forces may too be ‘magnified’ and hence retain an important role in 
grasping the desirability of FTAs even in the presence of low preference margins. 
 
Nevertheless, the complexity of new trading relations (Baldwin, 2011), and the 
possible role of trade agreements in enhancing deep integration, also suggests that it 
is important to go beyond Vinerian economics. In his exposition of 21st century 
regionalism, Baldwin (2011) also argues in favour of a wider focus on barriers that 
impede the connection of international production facilities. He identifies 4 such 
behind-the-border-barriers; competition policy; movement of capital; intellectual 
property rights; and investment assurances. These do not lend themselves to 
traditional Vinerian analysis because these need not be discriminatory in nature in 
the same way that preferential tariffs are. In fact removing such non-tariff barriers, 
even on a ‘preferential’ basis, may result in the creation of public goods that could 
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benefit countries outside preferential agreements (Baldwin 2011)232. Hence, if FTAs 
are more efficient at promoting this type of regulatory reform, through ‘deeper 
integration’, this may lead to larger preferential and non preferential trade flows and 
hence important global welfare gains. This would suggest that FTAs may not be as 
‘damaging’ as Bhagwati feared. 
3.3.1.2. INCENTIVE STRUCTURES 
 
The changing nature of trade may also introduce changes in the incentive structures 
that lead to one form of liberalisation over another (Bhagwati’s second question). 
However, evidence suggests that multilateralism and regionalism could be 
endogenous processes233. Mansfield and Reinhardt’s (2003) findings posit that it is 
the growing membership of the GATT/WTO that incites a country to embrace 
bilateral trade deals. As membership grows, a partner’s negotiating leverage falls and 
the uncertainties associated with a failure of the multilateral system rise. Like-
minded countries are then pushed towards bilateral trade deals as an insurance 
mechanism against such failures234. Contrasting evidence also suggest the presence 
of reverse causality. Estevadeordal et al. (2008) show how regional liberalisation in 
Latin America may have led to reductions in applied MFN tariffs and Baldwin 
(2011) provides further evidence of this trend. He argues that, since the Doha Round 
began in 2001, there has been a concurrent increase in regionalism with an observed 
reduction in applied MFN tariffs (through unilateral liberalisation)235. This then 
suggests that different forms of liberalisation may be complementary rather than 
substitutes. The changing nature of trade may help explain why this arises. 
 
                                                 
232 Baldwin 2011:p26 calls this “the public-good nature of regulatory reform”. He suggests that the 
complexities of 21st century trade deals make it hard to discriminate as it is often hard to determine the 
origin of multinational nationality (i.e. services or exchanges in a world where fragmentation is rife 
and value added is performed in many different locations). It is still possible to discriminate against 
certain goods, but more complex barriers against services, procurement or investment decisions are 
harder to enforce. 
233 See Freund (2000) and Ethier (1998) who argue that multilateral tariff cuts facilitate the 
propagation of FTAs. 
234 in addition to possible undesirable outcomes in dispute settlements (Mansfield and Reinhardt 
2003). 
235 Baldwin (2011) shows evidence of important MFN cuts in many new emerging regions which have 
embraced FTAs (South Asia; East Asia; Middle East & North Africa; and Sub Saharan Africa, 
Baldwin, 2011:p17). In a separate paper Baldwin (2006b) argues that the binding of tariffs, through 
FTAs, may also be important. 
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As international fragmentation unfolds, so too do changes in the costs and benefits of 
engaging in liberalisation. The propagation of international production introduces the 
possibility of enhanced gains from liberalisation as comparative advantages are being 
exploited at a finer process rather than product level. And the costs of liberalisation, 
which are primarily political in nature, may also begin to fall. As countries become 
more interconnected, and trade in intermediate products increases, protectionism is 
likely to increasingly become a production tax rather than a measure that fosters, or 
protects, domestic production236. This may reduce the internal opposition towards 
liberalisation so that governments may begin to more freely embrace liberalisation as 
a form of industrial policy (This would cater for access to cheaper products for both 
consumers and producers). 
 
Whether this liberalisation is unilateral, bilateral or multilateral is hard to tell. It may 
depend on the ease of negotiating one alternative over the other. However, because 
vertically specialised modes of production involve not only seeking access to cheap 
intermediate imports but also opening markets for the associated exported products, 
bilateral deals may be preferred. But one type of liberalisation does not preclude the 
other. And, in the presence of vertically specialised trade, unilateral and bilateral 
liberalisation may be complementary. Once liberalisation has been achieved on the 
export side, through an FTA, countries may seek to reduce their MFN tariffs so as to 
capture cheaper sources of intermediates and gain competitiveness in preferential 
markets237. The case of Mexico, shortly after concluding NAFTA, is a prime 
example of such a strategy238, and the earlier cited evidence provided by 
Estevadeordal et al. (2008) and Baldwin (2011) also lend support to this idea. If there 
are indeed complementarities between these processes of liberalisation then 
Baldwin’s (2011:p23) assertion that “the old building-stumbling-blocks approach is 
                                                 
236 Tariffs are more likely to increasingly fall on intermediate products and this has undesirable 
consequences for domestic value added as suggested by the effective rate of protection logic. 
237 It need be noted that issues regarding Rules of Origin and the overlapping nature of trade 
agreements will increasingly be important. It is perhaps in consolidating these that the WTO can play 
a strong role. 
238 The first essay of this thesis shows how Mexico witnessed an important rise in VS with respect to 
the US as a result of NAFTA but that subsequently Mexico has embraced intermediate imports from 
China. Concurrent with this is an important degree of unilateral liberalisation. 
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logically misstated” may hold true due to the endogenous nature of the different 
liberalisation strategies239. 
 
However Antras and Staiger (2011:p.4) warn us that “the rise of offshoring can be 
seen to present the WTO with a profound institutional challenge”. Their argument is 
that this type of trade leads to a greater demand for deeper forms of regulatory 
cooperation which are moulded to the idiosyncrasies of the value chain interactions 
between countries. Because bilateral agreements may more readily cater for these, 
then they might be preferred to a multilateral alternative240. As the debate continues 
to gather momentum (see Bhagwati, 2008 vs Baldwin, 2011), and in the current 
climate where the Doha Round appears to falter, the only certainty is that 
“regionalism is here to stay” (Baldwin 2006a:p1451) whether for good or for bad. 
Understanding the forces that drive the formation of new FTAs is then crucial in 
assessing the likely direction of the multilateral trading system. 
3.3.2. POLITICAL ECONOMY, GOVERNANCE AND THIRD COUNTRY EFFECTS  
Bhagwati (1993) anticipated that the incentives of three key agents would need to be 
considered in forming an understanding of the ‘threat’ of regionalism. Governments - 
who ultimately decide whether or not to pursue preferential liberalisation - would be 
the decision-making agents. These would be influenced by; consumers; domestic 
special interest groups; and interest groups located in third countries. Grossman and 
Helpman’s (1995) theoretical political economy model introduces some of these 
actors into a government’s objective function in an effort to model the forces that 
shape the decision of engaging in a trade agreement241. The choice of participating in 
an FTA is made after weighing the gains for voters and exporting industries against 
the possible losses that would befall import competing industries from the in or out 
scenarios. The nature of the game is one where industry interest groups make 
contributions, commensurate on profits, which aim to veer government decisions 
                                                 
239 Baldwin’s quote finishes “..– it asks about the correlation of two endogenous variables driven by 
common factors”. 
240 Baldwin (2011) highlights that “regionalism is a threat to the WTO’s role as a rule writer, not as a 
tariff cutter”. 
241 Other notable contributions to this political economy literature can be found in Ethier (1998, 2007) 
and Bagwell and Staiger (1998 and 2002). A discussion of these is omitted for brevity but they place 
greater emphasis on the importance of controlling terms of trade in the government’s objective 
function.  
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towards the outcome that is most favourable to their economic activity. Governments 
weigh these contributions against consumer welfare gains, identified through 
changes in tariff revenue and consumer surplus, and then make a decision on whether 
to engage in a trade agreement or not242. 
 
Grossman and Helpman’s (1995) paper, and the literature that it inspires, uses a 
framework in which the decision to sign a trade agreement is made on the basis of 
the characteristics of two negotiating partners only. However Baldwin (1993 and 
1997) suggests that the process of FTA formation may also be driven by 
neighbouring regionalism243. In his domino theory of regionalism, countries that are 
left out of neighbouring agreements are adversely affected by trade diversion which 
leads to losses in export market shares. These affect the internal political economy 
forces in favour of participating in an excluded FTA, or indeed a new FTA with 
other excluded members244. The main insight is that engaging in an FTA is not just a 
product of bilateral characteristics, but also one where third country effects matter. 
As markets get bigger, through regionalism, the costs of being left out of a 
preferential area increase as do the benefits from being inside.  
 
Dominoes are then reinforced by a juggernaut effect. Tariff reforms carry with them 
a feedback mechanism that plays on the structure of the interest groups within a 
country. Once preferential liberalisation has been accomplished, inefficient import 
competing firms are likely to be pushed out of the market and hence their bargaining 
power should fall245. This shifts the lobbying mass further towards favouring more 
liberal policies which may then set off further dominoes. A similar idea is captured in 
Ornelas’ (2005a) theoretical model. Because political contributions are 
commensurate to the market shares of domestic firms, as these fall from opening the 
                                                 
242 This theoretical framework implicitly includes the impact of trade policy on the decisions to 
engage in an agreement (through trade creation and trade diversion and the corresponding impacts on 
consumer surplus, producer surplus and tariff revenue). 
243 It incorporates Bhagwati’s third interest group. 
244 Originally, Baldwin’s (1993) paper sought to understand the drivers of EU enlargement and hence 
the impact of being left out of the EU was the subject of interest, however the domino theory of 
regionalism can be applied in more contexts than enlargement. In fact the formation of EFTA can be 
seen as an attempt to balance the negative impact of being left out of the EEC. Empirical support for 
the domino theory of regionalism can be found in Mansfield and Reinhardt (2003), Egger and Larch 
(2008) and Baldwin and Jaimovich (2010). 
245 Although some small and well established lobbies can retain an inordinate amount of power as 
seen in the EU with the Common Agricultural Policy. 
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market to increased competition from FTA partners, so too does the weight of this 
factor in the governments objective function. This tilts the balance of the 
government’s objective function further towards a stance that favours an 
optimisation of consumer surplus through liberalisation. 
3.3.2.1. POLITICAL ECONOMY DYNAMICS AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF TRADE  
 
Looking at the role of the changing nature of trade in this process requires 
identifying how the interest groups which shape the political economy forces are 
affected by the rise in vertically specialised trade. High or growing degrees of VS 
should manifest a high or growing presence of firms engaged in both import and 
export markets relative to import competing firms. In turn, these firms should be 
inclined to lobby in favour of more liberal policies which would afford them access 
to cheaper intermediate inputs (Manger 2009). Owing to the reciprocal nature of 
FTAs, these firms would also stand to gain from a preferential access into new export 
markets hence reinforcing this lobbying mass.  
 
The previously highlighted changes in the characteristics of new regional partners 
(Figure 3.5) suggest that shifts in the political economy forces may already be taking 
place. The changing nature of trade, with the spread of vertical specialisation, may be 
closing the gap between good politics and good economics. The delocalisation of a 
segment of production, rather than an entire industry, may be more politically 
palatable. Hence if industries thrive as a result of liberalisation, through access to 
cheaper intermediates, then a new source of juggernaut effects, reinforcing 
liberalisation, may also arise at a cheaper political cost. With vertical specialisation, 
rather than having competing trade, one might be in the presence of complementary 
trade (Samuelson, 2001 and Bas and Strauss-Kahn, 2011)246. This implies that the 
Grossman and Helpman (1995) model need not see the reduction in prices caused by 
the formation of an FTA as an attack on producer surplus, but rather as a positive 
factor that contributes to the reduction in the costs of production. If this increases the 
profits of firms, and by extensions of the model, the political contributions, then 
liberalisation is likely to become a more favoured outcome for governments. 
                                                 
246 Samuelson’s (2001) neat numerical example exposes the gains from complementary trade. When a 
country uses the products of another, produced under a greater comparative advantage, then 
specialisation and trade gives rise to important reductions in production costs. These act as 
technological ‘shocks’ that push the PPF outwards.  
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This implies that countries that exhibit greater degrees of global vertical 
specialisation should be more inclined towards favouring liberalisation and hence 
possibly FTAs. Moreover, because the presence of a bilateral production link 
between two countries should be indicative of a stronger interest, by both parties, in 
the successful conclusion of an agreement, then one could also expect higher levels 
of bilateral VS to be associated with a higher likelihood of an FTA.  
3.3.2.2. REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS AND FTAS 
 
Although the changing nature of trade is expected to lead to further liberalisation, the 
type of liberalisation that will be supported remains unclear. On the one hand, 
multilateral (unilateral) liberalisation guarantees a wider access to cheaper sources of 
intermediate products. But on the other hand, such liberalisation may struggle to 
open markets for the associated exported product and also fall short in delivering 
desirable harmonised regulatory frameworks that may be needed in the presence of 
more complex economic transactions. Nunn (2007) makes an interesting link 
between trade and regulatory frameworks in the presence of ‘relationship-specific’ 
economic activity. He argues that internationally sequenced modes of production, or 
the customisation of inputs, tend to require relationship specific investment. The lack 
of appropriate regulatory structures that promote contract enforcement may lead to 
underinvestment that raises the costs of producing both intermediate and final 
products. He then argues that appropriate regulatory structures can deliver 
comparative advantages in the production of output. 
 
If common cross-border provisions are needed to guarantee a smooth functioning of 
value chains (Nunn, 2007; and Antras and Staiger, 2011), then bilateral agreements 
may turn out to be more feasible and hence preferable247. This reasoning is in line 
with the theoretical model of Antras and Staiger (2011) which looks at offshoring 
and FTAs in the presence of incomplete contract. It identifies a hold-up problem, 
associated with market failures, that leads to an inefficient level of economic activity 
(offshoring) between countries. Their model suggests that flows of vertically 
specialised trade could be curtailed by the lack of appropriate regulatory frameworks 
                                                 
247 and more feasible as it may be easier to negotiate ‘deeper’ provisions between smaller cohorts of 
countries. 
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or enforcement mechanism248. They argue that “As the prevalence of offshoring 
rises, effective trade agreements and the institutions that support them will have to 
evolve, [...], towards a collection of more-individualized agreements that can better 
reflect member-specific idiosyncratic needs” (Antras and Staiger 2011:p4). This 
suggests that there might, in principle, be a link between regulatory frameworks and 
the demand for FTAs. ‘Good’ regulations can promote the contestability of markets 
and ensure tighter controls in the enforceability of contracts hence reducing the 
incidence of hold-ups in trade.  If appropriate enforcement mechanisms are needed 
for buyers and sellers to conduct their business, then good institutions, or indeed 
governance mechanisms, could play a trade enhancing role. 
 
Regulatory frameworks are then likely to become increasingly important in 
mediating international economic activity. This is because modern international 
production sequences demand greater coordinating efforts. As production is 
‘chopped’ across many different origins, the incidence of a failure of one segment of 
production along a value chain rises. This may jeopardise the functioning of the 
entire value chain. Hence an appropriate regulatory framework that enforces 
contractual obligations and allows for private sector dispute settlement may provide 
some of the necessary conditions for the spread of this type of international 
production249. The work of Orefice and Rocha (2011) corroborates a link between the 
regulatory environment and intermediate goods trade. They suggest that this type of 
trade not only motivates the conclusion of ‘deeper’ agreements but is also positively 
affected by the presence of deeper provisions. This implies that countries may seek 
to engage in deeper FTAs in an effort to bolster value chain activity through 
regulatory reform and hence that current measures of governance may affect the 
desirability of engaging in new trade agreements.  
3.3.2.3. THE SPREAD OF PRODUCTION AND INTERDEPENDENCE 
 
In Baldwin’s (1993) domino theory of regionalism, third country FTAs cause trade 
diversion which negatively impacts on domestic firms through a loss in export 
market shares. This incites domestic firms to lobby harder for further bilateral 
                                                 
248 Antras and Staiger (2011:p2) argue that “trade policies which encourage input trade volume can 
substitute for the more standard contractual safeguards available in domestic transactions and can 
thereby help bring countries closer to the efficiency frontier”. 
249 It may also facilitate the enforceability of private international law. 
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liberalisation in an effort to retain these markets or to gain access to new export 
markets. A similar form of interdependence may also arise from the spread of 
production. 
 
Neighbouring regionalism may jeopardise the location of a domestic segment of 
production within an international value chain. This may, in turn, bring about 
lobbying incentives towards joining new or expanding FTAs. If Mexico is currently 
exporting intermediate inputs to Korea, then a China-Korea agreement may threaten 
Mexico’s link with Korea. This agreement may lead to ‘source-switching’ where 
Korea begins importing intermediates from China rather than from Mexico. This 
implies that Mexico’s support for an FTA with Korea may be affected by Korea’s 
patterns of regionalism and influenced through value chain activity.     
3.3.3. TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
 
The analysis presented in this section suggests the presence of three channels through 
which the changing nature of trade can impact the desirability of engaging in an 
FTA. These give rise to three testable hypotheses. The first is that greater degrees of 
vertical specialisation should lead to a higher likelihood of a trade agreement being 
concluded. The second is that the spread of production should give rise to 
interdependence effects which affect the probability that countries engage in new 
trade agreements. The third then suggests that regulatory quality should affect the 
desirability of engaging in an FTA. If the changing nature of trade is shaping new 
agreements, then the inclusion of variables that capture these factors should serve 
explain new patterns of regionalism.  
 
3.4. NEW DETERMINANTS FOR NEW FTAS 
This section details the data used in looking at the new determinants of new FTAs. A 
different indicator is associated to each new channel through which the changing 
nature of trade has been identified to impact on the formation of FTAs. Hence 
changes in political economy conditions are identified through measures of vertically 
specialised trade; the role of regulatory frameworks is captured through indicators of 
governance; and interdependence effects are calculated using a vertically specialised 
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weighted measure of neighbouring agreements. In the empirical section, a 
unidirectional unit of observation is used instead of one that identifies dyadic 
observations. The choice of such a unit of observation does not alter the results 
obtained and is favoured because it facilitates the interpretation of these. In 
particular, using unidirectional observations allows one to focus on both dyadic 
characteristics as well as individual country observations, such as the degree of 
vertically specialised trade of a country, without altering the results of the 
estimation250. 
 
In looking at the changing determinants of FTAs two separate samples of countries 
will be used. A larger sample, of 140 countries for the period 1960 to 2006, will be 
called upon to ascertain how the ‘traditional’ determinants of FTAs change across 
the different waves of regionalism. However, in looking at how the changing nature 
of trade affects the formation of new trade agreements a smaller sample is used due 
to constraints in the calculation of measures of vertically specialised trade. Although 
this reduced sample is composed of 39 countries, for the period 1995-2008, it still 
captures 80% of world trade in 2008251. It is the same sample that was used in the 
previous essays of this thesis.  
3.4.1. TRADITIONAL DETERMINANTS OF FTAS AND VERTICAL 
SPECIALISATION 
The theoretical findings of the early models of Krugman (1991a and 1991b), Frankel 
et al. (1995) and Frankel (1997) did not receive a more formal empirical treatment 
until Baier and Bergstrand (2004) - henceforth BB2004. Using a qualitative choice 
model they find that the likelihood of an FTA is higher between partners; that are 
close in distance but remote from the rest of the world; that share a greater similarity 
in their GDPs; and that are more dissimilar in their factor endowments with respect 
to each other but more similar with respect to the rest of the world. These 
‘traditional’ determinants of FTAs have been embraced by the empirical literature 
                                                 
250 Using dyadic observations complicates the identification of whether results are being driven by 
reporter or partner characteristics. 
251 This is the same sample that was used in the previous essays of this thesis to which the reader is 
referred to for information on the computation of the VS indicator and the description of the gravity 
variables. There are then 1482 observations per year and 714 agreements in place by 2008 when 
considering unidirectional observations. 
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and constitute the benchmark model for investigating the formation of FTAs252. The 
implicit idea behind these models is that trade enhancing characteristics, or the 
potential thereof, should help predict what countries will find it desirable to engage 
in an agreement. 
 
Regionalism derives its name from the fact that preferential partners tend to be 
neighbouring countries. BB2004 capture this by introducing two distance based 
measures into their FTA formation equation. These serve the purpose of capturing 
trade costs in the spirit of the theoretical models of Krugman (1991a, 1991b) and 
Frankel et al. (1995). Higher transport costs are associated with lower trading 
volumes and hence a lower likelihood of an FTA being formed. BB2004 use the 
natural logarithm of the inverse of distance between two countries suggesting that 
‘NATURAL’ trading partners, i.e. those that are closer, will be more likely to engage 
in an agreement. The second distance based indicator is a measure of remoteness 
(REMOTE) which identifies the distance between a country and its closest trading 
partners: 
 
 = 	 ,	.	
ln	 ∑  − 1,	  + ln	 ∑  − 1,	 
2
 
(3.1) 
CONT is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when countries are located in the same 
continent. REMOTE then identifies the simple average of country i’s distance from 
all trading partners except j that are located in the same continent. The intuition 
behind this measure is that a pair of countries, with more remote third country 
partners, is expected to trade more with each other because of the presence of higher 
trade costs with respect to other trading alternatives. Hence Australia and New 
Zealand’s trade is not only a product of the distance between these, but also the 
distance with respect to the closest third country partners. The remoteness measure is 
reminiscent of the ‘multilateral resistance’ term introduced in Anderson and Van 
Wincoop (2003). Even though it is calculated in terms of distance rather than price, it 
                                                 
252 See Egger and Larch (2008), Baldwin and Jaimovich (2010) and Baier et al (2010) for further 
justifications of using Baier and Bergstrand’s (2004) model as a starting point for the analysis of the 
formation of FTAs. 
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serves capture a similar concept253. The variable is expected to have a positive 
coefficient capturing the fact that the welfare gains from an FTA between two 
countries should be increasing as these are more remote from the rest of the world 
(Hypothesis 2 in BB2004)254. 
 
The other measures introduced in BB2004’s ‘traditional’ determinants of FTAs are 
the economic characteristics that were discussed in section 3.2. Countries which are 
larger, in terms of their economic mass are more likely to engage in FTAs. Hence a 
measure of the sum of the log of their GDP’s (RGDP) is expected to yield a positive 
coefficient. However, countries that are more dissimilar in this economic mass, 
identified through the absolute difference in the log of their GDPs (RGDPsim), are 
expected to be less likely to engage in an FTA255. BB2004 used measures of capital 
labour ratios to control for the fact that agreements between partners with larger 
differences in these ratios are more likely to deliver higher welfare gains (as 
predicted by traditional H-O models of trade). However Egger and Larch (2008) – 
Hereafter EL2008 - suggest that per capita GDPs can be used to capture these 
differences256. They include the absolute difference in the logs of the per capita 
GDPs (DGDPcap) and the square of these (SQDGDPcap), to capture non-linearities 
in this term, in their FTA formation equation. The expected sign of the coefficient of 
the former is positive whereas the latter is expected to have a negative coefficient 
(capturing these non-linearities)257. A final measure of the difference in the per capita 
GDPs of countries with respect to the rest of the world (DGDPcapROW) is added in 
an effort to account for BB2004’s notion that the probability of two countries 
engaging in an FTA is diminishing as the K-L ratios with respect to the world rise. 
This measure is computed using the following equation obtained from EL2008: 
 
                                                 
253 Remembering that prices are rising in distances due to trade costs. 
254 The measure of REMOTENESS also bears similarities with measures of interdependence used in 
Baier et al. (2010). 
255 BB2004 suggest that this arises from the fact that welfare gains, from an FTA, increase with 
similarity in the economic mass of the countries involved.  
256 This is very convenient as K-L ratio data is notoriously hard to come by. Egger and Larch (2008) 
note that the correlation coefficient of the capital-labour ratios used in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) 
and real GDP per capita is high (0.975). Bergstrand et al. (2010) also use this measure to proxy for 
differences in capital-labour ratios in their analysis of the timing of FTAs. 
257 Nevertheless the estimated coefficient of this indicator is expected to behave differently across the 
different waves of regionalism.  
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(3.2) 
The idea that has permeated the discussion on the determinants of FTAs is that the 
degree of vertical specialisation should play a positive role in the formation of new 
agreements. This is because measures of vertically specialised trade can help identify 
changing political economy conditions. Several measures will be used for this 
purpose. The first is a fully bilateral measure of the value of imported intermediates 
that are part of a bilateral value chain (lnintimps_BVSbil). It captures the value of the 
components imported from a particular partner that are then used to produce exports 
to that very same partner258. This measure is calculated using the OECD IO tables 
and trade data from COMTRADE. A discussion on how this measure is obtained, 
what it represents and the assumptions needed for its calculation can be found in 
earlier essays of this thesis. One important point worth recalling is that these 
measures are computed rather than observed and hence they serve as proxy measures 
of bilateral value chain activity.  
 
A measure of intermediate goods trade, where intermediates are identified using the 
BEC nomenclature (lnintimps_BEC), will also be introduced in the estimations. This 
is to compare the results of this essay to the findings of the previous one which saw 
different effects of an FTA on trade contingent on the use of imported intermediates. 
Furthermore, this also facilitates a comparison against Orefice and Rocha’s (2011) 
results. Finally, a measure of the global degree of vertical specialisation of a country, 
VSWLD, will be used. It is calculated from the equations presented in the first essay 
of this thesis and represents the Hummels et al. (2001) indicator. VSWLD captures 
the degree of global vertical specialisation, it is the share of total intermediate 
imports used, irrespective of their precedence, to produce total exports to all partners. 
It represents the international backward linkages of countries and is invariant across 
partners. It is used to identify the internal structure of the political economy forces 
within a country. Higher degrees of VSWLD should imply the presence of a greater 
                                                 
258 This was the dependent variable in the previous essay of this thesis. 
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amount of vertically specialised industries within a country and hence a greater 
lobbying mass in favour of liberalisation.  
3.4.2. GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
 
The presence of ‘appropriate’ governance structures within a country can, in 
principle, facilitate the flow of goods and ideas and is often associated with a more 
liberal trade stance (see Mansfield et al. 2000, 2002 and Mansfield et al. 2008)259.The 
link arises through more democratic governments placing a greater value on the well-
being of its citizens and hence conducting a more liberal trade policy in an effort to 
bolster their consumer surplus260. However another link between governance and 
FTAs can arise from the recent theoretical literature on incomplete contracts and 
trade (Antras, 2003; Ornelas and Turner, 2008; and Antras and Staiger 2011). Antras 
and Staiger’s (2011) hold-ups occur when firms trade less than they normally would 
due to the existence of uncertainties about the quality of the counterparts they are 
engaging in a deal with. The possibility that these renege on their contractual 
obligations leads to an inefficient amount of economic activity taking place between 
countries. However, if such uncertainties can be reduced by the presence of 
appropriate governance mechanisms, then it is possible that these mitigate hold-up 
problems261. This may then suggest that countries with better institutions, or 
governance structures, should not only trade more, but also be more willing to 
engage in trade agreements262.  
 
However, the link between governance mechanisms and the formation of FTAs is 
likely to be rather complicated. Although, a priori, better governance structures are 
expected to be associated with a higher likelihood of an FTA, countries may also 
wish to engage in FTAs in an effort to redress shortfalls in regulatory quality. Hence 
lower measures, within certain acceptable levels, may provide countries with the 
                                                 
259 It is noted that within this category of determinants should lie the role of multilateral negotiations 
in the formation of new trade agreements as suggested by Mansfield and Reinhardt (2003). These are 
omitted in this essay. A mitigating factor is that the period under investigation only includes one 
round of negotiations unlike that used in Mansfield and Reinhardt (2003).  
260 In the spirit of Grossman and Helpman’s (1995) model. 
261 See Antras (2003) for a similar argument for normal trade in the presence of incomplete contracts. 
262 The introduction of these measures at this stage of the analysis and not in prior essays may raise 
concerns. In particular, if these are indeed determinants of vertically specialised trade, then they 
should be included in a gravity model (essay 2). However, recalling that the gravity model presented 
in essay 2 used controls for country-year effects, and that these measures have this structure then the 
gravity model presented in the previous essay effectively already controls for governance measures. 
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opportunity of addressing shortfalls in governance through an FTA. An example of 
this arises from the Eastern European enlargement where it is often argued that a 
large share of the benefits from enlargement arose from binding regulatory 
frameworks to the provisions of the acquis communautaire. EU countries may have 
found it desirable to sign deeper agreements with Eastern European countries in an 
effort to bolster their regulatory provisions so as to engage in a wider fragmentation 
of production with these countries. 
 
In an effort to capture the role of regulatory structures in the formation of FTAs, 
measures from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators will be 
introduced into an FTA formation equation263. These are harmonised by country and 
year and range from -2.5 to 2.5. Higher values are associated with better governance 
structures264. Each indicator captures a different facet of governance:  
- Voice and Accountability (Voice_acc): Captures freedom of speech, 
association and free media. This measure is the perceptions of the extent to 
which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government. 
- Political Stability (Pol_stab): measures the perceptions of the likelihood that 
a government will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means. 
- Government Effectiveness (Gov_eff): captures perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies. 
- Rule of Law (Rol): captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence. 
- Control of Corruption (ctr_corr): captures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
                                                 
263 See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm for a description of the database. 
264 The definitions are directly transcribed from the database documents. Missing values in the dataset 
are manually imputed as averages of the year before and after the missing value. This occurs for 1995, 
1997, 1999 and 2001. 
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forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private 
interests. 
- Regulatory Quality (Reg_qual): captures perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development. 
As shown in Table 3.1, the measures of governance are highly correlated and hence 
their use, in the empirical section, needs to be approached with care. Introducing all 
measures into one single specification will cause multicollinearity which will lead to 
problems in the interpretation of the resulting coefficients265. 
Table 3.1: Correlation Coefficient of Governance Measures 
  Ctr_corr Gov_eff Pol_stab RoL Voice_acc reg_qual 
Ctr_corr 1 
Gov_eff 0.965 1 
Pol_stab 0.774 0.779 1 
RoL 0.958 0.954 0.805 1 
Voice_acc 0.851 0.847 0.792 0.870 1 
reg_qual 0.896 0.904 0.764 0.908 0.832 1 
 
In the empirical section, variations of these measures will be used to capture different 
links between regulatory frameworks and FTAs. First, the value of these will be 
introduced into an FTA formation model with the expectation that higher measures 
be associated with a higher likelihood of an FTA being formed. However, looking at 
dyadic characteristics, such as the minimum, the maximum, and the difference in 
these measures will also be instructive. If hold-ups are important, and can be 
mitigated by appropriate governance structures, then one could expect that the 
minimum governance measure, in a dyadic relationship, provides the binding 
condition for there to be an agreement. This is because the degree of the hold-up is 
likely to depend on the characteristics of the weakest member in a dyadic 
observation. This minimum measure may also help identify if countries are signing 
trade agreements in view of redressing shortfalls in regulatory frameworks as earlier 
suggested. However disentangling which effect dominates will be complicated. 
Wider differences in governance measures should also be associated with lower 
                                                 
265 Two solutions present themselves; first, introduce these in individual models and determine which 
is most significant; or second, transform the data using principle component analysis (PCA).Several 
attempts were made at using PCA but it was decided to stick with individual measures. 
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likelihoods of engaging in a trade agreement through similar channels. Both these 
stories would be consistent with Antras and Staiger’s (2011) work266. 
 
Although these measures are expected to be determinants of FTAs, a word of 
caution, in their interpretation is advised. These are collated from many different 
sources and represent the sentiment, or perceptions, of the inhabitants of a country 
rather than being direct observations of the actual quality of governance. 
Furthermore, in interpreting the marginal effects, the truncation of these measures 
will need to be considered as will what constitutes a ‘relevant’ change in these267. 
3.4.3. INTERDEPENDENCE EFFECTS 
 
The importance of interdependence effects in the formation of FTAs, as predicted by 
Baldwin’s (1993) domino theory of regionalism, has recently been established. Egger 
and Larch (2008) were first to give this hypothesis an empirical backing. They 
showed that third party agreements play a positive role on the probability that 
countries engage in an agreement. Their empirical approach relies on a spatial 
econometric model in which a distance weighted FTA lag is introduced into Baier 
and Bergstrand’s (2004) original FTA formation model. Baldwin and Jaimovich 
(2010) then take a similar approach but propose a measure of FTA ‘contagion’ that is 
obtained from a weighted spatial lag that uses exports as weights rather than the 
distances used in Egger and Larch (2008). Both suggest that ‘other’ FTAs affect the 
probability of a country pair engaging in one of their own. 
 
Baier et al. (2010) opt for a more traditional approach in looking at interdependence 
effects (rather than the aforementioned spatial models)268. They argue that 
                                                 
266 The interactions between FTAs and measures of governance are likely to be complex and might 
also give rise to reverse causality. Better governance may lead to the formation of FTAs and FTAs 
may lead to reforms that increase governance. Orefice and Rocha (2011) touch upon this issue through 
their analysis of the role that intermediate goods trade plays as a determinant of the depth of FTAs. 
They also highlight how the depth of an agreement positively affects the degree of intermediate goods 
trade between countries.  
267 When calculating marginal effects one needs to evaluate these at a certain point in the data. 
Commonly averages are chosen and deviations from these show the marginal effects. However it is 
hard to ascertain what a change from 0.7 to 1.7 implies, or if this constitutes a real world change in 
these variable, and hence hard to grasp the marginal effects of these variables on the formation of 
FTAs. Hence the signs of these are likely to be more revealing.  
268 The method that they propose relies on calculating ‘multilateral indexes’ which lends itself to a 
simpler estimation procedure than the spatial techniques used in Egger and Larch (2008) and Baldwin 
and Jaimovich (2010). The nature of these indicators is not dissimilar to the multilateral resistance 
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interdependence can be subsumed into Own FTA and Other FTA effects269. The first 
type of interdependence captures changes in the incentives of countries to form new 
FTAs which are commensurate on the amount of FTAs they currently hold270. The 
second captures a similar effect to that investigated in the spatial models, namely the 
role of third country regionalism on FTA formation271.  
 
Own-FTA effects can be captured using a variable that identifies the sum of a 
country’s existing FTAs with other countries (Baier et al. 2010). This variable is 
likely to capture two different effects. First, the costs of negotiating an additional 
FTA should be decreasing in the number of FTAs a country has already signed and 
hence this measure should have a positive impact on the probability of signing an 
additional agreement by capturing lower negotiating costs272. Secondly, a larger 
count of FTAs should also manifest the presence of political economy forces that are 
more inclined towards liberalisation273. This is akin to capturing Baldwin’s 
juggernaut effect where more liberal policies reduce the lobby powers of import 
competing firms and increase those of firms who favour liberalisation. However, in 
capturing these political economy forces, it is also possible that this measure is 
correlated with others that serve the same purpose such as the earlier explained 
VSWLD and hence the inclusion of these measures in the same estimation need be 
approached with caution274.  
 
The other source of interdependence arises from domino forces or ‘other FTAs’. 
Baldwin and Jaimovich’s (2010) – henceforth BJ2010 – ‘contagion’ index can be 
used to capture such interdependence. The main idea here is that countries that are 
left out of expanding agreements can lose export shares in these as a result of trade 
                                                                                                                                          
terms introduced by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). Baier et al (2010:p8 footnote 7) explain the 
problems associated with estimating spatial econometric models and provide compelling arguments in 
favour of simpler estimation methods.  
269 Baier et al. (2010) attempt to discern which one of these is most important in driving FTA 
formation. 
270 This idea is derived from the literature on tariff-complementarity (Bagwell and Staiger 1997, 1999 
and Ornelas 2005). 
271 Derived from models of competitive liberalisation (Baldwin 1993 and Bergsten 1996). 
272 This may capture a learning by doing element of negotiations. 
273 It is also possible that there are diminishing returns to this variable so a squared term can be added. 
If countries have signed many FTAs, the returns to an additional FTA should fall as the chances are 
that FTAs have already been signed with the most important trading partners. 
274 This captures the total degree of global vertical specialisation and was expected to yield positive 
coefficients through similar political economy channels. 
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diversion. This then induces them to sign trade agreements in an effort to re-direct 
their trade flows. BJ2010 create their contagion indicator using the following 
equation: 
 =   ,,
	,,

,
	
,

 
(3.3) 
Where  ,,
 is the share of exports of country i to all partners (k) except j and FTA is 
equal to one for each agreement that country j has with partner’s that are not country 
i. The measure captures the importance of country j’s preferential partners weighted 
by country i’s exports to these. It is expected to have a positive influence on the 
likelihood of signing an FTA (BJ2010). 
  
Similar forms of contagion may also arise from vertically specialised modes of 
production. Being excluded from an expanding agreement can jeopardise a domestic 
industry’s position within an international value chain. Hence third country 
regionalism can also lead to interdependence effects through its effects on value 
chain activity. In an effort to capture this, a VS contagion index (wbvsFTA) is 
created through a similar measure. The only difference arises from the use of a new 
share parameter. It identifies the importance of country j’s preferential partners for 
country i captured through the share that these markets occupy in country i’s bilateral 
value chain activity:   
!" =  intexps_bvs,,
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(3.4) 
The inclusion of these contagion measures raise issues of endogeneity because trade 
shares are likely to be affected by changes in preferential status (BJ2010). To control 
for this issue, the above shares are calculated for the first year in the sample (1995) 
when no agreements are identified. This implies that these contagion measures only 
vary through country’s participation in FTAs. 
 
Table 3.2 provides a summary of the indicators that will be used in the empirical 
section. It identifies; the name of the variables; a description of what these capture; 
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the expected sign on the impact of the probability of the formation of a new FTA; 
and the source from which the measures are calculated/derived275. 
Table 3.2: Summary of Independent Variables for FTA formation model 
Variable Description expected sign Source 
NATURAL 
Inverse of the natural logarithm of the distance 
between two countries 
(+) BB 2004 and 
EL 2008 
 Calculated 
using CEPII 
REMOTE 
Distance between a country and its closest 
neighbouring partners (except j). Calculated 
using equation 3.1 
(+) BB 2004 and 
EL 2008 
Calculated using 
CEPII 
RGDP  Sum of the log of the GDP of countries i and j. 
(+) BB 2004 and 
EL 2008 
 Calculated 
using WDI 
RGDPsim 
 = 	
 1 −   + 

−   + 
 (+) BB 2004 and 
EL 2008 
Calculated using 
WDI 
DGDPcap 
Absolute difference in the log of the per capita 
GDP’s of i and j. 
(+) BB 2004 and 
EL 2008 
 Calculated 
using WDI 
SQDGDPcap Square of DGDPcap 
(-) BB 2004 and 
EL 2008 
 Calculated 
using WDI 
DGDPcapROW 
Differences in the per capita GDP’s of country i 
and j with respect to the rest of the world. 
Equation 3.2. 
(-) BB 2004 and 
EL 2008 
 Calculated 
using WDI 
Governance 
measures 
Voice_acc, Rol, Pol_stab, Gov_eff, Reg_qual, 
Ctr_corr (+)AS 2011 WGI 
MinGov* 
MinGov* is the minimum measure of the above 
governance indicators in a dyadic observation.  (+) AS 2011 WGI 
MaxGov* 
MaxGov* is the maximum measure of the 
governance indicators in a dyadic observation. (+)AS 2011 WGI 
DiffGov* 
DiffGov* is the absolute difference between the 
reporter and partner measures of governance.  (-)AS 2011 WGI 
IMPORTS Natural logarithm of imports (+) Magee (2003)  COMTRADE 
INTIMPS_BEC 
Natural logarithm of intermediate imports used 
for any purpose in the economy. Identified by 
way of the BEC nomenclature 
(+) Orefice and 
Rocha (2011) COMTRADE 
INTIMPS_BVS 
Natural logarithm of the intermediate imports that 
are part of a fully bilateral value chain. See essay 
1 for calculations and essay 2 for a wider 
discussion. (+) 
# COMTRADE 
and OECD 
STAN database 
VSWLD 
Degree of global vertical specialisation. Captures 
the structure of trade by reporting the share of 
total intermediate imports (irrespective of origin) 
that are part of a value chain, as a proportion of 
total exports  (+) 
# COMTRADE 
and OECD 
STAN database 
countFTA Sum of FTAs a country has in a given year (+) 
  Calculated 
using CEPII 
wexpFTA 
Measure of contagion with export weights in 
1995. See equation (3.3). Identifies the 
importance of country j’s preferential partners in  
country i’s exports (+) BJ2010 
  Calculated 
using CEPII + 
Comtrade 
wbvsFTA 
 Measure of contagion with VS weights from 
1995. See equation (3.4). Identifies the 
importance of country j’s preferential partners in 
country i’s  exports of intermediate goods used in 
bilateral value chain activity. (+)  
  Calculated 
using CEPII + 
OECD STAN + 
Comtrade 
                                                 
275 A summary table of the descriptive statistics for these variables can be found in the Appendix 
A3.2. 
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# See the first essay of this thesis for a discussion on the calculation of bilateral indicators of vertical 
specialisation. 
 
3.5. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
In capturing the impact of vertical specialisation on the probability that two countries 
engage in an FTA one will be confronted with two separate issues of endogeneity. 
The first arises from unobserved heterogeneity whereas the second is caused by 
simultaneity
276. Unobserved heterogeneity occurs because of the presence of 
unobserved variables (to the econometrician) simultaneously affecting both the 
probability of countries engaging in an FTA and also the levels of vertical 
specialisation between these277. These unobserved parameters are captured by the 
error term (which will no longer exhibit its desired i.i.d. properties) and cause biases 
in the estimation of the coefficients of interest. Baier et al. (2007:p26) remark that 
“the inclusion of bilateral trade as a RHS variable [..] is likely to result in 
inconsistent coefficient estimates”278. Simultaneity is also likely to be problematic. It 
occurs through the impact that FTAs have on current trade flows. Mitigating this bias 
can be done through the use of pre-agreement rather than current trade flows, 
however providing controls for unobserved heterogeneity may be more complicated. 
Understanding the nature of these biases is crucial in providing solutions to the 
problems they cause in the estimation. 
 
The previous essay of this thesis suggested that there was indeed cause for concern 
about the presence of endogeneity. It showed that current levels of vertically 
specialised trade were affected by the presence of future trade agreements (see Table 
2.5) and hence that countries with characteristics associated with higher levels of 
vertically specialised trade appeared to be selecting into FTAs279. If these 
characteristics are unobserved, then biases in the estimation of an FTA formation 
equation will appear280. These biases can be dealt with using cross-sectional and 
                                                 
276 see previous essay for a justification of the positive impact of FTAs on vertically specialised trade. 
277 This assumption is the same as the one made in the previous essay of this thesis. 
278 The presence of unobserved heterogeneity in these estimations was confirmed in the second essay 
of this thesis where it was found that unobserved variables drove levels of trade and also the 
desirability of engaging in an FTA. 
279 This, in part, motivated the hypothesis of this essay. 
280 In the previous essay, once appropriate controls were used through a set of selected FE, it was 
shown that current trade flows were unaffected by future trade agreements which then supported the 
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panel data techniques and this section discusses the merits and pitfalls of these 
approaches in estimating an FTA formation model using trade based measures of 
vertical specialisation.  
3.5.1. CROSS-SECTIONAL MODELS 
The traditional empirical framework used to capture the determinants of FTAs is the 
binary response model. The probability of a positive outcome (FTA=1), conditional 
on a set of covariates (x), is determined by the function P(FTA=1|x)= G(xβ). G(.) 
represents the cumulative density function (cdf) that ensures that predicted values lie 
within the unit interval and β identifies a set of coefficients. A positive outcome is 
occurs when FTA= 1[FTA*>0] where FTA* is a latent unobserved variable that 
captures the minimum utility that each country is likely to obtain from signing an 
agreement (i.e. FTA* = min(∆Ui,∆Uj)). This empirical approach to the formation of 
FTAs, first proposed by Baier and Bergstrand (2004), is valid provided that strictly 
exogenous explanatory variables are used. In this respect, BB2004 rely on distance 
and income measures which should satisfy this criterion281. However the introduction 
of measures of vertical specialisation raises concerns related to unobserved 
heterogeneity. The following ‘true’ model of FTA formation can help elucidate the 
nature of the problem:  
 , = #,$ + %, 
 %	, = 	 &, 	+ 	 '	, 
(3.5) 
 
The probability of two countries (i,j) engaging in an FTA is determined by; a set of 
covariates Xi,j which include the degree of VS between these; and an error term that 
is composed of an unobserved element (qi,j) and an iid normally distributed error 
term (εi,j). Because the unobserved element is likely to be correlated with both the 
probability that two countries form an FTA (dependent variable) and the levels of VS 
between these, the model cannot be estimated using traditional techniques because 
biases in the coefficients of interest will arise. Estimating the probability model then 
                                                                                                                                          
notion that the impact that the FTA dummy variable was capturing was the impact of an FTA on VS 
rather than any other unobserved factor.  
281 It can be argued that income is not exogenous as it can be affected by FTAs, but taking lagged 
values should resolve these issues. 
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requires using a method that generates exogenous variation in the independent VS 
variable.  
 
This can be achieved, in cross-sectional models, either through an Instrumental 
Variable (IV) approach or a first difference (FD) estimator. Magee (2003) opts for 
the former by treating trade flows and FTAs as endogenous processes. Instrumenting 
for each in a first step equation, he uses the predicted values thus obtained to 
estimate their impact on each other in a second step. Looking at the role of VS on the 
probability that two countries engage in an agreement can be achieved through a 
similar two-step procedure: 
 (), 	= 	 *,$	 + 	+, 	 
(3.6) 
 , = 	 #,$	 + 	(),, + %, 	 
(3.7) 
 
A first step gravity model for vertically specialised trade (3.6) is estimated using a set 
of valid instruments and the predicted values of this first-step,	(),,, are introduced in 
a second step FTA formation equation (3.7)282. In the first step, Z, identifies a set of 
explanatory variables that include instruments that meet the necessary validity 
criteria. The first one is that the fitted values from the first step must be uncorrelated 
with the unobserved element of the error term υi,j in (3.7) so that COV((),,, υi,j)=0. 
Because this term (υi,j) is unobserved, it is hard to determine whether this condition is 
met in these types of models. The second validity test requires the instruments to be 
as correlated as possible with the measure of VS283. Proving the validity of 
instruments tends to be complicated and often boils down to providing a convincing 
argument284. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) argue that valid instruments, in this type of 
estimation, are notoriously hard to come by285. Hence alternative methods for 
estimating FTA formation equations will need to be pursued. 
 
                                                 
282 The use of a gravity model to estimate intermediate imports is justified in the previous essay of this 
thesis. 
283 This condition should be met by virtue of the first step. 
284 There is no direct test which guarantees the validity of the instruments used. 
285 They suggest that the instruments used in Magee’s (2003) paper do not meet these validity criteria. 
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One such alternative approach is to estimate these models using a first difference 
(FD) estimator. If the ‘true’ model of FTA formation follows equation (3.5), and one 
can draw on two time periods (T=2), then it is possible to apply a first difference 
approach to eliminate the problematic unobserved parameter (qi,j) so that the 
following model is estimated: 
 -, = . + (#,, − #,,)$ + ((),, − (),,) + (&,, − &,,) + (',, −',,)  
(3.8) 
 
The dependent variable takes the value 1 when a country ‘switches’ into an 
agreement from period 0 to period 1 and thus identifies new agreements within the 
sample286. The α0 constant captures the time trend in the data (i.e. the difference in 
the intercept in period 0 and period 1). By virtue of the assumed time invariant nature 
of the unobservable variable, the term (q i,j,1- q i,j,0) in the above expression will be 
equal to zero and hence disappear from the estimation. If δ >0 then this implies a 
positive effect of the change in VS on the probability that a country switches into an 
agreement. The above model can be estimated using non-linear probability models 
(probit or logit) to make sure that the predicted values lie within the unit interval, 
however if the source for unobserved heterogeneity arises from factors that change in 
time, then such a specification may not resolve the endogeneity problem and also 
deliver biased estimates.  
 
In estimating this model one should also bear in mind that the period during which 
the differences are taken is going to be important. If one takes differences between 
the first period and the last period of the sample then the FD model might remain 
biased due to simultaneity. If flows of vertically specialised trade are positively 
affected by FTAs, then changes in flows will be endogenous to the presence of an 
FTA. This suggests that pre agreement changes in flows should be used to predict 
future changes in FTA status. 
                                                 
286 This approach could be problematic if there are instances of switching out of agreements because 
the dFTA dependent variable would take on negative values. This is not the case in the context of the 
dataset used in this essay. Furthermore it is actually a very convenient way of looking at the role of the 
independent variables in the formation of NEW agreements as it eliminates all those agreements that 
are time invariant. 
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3.5.2. PANEL DATA APPROACHES 
 
Panel data settings generally provide convenient solutions for dealing with 
unobserved heterogeneity as shown in the previous essay. Using an informed choice 
of FE can often eradicate the biases that this condition afflicts on the coefficients of 
interest. However the binary nature of the FTA dependent variable requires using 
non-linear estimation techniques which introduce complications in the estimation 
procedure on account of the ‘incidental parameters problem’ (see Wooldridge, 2002 
Chapter 15 p 484; and Greene, 2010 Chapter 9)287. Binary dependent variable models 
may yield severe biases when using the FE estimator. The alternative of using a 
random effects (RE) model is also unsatisfactory because of the implicit assumption 
of no correlation between the unobserved effects and the regressors. If the underlying 
hypothesis posits that the nature of the endogeneity problem arises from the 
unobservables driving both the level of VS and also the incentives to form a trade 
agreement, then the RE model assumption is generally, but as we shall see, not 
always, inadequate. Although there is no widely accepted method for estimating 
binary models with FE using panel data, several ‘fixes’ have been proposed in the 
literature. 
 
The first is similar to the IV approach that was earlier presented (Equations 3.6 and 
3.7) but it is applied in the context of a panel estimation. Manger (2009) looks at the 
impact of vertical intra industry trade288 on the probability of two countries engaging 
in an FTA using such a two step procedure289. The first step consists of estimating a 
gravity model and the second step uses the predicted values of this first step to look 
at an FTA formation equation. One can apply this method to look at the role of VS in 
                                                 
287 Honore (2002:p166) says that the incidental parameter’s problem “will typically, but not always 
lead to inconsistent estimation of all the parameters of the model. The problem arises when T is small. 
The estimates of the unobserved effect become inconsistent (even when one increases N). This 
inconsistency then causes biases in the estimated coefficients”. 
288 The indicator of vertical intra-industry trade identifies the overlap between imports and exports at a 
certain level of aggregation (6-digits in this instance). Manger (2009) follows the traditional literature 
and identifies vertical flows when the difference in the unit values of the export and import flows is 
above a certain threshold.  
289 Manger (2009) underlines that the changing nature of the partners that are involved in new FTAs 
arises from evolving features in the typology of trade which are captured by this indicator. The 
proliferation of FTAs between countries of different levels of development is then motivated by 
changes in the political coalitions that support liberalisation manifested by the rise in vertical intra-
industry trade (VIIT). Manger essentially proposes a similar conceptual link between VIIT and FTAs 
as is made here between VS and FTAs. However, in his empirical strategy he makes no distinction 
between VIIT in intermediate or in final goods. It is then possible that his results are capturing 
different incentives to form trade agreements than those that are the concern of this essay. 
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the formation of FTAs290. The idea here is that using predicted values of VS rather 
than actual values means that the unexplained part of this variable, that is likely to be 
correlated with the unobservables, is removed and hence exogenous variation in the 
VS measure has been accomplished. This implies that it can be introduced into a 
second step FTA formation equation291.  
 
Wooldridge (2002) proposes a different solution for estimating binary models with 
fixed effects. He suggests that a Mundlak-Chamberlain approach can be applied292. 
This can be accomplished by estimating an RE model with added observation 
averaged independent variables which act as pseudo-fixed-effects293. Consider a 
variant of equation (3.5) that incorporates a time dimension and where the VS term 
enters through the set of explanatory variables, Xi,j,t, and is correlated with the time 
invariant term qi,j: 
    ,,
 = #,,
$ + &, 	+ 	 '	,,
 
(3.9) 
 
It is possible to condition the structure of qi,j using observation averages so that: 
 &, = / + 	#,,
0 + !, 
(3.10) 
 
The unobserved component of the FTA equation, qi,j, is conditioned as a function of #,,
 , which identifies the average values of the regressors over time and an error 
term bi,j that is assumed to be uncorrelated with #,,
. Wooldridge (2002) argues that 
“Adding [#,,
] as a set of controls for unobserved heterogeneity is very intuitive: we 
are estimating the effect of changing [Xi,j,t] but holding the time average fixed”. 
 
 
                                                 
290 Manger (2010) argues that such an approach requires undertaking a panel bootstrap so as to 
address the incorrect estimation of the standard errors. Additionally he suggests that this corrects for 
time dependence in short panels and the presence of slow moving variables (p.16). However he argues 
that inference in these models is likely to be ‘more conservative’ (p.17). 
291 However, because there is no STATA routine for such an estimation, one has to pay particular care 
in how the standard errors are treated. Manger (2009) suggest a bootstrap method. 
292 See Greene (2011) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2007) for a more detailed discussion of this 
methodology. 
293 Wooldridge (2002) attributes this method to Chamberlain (1980) and calls it Chamberlain’s 
random effects probit model. 
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3.6. RESULTS 
The objective of this essay is to investigate how and if the changing nature of trade 
affects the formation of FTAs. Three new channels through which this might occur 
have been identified. One is through changes in the political economy dynamics of 
liberalisation. Another is through a larger role for institutional participation captured 
by way of governance measures; the last is through the emergence of 
interdependence effects arising from the spread of production across national 
borders. Before turning to each of these, a closer analysis of how the traditional 
determinants of FTAs fare in explaining the participation of countries across the 
different waves of regionalism is warranted. If the changing nature of trade is 
important, then one might expect changes in the coefficients of the traditional 
determinants of FTAs. Furthermore, if there are new reasons for engaging in new 
FTAs then one might also expect that these traditional determinants show a 
diminishing explanatory power in predicting the countries involved in the different 
waves or regionalism. Once the need for looking at new determinants of FTAs has 
been established, a more focused analysis of the new determinants of new 
agreements signed between 1995 and 2008 will be carried out on a subsample of 
countries using, first, cross-sectional models and then panel techniques294. 
3.6.1. CHANGES IN THE TRADITIONAL DETERMINANTS OF FTAS 
The preliminary evidence presented in section 3.2 pointed to perceivable differences 
in the characteristics of new preferential partners with respect to earlier waves. It 
suggested that the countries involved in the latest wave of regionalism tended to be 
less distant and shared lower similarities in their capital-labour ratios (as proxied by 
GDP per capita) than during earlier waves. If there are changes in the determining 
features of FTAs across the different waves, then one should be able to capture these 
by re-estimating the traditional FTA formation equations (BB2004). To this end, the 
                                                 
294 Data constraints in the calculation of right hand side variables force a considerable reduction in the 
temporal and country coverage of the sample when looking at the new determinants of new 
agreements. The resulting sub-sample is the same that was used in the previous essay of this thesis 
and is described at greater lengths in sections 3.4 of this essay and section 2.6.1.3 of the previous 
essay. 
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following cross-sectional logit model is estimated across the different waves of 
regionalism295: 
 
7, =  + 8 , + , + , + ,
+ (, + !9(, + 	, + :, 
(3.11) 
The results from these estimations, for a sample of 140 countries, are presented in 
Table 3.3. The dependent variable in the first column is equal to one if an FTA has 
been concluded by the year 2006 so that this estimation captures the traditional 
determinants of any agreement as in BB2004. The final three columns of the table 
show the results of estimating equation (3.11) for different dependent variables that 
capture the formation of new agreements during each identified wave of regionalism. 
Hence for Column (2) the dependent variable is equal to one only if a new agreement 
is signed during the identified lapse of the wave (i.e. 1958-1985). The dependent 
variable in column (3) is then equal to one if a dyad signed a new agreement during 
the second wave and so forth296. A different base year is used for each estimation so 
that; the first wave uses 1970’s economic characteristics; the second wave has a base 
year of 1985; and the third wave is investigated using the characteristics of countries 
in 1995297. 
 
Column (1) confirms the results obtained by BB2004 and EL2008298. It shows that 
the probability of two countries engaging in an FTA is increasing in the degree of 
proximity between these (NATURAL) and remoteness (REMOTE) with respect to 
third countries. The combined economic mass (RGDP) and the similarity in GDP’s 
(RGDPsim) also have a positive impact on the likelihood of an FTA as do larger 
                                                 
295 A logit is chosen for comparability across results in subsequent sections. Initially a probit model 
was also run but it seemed to fare worse in predicting successful FTAs than the logit. 
296 If a country signs an agreement during the first identified wave of regionalism, it is removed from 
the sample in subsequent estimations. In looking at the determinants of new agreements, an issue 
arises concerning the treatment of existing agreements. This is discussed at length in the Appendix 
A3.3. 
297 As a robustness check this table is also estimated using 1970’s data. BB2004 used a baseline year 
of 1960 to avoid issues of endogeneity arising from the possible impact of FTAs on GDP. Their 
sample is also smaller and included 57 countries with a dependent variable that was equal to one if a 
country was part of an agreement in 1996. Robustness checks show that the results are relatively 
insensitive to the use of different base years. 
298 Although it is noted that a lower predictive power is obtained in this sample than that of BB2004. 
They focused on agreements in 1996 so this fact may give further support to the changing 
determinants of FTAs during the new wave of regionalism. 
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differences in capital-labour ratios (DGDPcap). This last variable enters the 
specification non-linearly as seen by the significance of the square of this term 
(SQDGDPcap). A comparison of the coefficient estimates across the different waves 
gives econometric support to the stylised facts observed in section 3.2. The changing 
role of distance appears to be captured by changes in the coefficient estimates of the 
distance based variables. In particular, the insignificance of the REMOTE measure in 
the final column may be pointing to differences in the geographic spread of new 
preferential partners during the latest wave of regionalism, or in other words to the 
emergence of more distant agreements299. In addition, the increase in the coefficient 
estimates of the DGDPCAP measure seen for the latest wave also lends itself to the 
notion that new preferential partners are increasingly more dissimilar in their capital-
labour ratios. 
 
Another revealing result lies in the decline in the predictive powers of the estimations 
across the different waves. Whereas the independent variables explain 43% of the 
full sample variance, they only explain 31% of the variance during the latest wave of 
regionalism300. Hence, although these determinants remain important, their predictive 
powers fall considerably in explaining the latest wave of regionalism. This is also 
highlighted when using another measure of ‘goodness-of-fit’ that tracks the 
percentage of correctly predicted FTAs conditional on the outcome (BB2004)301. 
Here the full sample model successfully predicts 43% of the agreements that are in 
place throughout the entire sample (column 1). However this predictive power is 
reduced to 11% for new agreements signed during the third wave (i.e. 91 of the 831 
agreements)302. These results make a case for considering the waves of regionalism 
                                                 
299 This may be capturing the ‘hump’ that appeared in Figure 3.3. 
300 Bearing in mind that the pseudo_r2 is calculated as 1 minus the ratio of the log likelihood value for 
the estimated model and that predicted by a model with just an intercept (like in BB2004). 
301 It is assumed that predicted PTA membership occurs when the predicted response probability 
(p(FTA)) is above 0.5 as in BB2004 and EL2008. The focus is placed on ‘true positives’ (i.e. correctly 
predicting an FTA when there is one) because correctly predicting the presence of no FTA in a sample 
such as this one with little incidence of FTAs is easier. In fact, if the model had no predictive powers 
whatsoever and predicted no FTAs, it would still correctly predict over 96% of the observations.  
302 Another striking feature is that the determinants of the first and last wave of regionalism share 
more similarities with each other than with the determinants of the second wave. Whilst it would be 
interesting to pursue what drives these results, it is, at present, beyond the scope of this essay. 
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independently and may be suggestive of changes in the determinants of new FTAs303. 
This is the focus of the remainder of this study. 
 
Table 3.3: Determinants of FTAs across the different waves of regionalism – 
Full Sample  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Expected 
Signs 
FTA in 2006 
FTA: first wave 
1960-1984 
FTA: Second 
wave 1985-1995 
FTA: Third 
wave 1995-
2006 
(1970 values) (1970 values) (1985 values) (1995 values) 
NATURAL (+) 1.936*** 1.399*** 1.662*** 1.749*** 
  
(0.0578) (0.0714) (0.0708) (0.0648) 
REMOTE (+) 0.0573*** 0.134*** 0.249*** -0.00542 
  
(0.00726) (0.0183) (0.0179) (0.00907) 
RGDP (+) 0.219*** 0.212*** 0.218*** 0.251*** 
  
(0.0111) (0.0223) (0.0153) (0.0140) 
RGDPsim (+) 0.114*** -0.0730 0.400*** 0.145*** 
  
(0.0257) (0.0446) (0.0508) (0.0311) 
DGDPCAP (+) 0.441*** -0.385* 0.706*** 1.012*** 
  
(0.131) (0.230) (0.210) (0.136) 
SQDGDPCAP (-) -0.223*** -0.0183 -0.369*** -0.263*** 
  
(0.0443) (0.0737) (0.0720) (0.0330) 
DGDPcapROW (-) -0.638*** -0.0943 0.413*** -0.555*** 
  
(0.0733) (0.107) (0.0809) (0.0765) 
Constant 
 
10.93*** 3.394*** 4.326*** 7.186*** 
  
(0.541) (0.695) (0.665) (0.580) 
Observations 
 
19,460 19,460 18,957 18,455 
r2_p 
 
0.439 0.385 0.496 0.308 
Correctly Predicted 
p(FTA)=FTA  
92.78% 98.28% 96.81% 95.23% 
Correctly Predicted 
FTA=1*  
43.29% 
(781 out of 1804) 
15.93% 
(58 out of 364) 
27.3% 
(175 out of 641) 
10.95% 
(91 out of 
831) 
97.84% 99.85% 99.24% 99.21% 
Correctly predicted 
FTA=0  
19,460 19,460 18,957 18,455 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Values are for the different base years. Column (1): 1970; Wave 1: 1970; Wave 2: 1985; Wave 3, 
1995. 
*Sum of new agreements across different waves is larger than that of agreements in 2006. This 
reflects agreements that expired 
 
3.6.2. DETERMINANTS OF NEW FTAS: GOVERNANCE  
One of the hypotheses put forward in this essay is that the rising complexity of 
international economic transactions should lead to a greater demand for ‘appropriate’ 
regulatory frameworks. Measures of governance may help identify the scope for 
                                                 
303 The results presented in Table 3.3 are robust to different specifications of the temporal coverage of 
the waves. In the Appendix Table A3.4 the first wave is shortened and is identified for the period 
1960-1980, the second wave is then lengthened from 1981-1999 and the third wave occurs from 2000-
2006. The results suggest, if anything, that the traditional determinants of FTAs are worse at 
predicting FTAs during this newly defined third wave. The percentage of correctly predicted FTAs 
falls to around 5%. 
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hold-ups and hence be determinants of the desirability of engaging in FTAs. A priori, 
countries with ‘better’ governance structures are expected to experience a lower 
incidence of hold-ups and hence larger trade volumes making the conclusion of an 
FTA more desirable. However, it is also possible that larger hold-ups motivate the 
creation of FTAs in an effort to redress these through a harmonisation of regulatory 
frameworks. Looking at the role of measures of governance in the formation of new 
FTAs is approached through the introduction of these measures into a ‘traditional’ 
FTA formation equation304.  
 
The first column of Table 3.4 shows the results obtained from estimating BB2004’s 
traditional FTA formation model for a cross section of countries in the year 2008 
using the reduced sample of countries305. This benchmarking exercise reveals that the 
‘traditional’ determinants of FTAs fare better at predicting new FTAs in the new 
subsample of countries than they were seen to be in the larger sample used to 
produce the results reported in Table 3.3306. The model now successfully predicts 
54% of new agreements signed. The remainder of the columns introduce the levels of 
the different governance measures. The positive sign in the coefficients of these 
measures gives supporting evidence to the initial hypothesis - ‘better run’ countries 
are more likely to engage in FTAs. The results also suggest that the measure that 
tracks regulatory quality (REG_QUAL) explains the largest amount of the variance 
when compared to the other measures. Recalling that this measure captures the 
ability of governments in formulating and implementing policies that promote 
private sector development reinforces the claim that regulatory frameworks are 
important as originally suggested. 
                                                 
304 The measures are introduced individually rather than collectively to avoid multicollinearity. A 
principle component analysis (PCA) derived aggregate indicator was also attempted. The analysis 
suggested that one factor explained 85% of the variance i.e. the eigenvalue of the first factor was 
above 5 whereas the remaining ones were well below 1 implying that only one factor should be 
retained. This suggests that not much information is added through the process of aggregating these 
and hence it was decided that looking into the role of these measure separately would be more 
informative.  
305 See section 3.4 of this essay for a short description of the countries used for this regression. Also 
see section 2.6.1.3 of the previous essay for a fuller description of the database. 
306 It need be noted that this subsample captures many of the new agreements signed during the latest 
wave and hence that an FTA event is more likely here than in the larger sample. 
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Table 3.4: Determinants of FTAs – Measures of Governance 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
NATURAL 0.817*** 0.817*** 0.863*** 0.930*** 0.909*** 0.879*** 0.923*** 
  (0.139) (0.139) (0.141) (0.150) (0.145) (0.144) (0.148) 
REMOTE 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.180*** 0.183*** 0.180*** 0.184*** 0.189*** 
  (0.0311) (0.0311) (0.0314) (0.0317) (0.0319) (0.0323) (0.0324) 
RGDP -0.224*** -0.224*** -0.217*** -0.208*** -0.211*** -0.217*** -0.212*** 
  (0.0515) (0.0514) (0.0532) (0.0531) (0.0538) (0.0544) (0.0549) 
RGDPsim 0.0786 0.0786 0.128 0.122 0.112 0.128 0.159* 
  (0.0879) (0.0892) (0.0902) (0.0920) (0.0905) (0.0914) (0.0929) 
DGDPCAP 1.344*** 1.344*** 1.477*** 1.518*** 1.468*** 1.512*** 1.561*** 
  (0.365) (0.365) (0.377) (0.376) (0.383) (0.386) (0.388) 
SQDGDPCAP -0.312*** -0.312*** -0.335*** -0.350*** -0.329*** -0.339*** -0.352*** 
  (0.116) (0.116) (0.123) (0.123) (0.127) (0.128) (0.129) 
DGDPcapROW -2.000*** -2.000*** -2.101*** -2.016*** -2.181*** -2.142*** -2.042*** 
  (0.316) (0.317) (0.353) (0.360) (0.371) (0.371) (0.376) 
POL_STAB -5.37e-05 
  (0.129) 
ROL 0.430*** 
  (0.106) 
VOICE_ACC 0.695*** 
  (0.156) 
CTR_CORR 0.470*** 
  (0.0934) 
GOV_EFF 0.700*** 
  (0.129) 
REG_QUAL 0.868*** 
  (0.124) 
Constant 19.25*** 19.25*** 19.01*** 18.76*** 19.09*** 18.81*** 18.64*** 
  (2.875) (2.875) (2.941) (2.956) (2.970) (2.988) (3.008) 
Observations 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 
r2_p 0.350 0.350 0.364 0.369 0.369 0.371 0.384 
Correctly Predicted p(FTA)=FTA 81.5% 81.5% 81.4% 81.2% 81.4% 81.7% 81.5% 
Correctly Predicted FTA=1 54.0% 54.0% 54.3% 54.6% 53.4% 55.5% 55.5% 
Correctly predicted FTA=0 93.2% 93.2% 92.9% 92.5% 93.3% 92.8% 92.5% 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Dyadic variations in these measures could also be important in determining FTA 
status. This is because, for the successful completion of an FTA, both negotiating 
partners need to ratify the agreement which suggests that their combined 
characteristics might be determining. Consistent with an interpretation of Antras and 
Staiger’s (2011) paper would be that it is the minimum value of these measures 
which is binding. Or, in other words, that the degree of hold-ups is determined by the 
degree of regulatory quality of the weakest member in a dyadic relationship. 
Differences in governance measures may also be important where wider 
discrepancies in regulatory frameworks between countries should lead to lower 
levels of offshoring and hence a lower demand for FTAs. 
 
Table 3.5 looks at the role of different dyadic measures of governance on the 
precision of the FTA formation equation
307
. The first panel uses the minimum value 
of the governance measure in a dyadic observation whilst the second and third 
columns show the maximum and the difference in these respectively. The results 
support the idea that it is the minimum measure that is most influential in 
determining the formation of new FTAs. This can be seen by comparing the 
predictive power of the models in panel 1 against those of the remaining columns of 
Table 3.5. Again, the measure of regulatory quality appears to act as the ‘best’ 
predictor of FTAs when compared to the other measures of governance. In this 
format its inclusion increases the predictive powers of the FTA formation equation to 
a successful prediction of 66% of new agreements. This is to be contrasted against 
the benchmark model that correctly predicted 54% of agreements (column 1 of Table 
3.4). One other possible interpretation for the positive coefficient found in this 
variable is that it is low measures of regulatory quality, in a dyadic observation, that 
motivate countries to sign new trade agreement. Or that countries may wish to 
engage in FTAs so as to redress shortfalls in regulatory quality. This interpretation is 
consistent with the results presented, however providing full econometric evidence of 
this effect by isolating it from other drivers might be tricky and require further work 
(see Appendix A3.4 for a discussion and some attempts at incorporating non-linear 
effects of these measures on the likelihood of an FTA being formed
308
).  
                                                 
307
 The coefficients of the traditional FTA formation variables are omitted for brevity. 
308
 In Appendix A3.4. the relationship between these measures and the probability of engaging in an 
FTA is further investigated where the results suggest that there might be a non-monotonic relationship 
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The results presented in the second panel then reveal that, although the maximum 
values of the governance measures in a dyadic relationship are significant, they add 
little explanatory power to the FTA formation equations. Turning then to the 
differences in these measures, in the final panel, shows support to the initial 
predictions suggesting that FTAs are less likely between countries that exhibit wide 
differences in governance
309
. 
Table 3.5: Determinants of FTAs – Measures of Governance, min, max and diff 
  
(1) 
MINS 
(2) 
MAX 
(3) 
DIFF 
  Coeff Ps- R2 Pred Coeff Ps- R2 Pred Coeff P- R2 Pred 
POL_STAB 
-0.322** 0.353 55.2% 0.612*** 0.356 53.7% 0.742*** 0.365 57.1% 
(0.151)   (0.218)   (0.164)   
ROL 
1.126*** 0.398 62.0% 0.787*** 0.366 51.5% -0.761*** 0.367 58.3% 
(0.167)   (0.175)   (0.165)   
VOICE_ACC 
1.774*** 0.413 62.6% 1.591*** 0.372 50.3% -1.195*** 0.380 58.3% 
(0.375)   (0.322)   (0.253)   
CTR_CORR 
1.897*** 0.446 63.8% 0.493*** 0.362 51.5% -0.763*** 0.373 60.1% 
(0.257)   (0.119)   (0.132)   
GOV_EFF 
2.412*** 0.450 64.4% 0.819*** 0.362 52.8% -1.865*** 0.405 65.0% 
(0.305)   (0.197)   (0.231)   
REG_QUAL 
2.852*** 0.501 66.3% 1.091*** 0.367 53.4% -2.400*** 0.458 65.0% 
(0.368)     (0.236)     (0.248)     
 Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
These results suggest that governance measures are important in determining the 
likelihood of a new agreement being formed and hence that their omission in 
subsequent estimations may lead to omitted variable biases. However, because the 
collective use of these introduces elements of multicollinearity, in subsequent 
estimations, only the measure that explains the largest variance in the probability of 
an FTA will be included. This is the minimum measure of regulatory quality. 
3.6.3. DETERMINANTS OF NEW FTAS: VERTICAL SPECIALISATION 
Table 3.6 shows the results from estimating an augmented FTA formation model 
using various measures of trade and vertical specialisation for the year 2008. The 
first column now becomes the new baseline model. It includes the traditional 
determinants of FTAs (BB2004) in conjunction with the minimum measure of 
                                                                                                                                          
between governance and FTA formation. They show that very low measures of regulatory quality are 
associated with lower likelihoods of FTA formation, however measures in the low-to mid range are 
seen to be associated with higher probabilities of an FTA being formed. 
309
 Table 3.5 shows that the variable POL_STAB seems to react in a way that is counter to the 
predictions made. It is possible that this variable captures necessary conditions needed for value chain 
activity. A low value of political stability may imply very little security in economic transactions and 
hence reduce the probability of an FTA.   
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regulatory quality. The three columns that follow then capture the role of various 
trade measures on the likelihood of countries forming a new FTA. Column (2) 
introduces the log of the value of total imports (IMPORTS); column (3) the log of 
the value of intermediate imports as identified by way of the BEC nomenclature 
(INT_IMPS_BEC); and column (4) the log of the value of bilateral intermediate 
imports that are part of a bilateral value chain (INT_IMPS__BVS)
310
. These 
measures are seen to enter the FTA formation equation with a positive coefficient so 
that they are associated with a positive impact on the likelihood of the successful 
conclusion of a new FTA. Comparing the coefficients of these trade measures also 
shows that the largest impact, in terms of the size of the coefficient, is delivered by 
the BEC measure of intermediate imports
311
. However, the inclusion of the bilateral 
measure of vertically specialised trade results in a higher prediction of successful 
outcomes.  
 
In column (5), a measure of the structure of trade is introduced through the 
minVSWLD indicator. The positive coefficient on this measure suggests that 
countries that are more globally vertically specialised are more likely to engage in a 
trade agreements. This indicator serves the purpose of capturing the political 
economy dynamics within a country. Higher measures are associated with a larger 
presence of a relative lobbying mass in favour of liberalisation. The minimum value 
of this indicator is used to reflect the fact that both countries have to have a larger 
lobbying mass in favour of liberalisation for the successful conclusion of an 
agreement
312
. Column (7) then adds the measure of the value intermediate imports 
which are part of a bilateral value chain to this specification. Again, further support 
to the positive role of vertically specialised trade on the formation of new trade 
agreements is identified
313
. 
                                                 
310
 This is the same measure that exhibited magnification effects in the previous essay. 
311
 This is in line with Orefice and Rocha’s (2011) findings. 
312
 Other estimations used the value of a country’s measure of world vertical specialisation rather than 
the minimum. A positive coefficient was found confirming the hypothesis that countries with a higher 
relative lobbying mass in favour of liberalisation are more likely to engage in trade agreements. 
However the predictive powers of the FTA formation equation were lower than when the minimum 
measure was used. These results are not reported but are available upon request. 
313
 Interestingly, when an interaction term is added between bvs intermediates and reg quality (not 
shown), the trade measure loses its significance and interacted term becomes significant. This may 
imply that the vs measure is acting through the governance measure as originally suggested by Antras 
and Stagier (2011). Extensions of this thesis should focus on this issue. 
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Table 3.6: Determinants of FTAs – Trade Measures 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NATURAL 1.482*** 1.317*** 1.304*** 1.215*** 1.528*** 1.322*** 
  (0.195) (0.217) (0.212) (0.218) (0.205) (0.231) 
REMOTE 0.195*** 0.184*** 0.177*** 0.178*** 0.185*** 0.173*** 
  (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0396) (0.0386) 
RGDP -0.108 -0.322*** -0.382*** -0.347*** 0.0377 -0.164 
  (0.0725) (0.119) (0.121) (0.103) (0.0743) (0.110) 
RGDPsim 0.451*** 0.443*** 0.449*** 0.446*** 0.293** 0.297** 
  (0.125) (0.128) (0.128) (0.130) (0.129) (0.133) 
DGDPCAP 2.277*** 2.245*** 2.271*** 2.217*** 2.806*** 2.708*** 
  (0.422) (0.426) (0.429) (0.433) (0.496) (0.503) 
SQDGDPCAP -0.193 -0.185 -0.193 -0.178 -0.333* -0.309* 
  (0.158) (0.158) (0.159) (0.160) (0.176) (0.176) 
DGDPcapROW -3.364*** -3.381*** -3.347*** -3.352*** -2.790*** -2.796*** 
  (0.693) (0.697) (0.698) (0.696) (0.668) (0.673) 
minREG_QUAL 2.852*** 2.889*** 2.895*** 3.013*** 3.285*** 3.358*** 
  (0.368) (0.373) (0.371) (0.378) (0.381) (0.378) 
IMPORTS 0.235** 
  (0.0960) 
INT_IMPS_BEC 0.293*** 
  (0.0955) 
INT_IMPS_BVS 0.184*** 0.141*** 
  (0.0484) (0.0519) 
minVSwld 7.599*** 6.920*** 
  (1.403) (1.481) 
Constant 17.69*** 26.19*** 29.04*** 27.90*** 5.929 15.11*** 
  (3.413) (4.950) (5.133) (4.544) (3.995) (5.242) 
Observations 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 
r2_p 0.501 0.506 0.508 0.512 0.522 0.528 
Correctly Pred p(FTA)=FTA 86.1% 85.6% 86.2% 86.3% 87.0% 87.8% 
Correctly Predicted FTA=1 66.3% 67.5% 68.7% 69.6% 69.9% 72.1% 
Correctly predicted FTA=0 94.5% 93.3% 93.7% 93.5% 94.2% 94.5% 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The marginal effects for these estimations, evaluated at the mean, are reported in the 
appendix (Table A.3.7). They suggest that a 1% increase in imports leads to an 
increase in the likelihood of an agreement of 3.3 percentage points. The same 
increase in the BEC identified measure of intermediate goods trade raises this 
probability by 4.1 percentage points whereas a 1% increase in the  measure of 
vertical specialisation increases the probability of an agreement by 2.5 percentage 
points holding all else equal at mean values.   
 
Although the results above presented are in line with the predictions made in this 
essay, the estimations used have applied no controls for either simultaneity or 
unobserved heterogeneity and they are hence likely to be biased. In Table 3.7, an 
attempt to control for unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity is made through the 
use of an FD estimator. It captures differences in the data between 2000 and 1995 to 
predict changes in FTA status by 2008
314
. This eliminates the time invariant and 
unobserved component of the error term that may be causing biases (see equation 
3.7)
315
. Another way of putting this is that it controls for initial levels of trade to 
determine whether changes in trade affect the probability that a country switches into 
a trade agreement. First differences are taken with respect to the year 2000 rather 
than the end of the sample period to mitigate biases arising from simultaneity. These 
are discussed at greater lengths in the Appendix A3.5 where a robustness check, 
using different base years in the first differencing strategy, is provided
316
. These 
changes are used to predict FTA status switches taking place between 1995 and 
2008. 
 
                                                 
314
 The choice of looking at differences with respect to the year 2000 is made on the basis that it caters 
for sufficient variance in the independent variables and also a low enough incidence of trade 
agreements. Most agreements in the sample were signed after this year. 
315
 This estimator only eliminates the problems associated with unobserved heterogeneity if the cause 
of these is time invariant. 
316
 These biases arise from the positive impact of FTAs on trade flows (see previous essay of this 
thesis for a justification of this assertion). Using changes in trade flows between 2008 and 1995 to 
predict FTA formation will not deal with these biases. Changes in trade flows during this period will 
be affected by the presence of an FTA and hence the coefficient on the trade measures is likely to bias 
upwards. To avoid these biases, the estimation should be carried out using changes in trade flows 
before the conclusion of an agreement. But because the switch into an agreement happens for different 
countries at different periods in time, then one has to think carefully how to treat changes in trade 
flows between countries that have not signed an agreement. The appendix provides a fuller discussion 
of these issues (see section A3.5). 
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Table 3.7: FD Estimator – Impact of VS on the probability of an FTA (1995-2000) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
dRGDP -0.0911 -0.288** -0.235* 0.0912 0.269** 0.317*** 
  (0.112) (0.129) (0.126) (0.123) (0.115) (0.122) 
dRGDPsim 0.375** 0.439*** 0.445*** 0.572*** 0.627*** 0.679*** 
  (0.159) (0.169) (0.167) (0.184) (0.195) (0.206) 
dDGDPCAP -0.713** -0.655** -0.635** -0.647* -0.659* -0.651* 
  (0.302) (0.316) (0.311) (0.341) (0.346) (0.366) 
dSQDGDPCAP 0.404*** 0.406*** 0.398*** 0.446*** 0.441*** 0.464*** 
  (0.0773) (0.0806) (0.0791) (0.0895) (0.0890) (0.0953) 
dDGDPcapROW -3.466*** -3.469*** -3.387*** -3.379*** -3.547*** -3.506*** 
  (0.383) (0.410) (0.399) (0.413) (0.433) (0.442) 
dminREG_QUAL 1.646*** 1.617*** 1.606*** 1.727*** 1.931*** 1.942*** 
  (0.218) (0.217) (0.216) (0.222) (0.230) (0.233) 
dIMPORTS 0.332*** 
  (0.0953) 
dINT_IMPS_BEC 0.215** 
  (0.0919) 
dINT_IMPS_BVS 0.326*** 0.193*** 
  (0.0680) (0.0657) 
dminVSwld 8.489*** 6.951*** 
  (0.885) (0.968) 
Constant -0.643*** -0.746*** -0.717*** -0.841*** -0.983*** -1.035*** 
  (0.0956) (0.0996) (0.0997) (0.109) (0.109) (0.115) 
Observations 1,090 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,090 1,052 
r2_p 0.130 0.131 0.126 0.157 0.202 0.196 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
d identifies differences in the independent variables from 1995 to 200
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Column (1) of Table 3.7 shows that switches into FTAs are driven by changes in; the 
similarity of GDP; differences in per capita GDP; and changes to the minimum 
dyadic regulatory quality. Columns (2) and (3) see the introduction of changes in 
total import flows and changes in intermediate imports (identified through the BEC 
nomenclature) into the FTA formation estimation. These show a positive coefficient 
suggesting that higher changes in this type of trade are associated with a higher 
likelihood of switching into an FTA by 2008. The results in column (4) suggest that 
the probability of switching into an agreement is increasing in the growth in the 
value of intermediate imports that are part of a bilateral value chain 
(lnintimps_BVS). The introduction of this measure is also associated with a larger 
explanatory power. 
 
Column (5) then highlights that increases in the degree of global vertical 
specialisation, or the participation in international modes of production, are also 
associated with a higher likelihood of switching into an FTA. This may be evidence 
of the shifting political economy forces that are associated with higher degrees of this 
measure. The final column introduces the change in the value of bilateral vertically 
specialised trade in conjunction with the indicator of global vertical specialisation. 
The results suggest that both have a positive impact on the likelihood of an FTA. The 
marginal effects, reporter in the Appendix Table A3.8, reveal that a 1% positive 
change in the growth of vertically specialised trade leads to a 9 percentage point 
increase in the likelihood of switching into an agreement
317
.  
 
An alternative way of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity is 
through an IV approach. This introduces exogenous variation into the trade 
measures. However, as anticipated, providing support for the validity of the 
instruments used can be complicated. Nevertheless, three instruments were identified 
and used to look at the impact of trade flows on the probability of an FTA being 
formed. The first is the minimum share of Co2 emissions over GDP. It is expected to 
be correlated with manufacturing activity and hence drive a measure of demand for 
imported inputs whilst remaining uncorrelated with the desirability of engaging in an 
                                                 
317
 Evaluated at mean values. It must be noted that a 1% change in the change in vertically specialised 
trade might be a relatively big change. 
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FTA
318
. The second instrument used captures the minimum density of telephone 
lines which should be correlated with the infrastructure of a country and hence also 
import demand. The final instrument is a measure of the minimum per capita 
expenditure on health services. The results for the IV estimation are presented in the 
Appendix. A3.7. A priori, the instruments are valid in the sense that they are 
significantly correlated with all the measures of trade flows. They also pass the Wald 
test of exogeneity. The results suggest that all three measures of trade play a positive 
role in determining the probability of a country engaging in a new FTA. However 
distinguishing how each measure impacts FTA formation is complex because they 
are all constructed using the same instruments
319
.  
3.6.4. DETERMINANTS OF NEW FTAS: INTERDEPENDENCE EFFECTS 
This section delves deeper into the role that interdependence plays in the formation 
of new agreements. This is approached through the same FD estimator so that, here 
too, the estimated coefficients capture the impact of changes in the independent 
variables rather than the effects of levels. This is convenient as it is changes in the 
formation of neighbouring agreements which are likely to bring forth changes in the 
decisions to engage in FTAs as Baldwin’s theory of regionalism suggests. Table 3.9 
reports the results obtained from introducing various measures of interdependence 
into the baseline estimation shown in Column (1) of Table 3.8. The coefficients of 
these baseline variables are omitted for brevity
320
. The first column introduces 
BJ2010’s contagion indicator (wexpFTA)
321
. It captures the domino effects predicted 
by Baldwin’s (1993) original hypothesis. The results suggest that changes in export 
market shares, as a result of neighbouring regionalism, positively and significantly 
affect the probability of a new agreement being signed. The second column then 
looks at contagion effects occurring through vertically specialised trade (wbvsFTA) 
where the weights attributed to the FTA variable are measured in terms of the share 
of vertically specialised intermediate exports. Here too, supportive evidence is given 
                                                 
318
 Although it can be argued that some new agreements have certain environmental clauses, one 
would be hard pressed to argue that this is a make or break condition in the formation of trade 
agreements (perhaps unfortunately). 
319
 This implies that, in terms of the first step equation, there is little variation in the instruments used 
so that all three measures could be capturing the same type of variation. A more appropriate test 
would require identifying instruments that singularly capture variance in each measure. 
320
 The marginal effects of the full table are presented in the Appendix A3.9 
321
 Recall that the measure identifies country i’s weighted exports to country j’s FTA partners. 
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to the notion that contagion can arise through the interconnection of international 
production as this measure positively affects the probability of switching into an 
agreement. Looking at the differences in the results in these two columns reveals that 
both have a similar impact on the likelihood of an FTA but the vertically specialised 
measure of contagion appears to yield a larger predictive power in the FTA 
formation equation.  
 
The third column introduces Baier et al.’s (2010) indicator of ‘own FTA’ which 
captures changes in the internal political economy dynamics. The original hypothesis 
that the probability of engaging in an FTA is increasing in the number of trade 
agreements already signed is confirmed. This measure captures evolving political 
economy dynamics in the spirit of Ornelas (2005) and Baldwin’s juggernaut 
effect
322
.  Columns (4) to (6) then show that the introduction of the measure of 
vertically specialised trade does not alter the results obtained from the measures of 
interdependence. Positive changes in vertically specialised trade remain important 
drivers of FTAs even when contagion effects are accounted for.  
 
Table 3.8: Interdependence Effects (changes 1995-2000) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
dwexpFTA_o 3.965*** 4.212*** 
  (0.396) (0.426) 
dwbvsFTA_o 3.700*** 3.792*** 
  (0.425) (0.442) 
dcountFTA_o 0.098*** 0.087*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) 
dINT_IMPS_BVS 0.385*** 0.368*** 0.302*** 
  (0.079) (0.078) (0.069) 
Constant -0.877*** -0.836*** -0.957*** -1.128*** -1.069*** -1.098*** 
  (0.106) (0.105) (0.108) (0.126) (0.124) (0.118) 
Observations 1090 1090 1,090 1,052 1,052 1,052 
r2_p 0.207 0.216 0.166 0.238 0.244 0.184 
Robust standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Overall, the cross-sectional models seem to confirm the original hypotheses of this 
essay. The inclusion of the new identified variables increase the predictive powers of 
the FTA formation equations and suggest that new agreements seem to be better 
explained through the introduction of measures of governance, changes in vertically 
                                                 
322
 There is no evidence of a diminishing marginal utility (or return) to signing an extra agreement. 
Entering this measure squared shows a positive coefficient and is omitted in the results presented 
however the results with this measure are available upon request and do not substantially alter the 
above presented findings. 
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specialised trade and interdependence effects. This gives supportive evidence to the 
notion that changes in the incentives to form agreements might arise from changes in 
the typology of trade
323
.  
 
Two caveats in this analysis need be noted. First, the use of a reduced sample, both in 
terms of time and country coverage, may be problematic. The country coverage does 
not include LDCs and hence is not totally representative of world economic activity. 
Nevertheless, the sample captures a significant proportion of new FTAs signed. 
Many of these are North-North and North-South agreements but few are South-South 
agreements. It would also have been desirable to extend the sample in time so as to 
identify how the new determinants of FTAs behave during the different waves. This 
was not possible on account of data constraints. Governance measures are only 
available since the mid-90’s as are harmonised indicators of vertically specialised 
trade
324
. 
3.6.5. PANEL DATA APPROACH 
This section uses panel data techniques to identify the role of the changing nature of 
trade on the formation of new agreements. Such techniques can provide additional 
controls for the biases that arise from unobserved heterogeneity. However, as 
anticipated, estimating binary dependent variable models with fixed effects may 
introduce problems related to ‘incidental parameters’. This implies that the desirable 
properties of the FE estimator may not be properly utilised
325
. Nevertheless, 
alternative estimation procedures that provide similar controls for endogeneity are 
available as discussed in the empirical section. One such alternative is the use of a 
Mundlak-Chamberlain approach that conditions the correlation between the 
unobserved variable and the independent variable. Another is an IV approach that 
introduces independent variation in the endogenous trade variables. These techniques 
are used to determine whether the hypotheses put forward in this essay hold.  
                                                 
323
 However it is hard to prove the validity of this statement as the indicators that are incorporated in 
the estimations are only available for the periods that occupy the latest wave of regionalism. A more 
conclusive proof of this claim would have passed through looking at the role of these variables 
throughout the different waves of regionalism which is unfortunately not possible. 
324
 Another problem that may arise is that the anticipation of an agreement could already be causing 
variables to shift. In the panel specification lags will be taken to control for this. 
325
 The severity of this incidental parameters problem falls as T rises and hence in a sample with 14 
years the problem may not be as pronounced (Greene 2010). 
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The use of panel data is desirable for various reasons. First, it provides additional 
mechanisms through which to control for issues of endogeneity. Second, it allows for 
both temporal and cross-sectional variance in the regressors. Thirdly, the use of a 
panel setting facilitates the use of temporal lags when the impact of variables is 
likely to be delayed (slow-moving variable impact). This may arise for the measures 
of vertical specialisation and the interdependence effects. 
 
Table 3.9 presents the results obtained from the panel data estimations of an 
augmented FTA formation model with the following specification. 
 
,, =  + 	,, + 

,, + ,, + ,,
+ 	,, + 
,, + 	,,
+ 
_,, + __,,
+ wbvsFTA,,,+	, 
(3.12) 
It introduces the quality of the regulatory framework (minREG_QUAL); the value of 
vertically specialised intermediate imports (lnINT_IMPS_BVS) with a one year lag; 
and the interdependence variable (wbvsFTA), also with a one year lag. The first 
column captures the coefficient estimates of the pooled linear probability model 
(LPM). Here no controls are introduced to mitigate the biases caused by unobserved 
heterogeneity. Nevertheless, the results capture the positive impact of vertically 
specialised trade on the probability that a country forms an FTA. It also highlights 
the positive role of interdependencies and regulatory frameworks in this process. The 
signs of the coefficients obtained are in line with the predictions of the traditional 
literature and the earlier observed results. The second column shows the results for a 
pooled logit estimation. Here too the signs of the coefficients are comparable with 
those earlier obtained. The third column then uses a random effect estimator. This 
introduces many changes in both the sign and the magnitude of the impacts. This is 
unsurprising because the estimator assumes that there is no correlation between the 
unobservables and the independent variables which is counter to the received 
wisdom (Baier et al. 2008).  
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Column 4 then runs a conditional logit (clogit) estimation that uses a group-wise 
pseudo fixed-effects approach. The observations are grouped by dyad and hence 
represent a ‘within’ variation which is similar to that of the FD model earlier 
estimated (albeit with more data points). This implies a reduction in the estimated 
sample which only considers countries which have witnessed changes in their FTA 
status. The coefficients reported appear to be in line with the predictions made 
throughout this essay. It supports the positive role of vertically specialised trade, 
governance measures and interdependence effects. However the non-linearities, 
originally captured by the SQDGPDCAP variable, no longer appear. One of the 
concerns, in interpreting the results of this estimation is that only within variation is 
captured for countries that change agreement and hence that the coefficient estimates 
are capturing the impact of changes in country characteristics only of countries that 
have effectively switched into an agreement
326
. 
 
In the fifth column, an instrumented measure of vertically specialised trade is 
introduced. This is done by running a panel data gravity model in the guise of that 
run in the previous essay and using the predicted values from this in a second step 
conditional logit model
327
. The correction of the standard errors is undertaken 
through a panel bootstrap with 500 replacements. The results obtained are similar to 
those of the preceding column however the role of vertically specialised trade 
appears to be significantly lower. 
 
Column 6 introduces a Mundlak-Chamberlain approach to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity
328
. The results are also in line with the predictions made in the cross 
sectional analysis and capture the positive role that measures of governance; 
vertically specialised trade; and interdependence play in the formation of new 
agreements. However, the per capita GDP measures exhibit some strange 
coefficients. DGDPCAP is now negative and the other similar measures are now 
                                                 
326
 Even though this estimation may raise incidental parameters problems, the results obtained suggest 
that the 14 year span of the data may have considerably reduced the undesirable consequences of such 
problems. 
327
 The first step estimated a model like that in equation 2.22 in the previous essay however the model 
is estimated without the FTA coefficient as the interest lies in predicting the amount of trade that 
would take place without an FTA. Very similar results emerged from running this 2 step approach 
with a model that uses the FTA variable in the first step. It is not entirely clear which approach is the 
correct method of estimation to follow. 
328
 The coefficients on the regressors capturing the averages are not reported to avoid over cluttering. 
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insignificant. The role of the squared GDP per capita term has been reversed, 
implying that this term does not enter the specification non-linearly in the same way 
than originally predicted in Baier and Bergstrand (2004). This might arise as a direct 
consequence of the changing nature of trade. Differences in capital labour ratios 
between countries may be even more welfare enhancing in a scenario where 
production structures are fragmented and hence there might not be any decreasing 
returns to the degree of complementarity that arises between countries. Furthermore, 
a wider difference in K/L ratios with respect to the RoW might also make a country 
more attractive insofar as it could enhance the potential for further specialisation. 
However, a cautionary word, in the interpretation of these coefficients, deserves 
mention. This final estimation includes observation averaged variables (not reported) 
in addition to the normal variables and hence some ‘level’ effects may be overriding 
some of the ‘changes’ effects that are captured in the reported coefficients.  
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Table 3.9: Determinants of FTAs - Panel Estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES  OLS LOGIT RE FE FE-IV MC 
NATURAL (+) 0.0350*** 0.654*** 4.972*** 
   (0.00418) (0.0692) (0.504) 
REMOTE (+) 0.00775*** 0.0991*** 1.578*** 
   (0.00101) (0.0137) (0.151) 
RGDP (+) 0.00534*** 0.320*** 0.252 2.896*** 2.773*** 2.330*** 
   (0.00191) (0.0361) (0.225) (0.172) (0.166) (0.766) 
RGDPsim (+) 0.0295*** 0.809*** 3.147*** 3.899*** 4.164*** 1.226 
   (0.00230) (0.0535) (0.531) (0.487) (0.325) (0.958) 
DGDPCAP (+) 0.0677*** 1.301*** 0.625 2.169*** 1.431*** -4.186*** 
   (0.00723) (0.161) (1.062) (0.627) (0.508) (1.490) 
SQDGDPCAP (-) -0.0119*** -0.199*** -0.194 1.139*** 1.124*** 0.159 
   (0.00175) (0.0584) (0.323) (0.275) (0.220) (0.564) 
DGDPcapROW (-) -0.112*** -2.936*** -10.02*** 0.791 1.933*** -0.931 
   (0.00606) (0.217) (0.969) (0.795) (0.717) (1.902) 
minREG_QUAL (+) 0.0576*** 1.387*** 6.748*** 3.876*** 2.817*** 5.440*** 
   (0.00402) (0.0969) (0.748) (0.477) (0.398) (1.561) 
L. INT_IMPS_BVS (+) 0.00617*** 0.0687*** 0.282** 1.490*** 0.175*** 0.633*** 
   (0.00108) (0.0199) (0.135) (0.0873) (0.0362) (0.220) 
L.wbvsFTA (+) 0.656*** 4.507*** 16.78*** 14.05*** 
   (0.0113) (0.125) (1.846) (1.081) 
Constant   0.214** -11.54*** 27.21** 23.03 
   (0.0927) (1.595) (11.59) (18.48) 
YEAR  Y Y Y N N N 
DYAD  N N Y Y Y Y 
Observations  14,132 14,132 14,132 3,744 3,744 14,132 
r2_p  0.565* 0.607 0.589 0.678 0.575 0.583 
ll  -638.4 -2616 -1076 -842.8 -1112 -1007 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This essay puts forward the hypothesis that changes in the typology of trade, 
evidenced by the rise in vertical specialisation, generate new incentives for countries 
to engage in new FTAs. It identifies three distinct waves of regionalism and provides 
some comparative static evidence that suggests that the latest wave involves 
countries that are more distant and that exhibit wider differences in their factor 
endowments than in the past. This leads to changes in the expected coefficient 
estimates of the ‘traditional’ models of FTA formation (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004). 
But the rise in vertically specialised trade also introduces new incentives to form new 
agreements and this arises through three distinct channels. 
 
The first is through the emergence of a greater demand for appropriate regulatory 
frameworks. More complex modes of international production require the presence 
of more ‘suited’ regulatory frameworks so as to avoid inefficient ‘hold-ups’ (Antras 
and Staiger, 2011). This suggests that the desirability of an FTA between two 
countries could be tied to the prevailing quality of regulatory frameworks. Countries 
with better regulatory quality are seen to have a higher likelihood of signing an FTA. 
However, a low regulatory quality, within certain ‘acceptable’ levels, can also 
provide countries with opportunities to redress regulatory shortcomings through an 
FTA. 
 
The second channel through which the changing nature of trade affects the likelihood 
of an FTA being formed arises from changes in the internal political economy 
dynamics. As countries embrace international modes of production, their dependence 
on cheaper foreign inputs grows and this means that tariffs are increasingly going to 
act as production taxes rather than protectionist measures (as the literature on 
effective rates of protection suggests). This re-shapes the internal political economy 
forces towards further support for more liberal trade policy stances in an effort to 
reduce the costs of intermediate products. Because vertically specialised firms are 
also involved in export markets, the growth in this type of trade also generates a 
greater demand for market access and hence for the formation of new FTAs. 
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The proliferation of neighbouring trade agreements also has an impact on a country’s 
decision to engage in FTAs as Baldwin’s (1993) domino theory of regionalism 
suggests. The third channel of influence arises from the threat of delocalisation of 
segments of production in other countries. If China signs a trade agreement with 
Korea, this might jeopardise Mexico’s position within a value chain, and hence 
domestic political economy forces will rally in favour of a Mexico-China FTA. The 
changing nature of trade then introduces new forms of FTA ‘contagion’ (Baldwin 
and Jaimovich, 2010). 
 
Some of the findings of this essay point towards directions for future research. For 
example, the introduction of governance measures is novel in this type of analysis, 
and has been shown to greatly increase the predictive powers of an FTA formation 
model. However, causation issues are hard to disentangle and this opens up new 
avenues for research. Particularly in an effort to understand how regulatory 
frameworks, vertical specialisation and FTAs interact. This is likely to become an 
issue of growing importance and one that might be pivotal in understanding how 
multilateral institutions and regionalism co-exist. This essay adds to Orefice and 
Rocha’s (2011) investigations into such links. 
 
In a related note, one caveat of this study is that it does not include measures of 
multilateral liberalisation as Mansfield and Reinhardt (2003) suggest should be done 
in such models. A mitigating factor is that the period under investigation begins just 
after the Uruguay round is concluded and is short enough to not have substantially 
changed external multilateral conditions. Furthermore, common changes in the 
multilateral system may be controlled for using different temporal intercepts such as 
those used in the FD estimations. 
 
However, a more general issue arises from the sample used in the estimations. The 
analysis conducted in this essay has ‘dropped’ all observations for countries that 
belonged to an agreement before the year the sample began. This was done to focus 
on the creation of new agreements rather than the existence of agreements. This 
introduces an element of selection in the estimation that requires further thought. 
Although it makes sense to compare countries that have switched into an agreement 
against those that have not switched and are not presently in an agreement, the 
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selection of the ‘control’ sample may require a more rigorous approach in the guise 
of a ‘heck-probit’ model.  
 
Nevertheless, the empirical analysis of this essay provides important contributions to 
the empirical literature on FTA formation. Understanding what motivates new 
agreements is important in itself, but more so in view of ascertaining how the world 
trading system is likely to evolve. The WTO may face important challenges in 
maintaining its role as arbiter of international trade if it cannot reconcile the new 
determining features of regionalism with its system.  
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OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis set out to look at the links between vertically specialised trade and Free 
Trade Agreements. Much of the empirical literature has focused on these processes 
independently but little has been said about how these are linked. This is mainly 
because the identification and measurement of these new modes of production has 
been rather elusive. The first essay of this thesis aimed at resolving these issues by 
providing a new measure of vertical specialisation that disentangles the origin of the 
intermediate import flow and the destination of the corresponding export flow. In the 
process an indicator of bilateral vertical specialisation, which serves as a proxy 
measure for bilateral value chain activity, was created. This then led to the 
construction of a new database that tracked bilateral vertical specialisation and that 
enabled delving deeper into the links between vertical specialisation and new 
regionalism. One of the outputs of this thesis that has not been reported in the text is 
that this database also contains information disaggregated by sector and this will 
further facilitate looking at these links in future studies.  
 
The separation of vertical specialisation into backward and forward linkages proved 
instructive and facilitated tracking the position of countries along the value chain, or 
whether countries are engaging in assembly activities or in higher value adding 
processes of production. The first essay highlighted the presence of a long-run path 
of specialisation and presented some prima facie evidence of how countries may 
move along this path. Although individual short-run country patterns of 
specialisation were found to be somewhat different from this long-run path, evidence 
showed that countries cluster along a clearly defined non-monotonic snake-curve of 
income and total vertical specialisation. They enter value chains in assembly 
activities but as development unfolds they start specialising in higher value adding 
sequences of production. These patterns of specialisation are in line with Mexico’s 
experience where the first generation maquiladora assembly lines have now evolved 
towards the production of more sophisticated goods (Bergin et al., 2008). 
 
Looking at the bilateral spread of these processes of production suggested that much 
of this specialisation is taking place along regional blocks. The US was shown to 
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play a strong role in Mexico’s evolving patterns of specialisation. In the EU, 
Germany was shown to be a net exporter of intermediate products which appear to 
enter assembly lines in Eastern Europe whilst in Asia; China emerges as a new 
supplier of intermediate products but remains reliant on imported components from 
Korea and Japan. Inter-regionally, China also enters value chain activity with the EU 
and the US although these production patterns seem to involve more complex 
sourcing strategies within East Asia and towards the EU and NAFTA. 
 
Finding a high incidence of VS within regional blocks does not imply that FTAs 
cause such modes of production. Regional partners share other common 
characteristics, such as proximity or similarity in income, which are also likely to 
affect value chain activity. This suggested that one would need to look at the role of 
FTAs on these flows through an econometric approach that isolates the trade policy 
element from other characteristics that also determine vertically specialised trade. 
This was addressed, in the second essay of this thesis, through a theoretically derived 
gravity model of input trade. 
 
The empirical strategy was devised to account for biases that arise from the 
endogenous formation of FTAs. Countries that sign new trade agreements exhibit, 
prior to the conclusion of these, higher trade flows and hence they choose their 
partners well (see Magee, 2003). This implies that it is important to control for the 
reasons behind these countries trading more in order to capture an unbiased estimate 
of the FTA effects. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) propose the use of country pair fixed 
effects (FE) to control for these biases, however this imposes restrictions on the 
variance of the FTA variable which implies that its coefficient captures the impact of 
switching into a trade agreement. This is problematic when using panels that cover 
observations across a limited amount of years and where there is a large prevalence 
of agreements in place before the beginning of the sample period. Hence alternative 
and less restrictive country-year FE were employed. In order to test whether these FE 
provided appropriate controls for unobserved heterogeneity, a gravity model of trade 
was estimated using a future FTA variable on a restricted sample. The results showed 
that the introduction of these controls led to an insignificant effect of a future FTA on 
current trade flows and hence that appropriate controls for the reasons why countries 
trade more prior to agreements being concluded had been provided.  
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The results then showed that FTAs have a positive impact on bilateral intermediate 
imports. However, this impact was found to be of a similar magnitude to that found 
for total trade. But when more targeted measures of vertical specialisation were used 
in the estimations, more pronounced FTA effects arose. In particular, the FTA effect 
was found to be 5 percentage points higher on an indicator that proxies for 
international value chain activity. This reflects that this type of trade might be more 
sensitive to trade policy than traditional trade flows. Moreover, when looking at the 
impact of FTAs on an even more targeted measure of bilateral value chain activity, 
an even larger effect arose. 
 
This type of production is associated with a backwards and forwards movement of 
products across countries and hence the removal of border measures ‘magnifies’ the 
response of these flows to tariff cuts. This type of trade was also found to be more 
responsive to changes in trade costs and income variables than traditional trade flows 
giving supportive evidence to Yi’s (2003) theoretical ‘magnification effects’. The 
presence of such modes of production coupled with these magnification effects help 
explain why world trade has grown at a faster rate than world GDP in recent decades 
(Yi, 2003). The large identified role of FTAs in this process also suggests that trade 
policy can play an active role in promoting such modes of production which, in turn, 
implies that it can be an effective tool in the propagation of value chain activity. 
 
The observation, in the second essay, that countries exhibit above average trade 
flows prior to signing agreements raised the question of how vertical specialisation 
affects the formation of new FTAs. This motivated the third essay of this thesis. The 
characteristics of countries engaging in the different waves of regionalism were 
shown to be changing. The latest wave seems to occupy countries which are more 
distant and which have wider differences in their factor endowments. This suggested 
that changes in the incentives that lead to the conclusion of FTAs might be occurring. 
 
Three channels of influence, through which the changing nature of trade affects 
incentives to form new FTAs, were identified. The rise in international production 
leads to more complex international economic activity and transactions and this 
increases the possibility that failures in one segment of production jeopardise the 
217 
 
entire functioning of the supply chain. Avoiding these failures requires incurring 
higher coordination costs and implementing tighter control mechanisms. Whilst 
some of these mechanisms can be internalised within multinational activity, others 
may require the involvement of institutions in setting appropriate governance 
structures that ensure the enforceability of contractual agreements. The recent work 
on ‘offshoring’ and FTAs of Antras and Stagier (2011) suggests that vertical 
specialisation, FTAs and regulatory frameworks could be linked in this fashion. The 
empirical evidence provided by Orefice and Rocha (2011) further substantiates that 
there is a link between trade in intermediate goods and demand for ‘deeper’ 
agreements. The results of this essay then find that the prevailing regulatory quality 
of countries is an important determinant of new FTAs. The minimum value of this 
measure, in a dyadic observation, explains a large part of the variance in an FTA 
formation model. This may indicate that countries are either engaging in an FTA so 
as to resolve shortfalls in regulatory quality or that it is the lowest measure in a 
dyadic observation that determines the extent of the ‘hold-up’ problem. 
Disentangling which dominates is hard and was left for subsequent work. 
 
The changing nature of trade is also likely to have an effect on the internal political 
economy dynamics that determine the formation of FTAs (in the guise of the 
Grossman and Helpman (1995) and the Ornelas (2005a) theoretical models of FTA 
formation). This is the second channel of influence. Countries that exhibit higher and 
growing degrees of vertical specialisation are expected to have growing lobbies 
supporting liberalisation. This is because higher measures of vertical specialisation 
should capture a larger presence of firms engaging in international production and 
hence firms that would benefit from access to cheaper intermediate inputs and 
market access for their associated exported product. The final channel through which 
the changing nature of trade affects the formation of new FTAs arises from domino 
effects (Baldwin, 1993). The participation in international value chain activities 
implies a greater interdependence between FTAs. Countries are shown to engage in 
new agreements in an effort to consolidate or gain access to a position within a value 
chain as a result of neighbouring regionalism.  
 
This thesis was constrained by the lack of IO tables to calculate indicators of vertical 
specialisation for a wider sample of countries. This would have been desirable so as 
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to capture the dynamics of specialisation and in particular to tackle the question of 
how engaging least developed countries in these production processes can help attain 
development goals. However, this work can serve as a benchmark for further 
analysis using more flexible data approaches.  Another issue that requires further 
empirical analysis and which was not tackled herein arises from the links between 
vertical specialisation and productivity growth. Although there appears to be a 
correlation between these processes, disentangling causality is important. If vertical 
specialisation leads to productivity gains and trade policy can promote this type of 
specialisation then a link between trade policy and economic growth emerges. 
 
Several caveats are worth noting. First, the indicators developed remain proxy 
measures of vertical specialisation and can yet be refined329. Second, the theoretical 
model of input trade requires further extensions. In particular this thesis has 
identified different FTA effects on different types of intermediate inputs, but how 
these arise has not been developed theoretically. The magnification effects are an 
example of this. They seem important but they do not arise from the model 
presented. Drawing on the heterogeneous firm literature, and in particular on the 
recent paper by Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2011) provides further avenues for 
developing such a model. Finally, the links between the regulatory environment and 
the formation of FTAs require a more in depth analysis. The results presented in this 
thesis provide an important backing to the notion that the complexity of trade leads 
to a greater demand for regulatory frameworks as suggested by Antras and Staiger’s 
(2011) recent paper. But it would be desirable to place more focus on how this 
relationship emerges and in particular on whether there is an interaction between the 
degrees of vertically specialised trade and the regulatory frameworks.  
 
This thesis’ aim was to contribute to the growing literature on FTAs and vertical 
specialisation. In the process it has identified its spread across broad regions and 
highlighted some features of its underlying nature. Moreover, it has isolated the 
impact of FTAs on these flows and shown how trade policy can play an active role in 
the propagation of these modes of production. Finally, this thesis has also shown how 
                                                 
329
 The recent paper by Johnson and Noguera (2011) provides a more precise method for calculating 
value added and these methods can be adapted to compute more targeted measures of bilateral value 
chain activity. 
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the changing nature of trade creates new incentives to form new agreements. These 
results are quite timely given the growing concerns relating to the future role of the 
WTO in shaping international economic activity. Indeed the recent World Trade 
Report (WTO, 2011) is dedicated to looking at how regionalism and multilateralism 
interact. Moreover, there is a new impetus, in the field of trade statistics, to establish 
more accurate measures that can help capture vertically specialised modes of 
production (see Lamy, 2010 and OECD-WTO, 2011). This thesis contributes to these 
debates by introducing new insights on the links between vertical specialisation and 
new regionalism.  
  
220 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Archarya, R., Crawford, J. A., Maliszewska, M. and Renard, C., (2010) ‘Landscape’, 
in Chauffour, J. P. et Maur, J. C. (éds), Preferential Trade Agreement Policies 
for Development : A Handbook, World Bank, Washington (D.C.). 
Anderson, J. E., (1979) ‘A Theoretical Foundation for the Gravity Equation’ 
American Economic Review 69, 106-116. 
Anderson, J. E., (2010) ‘The Gravity Model’ (December 2010). NBER Working 
Paper Series, Vol. w16576, pp. -,Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1719936 
Anderson, J. E., and Marcouiller, D., (2002) ‘Insecurity And The Pattern Of Trade: 
An Empirical Investigation’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT 
Press, vol. 84(2), pages 342-352, May 
Anderson, J. E., and Van Wincoop, E., (2003) ‘Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to 
the Border Puzzle’ American Economic Review, vol. 93(1), pages 170-192, 
March. 
Antras, P., (2003) ‘Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure,’ Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 118, pp. 1375-1418. 
Antras, P. and Staiger, W., (2011) ‘Offshoring and the Role of Trade Agreements’ 
Mimeo: Harvard University 
Antras, P., and Helpman. E., (2004) ‘Global Sourcing,’ Journal of Political 
Economy, 112: 552-580 
Ardelean, A., (2006) ‘How Strong is Love of Variety?’ Mimeo: Purdue University 
Armington, P.S., (1969) ‘A theory of demand for products distinguished by place of 
production’, IMF Staff Papers 16: 159-177 
Arndt, S. W., (2002) ‘Production Sharing and Regional Integration’, Claremont 
Colleges Working Papers 2002-10, Claremont Colleges. 
221 
 
Arndt, S. W., and Kierkowski, H., (eds) (2001) Fragmentation: New Production 
Patterns in the World Economy. Oxford University Press. 
Bagwell, K. and Staiger, R., (1997) ‘Multilateral tariff cooperation during the 
formation of customs unions,’ Journal of International Economics, vol. 42(1-
2), pages 91-123, February. 
Bagwell, K. and Staiger, R., (1998) ‘Will Preferential Agreements Undermine the 
Multilateral Trading System?’ Economic Journal, vol. 108(449), pages 1162-
82, July. 
Bagwell, K., and Staiger, R., (1999) ‘An Economic Theory of GATT’ American 
Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 1, pp. 215-248. 
Bagwell, K., and Staiger, R., (2002) The Economics of the World Trading System the 
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 
Bagwell, K., and Staiger, R., (2004) ‘Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral 
opportunism and the rules of GATT/WTO,’ Journal of International 
Economics, vol. 63(1), pages 1-29, May. 
Baier, S.L., and Bergstrand, J.H., (2001) ‘The growth of world trade: tariffs, 
transport costs, and income similarity,’ Journal of International Economics, 
vol. 53(1), pages 1-27, February 
Baier, S.L., and Bergstrand, J.H., (2002) ‘On the Endogeneity of International Trade 
Flows and Free Trade Areas’. Draft paper presented at the American Economic 
Association meeting January 2002, Atlanta 
Baier, S.L., and Bergstrand, J.H., (2004) ‘Economic Determinants of Free Trade 
Agreements’ Journal of International Economics, Vol 64, No. 1, October 
2004, 29-63. 
Baier, S.L., and Bergstrand, J.H., (2007) ‘Do free trade agreements actually increase 
members' international trade?’ Journal of International Economics, vol. 71(1), 
pages 72-95, March. 
222 
 
Baier, S.L., and Bergstrand, J.H., (2009) ‘Bonus Vetus OLS: A Simple Method for 
Approximating International Trade-Cost Effects using the Gravity Equation’, 
Journal of International Economics, vol. 77, 77-85. 
Baier, S.L., Bergstrand, J.H., and Egger, P., (2006) ‘The New Regionalism: Causes 
and consequences’ Inter-American Development Bank and CEPII conference 
February 2006 
Baier, S.L., Bergstrand, J.H., and Egger, P., (2007) ‘The New Regionalism: Causes 
and Consequences’ Économie internationale 109 (2007), p. 9-29 
Baier, S.L., Bergstrand, J.H., and Mariutto, R., (2010) ‘Economic Determinants of 
Free Trade Agreements Revisited: Distinguishing Source of Interdependence’ 
University of Notre Dame Working Paper. December 2011 version 
Baier, S.L., Bergstrand, J.H., Egger, P., and Mclaughlin, P., (2008) ‘Do Economic 
Integration Agreements Actually Work?  Issues in Understanding the Causes 
and Consequences of the Growth of Regionalism,’ The World Economy, vol. 
31, No. 4, April 2008, 461-497. 
Balassa, B., (1967) Trade Liberalization among Industrial Countries. McGraw-Hill, 
New York 
Baldone S., Sdogati F., and Tajoli, L., (2007) ‘On some effects of international 
fragmentation of production on comparative advantages, trade flows and 
incomes of countries’ The World Economy 2007 vol 30. No 11, November 
2007 
Baldwin, R. E., (1993). ‘A Domino Theory of Regionalism’ NBER WP4465 
(Cambridge) 
Baldwin, R. E., (1997) ‘The Causes of Regionalism,’ The World Economy. Vol. 20, 
No. 7: 865-888. 
Baldwin, R. E., (2006a) ‘Globalisation: the great unbundling(s)’ Working paper for 
project: Globalisation Challenges for Europe and Finland. 20th September 
223 
 
2006:http://appli8.hec.fr/map/files/globalisationthegreatunbundling%28s%29.p
df 
Baldwin, R. E., (2006b) ‘Managing the Noodle Bowl: The fragility of East Asian 
Regionalism’. CEPR Discussion Paper 5561, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. 
Baldwin, R. E., (2006c) ‘Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building 
Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade,’ The World Economy, vol. 29(11), 
pages 1451-1518, November. 
Baldwin, R. E., (2010) ‘Integration of the North American economy and new-
paradigm globalisation’, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 7523 
Baldwin, R. E., (2011) ‘21st Century Regionalism: Filling the gap between 21st 
Century Trade and 20th Century Trade Rules’ WTO Economic Research and 
Statistics Division. Staff Working Paper ERSD-2011-08 May 2011. 
Baldwin, R. E., and Jaimovich, D., (2010) ‘Are free trade agreements contagious?’ 
NBER Working Paper No. 16084. 
Baldwin, R. E., and Rieder, R., (2007) ‘A Test of Endogenous Trade Bloc Formation 
Theory on EU data’ CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6389 July 2007 
Baldwin, R. E., and Robert-Nicoud, F., (2010) ‘Trade-in-goods and trade-in-tasks: 
An Integrating Framework,’ NBER Working Papers No. 15882,  
Baldwin, R. E., and Taglioni, D., (2007) ‘Gravity for dummies and dummies for 
gravity equations’ NBER Working Paper No. 12516, published as ‘Trade 
effects of the euro: A comparison of estimators’, Journal of Economic 
Integration, 22(4), December, pp 780–818. 2007 
Baldwin, R. E., and Taglioni, D., (2011) ‘Gravity chains: estimating bilateral trade 
flows when parts and components trade is important’. NBER Working Paper 
16672. 
Baldwin, R. E., and Thorton, P., eds (2008) Multilateralising Regionalism. Centre for 
Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ISBN: 978-1-898128-99-1 
224 
 
Baltagi B. H., Egger P., and Pfaffermayr, M., (2003) ‘A generalized design for 
bilateral trade flow models’. Journal of Economic Letters, 80:391–397 
Bas, M. and Strauss-Kahn, V., (2011) ‘Does importing more inputs raise exports? 
Firm level evidence from France’ CEPII Working paper No 2011 – 15 June 
Bergin R. Paul, Robert C. Feenstra, and Gordon H. Hanson, (2008) ‘Offshoring and 
Volatility: Evidence from Mexico’s Maquiladora Industry,’ University of 
California, Davis, Published as Bergin, Paul R., Robert C. Feenstra, and 
Gordon H. Hanson. (2009) ‘Offshoring and Volatility: Evidence from Mexico's 
Maquiladora Industry.’ American Economic Review, 99(4): 1664–71 
Bergsten, C.F., (1997) ‘Open Regionalism,’ The World Economy, Vol. 20, no. 5: 
545-65. 
Bergstrand, J. H., (1985) ‘The Gravity Equation in International Trade: Some 
Microeconomic Foundations and Empirical Evidence’. Review of Economics 
and Statistics 67, 474-481 
Bergstrand, J. H., (1989) ‘The Generalized Gravity Equation, Monopolistic 
Competition, and the Factor-Proportions Theory in International Trade,’ 
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 71, No. 1, February 1989, 143-153. 
Bergstrand, J.H, Egger, P and Larch, M., (2010) ‘Economic Determinants of the 
Timing of Preferential Trade Agreement Formations and Enlargements’ 
University of Notre Dame Working Paper. 
Bhagwati, J., (1990) ‘Departures from Multilateralism: Regionalism and Aggressive 
Unilateralism’ Economic Journal. Vol. 100, Issue 403: 1304-1317. 
Bhagwati, J., (1993) ‘Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview.’ J. de Melo 
and A. Panagariya, eds. New Dimensions in Regional Integration. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Bhagwati, J., (2008) Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Trade 
Agreements Undermine Free Trade. Oxford University Press 
225 
 
Bhagwati, J., and A. Panagariya, (1996) ‘Preferential Trading Areas and 
Multilateralism: Strangers, Friends, or Foes?’ in J. Bhagwati and A. 
Panagariya, eds. The Economics of Preferential Trade Agreements. 
Washington, DC: AEI Press. 
Blinder, A., (2006) ‘Offshoring: The next Industrial revolution’ Foreign Affairs 
85(2): 113-128 
Blinder, A., (2009) ‘How Many US Jobs Might be Offshorable?,’ World Economics, 
vol. 10(2), pages 41-78 
Broda, C., and Weinstein, D.E., (2006) ‘Globalization and the Gains from Variety,’ 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 121(2), pages 541-585, May 
Burda, M. C., and Dluhosch, (2002) ‘Cost competition, Fragmentation and 
Globalisation’ Review of International Economics vol 10(3) 424-441 
Burfisher, M., Robinson, S. and Thierfelder, K., (2003) ‘ Regionalism: Old and New, 
Theory and Practice’ Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where are we 
Heading? Invited paper presented at conference Capri, June 23-26, 2003 
Cairncross, F., (1997) The Death of Distance: How the Communication Revolution 
changed Our Lives. Harvard Business School Press. 
Carrere, C., (2006) ‘Revisiting the effects of regional trade agreements on trade 
flows with proper specification of the gravity model,’ European Economic 
Review, vol. 50(2), pages 223-247, February. 
Chakraborty, B. S., (2003) ‘Trade in Intermediate Goods in a Model with 
Monopolistic Competition’. Economica, 70: 551–566 
Chamberlain, G., (1980) ‘Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data’ Review of 
Economic Studies 47, 225-238. 
Chaney, T., (2008) ‘Distorted Gravity: The Intensive and Extensive Margins of 
International Trade’, American Economic Review, 98, 1707-21. 
226 
 
Chen, X., Guo Ju’e and c. Yang. (2005) ‘Extending the Input-Output Model with 
Assets,’ Economic Systems Research, 17: 211-226. 
Chinn, M., (2005) ‘Supply capacity, Vertical Specialization and tariff rates: the 
implications for Aggregate US trade flow equations’ NBER Working Paper 
No. 11719. 
Coulibali, S., (2008) ‘On the Complementarity of Regional and Global Trade’ The 
World Bank WDR09 Core Team. World development report, reshaping 
Economic Geography, Background Paper. 
Daudin, G, Rifflart, C. and Schweisguth, D. ,(2008) ‘Who Produces for Whom in the 
World Economy?’, Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2009-18, Observatoire 
Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE) 
Dean, J., Fung, K.C. and Wang, Z., (2007) ‘Measuring the Vertical Specialisation in 
Chinese Trade’ Office of Economics Working Paper. U.S. International Trade 
Commission No. 2007-01-A 
Deardorff, A. V., (1995) ‘Determinants of Bilateral Trade: Does Gravity Work in a 
Neoclassical World?,’ NBER Working Papers No.5377 
Deardorff, A. V., (1998) ‘Determinants of Bilateral Trade: Does Gravity Work in a 
Neoclassical World?’ in J. A. Frankel, eds., The Regionalization of the World 
Economy, University of Chicago Press. 
Deardorff, A. V., (2001) ‘Fragmentation Across Cones,’ in Arndt and Kierzkowski 
eds, Fragmentation: New Production Patterns in the World Economy. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
Deardorff, A. V., (2001b) ‘Fragmentation in Simple Trade Models,’ North American 
Journal of Economics and Finance, 12: 2, 121-137. 
Dixit, A., and Stiglitz, J., (1977) ‘Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product 
Variety,’ American Economic Review, 67, 1977, pp. 297–308. 
227 
 
Dornbusch, F., Fischer, S., and Samuelson, P., (1977) ‘Comparative Advantage, 
Trade and Payments in a Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods’, 
American Economic Review, 67, 823-29. 
Dunning, J., (1997) ‘The European Internal Market Programmed and Inbound 
Foreign Direct Investment,’  Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 35, 
Issue 2, June, pp.189–223. 
Egger P. and Pfaffermayr, M., (2005) ‘The Determinants of Intrafirm Trade: In 
Search for Export-Import Magnification Effects,’ Review of World Economics 
(Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), vol. 141(4), pages 648-669, December. 
Egger, H., and Egger, P., (2001) ‘Cross-border Sourcing and Outward Processing in 
EU Manufacturing,’ North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol 
12, Issue 3, November 2001, Pages 243–256 
Egger, H., and Egger, P., (2005) ‘The determinants of EU processing Trade’ The 
World Economy, vol. 28(2), pages 147-168, 02 
Egger, H., Egger, P., and Greenaway, D., (2008) ‘The trade structure effects of 
endogenous regional trade agreements,’ Journal of International Economics, 
vol. 74(2), pages 278-298, March. 
Egger, P., (2000) ‘A note on the proper econometric specification of the gravity 
equation,’ Economics Letters, vol. 66(1), pages 25-31, January 
Egger, P., and Larch, M., (2008) ‘Interdependent preferential trade agreement 
memberships: an empirical analysis’, Journal of International Economics, 76, 
384–99 
Eichengreen, B, (2006) The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism 
and Beyond. Princeton Economic History of the Western World.  
Eichengreen, B., and Irwin. D., (1995) ‘Trade Blocs, Currency Blocs and 
Reorientation of Trade in the 1930’s’ Journal of international Economics 38 
(1-2):1-24 
228 
 
Eichengreen, B., and Irwin. D., (1997) ‘The Role of history in Bilateral Trade Flows’ 
in: J. Frankel, editor. The Regionalization of the World Economy. University of 
Chicago Press. 
Estevadeordal, A., Freund, C., and Ornelas, E., (2008) ‘Does regionalism affect trade 
liberalization toward non-members?’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, 
1531-1575. 
Ethier, W.J., (1979) ‘Internationally Decreasing Costs and World Trade’, Journal of 
International Economics 9: 1-24. 
Ethier, W.J., (1982) ‘National and international returns to scale in the modern theory 
of international trade’, American Economic Review 72, 389-405. 
Ethier, W.J., (1998) ‘The New Regionalism,’ Economic Journal, vol. 108(449), 
pages 1149-61, July. 
Ethier, W.J., (2007) ‘The theory of trade policy and trade agreements: A critique,’ 
European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 23(3), pages 605-623, September. 
EUROSTAT (2005) ‘European union Foreign Direct Investment Year Book 2005’ 
data 1998-2003 
Evenett, S. J.  and Keller, W., (2002) ‘On Theories Explaining the Success of the 
Gravity Equation,’ Journal of Political Economy, vol. 110(2), pages 281-316, 
April. 
Feenstra, R.C., (1994) ‘New Product Varieties and the Measurement of International 
Prices’, American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 1, pp. 157-177 
Feenstra, R.C., (1998) ‘Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the 
Global Economy,’ Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(4): 31–50 
Feenstra, R.C., (2002) ‘Border Effects and the Gravity Equation: Consistent Methods 
for Estimation’. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 49: 491–506 
229 
 
Feenstra, R.C., (2004) Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence. 
Princeton University Press. 
Feenstra, R.C., and Hanson, G.H., (1996) ‘Globalization, Outsourcing, and Wage 
Inequality,’ American Economic Review, vol. 86(2), pages 240-45, May 
Feenstra, R.C., and Hanson, G.H., (1996b) ‘Foreign Investment, Outsourcing, and 
Relative Wages’ In Robert C. Feenstra, Gene M. Grossman and Douglas A 
Irwin, eds., The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Papers in Honour of 
Jagdish Bhagwati. Cambridge MIT Press. 
Feenstra, R.C., and Kee, H.L., (2004) ‘On the Measurement of Product Variety in 
Trade,’ American Economic Review, vol. 94(2), pages 145-149, May. 
Finger, J.M., (1976) ‘Trade and Domestic Effects of the Offshore Assembly 
Provision in the US tariff’ American Economic Review September 1976 p. 598-
611. 
Fontagné, L., Freudenberg, M., and Ünal-Kesenci, D., (1995) ‘Régionalisation et 
échanges de biens intermediaires” CEPII No 1995 – 11 Décembre. 
Frankel, J., eds (1997) The Regionalisation of the World Economy. The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Frankel, J., Stein, E., and Wei, S. J., (1995) ‘Trading Blocs And The Americas: The 
Natural, The Unnatural, And The Super-Natural,’ Journal of Development 
Economics, 1995, v47(1), 61-95.  
Frankel, J., Stein, E., and Wei, S. J., (1996) ‘Regional Trading Arrangements: 
Natural or Supernatural,’ American Economic Review, vol. 86(2), pages 52-56, 
May. 
Freund, C. and Ornelas, E., (2010) ‘Regional trade agreements,’ Policy Research 
Working Paper Series 5314, The World Bank. 
230 
 
Freund, C., (2000) ‘Multilateralism and the endogenous formation of preferential 
trade agreements,’ Journal of International Economics, vol. 52(2), pages 359-
376, December. 
Fujita, M., Krugman, P.R, and Venables, A.J., (1999) The Spatial Economy: Cities, 
Regions, and International Trade. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press 
Funke, M., and Ruhwedel, R., (2001) ‘Product Variety and Economic Growth: 
Empirical Evidence for the OECD Countries,’ IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave 
Macmillan Journals, vol. 48(2), pages 1. 
Gasiorek, M., Holmes, P., Lopez-Gonzalez, J., Lovo, S., Rollo, J. Xinyi, L., (2010) 
‘Deep Integration, Vertical Specialisation, trade and growth: Implications for 
developing countries’ CARIS report 
Goldberg, P., Khandelwal, A., Pavcnik, N., and Topalova, P., (2009) ‘Trade 
Liberalization and New Imported Inputs,’ American Economic Review, vol. 
99(2), pages 494-500, May 
Greene, W., (2010) Econometric Analysis. Seventh Edition. Pearson. 
Grossman, G. M., and Helpman, E., (1995). ‘The Politics of Free Trade Agreements’ 
American Economic Review, Vol 85. No 4. pp667-690. 
Grossman, G. M., and Helpman, E., (2004) ‘Managerial incentives and the 
international organization of production,’ Journal of International Economics, 
vol. 63(2), pages 237-262, July. 
Grossman, Gene M. and Rossi-Hansberg, E., (2008) ‘Trading Tasks: A Simple 
Theory of Offshoring,’ American Economic Review, vol. 98(5), pages 1978-97, 
December 
Hanson, G.H., (1995) ‘The Effects of Offshore Assembly on Industry Location: 
Evidence from the US Border Cities’, NBER Working Papers No.5400. 
Hanson, G.H., and Robertson, R., (2003) ‘Exporting Volatility: The Rise and Fall of 
Mexico’s Maquiladoras’ presented to Federal Reserve of Dallas, El Paso 
231 
 
Branch “Maquiladora Downturn: Structural Change or Cyclical Factors,” on 
November 21, 2003. 
Hanson, G.H., Mataloni, R., and Slaughter, M., (2005) ‘Vertical production networks 
in multinational firms’. Review of Economics and Statistics 87, 664–678 
Heckman, J.J., (1979) ‘Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error’. 
Econometrica, 47, 1, p53-161 
Helpman, E. and Krugman, P. R., (1985) Market Structure and Foreign Trade. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Helpman, E., Melitz, M.J., and Rubinstein, Y., (2008) ‘Estimating Trade Flows: 
Trading Partners and Trading Volumes’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123: 
441-487. 
Holmes, T., (2005) ‘What Drives Regional Trade Agreements that Work’ HEI 
Working Paper No: 07/2005 
Honoré, B., (2002) ‘Nonlinear Models with Panel Data’, Portuguese Economic 
Journal, 1, 163-179. 
Horn, H., G. Maggi, and R. W. Staiger., (2010) ‘Trade Agreements as Endogenously 
Incomplete Contracts’ American Economic Review 100(1): 394-419. 
Hummels, D., Ishii, J., and Yi K-M., (1999) ‘The nature and growth of vertical 
specialization in world trade,’ Staff Reports 72, Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York. 
Hummels, D., Ishii, J., and Yi K-M., (2001) ‘The Nature and Growth of Vertical 
Specialization in World Trade’. Journal of International Economics. 54 (June 
2001):75-96 
Imbens, G., and Wooldridge, J., (2007) ‘What’s New in Econometrics’ National 
Bureau of Economic Research. Summer Institute Lecture slides (Non-linear 
Panel Data Models - http://www.nber.org/minicourse3.html) 
232 
 
Johnson R.C., Noguera, G., (2011) ‘Accounting for intermediates: Production 
sharing and trade in value added’, Journal of International Economics, (In 
Press) 
Jones, R.W., and Kierzkowski, H., (1990) ‘The Role of Services in Production and 
International Trade: A Theoretical Framework,’ in R.W. Jones and A.O. 
Krueger (eds.), The Political Economy of International Trade. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Jones, R.W., and Kierzkowski, H., (2001) ‘A Framework for Fragmentation,’ in 
Arndt and Kierzkowski, eds Fragmentation: New Production Patterns in the 
World Economy. Oxford University Press. 
Kasahara, H and Lapham, B., (2006) ‘Import Protection as Export Destruction,’ 
University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute Working 
Papers 20062,  
Koopman, R., and Wei, S-J., (2012) ‘The Value-added Structure of Gross Exports: 
Measuring Revealed Comparative Advantage by Domestic Content in Exports’ 
Working paper.  
www.aeaweb.org%2Faea%2F2012conference%2Fprogram%2Fretrieve.php%3
Fpdfid%3D627&ei=vGNbT4qTOuLX0QXGqPTcAw&usg=AFQjCNFdh9AI9
zuk2-AZHw7tM5OZCFVtXQ 
Koopman, R., Wang, Z., and Wei, S-J., (2008) ‘Give Credit where Credit is due: 
Tracing Value Added in Global Production Chains’ NBER Working Paper No. 
16426 
Koopman, R., Wang, Z., and Wei, S-J., (2011) ‘Estimating Foreign Value-added in 
Mexico's Manufacturing Exports’ Office of Economics Working Paper No. 
2011-04A. US International Trade Commission 
Krugman, P.R., (1979), ‘Increasing returns, monopolistic competition and 
international trade’, Journal of International Economics Volume 9, Issue 4, 
Pages 469–479 
233 
 
Krugman, P.R., (1981)’Intra-industry specialisation and the gains from trade’ 
Journal of Political Economy, 89, 959–73. 
Krugman, P.R., (1991a) ‘Is Bilateralism Bad?’ In Elhanan Helpman and Assaf Razin 
eds International Trade and Trade Policy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Krugman, P.R., (1991b) ‘The Move Toward Free Trade Zones’. In Policy 
Implications of Trade and Currency Zones, proceedings of a Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City symposium. 
Krugman, P.R., and Venables, A. J., (1995) ‘Globalization and the inequality of 
nations’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 857–880. 
Lamy, P., (2002) ‘Stepping Stones or Stumbling Blocks? The EU’s Approach 
Towards the Problem of Multilateralism vs Regionalism in Trade Policy,’ 
World Economy. Vol. 25, No. 10: 1399-1413. 
Lamy, P., (2010) ‘Globalization of the Industrial Production Chains and Measuring 
International Trade in Value Added’ speech to the French Senate in Paris on 15 
October. http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl174_e.htm 
Lancaster, K., (1979) Variety, Equity and Efficiency. New York, Columbia 
University Press. 
Leijonhufvud, A., (2007) ‘The Individual, the Market and the Division of Labor in 
Society,’ Capitalism and Society: Vol. 2 : Iss. 2, Article 3. 
Levchenko, A., (2007) ‘Institutional Quality and International Trade,’ Review of 
Economic Studies, 74:3, 791-819. 
Levy, F., and Murnane, R., (2003) ‘The skill content of recent technological change: 
an empirical exploration’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4). 
Levy, P.I., (1997) ‘A Political-Economy Analysis of Free-Trade Agreements’ The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No. 4 (Sept., 1997), 506-519 
234 
 
Linden, G., Kraemer, K.L., and Dedrick, J., (2009) ‘Who captures value in a global 
innovation network? The case of Apple's iPod.’ Communications of the ACM, 
52(3), 140-144. 
Linder, S., (1961) An Essay on Trade and Transformation. Uppsala: Almqvist and 
Wiksells. 
Lopez Gonzalez, J., and Holmes, P., (2011) ‘The Nature and Evolution of Vertical 
Specialisation: What is the Role of Preferential Trade Agreements’ NCCR 
Working Paper No. 2011/41 
Luthje, T., (2001) ‘Intra-industry trade in intermediate goods’ International 
Advances in Economic Research November 2001. Vol 7. No 4. pp. 393-408 
Luthje, T., (2003) ‘Intra-Industry Trade in Intermediate Goods and Final Goods in a 
General Equilibrium Setting’ Open Economies Review; Apr 2003; 14, 2; p191-
209 
Magee, C., (2003) ‘Endogenous Preferential Trade Agreements: An Empirical 
Analysis’, Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy Volume 2 Issue 3 
Article 15. 
Magee, C., (2008) ‘New Measures of Trade Creation and Trade Diversion,’ Journal 
of International Economics 75, 340 – 362 
Maggi, G. and A. Rodriguez-Clare., (2007) ‘A Political-Economy Theory of Trade 
Agreements.’ American Economic Review 97(4): 1374-1406. 
Manger, M.S., (2009) ‘Vertical Trade Specialization and PTA Formation’ Paper 
presented at the workshop on The Politics of Trade Agreements: Theory, 
Measurement, and empirical analysis, Niehaus Centre for Globalization and 
Governance, Princeton University, April 29-30, 2010 
Mansfield, E.D., and Milner, H., (1999) ‘The New Wave of Regionalism.’ 
International Organization. Summer 1999, v.53,N.3:589-627. 
235 
 
Mansfield, E.D., Milner, H. and Rosendorff, B.P., (2000) ‘Free to Trade: 
Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade’, American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 94, N°2, June. 
Mansfield, E.D., Milner, H. and Rosendorff, B.P., (2002) ‘Why do democracies 
cooperate more: electoral control and international trade negotiations’, 
International Organization, 56, 3, Summer, pp. 477-513. 
Mansfield,  E.D., Milner, H. and Pevehouse J., (2008) ‘Democracy, Veto players, 
and the depth of Regional Integration’. World Economy, Vol. 31, Issue 1, pp. 
67-96, January 2008 
Mansfield, E.D., and Reinhardt, E., (2003) ‘Multilateral determinants of regionalism: 
The effects of GATT/WTO on the formation of preferential trading 
arrangements’ International Organization 57, 829-862. 
Markusen, J.R., (1989) ‘Trade in producer services and other specialised 
intermediate inputs’. American Economic Review, 79, 85–95. 
Markusen, J.R., (2010) ‘Putting Per-Capita Income Back into Trade Theory,’ NBER 
Working Papers No. 15903. 
McCallum, J., (1995). ‘National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade 
Patterns’. American Economic Review, Vol. 85(No. 3.). 
McKinnon, B.I., (1966) ‘Intermediate Products and Differential Tariffs: A 
Generalization of Lerner's Symmetry Theorem’, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 80 (1966), pp. 584-615. 
Melitz, M., (2003) ‘The impact of trade on intraindustry reallocations and aggregate 
industry productivity,’ Econometrica, 71, 1695-1725. 
Neyman, J., Scott, E.L., (1948) ‘Consistent estimation from partially consistent 
observations’. Econometrica 16, 1-32. 
Nordas, H.,K., (2004) ‘Determinants of Vertical Specialisation’ WTO Discussion 
Papers 
236 
 
Nordas, H.,K., (2007) ‘International production sharing: a case for a coherent policy 
framework’ WTO publications Discussion paper No. 11 
Nunn, N., (2007) ‘Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of 
Trade’.  The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2007) 122(2): 569-600 
OECD (2010) ‘Vertical Trade, Trade Costs and FDI’, paper produced for the 
Working Party of the Trade Committee, TAD/TC/WP(2008)23 
OECD-WTO (2011) ‘Trade in Value-Added: Concepts, Methodologies and 
Challenges’ Joint OECD-WTO note 
Orefice, G., and Rocha, N., (2011) ‘Deep integration and production networks: an 
empirical analysis,’ World Trade Organization Economic Research and 
Statistics Division, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2011-11. 
Ornelas, E and Turner, J., (2008) ‘Trade Liberalization, Outsourcing, and the Hold 
Up Problem,’ Journal of International Economics, 74:1, pp. 225-241. 
Ornelas, E., (2005a) ‘Trade-creating free trade areas and the undermining of 
multilateralism’, European Economic Review 49, 1717-1735 
Ornelas, E., (2005b) ‘Rent destruction and the political viability of free trade 
agreements,’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 1475-1506. 
Ornelas, E., (2005c) ‘Endogenous free trade agreements and the multilateral trading 
system,’ Journal of International Economics 67, 471-497. 
Panagariya, A., (1999) ‘Preferential Trade Liberalization: the Traditional Theory and 
New Developments’. Mimeo 
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A., and Trebbi, F., (2002) ‘Institutions Rule: The Primacy 
of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development,’ 
mimeo, Harvard University. 
Romer, P. M., (1987) ‘Growth based on increasing returns due to specialisation’ 
American Economic Review, 77, 56–62. 
237 
 
Ruiz, J., and Vilarrubia, J.M., (2007) ‘The wise use of dummies in gravity models: 
export potentials in the Euromed region,’ Banco de Espana Working Papers 
0720, Banco de España 
Samuelson, P.A., (2001) ‘A Ricardo-Sraffa Paradigm Comparing Gains from Trade 
in Inputs and Finished Goods’ Journal of Economic Literature , Vol. 39, No. 4 
(Dec., 2001), pp. 1204-1214 
Santos Silva, J.M.C. and Tenreyro, S., (2006) ‘The Log of Gravity’, The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 88(4), pp. 641-658 
Sanyal, K., and Jones, R., (1982) ‘The theory of trade in middle products’. American 
Economic Review 72 1 (1982), pp. 16–31 
Sauré, P., (2009) ‘Bounded Love of Variety and Patterns of Trade,’ Working Papers 
2009-10, Swiss National Bank. 
Smith, A., (1779) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations 
Soloaga, I. and Winters, A. L., (2001) ‘Regionalism in the nineties: what effect on 
trade?,’ The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 
12(1), pages 1-29, March. 
Tinbergen, J., (1962) Shaping the World Economy - Suggestions for an International 
Economic Policy, The Twentieth Century Fund. 
UN (1999) ‘Handbook of input-output table compilation and analysis’ Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division 
Vaccara B., (1986) ‘Changes over Time in Input-Output Coefficient for the United 
States’ in Readings in Input-Output Analysis, edited by Ira Sohn, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1986. 
Venables, A., (1996) ‘Equilibrium locations of vertically linked industries’, 
International Economic Review 37, 341–35 
238 
 
Viner J., (1950) The Customs Union Issue New York: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. 
Williamson, O.E., (1975)  Markets and Hierarchies Free Press  (New York) 
Wooldridge, J.M., (2002) Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
WTO (2008) ‘Trade in a Globalizing World’ World Trade Report 2008, Geneva, 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report08_e.p
df 
WTO (2011) ‘The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-existence to 
coherence’ World Trade Report 2011, Geneva. 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report11_e.p
df 
Yeats A.J., (1998) ‘Just How Big Is Global Production Sharing?’ Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 1871. 
Yeats A.J., (2001) ‘Just How Big is Global Production Sharing?’ in Arndt and 
Kierzkowski eds, Fragmentation: New Production Patterns in the World 
Economy. Oxford University Press. 
Yi, K-M., (2003) ‘Can Vertical Specialization Explain the Growth of World trade?’ 
Journal of Political Economy, 2003, vol. 111, no. 
Yi, K-M., (2003b) ‘A Simple Explanation for the Border Effect,’ working paper, 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Yi, K-M., (2005) ‘Vertical Specialization and the Border Effect Puzzle’ Working 
Paper. http://www.philadelphiafed.org/files/wps/2005/wp05-24.pdf 
Yi, S.-S., (1996) ‘Endogenous formation of customs unions under imperfect 
competition: Open regionalism is good,’ Journal of International Economics 
41, 151-175. 
239 
 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A1 
A1.1 OTHER MEASURES OF VERTICAL SPECIALISATION 
 
This section discusses alternative measures of vertical specialisation. Particular 
emphasis is given to how these may serve capture the bilateral element of this 
phenomenon. Two types of measures arise, those that are identified through trade 
databases and those that require other types of data.  
A1.1.1 TRADE BASED MEASURES OF VERTICAL SPECIALISATION 
 
Trade based measures of vertical specialisation are attractive for the wide coverage 
they offer in terms of geography and time. They are however not without their 
drawbacks. Having already discussed the use of the BEC nomenclature in the main 
body of the text this part focuses on different indicators that may be used for the 
identification of vertical specialisation. 
 
A1.1.1.1 Intra Industry Trade 
 
It is not unreasonable to presume that the backwards and forward movement of 
goods within similar tariff lines may serve the purpose of capturing some form of 
fragmentation of production structures across international borders. This exchange of 
intermediate goods across industries may be captured by way of Intra-Industry Trade 
(IIT) indicators. Consider the automotive industry (using the HS classification); 
motor vehicles lie in sector HS-87 where the final assembled motor vehicles can be 
found in HS-8703 whilst the parts and accessories of motor vehicles fall into the 
category HS-8708. Although constructing an IIT indicator for sector 8703 
(assembled motor vehicles) is likely to capture the simultaneous exchange of finished 
cars (e.g. Peugeots against Volkswagens), computing such an indicator for its ‘parts 
and accessories’ (HS-8708) may be an appropriate way of capturing vertical 
specialisation. 
 
Consider product HS-870840 – which identifies ‘gear boxes’. Calculating an IIT 
indicator at this tariff code could register the exchange of gear boxes at low levels of 
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processing for gear boxes at higher levels of processing. The differing levels of 
processing can then be identified by comparing import and export unit values. Where 
the difference between these is above a certain threshold, one could surmise that the 
product exported is significantly different from the product imported hence 
suggesting that some form of vertical specialisation is taking place. The crux of the 
validity of using such a method may hinge on the choice of an appropriate level of 
aggregation. If the IIT indicator is computed at the 4-digit level which identifies the 
different parts and components (HS-8708), or indeed at the 2-digit level (HS-87), 
then one may be capturing simultaneous trade in intermediates that are used in the 
production of cars. But such an exercise may be misleading if it involves imports of a 
6-digit product and exports of another (i.e. imports of radiators but exports of gear 
boxes). It can lead to an inaccurate identification.  
 
In addition, even if a good choice of aggregation is made there remains certain doubt 
that IIT indicators properly identify the full extent of vertical specialisation. The 
main problem comes from the construction of the indicator which, by composition 
requires there to be both imports and exports of products in the same tariff lines. It is 
entirely possible that Germany sources all its gear boxes from Eastern Europe and 
does not export this product at all. In this instance, vertical specialisation is taking 
place, but the IIT indicator will be zero and hence one would register no vertically 
specialised trade taking place. 
 
Further to this, if one considers the production of a car one need consider other 
materials the likes of the iron that is used to make the chassis; the plastic that is 
utilised for the interior; or the rubber that is used to make the tyres. All these 
products are located in very different HS tariff codes hence an IIT indicator may 
underestimate the true extent of vertical specialisation. This last point becomes 
clearer when one looks at I-O tables. Using these it is possible to track the share of 
inputs that come from the same industry and which are directly used to produce one 
unit of output of a given industry. This is accomplished by capturing the diagonal 
element of the total I-O table and dividing this by the total output of that same 
industry. In Table A1.1 such an exercise is demonstrated for the US. Here, it is seen 
that, on average, 22.1% of total inputs used in production come from the same I-O 
industry whilst 26.3% of imported intermediates over total imports of a given I-O 
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sector come from the same industry. These very low values suggest that IIT 
indicators may be inaccurate instrument for capturing the extent of vertical 
specialisation330.  
Table A1.1: Diagonal Elements of IO table for the US 
I-O 
sector Description 
share of imports 
from same industry 
in total imports 
share of inputs 
from same 
industry in total 
inputs 
1 AGRICULTURE, HUNTING, FORESTRY AND FISHING 35.2% 42.4% 
2 MINING AND QUARRYING 70.9% 30.3% 
3 FOOD PRODUCTS, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO 35.9% 21.7% 
4 TEXTILES, TEXTILE PRODUCTS, LEATHER AND FOOTWEAR 76.1% 49.4% 
5 WOOD AND PRODUCTS OF WOOD AND CORK 79.2% 35.2% 
6 
PULP, PAPER, PAPER PRODUCTS, PRINTING AND 
PUBLISHING 67.3% 42.0% 
7 
COKE, REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND NUCLEAR 
FUEL 3.4% 10.0% 
8 CHEMICALS EXCLUDING PHARMACEUTICALS 59.9% 41.9% 
9 PHARMACEUTICALS  40.3% 24.8% 
10 RUBBER AND PLASTICS PRODUCTS 10.4% 10.1% 
11 OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 39.9% 21.4% 
12 IRON & STEEL 45.2% 25.7% 
13 NON-FERROUS METALS 75.3% 45.1% 
14 FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS, except  10.3% 13.2% 
15 MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT, N.E.C. 34.8% 20.9% 
16 OFFICE, ACCOUNTING AND COMPUTING MACHINERY 34.4% 18.3% 
17 ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND APPARATUS, NEC 24.0% 12.0% 
18 RADIO, TELEVISION AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT 78.0% 42.2% 
19 MEDICAL, PRECISION AND OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS 13.8% 6.9% 
20 MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAILERS AND SEMI-TRAILERS 46.3% 31.7% 
21 BUILDING AND REPAIRING OF SHIPS AND BOATS 0.1% 0.3% 
22 AIRCRAFT AND SPACECRAFT 67.6% 34.0% 
23 
RAILROAD EQUIPMENT AND TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 
N.E.C. 14.3% 9.4% 
24 MANUFACTURING NEC; RECYCLING 19.0% 4.8% 
25 ELECTRICITY, GAS AND WATER SUPPLY 0.0% 18.6% 
26 CONSTRUCTION 0.0% 0.1% 
27 WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE; REPAIRS  9.6% 
28 HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS 0.0% 1.7% 
29 TRANSPORT AND STORAGE 7.0% 35.7% 
30 POST AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 0.0% 29.7% 
31 FINANCE, INSURANCE  1.5% 55.4% 
32 REAL ESTATE ACTIVITIES 0.0% 25.0% 
33 RENTING OF MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 0.0% 2.7% 
34 COMPUTER AND RELATED ACTIVITIES 0.3% 19.4% 
35 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 0.3% 1.5% 
36 OTHER BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 5.8% 35.9% 
37 
PUBLIC ADMIN. AND DEFENCE; COMPULSORY SOCIAL 
SECURITY 
38 EDUCATION 0.0% 0.2% 
39 HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK 0.0% 4.2% 
40 OTHER COMMUNITY, SOCIAL AND PERSONAL SERVICES 3.7% 26.8% 
  Average 26.3% 22.1% 
  Weighted average (by industry output) 14.2% 21.9% 
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 It is important to consider that the back of the envelope calculation provided is one taking into 
account the direct requirements in production. Whilst one should also consider the indirect 
requirements (i.e. the second round effects) However, these are likely to be smaller and hence the 
validity of the argument is likely to remain. 
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A1.1.1.2 Tariff Exemption Under Special Processing Provisions 
 
Another way that the literature has attempted to capture the extent of vertical 
specialisation is through special tariff provision for processing trade. The EU allows 
tariff exemption under a provision known as Outward Processing Trade (an 
equivalent provision for the US is the Offshore Assembly Provision). Under these, a 
tariff exemption is applied for certain goods allowing temporary export of 
intermediate goods for processing in a foreign country followed by re-importation 
under partial or complete tariff exemptions (or drawback). 
 
In the EU, outward processing activities are mediated under the Community Customs 
Code331.  Provisions exist for both outward processing and inward processing 
respectively known as OPX(or M) and IPX(or M). Inward processing imports, as 
opposed to outward processing exports as explained above, captures intermediate 
imports from a foreign country for home-processing with a subsequent re-export to 
the country of origin with tariff exemption. Processing authorisation is granted under 
special conditions where a particular tariff line is created for repair of goods; 
otherwise goods have to undergo an economic examination before authorisation is 
granted. The latter evaluates possible disadvantages of foreign processing on 
domestic processing firms. The conditions under which outward processing may be 
granted are also limited by type of processing and detailed annexes provide a list of 
possible processing activities covered. Outward processing takes place in 3 distinct 
phases. 
 
- Community goods are exported temporarily to a territory outside the EC 
customs territory. 
- Goods exported undergo processing 
- The permit holder re-imports processed products 
 
Under the community legislation there exists scope for full or partial relief of duties 
depending on the type of processing. 
                                                 
331
 COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community 
Customs Code (OJ L 302, 19.10.1992, p. 1) 
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Egger and Egger (2005) analyse the evolution of OPT in the EU with respect to 
CEECs and other Western European countries. Their aim is to elucidate the 
motivation behind this type of trade by looking at 4 different models attempting to 
explain outsourcing. Firstly, the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model, then new trade 
theory models, followed by politico-economic models and then models with 
infrastructure as predominating determinant of processing trade. Their evidence 
suggests that OPT does not seem to be affected by the standard H-O framework, i.e. 
factor costs do not tend to influence OPT. Furthermore, they find little evidence 
supporting market size as guiding processing trade patterns thus arguing that new 
trade theory models are not well suited to deal with this type of trade. The main 
determinants of OPT appear to be tax savings on profits and exchange rate ratios. In 
contrast, Yeats (2001), evaluates processing trade as a measure of vertical 
specialisation and claims that using these indices to instrument for VS significantly 
understates the importance of global production sharing.  
 
In effect, and in the context of identifying the role that FTAs may be playing with 
respect to vertically specialised trade, processing trade may not be useful. This is 
because it only covers trade movements under the presence of tariffs hence it will not 
afford one to look at vertical specialisation between regional partners where tariffs 
have been eliminated. In addition, and to the extent that tariffs may be low, firms 
might not apply for these types of provisions if the administrative cost is higher than 
the tariff faced. This is a common issue in the rules of origin literature that can be 
extended to OPT. In this literature the cost of compliance has been calculated at 
around 3-5% of the value of the product (as suggested by Evenett(2008)). However, 
processing trade remains an interesting indication of outsourcing as it is partially 
unaffected by tariff changes and hence can provide a good indication of firm 
incentives to source production internationally. Bearing in mind that these goods are 
exempt from tariffs, the growth of OPT trade will be dependent on non-tariff barrier 
changes and will thus significantly rely on factor price advantages for production. 
This may give one an ex-ante prelude to the formation of RTAs. By checking OPT 
flows prior to enlargements or signing RTA agreements it may be possible to 
determine if the latter were precursors to the signing of the agreement. However 
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processing trade will not capture the full extent of vertical specialisation as it 
becomes irrelevant once a preferential trade agreement has been signed. 
 
A1.1.1.3 Trade and Production Data 
 
Whilst trade and production data are very different in the way that they are collected, 
it is possible to merge these using the ISIC nomenclature. UNIDO provides detailed 
information at the ISIC rev 2 and ISIC rev 3 level on industrial production which can 
be matched to trade data by origin and destination. This has rarely been done, 
however a notable exception is that provided by a World Bank working paper by 
Nicita and Olarreaga (2001 and 2006). They use production data from UNIDO at the 
ISIC rev 2 and rev 3 levels and match the corresponding trade data for a selection of 
industrial goods. Their tables span from 1976 till 2004 in their last revision. These 
can be used to grasp the co-movement of imports and output acting as a proxy for 
vertical specialisation (by calculating shares of imports over output). The caveats of 
this method remain that industrial interlinkages remain uncounted. It further requires 
a considerable amount of work in matching intermediate imports so as to derive an 
indicator of vertical specialisation. This would have to be done using the BEC 
nomenclature. The advantage of this approach, for econometric estimation, is that it 
provides a harmonised nomenclature for analysing production related variables such 
as wage bills, employment and investment (via gross fixed capital formation). 
However the data availability varies greatly by country which makes obtaining a 
large panel a considerable challenge.  
 
A1.1.1.4 Vertical Intra Industry Specialisation 
 
In an effort to exploit the extensive availability of trade data and move away from the 
somewhat restrictive country coverage of input output tables, Gasiorek et al. (2010) 
develop a trade based index of vertical specialisation named vertical intra industry 
specialisation (VIIS). This indicator exploits the presence of ‘parts and components’ 
tariff lines within broad tariff aggregates deriving a share measure of intermediate 
imports (identified using the BEC nomenclature) over exports by industry and 
country. The aggregate measure then becomes the trade weighted average of the 
industrial measures. The main advantage of this type of indicator is that it allows for 
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extended analysis across developed and developing countries. In addition, it can 
easily be extended to consider a bilateral element of vertical specialisation thus 
allowing for the extension of analysis in a regional context. However, the drawbacks 
are that the underlying assumptions impose certain constraints requiring that imports 
of intermediates used in production lie within a broad aggregate industry indentified 
under a tariff aggregate. Furthermore it assumes that intermediate imports are being 
fully used to satisfy external demand and not domestic demand which in turn causes 
the indicators to be unbound upwards.  
 
Despite these shortcomings, the indicator is able to capture an important aspect of 
vertical specialisation. The use of the BEC nomenclature seems justified (as 
suggested in the discussion of Table 1.1) and the coefficients in the estimations 
provided in Gasiorek et al (2010) follow the expected signs. The FTA variable in the 
estimation suggests a statistically significant relationship between the presence of an 
FTA and higher levels of VIIS. This relationship is stronger between N-N partners 
and is also shown to be negative between S-S partners where a N-S type agreement 
has a statistically insignificant positive coefficient. Whilst these findings are 
insightful and provide a supporting step for our underlying hypothesis, the estimation 
procedure could suffer from endogeneity between the VIIS variable and the RTA 
dummy. It is indeed possible that the decision to engage in an FTA is the product of 
increased VIIS between bilateral partners. Equally, it is conceivable that partners that 
engage in an RTA show higher VIIS levels. Whilst Gasiorek et al (2010) were not 
particularly interested in the possible interplay between vertical specialisation and 
regional trade agreements, their work paves the way for a more systematic analysis 
using I-O data.  
A1.1.2 NON-TRADE BASED MEASURES OF VERTICAL SPECIALISATION 
 
As with the trade based measures of vertical specialisation, the non-trade based 
measures also have their advantages and disadvantages. These are outlined below for 
two such measures, FDI and VSI. The main disadvantage of these non-trade based 
measures is that these tend to be unavailable at the bilateral level. In addition, 
country and time coverage of these results in important challenges for practical 
implementation.  
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A1.1.2.1 Vertical Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows can be a source of information in mapping 
vertical specialisation as they represent firm’s commitments to delocalise production, 
partially or fully, across borders. The literature distinguishes two forms of FDI; 
market seeking (horizontal) and export platform seeking (vertical). The former takes 
place when firms decide to set-up production in another market for servicing that 
same market (i.e. companies recreate domestic production structures in a foreign 
country to gain access to that market). Vertical FDI then relates to firm incentives to 
source production internationally, delocalising segments of production to least cost 
producers in other countries. It is the latter form that captures the vertical 
specialisation element that we are interested in. 
 
A firm’s decision to engage in FDI hinges on choosing a production strategy that 
minimises production costs but maximises access to a given market. Under the 
presence of restrictively high trade costs (tariff, non-tariff or distance barriers) firms 
can engage in market seeking FDI rather than in international trade to service a given 
market. However as trade barriers fall, firms can prioritise minimising production 
costs taking advantages of factor endowment or comparative advantage differences 
to delocalise segments of production to where they are most efficient. Hence there 
appears to be an important link between FDI and trade that is mediated by trade and 
production costs. As market access increases by way of bilateral or multilateral 
negotiations firms’ incentives can change and vertical FDI can be promoted. 
 
An extensive literature review carried out by Blonigen (2005) identifies the main 
determinants of FDI as being exchange rates, taxes, institutions, factor endowments 
and trade protection. However Markusen and Maskus (2001) find that market size 
has a greater influence on FDI flows than do factor prices suggesting that FDI flows 
may be mostly market seeking (tariff-jumping or Horizontal FDI). These results may 
reflect the important underlying differences between the two types of FDI here 
exposed. The nature of FDI suggests that horizontal FDI could be larger in terms of 
values than vertical FDI. This is because the fixed costs of setup involved with 
servicing other markets in the form of full delocalisation of production should be 
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larger than arms length dealings or delocalisation of segments of production. In the 
context of vertical specialisation in preferential areas, not taking account of the 
marked differences between types of FDI flows may be inappropriate. Flows of FDI 
between preferential partners could be very different in nature to those between non 
preferential partners. Where the former would not be market seeking as market 
access should be granted by virtue of the agreement. Delocalisation of production 
within an RTA would then generally be registered under vertical FDI. This does not 
preclude horizontal FDI which would occur when strong backwards and forward 
linkages exist in other locations across the region. However if markets are highly 
integrated, the costs of setting up intra-regional affiliates will not be profitable unless 
we assume immobility of factors of production, high transport costs and very strong 
backwards and forward linkages. In this context we surmise that intra RTA FDI will 
predominantly take the form of vertical FDI. Blomstrom and Kokko (1997) conclude 
that, within RTAs, “international differences in factor endowments should become 
stronger influences on investment location decisions”. Conversely, when barriers to 
trade are high (outside RTA), firms gain advantage from setting up affiliates in other 
markets and reaping the benefits, through scale economies, of an extended entry into 
a market where the large fixed costs of setup can be recouped more easily. Dunning 
(1997) empirically demonstrates that RTA consolidation, the likes of the completion 
of the Single Market Programme, gave rise to an increase in intra and inter regional 
FDI. However, evidence showed that inter-regional FDI rose faster than intra-
regional FDI. This finding provides some evidence to our hypothesis and suggests 
that analysis of vertical specialisation using FDI flows should distinguish between 
vertical and horizontal types.  
 
Whilst FDI can be very informative in capturing firm incentives to delocalise 
production, the availability of data is limited. Generally data is not available 
bilaterally and lacks an adequate degree of disaggregation. In addition, there is little 
way in knowing which type of FDI flow is occurring as these are not generally 
recorded. The use of FDI as an indicator of vertical specialisation in econometric 
analysis is hence going to lead to misleading results given that the factors motivating 
these flows vary significantly according to the preferential status of bilateral partners.  
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A1.2  OECD STAN DATABASE AND METHOD OF CALCULATION 
 
The country and time coverage of the OECD tables is detailed in the table below: 
 
Table A1.2: OECD IO database coverage 
Country mid 90's early 00 mid 00 currency 
Argentina 1997 * * 1000 pesos 
Australia 1995/1996 * 2004/2005 Mill. AUD 
Austria 1995 2000 2005 Mill. Euros 
Belgium 1995 2000 2004 Mill. Euros 
Brazil 1995 2000 2005 Mil. Real 
Canada 1995 2000 2005 Mill. Can 
Switzerland * 2001 * Mill. CHF 
Chile 1996 * 2003 Mill CLP 
China 1995 2000 2005 10,000 Yuan 
Czech Rep. * 2000 2005 Mill. CZK 
Germany 1995 2000 2005 Mill. Euros 
Denmark 1995 2000 2005 Mill. Kro 
Spain 1995 2000 2005 Mill. Euros 
Estonia 1997 2000 2005 Mill. Kroon 
Finland 1995 2000 2005 Mill. Euros 
France 1995 2000 2005 Mill. Euros 
United Kingdom 1995 2000 2005 Mill. Pound 
Greece 1995 2000 2005 Mill. Euros 
Hungary 1998 2000 2005 Mill. Forint 
Indonesia 1995 2000 2005 Mill. RPS 
India 1993/1994 1998/1999 2003/2004 Mill. Lakhs (10 lakh = 1 million) 
Ireland 1998 2000 2005 Mill. Euros 
Italy 1995 * * Mill. Euros 
Japan 1995 2000 2005 Mill. Jpy 
Korea * 2000 2005 Mill. Krw 
Luxembourg 1995 2000 2005 Mill. Euros 
Mexico * * 2003 Mill. Pesos 
Netherlands 1995 2000 2005 Mill. Euros 
Norway 1995 2000 2005 Mill. Krone 
New Zealand 1995/1996 2002/2003 * Mill. NZD 
Poland 1995 2000 2005 Mill. PLN 
Portugal 1995 2000 2005 Mill. Euros 
Rumania * 2000 2005 Mill. Ron 
Russia 1995 2000 * Mill. Rub 
Slovakia 1995 2000 2005 Mill SKK 
Slovenia * 2000 2005 Mill. Euros 
Sweden 1995 2000 2005 Mill. Krona 
Turkey 1996 2002 * Bill/Mill TRL  
Taiwan 1996 2001 * Mill. NT 
USA 1995 2000 2005 Mill USD 
South Africa 1993 2000 * Mill. Rand 
 
The calculation of the indicators of vertical specialisation is carried out for 39 
countries using the OECD STAN database (it excludes Taiwan, Belgium and 
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Luxembourg). The following steps are taken to prepare the tables for a subsequent 
merge with the trade data obtained from COMTRADE: 
- Matrices are reduced to a 25x25 square matrix that captures manufacturing 
trade. This requires aggregating certain manufacturing sectors and also 
aggregating the service sectors to one sector only. 
- The base tables are then extended these so yearly tables are obtained 
- These are then deflated, using country specific deflators from the WDI 
database, to a base year 2000 and converted into dollars using exchange rates 
from the Penn World Tables database. The conversion is necessary so that 
one can merge the IO tables with the trade data in dollars 
- The trade data is also deflated, but here aggregate OECD deflators are used. 
- Once the data has been fully treated, the different indicators are calculated. 
 
In calculating indicators of vertically specialised trade an issue arises from the use of 
a bilateral import matrix of technical coefficients. Using the Aj
m matrix in 
conjunction with the domestic matrix for such a calculation will result in an 
alteration of the underlying technologies that lead to the production of output. This 
arises from the shortfall between the bilateral matrix and the aggregate matrix. Hence 
to keep technologies constant, the domestic intermediate matrix has to be 
transformed to compensate for the shortfall. The intuition behind this is relatively 
straight forward. If a country’s technology dictates that to produce one unit of an 
agricultural good you need to input 0.1 units of imported intermediate industrial 
goods, and if you do not currently import any industrial goods from a given origin, 
then you need to make up for this shortfall elsewhere so as to maintain production 
technologies constant.  
 
One way of dealing with this issue would be to assume some form of substitutability 
of goods across the I-O system that compensates for the shortfalls332. However, this 
would require computing an algebraic system with various Armington functions and 
introducing elasticity parameters. The system would then depend on how the 
substitutability of inputs is justified and technologies would no longer be Leontief. 
Hence a different route is taken. It assumes that, in order to satisfy demand, a 
reporter country needs to compensate for the shortfall in imports using alternative 
                                                 
332
 i.e. by using more domestic output. 
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sources of inputs which maintain the underlying technologies of the IO system333. 
This can be accomplished by calculating an intermediate transformation matrix, Tj, 
which is the sum of the domestic matrix and the difference between the total 
intermediate import matrix and the imported intermediate matrix from a given origin 
so that Tj = D+(M-mj)
334. The technical coefficient transformation matrix (ATj) can 
then be calculated by dividing each element of the Tj matrix by the output of the 
corresponding sector (Zn).  
 
Not carrying out this transformation is not overtly problematic when calculating 
indicators of vertically specialised trade. However, it might be a problem when 
looking at domestic value added versus the use of domestic intermediate products. 
The shortfall in trade arises because a reporting country does not import a particular 
commodity from a partner country. Hence say that Belgium does not import 
petroleum from Luxembourg. Because Belgium needs this product to produce output 
then it needs to make up for this shortfall in petroleum imports from Luxembourg by 
substituting the source of petroleum. One can assume that Belgium compensates for 
this shortfall either increasing its competitiveness, which might be unlikely, or that it 
uses inputs of this product from other sources, domestic of imported. Whether this is 
domestic or imported, does not affect the backward linkage between Belgium and 
Luxembourg, but it may affect other indicators of value added trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
333
 An alternative would have been that the compensation arises from an increase in value added. 
334
 An example is helpful. Imagine that, in order to produce a unit of output, Country A requires the 
total use of 0.4 units of input of which 0.3 is domestic and 0.1 is imported. Because Country A does 
not import this product from Country B, then the bilateral imported intermediate value for this 
product is 0. Not accounting for this implies that the sum of the domestic and the intermediate matrix 
is 0.3 rather than the 0.4 that is originally required. Calculating an indicator of vertical specialisation 
using this new matrix implies an alteration of the production technologies. Keeping these constant can 
be done by computing a transformation matrix that takes into account the shortfall in the import 
matrix so that technology is maintained at 0.4. The implication of this method is that one assumes that 
the shortfall is compensated through the use of more domestic inputs rather than value added.   
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A1.3 TESTING THE BVS INDICATOR: THE EU EXAMPLE 
 
Table A1.3 compares the bilateral VS calculations using the EU I-O tables’ 
delimitation of intra and extra EU trade (Panel 1) to that calculated using the 
methodology presented in the first essay of this thesis with trade data extracted from 
Comtrade (Panel 2). Here distinction is only made on the basis of the origin of 
intermediate imports so that the destination of exports is held fixed towards the 
world. Hence the sum of BVS across destination will give the VS indicator335. Whilst 
there are differences in the numbers reported across the different panels, the 
underlying relation is very similar. The table shows, in the first entry, that the import 
content of exports to the world amounts to 30% for Austria where 20 percent (68% 
of the total) comes from intra EU partners and 10 percent (32% of the total) from 
extra-EU partners. The second panel estimates the degree of vertical specialisation of 
Austria at 0.36 where 68% of intermediate imports come from EU partners and the 
remaining 32 from non-EU partners. The table serves two purposes, firstly that of 
evaluating and comparing the above outlined methodology and secondly that of 
investigating the current degree of vertical specialisation in the EU and the regional 
component of this vertical specialisation. Where this is concerned, there is some 
prima-facie evidence of important intra-EU value chain activity, and whilst not 
exactly surprising given that most of these countries trade heavily with the EU it is 
nonetheless important to be able to assign a numerical value to this for subsequent 
formal testing. 
 
The Eurostat I-O tables are more detailed than those of the OECD. They are 
composed of a S-U component and a further domestic and imported I-O table. The 
coverage in terms of sectors is extended to 59 sectors (11 more than the OECD I-O 
tables) identified by the CPA nomenclature (Statistical classification of Products by 
Activity in the European Community). As regards time coverage, there is coverage 
for most EU-15 countries for 1995 and 2000. The overlap between the OECD and 
the Eurostat tables allows one to compare 14 EU-15 countries (leaving Luxembourg 
out) for 1995 and 2000 
                                                 
335
 In compiling this table we use a reduced form imported intermediate matrix with merchandise 
trade values only. Furthermore, the export and import vectors are also only for merchandise trade. For 
comparability, this is done in both instances where we look at pure BVS derived from the I-O tables 
and that derived from extracted trade data. 
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Table A1.3: Degree of intra and extra EU-15 vertical specialisation in 2000 
  2000 
  EUROSTAT (1) Eurostat + trade data (2) 
  VS BVS EU-15* BVS non-EU VS BVS EU-15 BVS non-EU 
Austria 0.301 0.205 0.096 0.361 0.247 0.113 
    68.13% 31.87%   68.56% 31.44% 
Belgium 0.440 0.325 0.114 0.482 0.341 0.141 
    73.99% 26.01%   70.72% 29.28% 
Denmark 0.277 0.196 0.080 0.271 0.195 0.076 
    70.97% 29.03%   71.86% 28.14% 
Finland 0.296 0.145 0.151 0.270 0.137 0.133 
    48.98% 51.02%   50.61% 49.39% 
France 0.219 0.129 0.090 0.210 0.123 0.086 
    58.76% 41.24%   58.82% 41.18% 
Germany 0.269 0.142 0.127 0.235 0.112 0.123 
    52.64% 47.36%   47.62% 52.38% 
Ireland 0.337     0.325 0.154 0.171 
         47.40% 52.67% 
Italy 0.249     0.240 0.138 0.103 
         57.24% 42.76% 
Netherlands 0.398 0.206 0.192 0.303 0.151 0.152 
    51.73% 48.27%   49.90% 50.10% 
Portugal (1999) 0.388 0.304 0.084 0.377 0.296 0.082 
    78.35% 21.65%   78.32% 21.68% 
Spain** 0.263 0.176 0.087 0.277 0.196 0.081 
    67.00% 33.00%   70.72% 29.28% 
Sweden 0.301     0.279 0.175 0.104 
        62.79% 37.21% 
UK (1995) 0.236 0.135 0.100 0.235 0.126 0.108 
    57.35% 42.60%   53.88% 46.12% 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat I-O tables. Trade data from Comtrade 
*exchange rates taken from Penn World Tables 
** values in tables are in € 1995 hence ECUs exchange rate from average daily ECU exchange to 
Dollar 
 
. 
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A1.4 AGGREGATE BACKWARD AND FORWARD LINKAGES BY COUNTRY 
 
Table A1.4: Backward Linkages by Country 1995 and 2005 
Country 1995 2005 ∆  Country 1995 2005 ∆  
Argentina 0.133 0.283 0.150 Ireland 0.291 0.361 0.070 
Australia 0.192 0.213 0.021 Israel 0.375 0.515 0.140 
Austria 0.292 0.360 0.068 Italy 0.215 0.329 0.114 
Brazil 0.153 0.113 -0.041 Japan 0.091 0.287 0.197 
Canada 0.292 0.338 0.046 Korea 0.244 0.392 0.149 
Switzerland 0.148 0.270 0.122 Mexico 0.239 0.375 0.135 
Chile 0.250 0.260 0.010 Netherlands 0.306 0.353 0.047 
China 0.128 0.242 0.114 Norway 0.278 0.268 -0.009 
Czech Rep 0.343 0.504 0.162 New Zealand 0.231 0.208 -0.023 
Germany 0.174 0.278 0.104 Poland 0.245 0.361 0.117 
Denmark 0.243 0.318 0.076 Portugal 0.401 0.452 0.051 
Spain 0.247 0.372 0.124 Romania 0.213 0.161 -0.052 
Estonia 0.405 0.528 0.122 Russia* 0.069 0.093 0.024 
Finland 0.293 0.403 0.110 Slovakia 0.386 0.521 0.134 
France 0.177 0.299 0.122 Slovenia 0.292 0.421 0.129 
UK 0.218 0.243 0.025 Sweden 0.248 0.347 0.099 
Greece 0.239 0.248 0.009 USA 0.115 0.188 0.073 
Hungary 0.346 0.530 0.184 South Africa 0.227 0.272 0.045 
Indonesia 0.406 0.181 -0.225 World 0.168 0.279 0.112 
India 0.229 0.296 0.067     
Source: Own Calculations using OECD STAN database and Comtrade 
*Russia values are 1996 rather than 1995 
 
 
Table A1.5: Forward Linkages by Country 1995 and 2005 
Country 1995 2005 ∆  Country 1995 2005 ∆  
Argentina 0.110 0.181 0.071 Ireland 0.197 0.356 0.160 
Australia 0.181 0.500 0.318 Israel 0.119 0.210 0.091 
Austria 0.205 0.319 0.113 Italy 0.160 0.265 0.105 
Brazil 0.157 0.302 0.144 Japan 0.124 0.208 0.083 
Canada 0.128 0.234 0.106 Korea 0.099 0.214 0.116 
Switzerland 0.216 0.333 0.117 Mexico 0.135 0.233 0.098 
Chile 0.183 0.488 0.305 Netherlands 0.168 0.300 0.132 
China 0.125 0.234 0.110 Norway 0.338 0.587 0.249 
Czech Rep 0.228 0.307 0.079 New Zealand 0.097 0.145 0.048 
Germany 0.196 0.295 0.100 Poland 0.213 0.296 0.083 
Denmark 0.168 0.357 0.189 Portugal 0.180 0.343 0.162 
Spain 0.190 0.294 0.104 Romania 0.169 0.306 0.137 
Estonia 0.198 0.449 0.251 Russia* 0.284 0.587 0.302 
Finland 0.215 0.378 0.164 Slovakia 0.322 0.405 0.084 
France 0.167 0.269 0.102 Slovenia 0.181 0.255 0.074 
UK 0.193 0.348 0.155 Sweden 0.234 0.345 0.112 
Greece 0.154 0.246 0.092 Turkey 0.145 0.245 0.100 
Hungary 0.222 0.290 0.068 USA 0.191 0.289 0.098 
Indonesia 0.150 0.435 0.285 South Africa 0.190 0.427 0.237 
India 0.122 0.211 0.089 World 0.168 0.279 0.112 
Source: Own Calculations using OECD STAN database and Comtrade. 
* Russia value for 1995 is 1996 data 
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A1.5 TOTAL VERTICAL SPECIALISATION BY COUNTRY 
 
Table A1.6: Total Vertical Specialisation by Country in 2005 
Country VS-B VS-F diff VS-T Country VS-B VS-F diff VS-T 
Argentina 0.283 0.181 -0.102 0.413 Ireland 0.361 0.356 -0.005 0.589 
Australia 0.213 0.500 0.286 0.606 Israel 0.515 0.210 -0.306 0.617 
Austria 0.360 0.319 -0.041 0.564 Italy 0.329 0.265 -0.064 0.507 
Brazil 0.113 0.302 0.189 0.380 Japan 0.287 0.208 -0.079 0.435 
Canada 0.338 0.234 -0.104 0.493 Korea 0.392 0.214 -0.178 0.523 
Switzerland 0.270 0.333 0.063 0.513 Mexico 0.375 0.233 -0.141 0.521 
Chile 0.260 0.488 0.228 0.621 Netherlands 0.353 0.300 -0.053 0.547 
China 0.242 0.234 -0.008 0.420 Norway 0.268 0.587 0.319 0.698 
Czech Rep 0.504 0.307 -0.198 0.657 New Zealand 0.208 0.145 -0.063 0.323 
Germany 0.278 0.295 0.017 0.491 Poland 0.361 0.296 -0.065 0.550 
Denmark 0.318 0.357 0.038 0.561 Portugal 0.452 0.343 -0.109 0.639 
Spain 0.372 0.294 -0.078 0.556 Romania 0.161 0.306 0.145 0.417 
Estonia 0.528 0.449 -0.079 0.740 Russia 0.093 0.587 0.493 0.625 
Finland 0.403 0.378 -0.025 0.629 Slovakia 0.521 0.405 -0.115 0.715 
France 0.299 0.269 -0.030 0.488 Slovenia 0.421 0.255 -0.166 0.569 
UK 0.243 0.348 0.105 0.507 Sweden 0.347 0.345 -0.001 0.572 
Greece 0.248 0.246 -0.002 0.433 Turkey   0.245     
Hungary 0.530 0.290 -0.239 0.666 USA 0.188 0.289 0.101 0.423 
Indonesia 0.181 0.435 0.254 0.538 South Africa 0.272 0.427 0.155 0.583 
India 0.296 0.211 -0.085 0.444 World         
  
 
Table A1.7: Linkages and per capita GDP regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  backwards forwards total 
VARIABLES vsb vsf vst 
gdpcap_o 1.56e-05*** -8.50e-06*** 4.58e-05*** 
  (2.06e-06) (1.71e-06) (5.53e-06) 
gdpcap_o2 -3.48e-10*** 2.45e-10*** -2.20e-09*** 
  (0) (0) (2.72e-10) 
gdpcap_o3 0*** 
  (0) 
Constant 0.147*** 0.307*** 0.212*** 
  (0.0192) (0.0160) (0.0310) 
Observations 468 468 467 
R-squared 0.111 0.103 0.150 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A1.6 AGGREGATE SECTORAL VERTICAL SPECIALISATION  
 
Capturing the sectoral linkages across bilateral partners requires a little more 
thought. The first step is to use the principles that led to the derivation of equation 
(1.4) to obtain a matrix of imported intermediates from a given partner that are used 
to produce exports. This is done by changing the export term from an nx1 vector in 
equation (1.4) to a diagonalised nxn export matrix336.  
 
,, = , , 	,,	,,	  
 (A1.1) 
 
The product of this equation, SBVSn,i,j, is an nxn matrix containing the value of 
vertically specialised trade (i.e. the value of imported intermediates used in the 
production of exports) from a given partner to another337. To construct the sectoral 
backward linkage one then takes the column sums of this new matrix and divides 
these, element-by-element, by a vector of exports to a given partner. This then 
produces an indicator that captures the share of intermediate imports from all sectors 
from a partner that are used to produce exports for a given sector to a partner338. An 
illustrative example is helpful here. The sectoral backward linkage of the US with 
respect to Mexico in the car industry is the amount of imported intermediates used 
from all sectors in Mexico to produce car exports to a given partner.  
 
 − ,, = ∑ ,,	
		,  
 (A1.2) 
 
The sectoral forward linkage on the other hand is calculated by taking the row sums 
of the new SBVS matrix and dividing these, element by element, by total exports for 
                                                 
336
 This methodology has been previously used by Cardaso et al (2008). The diagonalisation of the 
matrix follows the simple principle of the identity matrix, it allows exports to be ‘fed into’ the VS 
share matrix (i.e. A
M
(I-A
D
)
-1
 thus providing an nxn matrix of vertically specialised trade). 
337
 For simplicity, we assume that i=j 
338
 If instead of the column sum, one takes the row sum of the imported intermediate matrix, then the 
interpretation of the indicator is different, it then becomes the share of intermediate imports from a 
given sector and partner that are used to produce total exports. 
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each sector. The indicator then captures the amount of imported intermediates from a 
particular sector that another country uses in producing all exports to a partner. 
Taking the car industry example, the US’ forward linkage with Mexico is the amount 
of intermediate car exports of the US to Mexico that then go into producing Mexican 
exports (i.e. all sectors) to a given partner: 
 
 − ,,, = ∑ ,			,  
 (A1.3) 
 
Being able to distinguish forward and backward linkages across sectors and across 
partners allows one to more accurately track value chain activity and a country’s 
position in the production sequence. Where the aggregate measures provides a good 
indication of how the whole economy is moving, the disaggregate measures will 
more finely capture where these moves are happening. The sectoral extension also 
facilitates future econometric analysis where industry specific effects may be 
controlled for.  
 
 
In order to shed light on possible sectoral specific trends in vertical specialisation a 
similar exercise as that carried out in the body of the text for aggregate VS is 
undertaken however it tracks OECDX sectoral VS-B (VSI) aggregates in time. This 
is important as VS could be a sector specific phenomenon and hence mostly present 
in countries that engage in some types of economic activities. It also affords the 
chance of looking at broad differences across broad sectoral divisions such as 
commodities, manufactures and services. Figure A1.1 maps the sectoral VSI for 
commodities in 1995 and in 2005 in the horizontal and vertical axes respectively. 
The figure depicts a noticeable increase in the VSI for all sectors except the 
‘Agriculture’ and ‘Rubber & Plastics’ sectors. Despite this increase, and with the 
exception of ferrous and non ferrous metals, most commodities remain low in the 
VSI spectrum. This is unsurprising as exports of raw materials will tend to have very 
low levels foreign content. However, the machinery used for their extraction might 
largely be foreign sourced.  
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Figure A1.1: Sectoral Vertical Specialisation for OECDX aggregate: 
Commodities 
 
Source: Own Calculations from OECD I-O STAN database 
 
Manufacturing sectors are considered in Figure A1.2. A higher and more dramatic 
increase in VS in time emerges. Refined petroleum is the ‘top-performer’ showing 
the highest degree of foreign value added (going from just below 0.4 in 1995 to 
around 0.58 in 2005). It is however important to note that there might be a price 
effect here where the price of raw imported materials may have risen at a faster pace 
than the price of the finished refined petrol. Noteworthy is the near doubling in VS of 
sectors such as ‘Telecoms equipment’, ‘Motor Vehicles’, ‘Computing Machinery’ 
and ‘Aircrafts’. Where these sectors may be considered as high-skill intensive, the 
important rise in VSI may point to either productivity gains or to changes in 
employment patterns towards non-OECDX countries. Perhaps a little surprising are 
the entries for ‘Pharmaceuticals’ and ‘Chemicals’ which lie very close to the 45 
degree line and where one could expect increases in VSI from new technologies and 
increases in foreign skills. However, the values for these sectors are to be interpreted 
with caution as the construct of the OECD tables means that these sectors are 
interchanged for some countries in the sample. Overall, and in comparison to the 
commodities sectors, there seems to be much higher levels and increases in VS in 
time for manufactures. 
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Figure A1.2: Sectoral Vertical Specialisation for OECDX aggregate: 
Manufactures 
 
Source: Own Calculations from OECD I-O STAN database 
 
Figure A1.3 then considers the service category where one perceives not only lower 
levels of VS, but also smaller and sometimes negative changes in time. Whilst one 
might have expected sectors like ‘Computer and related activities’ to experience 
important increases in vertical specialisation these have gone down considerably. It 
is however important to note that these aggregate sectoral measures can hide 
important country effects, hence outsourcing computer related activities to India will 
be watered down in this aggregate measure. This in turn then supports the 
development of a bilateral measure so that one can grasp how sectors and countries 
are responding to this new wave of globalisation. Other financial and business 
sectors have also remained relatively unchanged in time but ‘R&D’ arises as an 
important ‘climber’ where VSI has more than quadrupled in a decade. 
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Figure A1.3: Sectoral Vertical Specialisation for OECDX aggregate: Services 
 
Source: Own Calculations from OECD I-O STAN database 
 
On aggregate the above figures suggest that the increase in vertical specialisation is 
mostly a goods trade phenomenon (manufacturing and commodities). The service 
sectors seem to exhibit lower levels of vertical specialisation which have remained 
largely unchanged in time (or at least have not witnessed the increases seen in the 
other broad sectors). Overall there seems to be important interplay between domestic 
and foreign value added which varies considerably across industries and is more 
prevalent in the non-service sectors of the economy. 
 
A correlation between global output per worker and the degree of sectoral vertical 
specialisation also emerges as seen in Figure A1.4 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure A1.4: Sectoral 
Source: Own Calculations from OECD I
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APPENDIX A2 
A2.1. NET/GROSS FLOWS 
 
To illustrate the circumstances under which the net/gross distinction may be 
problematic, two separate scenarios are considered. In the first, the distinction 
between these flows is of a ‘measurement error’ nature whereas in the second, a net 
flow is a proportion of the gross flow. 
 
Measurement error case 
 
Imagine that the theoretical models suggest that the empirical analysis should be 
done on the basis of net trade flows. Consider then a true model of intermediate 
goods trade taking the following form339: 
 
Mij* = Xijβ + uij 
(A2.1) 
The net amount of intermediate goods trade M* is determined by a set of typical 
gravity covariates X and an independent and normally distributed error term uij 
exhibiting the typical properties. If gross trade in intermediates, as recorded by trade 
statistics, has the form Mij = Mij* + vij. The model estimated becomes: 
 
Mij = Xijβ + vij + uij 
(A2.2) 
This provides little complications if the error term vij is assumed to be independent. 
However there are two probable violations of this independence. The first is that 
there is a likely correlation of the unobserved component vij with the independent 
variables in X. Not netting out the value added of any preceding stage of production 
implies that the observed gross measure can contain imports from country i itself. If 
this value added is determined by characteristics that also determine the amount of 
trade between two countries, then estimating this equation using OLS will provide 
biased coefficients. To the extent that the amount of value added can be a function of 
factor endowments or economies of scale which also serve to determine trade then 
                                                 
339
 A priori this is equally applicable to an estimation of total trade. 
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the independence assumption may be violated. One can think of the error term vij as 
containing previous imports in a sequenced production hence also determined by 
similar covariates that determine M*. Capturing net flows, or where trade is only in 
final goods without international value added that is double counted, makes this error 
redundant, but given the perceived fragmentation of production across international 
borders the “measurement error” could have consequences on gravity type 
estimations. The second source of violation of independence transpires through the 
possible correlation between the terms vij and uij. If there are unobservables that 
determine imports, and which are uncorrelated with the covariates in X for 
simplicity, and that are captured in the term uij but also in vij, then biased coefficients 
will also arise in estimation (unobserved heterogeneity). The violation of this 
independence is likely because unobservables such as institutional arrangements, 
legal ties or other such deep integration issues are likely to determine both the 
amount of intermediate goods trade AND the levels of value added done at each 
stage of an international production sequence. The importance of the first type of 
complication will be an increasing function of the degree of fragmentation between 
two countries whilst that of the second will increase with the degree of integration 
across two countries. One can circumvent the first complication by using an 
approach that identifies net trade flows, or international value added rather that gross 
flows whereas the second will be discussed in more depth below where we look at 
unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
The case where net flows are in proportion to gross flows 
 
Consider now a similar setting where the theoretical model suggests that it is on the 
basis of net trade flows that the estimation is to be undertaken so that A2.1 continues 
to be the ‘true model’. If net flows are a share of gross flows so that 
 
Mij* =(ai) Mij 
(A2.3) 
and the model is estimated on the basis of gross flows rather than net flows then one 
would need to estimate the following: 
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Mij = (1/ai)Xijβ + uij 
(A2.4) 
This implies that the coefficients will be biased by (1/ai). Hence if theory tells us that 
the true model is to be estimated through net flows rather than gross, then biases will 
arise in the estimated coefficients. Hence if the net flows are half of the gross flows, 
the estimated coefficients will be double what they ought to be. It is important to 
note that these biases can also be controlled for through fixed effects or through a 
logarithmic transformation of the data. 
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A2.2: THE MODEL 
 
To obtain the demand for varieties from a particular country one minimises the cost 
function with respect to the production function so that the Lagrangian becomes: 
 
 = 	,
,

+ 	  −   	,,



 
(A2.5) 
The partial derivatives for goods from location i and j are obtained so that 
	
	
 = 

 	  	   
(A2.6) 
Hence 		 = 	
	


 
(A2.7) 
Singling out xj  =  		
		
 
(A2.8) 
Multiplying this expression by njφjpj gives us: 
 	() =  		
		
 
(A2.9) 
Summing up across origins: 
 
 = 	()

=( 		
)

		
 
(A2.10) 
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Inverting this gives the demand for a particular variety from country j 
 
, = 	,()∑ ( 		
)   
 
(A2.11) 
 
To determine the minimum cost function to obtain a unit of Xi one should substitute 
this expression into the production function which is recalled to be: 
 
 =   	,




 
 
(A2.12) 
So that: 
, = 	,()∑ ( 		
)   
(A2.13) 
Where 
 = 	 − 1  
(A2.14) 
Then 
 	, = 	,()∑ ( 		
)   
(A2.15) 
And summing across countries so that 
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 	,

= ( 		
)

  
(A2.16) 
 
Therefore 
 
 =   	,




=  ( 		
)



  
(A2.17) 
This is the minimum cost function that is required to obtain a unit of Xi. 
 
A similar model can be obtained without having to rely on technological differences 
so that if technology is fixed by country and not by the desirability of the product one 
can use the following production function: 
 =   	,




 
(A2.18) 
The cost/revenue function the becomes: 
 
 = 	  = 		 !,,

 
(A2.19) 
Yielding an input demand function: 
 
, = ( 	!,)∑ ( 	!,)   
(A2.20) 
And a minimum cost function: 
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 ( 		
)



  
(A2.21) 
 
Here it is easier to see how a greater availability of intermediate products reduces the 
cost of producing a unit of Xi although this only happens when the elasticity of 
substitution is above 2. 
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A2.3: DATABASE 
 
A2.3.1. THE VERTICAL SPECIALISATION INDICATORS 
 
The Input-Output database of the OECD is used to construct the different measures 
of vertical specialisation (using equation 2.1). The database contains information for 
42 countries at various intervals in time. See Table A1.2 for country and year 
coverage of the OECD IO table database. 
 
The calculation of the indicators of vertical specialisation is carried out for 39 of 
these countries (excluding Taiwan, Belgium and Luxembourg) in the following 
steps: 
- We reduce all the matrices to a 25x25 square matrix that captures 
manufacturing trade. This requires aggregating certain manufacturing sectors 
and also aggregating the service sectors to one sector only. 
- The base tables are then extended these so that we can obtain a yearly tables 
- These are then deflated, using country specific deflators from the WDI 
database, to a base year 2000 and converted into dollars using exchange rates 
from the Penn World Tables database. The conversion is necessary so that we 
can merge the IO tables with the trade data in dollars 
- The trade data is also deflated, but here we use an aggregate OECD deflator. 
- Once the data has been fully treated, we use equation 1 to calculate the 
difference indicators BVS, VS1 and TVS. 
 
The use of I-O tables for this type of analysis needs to be accompanied by some 
cautionary words, some to do with the OECD database and others of general 
consideration when using I-O tables. Firstly, given that the OECD tables are based 
on countries voluntary submission, the harmonisation of these requires applying 
various transformations which may reduce their individual precision at the benefit of 
the collective harmonisation. For example, countries use different collection methods 
and sectoral classifications hence harmonisation is sometimes difficult340. Some 
report Supply-Use tables at purchasing prices rather than basic prices and 
                                                 
340
 Adding to this, sometimes there are holes in the I-O tables which are filled using varying 
estimation techniques. This means that for some sectors, missing values are not recorded but are 
estimated. 
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transformations need be implemented to remove VAT and other types of subsidies. 
Secondly, the compilation of I-O tables is costly and is thus carried out across large 
time intervals. They provide a ‘snapshot’ of economic activity in a given year 
making the extension of these to obtain a panel highly reliant on restrictive 
assumptions. Extrapolating I-O tables can be done by a ‘double deflation’ 
methodology or alternatively require assuming constancy of technical and 
interdependence coefficients over time. For the purpose of our analysis we choose 
the latter technique but we need to understand how variation in technology may 
arise. UN (1999) puts forward that variation in technological coefficients can arise as 
a result of three circumstances: Firstly through changes in technology, secondly 
through changes in relative prices, and thirdly through imperfect data. The first is 
impossible to control for as the only information that we possess is based on the 
technology present in the base year of the I-O table. The second can be dealt with by 
using deflators to produce tables in constant price values given a base year whilst the 
third is also beyond our control. Choosing this methodology for extending the I-O 
tables is hence not without implications. First, we are constraining technological 
changes in the sample to three base years for which we have base I-O tables. This 
means that variation in our linkage indicators between these base years only occurs 
via variations in export and import values. We however have reason to believe that 
whilst this is a limiting factor, annual variation in technologies is small. Vaccara 
(1986) suggests that technical coefficients vary annually in the region of 2% and UN 
(1999) also suggest that changes are fairly gradual341. Second, and a more general 
limiting factor of I-O analysis, is that technology is assumed to be linear (Leontief). 
This implies that intermediate imports are required in fixed proportions to output or 
alternatively that there is no substitution between inputs used to produce output.  
 
A2.3.2 THE GRAVITY VARIABLES 
 
Most of the gravity variables are obtained from the CEPII database. As many of 
these are time invariant they are easily extended, however country specific time 
varying variables are drawn from other sources (see below). We use the FTA 
variable from the CEPII dataset to identify the presence or absence of a trade 
                                                 
341
 However, the variations in Vaccara (1986) are calculated during the 50’s and 60’s. There is reason 
to believe that the 90’s saw much higher variation through the introduction of new Information 
Technology such as the internet. 
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agreement between country pairs. It is however only available till 2006 and hence 
needs to be extended to incorporate years 2007 and 2008. We do this by imputing the 
values using the WTO RTA database 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/summary_e.xls). In the process of this 
imputation we also correct several inconsistencies in this variable given that the 
following agreements do not feature: 
 
NOR-KOR (2006): (Through EFTA) 
CHE-KOR (2006): (Through EFTA) 
JPN-MEX (2005): 
IDN-CHN (2003): (Through ASEAN)  
CHL-CHN (2006) 
 
Added Agreements: 
JPN-IDN (2008) 
CHL-JPN (2007) 
  
The GDP, per capita GDP and Population data is extracted from the WDI webpage. 
All trade data is downloaded using WITS from the COMTRADE database.  
 
Agreements covered: 
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Table A2.1: Agreements in Sample in 2008 
 
 
 
 
ARG-BRA BRA-ARG CHE-SWE CHL-USA DEU-CHE DNK-ESP ESP-GBR EST-ISR FIN-NOR FRA-SVK GBR-ZAF HUN-CZE IRL-DNK ISR-FRA 
ARG-CHL BRA-CHL CHE-TUR CHN-CHL DEU-CHL DNK-EST ESP-GRC EST-ITA FIN-POL FRA-SVN GRC-AUT HUN-DEU IRL-ESP ISR-GBR 
AUS-NZL CAN-CHL CHL-ARG CHN-IDN DEU-CZE DNK-FIN ESP-HUN EST-MEX FIN-PRT FRA-SWE GRC-CHE HUN-DNK IRL-EST ISR-GRC 
AUS-USA CAN-ISR CHL-AUT CZE-AUT DEU-DNK DNK-FRA ESP-IRL EST-NLD FIN-ROM FRA-TUR GRC-CHL HUN-ESP IRL-FIN ISR-HUN 
AUT-CHE CAN-MEX CHL-BRA CZE-CHE DEU-ESP DNK-GBR ESP-ISR EST-NOR FIN-SVK FRA-ZAF GRC-CZE HUN-EST IRL-FRA ISR-IRL 
AUT-CHL CAN-USA CHL-CAN CZE-CHL DEU-EST DNK-GRC ESP-ITA EST-POL FIN-SVN GBR-AUT GRC-DEU HUN-FIN IRL-GBR ISR-ITA 
AUT-CZE CHE-AUT CHL-CHE CZE-DEU DEU-FIN DNK-HUN ESP-MEX EST-PRT FIN-SWE GBR-CHE GRC-DNK HUN-FRA IRL-GRC ISR-MEX 
AUT-DEU CHE-CHL CHL-CHN CZE-DNK DEU-FRA DNK-IRL ESP-NLD EST-ROM FIN-TUR GBR-CHL GRC-ESP HUN-GBR IRL-HUN ISR-NLD 
AUT-DNK CHE-CZE CHL-CZE CZE-ESP DEU-GBR DNK-ISR ESP-NOR EST-SVK FIN-ZAF GBR-CZE GRC-EST HUN-GRC IRL-ISR ISR-NOR 
AUT-ESP CHE-DEU CHL-DEU CZE-EST DEU-GRC DNK-ITA ESP-POL EST-SVN FRA-AUT GBR-DEU GRC-FIN HUN-IRL IRL-ITA ISR-POL 
AUT-EST CHE-DNK CHL-DNK CZE-FIN DEU-HUN DNK-MEX ESP-PRT EST-SWE FRA-CHE GBR-DNK GRC-FRA HUN-ISR IRL-MEX ISR-PRT 
AUT-FIN CHE-ESP CHL-ESP CZE-FRA DEU-IRL DNK-NLD ESP-ROM EST-TUR FRA-CHL GBR-ESP GRC-GBR HUN-ITA IRL-NLD ISR-ROM 
AUT-FRA CHE-EST CHL-EST CZE-GBR DEU-ISR DNK-NOR ESP-SVK EST-ZAF FRA-CZE GBR-EST GRC-HUN HUN-MEX IRL-NOR ISR-SVK 
AUT-GBR CHE-FIN CHL-FIN CZE-GRC DEU-ITA DNK-POL ESP-SVN FIN-AUT FRA-DEU GBR-FIN GRC-IRL HUN-NLD IRL-POL ISR-SVN 
AUT-GRC CHE-FRA CHL-FRA CZE-HUN DEU-MEX DNK-PRT ESP-SWE FIN-CHE FRA-DNK GBR-FRA GRC-ISR HUN-NOR IRL-PRT ISR-SWE 
AUT-HUN CHE-GBR CHL-GBR CZE-IRL DEU-NLD DNK-ROM ESP-TUR FIN-CHL FRA-ESP GBR-GRC GRC-ITA HUN-POL IRL-ROM ISR-TUR 
AUT-IRL CHE-GRC CHL-GRC CZE-ISR DEU-NOR DNK-SVK ESP-ZAF FIN-CZE FRA-EST GBR-HUN GRC-MEX HUN-PRT IRL-SVK ISR-USA 
AUT-ISR CHE-HUN CHL-HUN CZE-ITA DEU-POL DNK-SVN EST-AUT FIN-DEU FRA-FIN GBR-IRL GRC-NLD HUN-ROM IRL-SVN ITA-AUT 
AUT-ITA CHE-IRL CHL-IRL CZE-MEX DEU-PRT DNK-SWE EST-CHE FIN-DNK FRA-GBR GBR-ISR GRC-NOR HUN-SVK IRL-SWE ITA-CHE 
AUT-MEX CHE-ISR CHL-ITA CZE-NLD DEU-ROM DNK-TUR EST-CHL FIN-ESP FRA-GRC GBR-ITA GRC-POL HUN-SVN IRL-TUR ITA-CHL 
AUT-NLD CHE-ITA CHL-JPN CZE-NOR DEU-SVK DNK-ZAF EST-CZE FIN-EST FRA-HUN GBR-MEX GRC-PRT HUN-SWE IRL-ZAF ITA-CZE 
AUT-NOR CHE-KOR CHL-KOR CZE-POL DEU-SVN ESP-AUT EST-DEU FIN-FRA FRA-IRL GBR-NLD GRC-ROM HUN-TUR ISR-AUT ITA-DEU 
AUT-POL CHE-MEX CHL-MEX CZE-PRT DEU-SWE ESP-CHE EST-DNK FIN-GBR FRA-ISR GBR-NOR GRC-SVK HUN-ZAF ISR-CAN ITA-DNK 
AUT-PRT CHE-NLD CHL-NLD CZE-ROM DEU-TUR ESP-CHL EST-ESP FIN-GRC FRA-ITA GBR-POL GRC-SVN IDN-CHN ISR-CHE ITA-ESP 
AUT-ROM CHE-NOR CHL-NOR CZE-SVK DEU-ZAF ESP-CZE EST-FIN FIN-HUN FRA-MEX GBR-PRT GRC-SWE IDN-JPN ISR-CZE ITA-EST 
AUT-SVK CHE-POL CHL-POL CZE-SVN DNK-AUT ESP-DEU EST-FRA FIN-IRL FRA-NLD GBR-ROM GRC-TUR IRL-AUT ISR-DEU ITA-FIN 
AUT-SVN CHE-PRT CHL-PRT CZE-SWE DNK-CHE ESP-DNK EST-GBR FIN-ISR FRA-NOR GBR-SVK GRC-ZAF IRL-CHE ISR-DNK ITA-FRA 
AUT-SWE CHE-ROM CHL-SVK CZE-TUR DNK-CHL ESP-EST EST-GRC FIN-ITA FRA-POL GBR-SVN HUN-AUT IRL-CHL ISR-ESP ITA-GBR 
AUT-TUR CHE-SVK CHL-SVN CZE-ZAF DNK-CZE ESP-FIN EST-HUN FIN-MEX FRA-PRT GBR-SWE HUN-CHE IRL-CZE ISR-EST ITA-GRC 
AUT-ZAF CHE-SVN CHL-SWE DEU-AUT DNK-DEU ESP-FRA EST-IRL FIN-NLD FRA-ROM GBR-TUR HUN-CHL IRL-DEU ISR-FIN ITA-HUN 
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Table A2.1: Agreements in Sample in 2008 (cont) 
ITA-IRL MEX-GBR NLD-ITA NOR-POL POL-SVN ROM-AUT SVK-EST SVN-GRC SWE-ITA TUR-ROM 
ITA-ISR MEX-GRC NLD-MEX NOR-PRT POL-SWE ROM-CHE SVK-FIN SVN-HUN SWE-MEX TUR-SVK 
ITA-MEX MEX-HUN NLD-NOR NOR-ROM POL-TUR ROM-CZE SVK-FRA SVN-IRL SWE-NLD TUR-SVN 
ITA-NLD MEX-IRL NLD-POL NOR-SVK POL-ZAF ROM-DEU SVK-GBR SVN-ISR SWE-NOR TUR-SWE 
ITA-NOR MEX-ISR NLD-PRT NOR-SVN PRT-AUT ROM-DNK SVK-GRC SVN-ITA SWE-POL USA-AUS 
ITA-POL MEX-ITA NLD-ROM NOR-SWE PRT-CHE ROM-ESP SVK-HUN SVN-MEX SWE-PRT USA-CAN 
ITA-PRT MEX-JPN NLD-SVK NOR-TUR PRT-CHL ROM-EST SVK-IRL SVN-NLD SWE-ROM USA-CHL 
ITA-ROM MEX-NLD NLD-SVN NZL-AUS PRT-CZE ROM-FIN SVK-ISR SVN-NOR SWE-SVK USA-ISR 
ITA-SVK MEX-NOR NLD-SWE POL-AUT PRT-DEU ROM-FRA SVK-ITA SVN-POL SWE-SVN USA-MEX 
ITA-SVN MEX-POL NLD-TUR POL-CHE PRT-DNK ROM-GBR SVK-MEX SVN-PRT SWE-TUR ZAF-AUT 
ITA-SWE MEX-PRT NLD-ZAF POL-CHL PRT-ESP ROM-GRC SVK-NLD SVN-ROM SWE-ZAF ZAF-CZE 
ITA-TUR MEX-SVK NOR-AUT POL-CZE PRT-EST ROM-HUN SVK-NOR SVN-SVK TUR-AUT ZAF-DEU 
ITA-ZAF MEX-SVN NOR-CHE POL-DEU PRT-FIN ROM-IRL SVK-POL SVN-SWE TUR-CHE ZAF-DNK 
JPN-CHL MEX-SWE NOR-CHL POL-DNK PRT-FRA ROM-ISR SVK-PRT SVN-TUR TUR-CZE ZAF-ESP 
JPN-IDN MEX-USA NOR-CZE POL-ESP PRT-GBR ROM-ITA SVK-ROM SVN-ZAF TUR-DEU ZAF-EST 
JPN-MEX NLD-AUT NOR-DEU POL-EST PRT-GRC ROM-NLD SVK-SVN SWE-AUT TUR-DNK ZAF-FIN 
KOR-CHE NLD-CHE NOR-DNK POL-FIN PRT-HUN ROM-NOR SVK-SWE SWE-CHE TUR-ESP ZAF-FRA 
KOR-CHL NLD-CHL NOR-ESP POL-FRA PRT-IRL ROM-POL SVK-TUR SWE-CHL TUR-EST ZAF-GBR 
KOR-NOR NLD-CZE NOR-EST POL-GBR PRT-ISR ROM-PRT SVK-ZAF SWE-CZE TUR-FIN ZAF-GRC 
MEX-AUT NLD-DEU NOR-FIN POL-GRC PRT-ITA ROM-SVK SVN-AUT SWE-DEU TUR-FRA ZAF-HUN 
MEX-CAN NLD-DNK NOR-FRA POL-HUN PRT-MEX ROM-SVN SVN-CHE SWE-DNK TUR-GBR ZAF-IRL 
MEX-CHE NLD-ESP NOR-GBR POL-IRL PRT-NLD ROM-SWE SVN-CHL SWE-ESP TUR-GRC ZAF-ITA 
MEX-CHL NLD-EST NOR-GRC POL-ISR PRT-NOR ROM-TUR SVN-CZE SWE-EST TUR-HUN ZAF-NLD 
MEX-CZE NLD-FIN NOR-HUN POL-ITA PRT-POL SVK-AUT SVN-DEU SWE-FIN TUR-IRL ZAF-POL 
MEX-DEU NLD-FRA NOR-IRL POL-MEX PRT-ROM SVK-CHE SVN-DNK SWE-FRA TUR-ISR ZAF-PRT 
MEX-DNK NLD-GBR NOR-ISR POL-NLD PRT-SVK SVK-CHL SVN-ESP SWE-GBR TUR-ITA ZAF-SVK 
MEX-ESP NLD-GRC NOR-ITA POL-NOR PRT-SVN SVK-CZE SVN-EST SWE-GRC TUR-NLD ZAF-SVN 
MEX-EST NLD-HUN NOR-KOR POL-PRT PRT-SWE SVK-DEU SVN-FIN SWE-HUN TUR-NOR ZAF-SWE 
MEX-FIN NLD-IRL NOR-MEX POL-ROM PRT-TUR SVK-DNK SVN-FRA SWE-IRL TUR-POL   
MEX-FRA NLD-ISR NOR-NLD POL-SVK PRT-ZAF SVK-ESP SVN-GBR SWE-ISR TUR-PRT   
 
 
 
273 
 
Table A2.2: Descriptive stats of variables 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
gdp_o overall 8.47E+11 1.74E+12 5.68E+09 1.17E+13 N =   20748 
  between   1.72E+12 8.78E+09 1.01E+13 n =    1482 
  within   3.07E+11 
-
1.21E+12 3.24E+12 T =      14 
          
gdpcap_o overall 18345.4 14111.63 449.2205 65065.73 N =   20748 
  between   13293.71 541.9631 48210.3 n =    1482 
  within   4746.177 7363.714 57828.14 T =      14 
          
rta overall 0.385965 0.486834 0 1 N =   20748 
  between   0.438271 0 1 n =    1482 
  within   0.212241 -0.54261 1.314536 T =      14 
          
lnimports overall 13.02743 2.188095 0.275356 19.6913 N =   20669 
  between   2.105007 4.76718 19.23532 n =    1482 
  within   0.623321 8.535602 16.38206 T-bar = 13.9467 
          
lnintimps_tot overall 5.507109 2.168155 -7.30772 12.11262 N =   20669 
  between   2.105339 -3.14625 11.7615 n =    1482 
  within   0.546298 1.03493 9.235838 T-bar = 13.9467 
          
lnintimps_bvs overall 5.022131 2.327805 -9.13527 11.2558 N =   20669 
  between   2.099616 -4.33347 10.76319 n =    1482 
  within   1.021737 -2.13908 9.519779 T-bar = 13.9467 
          
lnintimps_bvsbil overall -0.16405 3.735303 -19.0436 11.27024 N =   20590 
  between   3.560454 -12.5373 10.70017 n =    1482 
  within   1.180842 -7.98824 5.579733 T-bar = 13.8934 
          
bvs_bil overall 0.010385 0.027173 0 0.493401 N =   20748 
  between   0.024175 3.29E-06 0.301734 n =    1482 
  within   0.012422 -0.226 0.347093 T =      14 
          
vs1_bil overall 0.009767 0.027427 0 0.653405 N =   20748 
  between   0.024767 7.51E-06 0.384454 n =    1482 
  within   0.0118 -0.29576 0.278718 T =      14 
          
tvs_bil overall 0.01999 0.039551 0 0.662952 N =   20748 
  between   0.03521 3.47E-05 0.394959 n =    1482 
  within   0.018037 -0.28627 0.377034 T =      14 
          
lndist overall 8.351051 1.111235 4.087945 9.88258 N =   20748 
  between   1.111583 4.087945 9.88258 n =    1482 
  within   0 8.351051 8.351051 T =      14 
          
fk overall 0.24458 0.103939 0.036093 0.635668 N =   20672 
  between   0.100973 0.047272 0.614871 n =    1482 
  within   0.024973 0.091334 0.370834 T-bar = 13.9487 
          
ov_o (gross output) overall 1598452 3243938 11806.67 2.18E+07 N =   20748 
  between   3137179 18741.2 1.83E+07 n =    1482 
  within   829102.4 -2450593 1.01E+07 T =      14 
          
va_o (value added) overall 799475.6 1720307 4674.632 1.17E+07 N =   20748 
  between   1667872 7456.221 9831393 n =    1482 
  within   423558.3 -1401713 5726734 T =      14 
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A2.4. EXOGENEITY OF THE FTA VARIABLE  
 
To test that the particular set of FE that have been used control for unobserved 
heterogeneity Baier and Bergstrand (2007) suggest using a future FTA variable 
arguing that future FTAs should not affect current trade flows. If this variable is 
uncorrelated with current trade flows then appropriate controls have been provided 
for the unobserved heterogeneity. However, given the variance of the FTA variable 
in the sample, it is probable that such a test will not be conclusive if carried out on 
the full sample. The reason is that the correlation coefficient between the FTA and an 
FTA+5 variable is high (0.72). This implies that even if unobserved heterogeneity 
has been controlled for, a test on the full sample will not capture this because the 
FTA+5 will be effectively acting like the FTA variable. The table below shows the 
results obtained from carrying out this test on the full sample. Here it is seen that the 
FTA+5 is significant throughout. This does not mean that the set of FE does not 
control for the endogenous formation of FTAs, but rather that the test is an 
inappropriate one owing to the correlation between the FTA and the FTA+5 
variables.  
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Table A2.3: Exogeneity test on full sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep var: lnimports OLS FE1 FE2 FE3 
          
lncombgdp 0.918*** 1.024*** 1.008*** 1.125*** 
(0.00486) (0.0271) (0.0497) (0.0528) 
lndist -0.784*** -1.172*** -1.180*** 
(0.0123) (0.0476) (0.0159) 
contig 0.646*** 0.336** 0.334*** 
(0.0618) (0.152) (0.0457) 
comlang_off 0.699*** 0.671*** 0.675*** 
(0.0321) (0.0946) (0.0270) 
fta 0.170*** 0.0778*** 0.0880* 0.113** 
(0.0348) (0.0301) (0.0469) (0.0462) 
fta+5 0.187*** 0.212*** 0.291*** 0.257*** 
(0.0314) (0.0568) (0.0964) (0.0411) 
lngdpcap_d -1.285*** 1.168*** 1.223*** 2.393*** 
(0.100) (0.206) (0.157) (0.895) 
lngdpcap_d2 0.0673*** -0.127*** -0.130*** -0.141*** 
(0.00575) (0.0115) (0.00906) (0.0527) 
lnfk -0.0335 0.214*** -0.105 -0.149*** 
(0.0216) (0.0776) (0.131) (0.0402) 
Constant -23.19*** -41.29*** -31.27*** -46.91*** 
(0.548) (1.489) (2.128) (5.243) 
Observations 15,143 15,143 15,143 15,143 
R-squared 0.772 0.529 0.835 0.843 
r2_o . 0.493 0.859 0.811 
r2_w . 0.529 0.835 0.843 
r2_b . 0.495 0.925 0.823 
Number of repart 1,090 
Number of repyear 545 
Number of rep     39   
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In the essay, it is suggested that the test be carried out on a subsample of countries 
where the FTA variable exhibits some variance. What is done is that all agreements 
that do not vary in the sample are removed, hence if the FTA variable was equal to 1 
between a dyad throughout the entire sample, the dyad was dropped. Such a selection 
is indeed problematic because it is possible that common factors that are unobserved 
explain why countries do not engage in an FTA till the mid 90’s. However this 
selection affords us to test whether the endogenous formation of trade agreements 
has been controlled for. The table bellow shows the correlation coefficient between 
the FTA variable and its future lags in the sumsample. Here it is patent that the 
correlation coefficients are lower that those reported in Table 4.  
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Table A2.4: Correaltion Coefficient betwee FTA and future lags in reduced 
sample 
 
 
When the test is performed on this subsample, it is shown that the FTA+5 loses 
significance only when the country-year FE are used which supports the hypothesis 
that these provide appropriate controls for unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
The table below then carries out a robustness check on different forward lags of the 
FTA coefficient on the subsample of countries showing that when the interacted 
country-year fixed effects are used, most lags of future FTA remain insignificant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    rtaplus7     0.2961   0.4591   0.5438   0.6580   0.7972   1.0000
    rtaplus6     0.3714   0.5759   0.6822   0.8255   1.0000
    rtaplus5     0.4499   0.6977   0.8265   1.0000
    rtaplus4     0.5444   0.8442   1.0000
    rtaplus3     0.6449   1.0000
         rta     1.0000
                                                                    
                    rta rtaplus3 rtaplus4 rtaplus5 rtaplus6 rtaplus7
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Table A2.5. Robustness check on different FTA forward lags 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES lnimports lnimports lnimports lnimports lnimports 
lncombgdp 0.816*** 0.815*** 0.815*** 0.811*** 0.815*** 
(0.0829) (0.0817) (0.0814) (0.0811) (0.0816) 
lndist -1.415*** -1.416*** -1.415*** -1.414*** -1.415*** 
(0.0367) (0.0367) (0.0365) (0.0363) (0.0362) 
contig 0.233*** 0.233*** 0.233*** 0.233*** 0.233*** 
(0.0657) (0.0657) (0.0656) (0.0655) (0.0656) 
comlang_off 0.842*** 0.842*** 0.841*** 0.841*** 0.842*** 
(0.0427) (0.0427) (0.0425) (0.0426) (0.0427) 
lngdpcap_d2 -0.00763 -0.00763 -0.00751 -0.00624 -0.00757 
(0.00649) (0.00650) (0.00660) (0.00708) (0.00687) 
lnfk 0.284*** 0.285*** 0.284*** 0.282*** 0.283*** 
(0.0648) (0.0649) (0.0651) (0.0647) (0.0646) 
fta 0.222*** 0.225*** 0.224*** 0.222*** 0.225*** 
(0.0739) (0.0704) (0.0681) (0.0677) (0.0678) 
ftaplus3 0.0134 
(0.0816) 
ftaplus4 0.00178 
(0.0754) 
ftaplus5 0.0183 
(0.0777) 
ftaplus6 0.0559 
(0.0916) 
ftaplus7 0.0385 
(0.104) 
Constant -17.10*** -17.04*** -17.11*** -17.07*** -17.11*** 
(4.179) (4.127) (4.094) (4.062) (4.086) 
Observations 4,550 4,550 4,550 4,550 4,550 
R-squared 0.864 0.864 0.864 0.864 0.864 
Number of repyear 504 504 504 504 504 
r2_o 0.763 0.762 0.765 0.763 0.762 
r2_w 0.864 0.864 0.864 0.864 0.864 
r2_b 0.669 0.669 0.673 0.668 0.668 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The tables below shows the outcomes of the test for controls of unobserved 
heterogeneity when the dependent variable is intermediate goods trade. This is 
performed for the full sample first (Table A.4.4) and for the reduced sample (Table 
A.4.5). In the tables the dependent variables for the different estimations are as 
follows: 
 
(1) intermediate goods identified using BEC 
(2) intermediate goods identified using IO tables (total use) 
(3) intermediate goods used in the production of total exports (bvs) 
(4) intermediate goods used in the production of exports to the same destination as 
these originated from (bvsbil) 
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Table A2.6: Test for exogeneity of FTA coefficient in the case of intermediate 
goods on full sample 
 
 
 
Table A2.7: Test for exogeneity of FTA coefficient in the case of intermediate 
goods on reduced sample 
 
 
The results are similar in nature to those obtained from the total trade specification. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
                                                              
R-sq           0.831        0.828        0.814        0.873   
N              15136        15143        15143        15102   
                                                              
             (4.963)      (5.717)      (5.883)      (8.997)   
_cons        -52.378***   -49.846***   -50.620***   -94.547***
             (0.044)      (0.044)      (0.053)      (0.067)   
lnfk          -0.023       -0.064       -0.161***     0.027   
             (0.047)      (0.055)      (0.056)      (0.093)   
lngd~ap_d2    -0.182***    -0.100*      -0.098*      -0.160*  
             (0.805)      (0.941)      (0.954)      (1.574)   
lngdpcap_d     3.086***     1.705*       1.666*       2.829*  
             (0.044)      (0.044)      (0.050)      (0.062)   
rtaplus5       0.257***     0.273***     0.324***     0.543***
             (0.049)      (0.048)      (0.051)      (0.069)   
rta            0.085*       0.097**      0.121**      0.207***
             (0.026)      (0.029)      (0.032)      (0.044)   
comlang_~f     0.641***     0.640***     0.671***     1.297***
             (0.048)      (0.047)      (0.045)      (0.077)   
contig         0.334***     0.352***     0.298***     0.588***
             (0.018)      (0.016)      (0.017)      (0.037)   
lndist        -1.151***    -1.205***    -1.216***    -2.422***
             (0.055)      (0.060)      (0.062)      (0.089)   
lncombgdp      1.169***     1.098***     1.104***     1.925***
                                                              
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)   
                                                              
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
                                                              
R-sq           0.827        0.849        0.823        0.889   
N               4546         4550         4550         4536   
                                                              
             (7.369)      (4.424)      (5.752)     (11.726)   
_cons        -27.426***   -24.035***   -25.942***   -41.992***
             (0.079)      (0.068)      (0.080)      (0.118)   
lnfk           0.452***     0.375***     0.334***     0.865***
             (0.007)      (0.007)      (0.010)      (0.023)   
lngd~ap_d2    -0.003       -0.009       -0.006        0.026   
                   .            .            .            .   
lngdpcap_d         .            .            .            .   
             (0.092)      (0.085)      (0.089)      (0.144)   
rtaplus5      -0.059        0.033        0.023        0.084   
             (0.068)      (0.070)      (0.071)      (0.111)   
rta            0.109        0.208***     0.206***     0.415***
             (0.045)      (0.045)      (0.051)      (0.066)   
comlang_~f     0.809***     0.810***     0.880***     1.653***
             (0.067)      (0.067)      (0.072)      (0.114)   
contig         0.200***     0.284***     0.221***     0.270** 
             (0.031)      (0.037)      (0.038)      (0.054)   
lndist        -1.447***    -1.448***    -1.437***    -2.884***
             (0.144)      (0.088)      (0.115)      (0.240)   
lncombgdp      1.002***     0.815***     0.836***     1.244***
                                                              
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)   
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A2.5: RESULTS  
A2.5.1: THE CHOICE OF A FE MODEL 
 
The use of a FE model over a RE one is preferred on conceptual grounds because it 
is desirable that there the unobservables are allowed to be correlated with the 
dependent variables. It is also justified through a Hausman Test performed on the 
basis of equation (20): 
 
 
A2.5.2 THE IMPACT OF VARIETIES 
 
The table below shows the results for the estimation of (2.19) and (2.20). This 
exercise is interesting from the perspective of understanding how varieties and 
preferences affect the FTA coefficient. What emerges relatively consistently is that 
the estimates for the FTA coefficient seem to bias upwards when these are not 
included. This suggest that perhaps  when one does not include these important 
independent variables, the FTA coefficient is capturing the variety and preference 
effects suggesting that countries which trade more varieties and whose trading 
structure is preferred trade more with each other and are also likely to engage in an 
FTA. 
 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =     1213.52
                 chi2(59) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
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Table A2.8: Impact of varieties on trade flows 
Dep var: lnimports (no variety or pref) Dep var: lnimports (with variety and pref) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
OLS FE1 FE 2 FE 3 OLS FE1 FE 2 FE 3 
VARIABLES (repart) 
(rep. Par, 
year) 
(repyear, 
paryear) (repart) 
(rep. Par, 
year) 
(repyear, 
paryear) 
lncombgdp 0.897*** 0.488*** 0.488*** 0.924*** 0.890*** 1.014*** 1.003*** 1.060*** 
(0.00347) (0.0313) (0.110) (0.0358) (0.00407) (0.0244) (0.0466) (0.0329) 
lndist -0.776*** -1.062*** -1.063*** -0.761*** -1.063*** -1.065*** 
(0.00930) (0.0569) (0.0178) (0.00982) (0.0544) (0.0171) 
contig 0.592*** 0.245** 0.245*** 0.576*** 0.244** 0.246*** 
(0.0343) (0.111) (0.0309) (0.0340) (0.111) (0.0316) 
comlang_off 0.646*** 0.566*** 0.566*** 0.647*** 0.564*** 0.567*** 
(0.0277) (0.0981) (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0984) (0.0276) 
rta 0.195*** 0.114*** 0.242*** 0.238*** 0.254*** 0.104*** 0.234*** 0.240*** 
(0.0195) (0.0361) (0.0664) (0.0334) (0.0196) (0.0322) (0.0676) (0.0331) 
lngdpcap_d -1.289*** 1.215*** 1.200*** 1.187*** 
(0.0841) (0.183) (0.145) (0.386) 
lngdpcap_d2 0.0676*** -0.129*** -0.128*** -0.0881*** 
(0.00478) (0.0102) (0.00859) (0.0218) 
lnfk 0.0920*** 0.254*** 0.00318 -0.0340 
(0.0180) (0.0663) (0.135) (0.0411) 
Constant -28.09*** -13.14*** -3.991 -27.45*** -21.69*** -40.39*** -31.84*** -37.84*** 
(0.193) (1.649) (5.647) (1.929) (0.466) (1.333) (2.107) (2.851) 
Observations 20,669 20,669 20,669 20,669 20,631 20,631 20,631 20,631 
R-squared 0.795 0.377 0.820 0.842 0.801 0.540 0.836 0.843 
r2_o . 0.611 0.781 0.857 . 0.388 0.867 0.809 
r2_w . 0.377 0.820 0.842 . 0.540 0.836 0.843 
r2_b . 0.641 0.713 0.897 . 0.383 0.951 0.799 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A2.5.3. REGRESSION WITH NET FLOW OF INTERMEDIATE GOODS 
 
The net flow of intermediate goods is constructed by removing the domestic content 
of imported intermediates from a particular location. This is achieved by multiplying 
the measure intimps_bvsbil by one minus the average share of the domestic content 
of intermediate imports from the originating country (VS1). The results show very 
similar coefficients and hence imply that ‘double counting’ concerns may be 
unfounded. 
 
Table A2.9:  Impact of an FTA on gross and net flows of intermediate goods 
VARIABLES lnintimps_bvsbil lnnetintimps_bvsbil 
      
lnmass 1.919*** 1.920*** 
(0.0420) (0.0418) 
lndist -2.176*** -2.166*** 
(0.0373) (0.0374) 
contig 0.413*** 0.393*** 
(0.0581) (0.0579) 
comlang_off 1.082*** 1.080*** 
(0.0514) (0.0513) 
lngdpcap_d 1.302** 1.287** 
(0.600) (0.600) 
lngdpcap_d2 -0.0874** -0.0863** 
(0.0341) (0.0340) 
lnfk 0.217*** 0.217*** 
(0.0717) (0.0716) 
rta 0.503*** 0.497*** 
(0.0682) (0.0679) 
Constant -46.45*** -46.67*** 
(3.253) (3.268) 
Observations 20,590 20,590 
R-squared 0.870 0.870 
Number of repyear 545 545 
r2_o 0.763 0.734 
r2_w 0.870 0.870 
r2_b 0.696 0.627 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX A3 
 
A3.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF FTA PARTNERS 
 
The figures presented in the body of the text show the characteristics of FTA partners 
in the year that an agreement enters into force. However Baier and Bergstrand (2004) 
use a baseline year of 1960 in their analysis so as to avoid any possible endogeneity 
arising from the correlation of trade agreements and measures of economic mass. 
The figure below shows that the results are qualitatively the same when this is 
replicated in the entire sample for the baseline year 1960.   
 
Figure A3.1: Characteristics of FTA partners – Economic Mass and Income 
(1960) 
 
Source: Calculations from CEPII’s gravity database, economic data for 1960. FTA is identified if 
dyad shares an agreement in 2006 
Note: Difference in GDP is defined as the absolute difference in the logs of the GDPs of the dyad 
countries. GDP per Capita difference is also the absolute difference in the log of the GDP per capita of 
the dyad countries. 
 
The analysis of the different waves of regionalism was also carried out using a 
baseline year of 1960. The figure below shows that using different years, such as the 
year of the beginning of the agreement, produces similar results. 
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Figure A3.2: Economic mass and Income differences between FTA partners 
across the different waves of regionalism – values at 1960 
Source: Calculations from CEPII’s gravity database, data from 1960. First Wave identifies countries 
that signed a trade agreement between 1960 and 1984. The Second wave requires there to be a new 
agreement between 1985 and 1994 whilst the third captures new agreements signed between 1995 and 
2006. Differences in economic mass are measures through the absolute difference in the logs of the 
GDPs of the dyads. 
 
Figure A3.3: Characteristics of third wave FTA partners versus non FTA 
partners (2006). 
 
Source: Calculations from CEPII’s gravity database, data from 2006. Bold blue line identifies dyads 
that have signed an FTA during the third wave. Bold red line identifies dyads that have never signed 
an FTA. 
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A3.2: DATABASE SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
 
 Table A3.1. Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
            
FTA 20748 0.3869289 0.4870589 0 1 
newFTA 20748 0.219973 0.414238 0 1 
NATURAL 20748 -8.351051 1.111235 -9.88258 -4.08795 
REMOTE 20748 3.338295 4.165442 0 9.604952 
RGDP 20748 52.8258 2.021133 46.16747 59.39784 
RGDPsim 20748 -1.467634 0.904541 -6.77196 -0.69315 
DGDPCAP 20748 1.28893 1.039722 0.00028 4.564457 
SQDGDPCAP 20748 2.74231 3.832856 7.86E-08 20.83427 
DGDPcapROW 20748 1.136153 0.5189738 0.008495 3.539416 
            
minVoice_acc 20748 0.512327 0.7684196 -1.71874 1.814402 
minRol 20748 0.4483433 0.8043411 -1.11595 1.939776 
minPol_stab 20748 0.0872928 0.8104919 -2.03537 1.454821 
minGov_eff 20748 0.5807846 0.7210308 -0.83264 2.142508 
minreg_qual 20748 0.5643998 0.6559972 -1.07531 1.880103 
            
Lnimports 20710 6.05769 2.190186 -6.583224 12.58039 
Lnintimp_BEC 20710 5.587141 2.224157 -5.979344 11.96324 
Lnintimp_BVS 20590 6.743704 3.724486 -19.04363 11.27024 
VSWLD 20710 0.3170656 0.1371201 0.002995 0.816159 
            
countFTA 20748 14.31637 10.3769 0 29 
countFTArow 20748 7.19785 7.462788 0 29 
wexpFTA 20710 -.1631003 0.3444812 0 0.984415 
wbvsFTA 20710 0.6464864 0.3748953 0 0.998597 
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Table A3.2. Summary statistics (panel) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
FTA overall 0.386929 0.487059 0 1 N =   20748 
  between 0.439228 0 1 n =    1482 
  within   0.210776 -0.54164 1.3155 T =      14 
    
newfta overall 0.219973 0.414238 0 1 N =   20748 
  between 0.414368 0 1 n =    1482 
  within   0 0.219973 0.219973 T =      14 
    
NATURAL overall -8.35105 1.111235 -9.88258 -4.08795 N =   20748 
  between 1.111583 -9.88258 -4.08795 n =    1482 
  within   0 -8.35105 -8.35105 T =      14 
    
REMOTE overall 3.338295 4.165442 0 9.604952 N =   20748 
  between 4.166747 0 9.604952 n =    1482 
  within   0 3.338295 3.338295 T =      14 
    
RGDP overall 52.8258 2.021133 46.16747 59.39784 N =   20748 
  between 1.949821 46.80285 59.0728 n =    1482 
  within   0.534376 51.02711 57.06868 T =      14 
    
RGDPsim overall -1.46763 0.904541 -6.77196 -0.69315 N =   20748 
  between 0.873368 -6.40778 -0.69474 n =    1482 
  within   0.236432 -3.79728 0.633898 T =      14 
    
DGDPCAP overall 1.28893 1.039722 0.00028 4.564457 N =   20748 
  between 0.971241 0.007903 4.488735 n =    1482 
  within   0.37189 -0.99263 4.22026 T =      14 
    
SQDGDPCAP overall 2.74231 3.832856 7.86E-08 20.83427 N =   20748 
  between 3.590383 0.000101 20.1511 n =    1482 
  within   1.344624 -5.45585 17.6888 T =      14 
    
DGDPcapRoW overall 1.136153 0.518974 0.008495 3.539416 N =   20748 
  between 0.488523 0.183032 3.098337 n =    1482 
  within   0.175582 0.119586 1.844044 T =      14 
    
minVoi_acc overall 0.512327 0.76842 -1.71874 1.814402 N =   20748 
  between 0.753621 -1.528 1.546162 n =    1482 
  within   0.151259 -0.12505 0.90208 T =      14 
    
minRol overall 0.448343 0.804341 -1.11595 1.939776 N =   20748 
  between 0.79111 -0.90716 1.863745 n =    1482 
  within   0.146634 -0.20901 1.028451 T =      14 
    
minPol_stab overall 0.087293 0.810492 -2.03537 1.454821 N =   20748 
  between 0.771615 -1.50497 1.270505 n =    1482 
  within   0.248759 -0.96202 0.803981 T =      14 
    
minGov_eff overall 0.580785 0.721031 -0.83264 2.142508 N =   20748 
  between 0.697832 -0.55685 2.011447 n =    1482 
  within   0.182266 -0.03533 1.168117 T =      14 
    
Minreg_qual overall 0.5644 0.655997 -1.07531 1.880103 N =   20748 
  between 0.614247 -0.71344 1.647874 n =    1482 
  within   0.230802 -0.29259 1.61287 T =      14 
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lnIMPORTS overall 6.05769 2.190186 -6.583224 12.58039 N =   20710 
  between 2.116098 -1.895212 12.28444 n =    1482 
  within   .5626767 -.0781112 10.10082 T-bar = 13.9744 
    
lnINTIMPS_BEC overall 5.587141 2.224157 -5.979344 11.96324 N =   20710 
  between 2.146415 -2.159427 11.66313 n =    1482 
  within   .5818033 -.8450785 10.10569 T-bar = 13.9744 
    
lnINTIMPS_BVS overall -.1631003 3.724486 -12.13587 11.27024 N =   20710 
  between 3.516845 -5.62951 10.70017 n =    1482 
  within   1.225842 -1.08048 10.58313 T-bar = 13.9744 
    
bvswld_o overall 0.317066 0.13712 0.002995 0.816159 N =   20710 
  between 0.093914 0.165115 0.526723 n =    1482 
  within   0.100065 -0.05341 0.755386 T-bar = 13.9744 
    
countFTA_o overall 14.31637 10.3769 0 29 N =   20748 
  between 9.367344 0 23.28571 n =    1482 
  within   4.47079 -2.39792 31.03065 T =      14 
    
wexpFTA_o overall .3654931 .3486506 0 .9839385 N =   20748 
  between .3236264 0 .9199914 n =    1482 
  within   .1299571 -.4423418 1.018985 T-bar = 14 
    
wexpbvsFTA_o overall .3875159 .4279464 0 .9999816 N =   20710 
  between .4007341 0 .9998144 n =    1482 
  within   .1505021 -.5387159 1.05969 T-bar = 13.9744 
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A3.3: CHANGES IN THE TRADITIONAL DETERMINANTS OF FTAS 
 
Waves of Regionalism and Treatment of Existing Agreements 
 
Looking at the determinants of new FTAs requires thinking about how pre-existing 
agreements are to be treated in the estimation procedure. The traditional FTA 
formation models compare the characteristics of preferential partners to those of non-
preferential countries to ascertain the role of the independent variables of interest on 
the outcome (i.e. FTA=1). However, when one wants to look at the determinants of 
new agreements, it is important to think carefully about the nature of the ‘control’ 
group which implies tackling the presence of pre-existing FTAs in the sample. 
 
 Consider the observations used to estimate the determinants of the latest wave of 
regionalism in Table 3.3 column 4. Here there are three different sub-categories of 
countries in the sample; one that has not signed any agreement; one that signed an 
agreement during an earlier wave; and one that is engaging in a new agreement 
during this final wave. The question is, how should one treat pre-existing agreements 
in the sample (the second category of countries)? Two simple options are available, 
either remove these or leave these in. Each option has its merits and pitfalls. First 
recall that the dependent variable in this estimation is equal to 1 when a country signs 
an agreement during the identified lapse of the wave. Also consider that the interest 
of the investigation is to ascertain the determining characteristics of the partners that 
are engaged in new FTAs. Now consider leaving countries with pre-existing 
agreements in the sample. This implies that one is effectively comparing the 
countries that engage in new regionalism against both the countries that do not 
engage in FTAs AND those that were already part of an FTA signed during a 
preceding wave. Because the latter group will have characteristics that make it 
desirable for them to sign an FTA as the existence of an agreement shows, then 
leaving these in the sample can cloud the coefficients obtained the estimation. 
However if one removes the observations for countries that have pre-existing 
agreements then one is effectively introducing an element of selection into the 
estimations. The dependent variable is then capturing the incidence of signing a new 
agreement contingent on not having signed any agreements in the past. This selection 
bias could be mitigated by introducing a Heckman control function that identifies the 
determinants of not engaging in an agreement. The Mills-ratio obtained is then 
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introduced in subsequent FTA formation equations hence reducing the selection 
biases. However such a ‘non-selection’ model would require the identification of a 
variable that was correlated with not being in an agreement but uncorrelated with 
engaging in an agreement. It is hard to think of any variable that would satisfy this 
criterion. 
 
Because it is desirable to compare countries that sign new FTAs against those that 
have not signed, the estimations in the text are run by removing pre-existing 
agreements from the sample. However it is also important to note how the results 
might change in a sample where pre-existing agreements are maintained. This is 
shown in the Table below. Here it becomes immediately obvious that the predictive 
powers of the FTA formation equation fall significantly. The rate of true positives is 
only 3% during the latest wave. This lower explanatory power of the FTA formation 
equations may be due to the aforementioned comparisons between countries that are 
signing a new agreement against those that have not signed AND those that are 
already in an agreement. Although a hard choice, the removal of dyads with an 
agreement is the preferred method of dealing with pre existing agreements as it 
makes more sense to compare countries that engage in new FTAs against those that 
do not engage in FTAs at all. 
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Table A3.3: Traditional FTA formation equation without removal of pre-
existing agreements. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES FTA in 2006 
FTA: first wave 
1960-1985 
FTA: Second wave 
1985-1995 
FTA: Third 
wave 1995-2006 
NATURAL 1.948*** 1.397*** 1.302*** 1.265*** 
(0.0578) (0.0713) (0.0613) (0.0532) 
REMOTE 0.0575*** 0.134*** 0.249*** -0.0335*** 
(0.00725) (0.0183) (0.0187) (0.0102) 
RGDP 0.218*** 0.213*** 0.122*** 0.135*** 
(0.0111) (0.0224) (0.0140) (0.0121) 
RGDPsim 0.115*** -0.0702 0.414*** 0.103*** 
(0.0256) (0.0447) (0.0513) (0.0305) 
DGDPCAP 0.434*** -0.393* 1.253*** 1.097*** 
(0.130) (0.230) (0.213) (0.127) 
SQDGDPCAP -0.219*** -0.0155 -0.488*** -0.254*** 
(0.0438) (0.0734) (0.0739) (0.0312) 
DGDPcapROW -0.623*** -0.123 0.316*** -0.756*** 
(0.0724) (0.106) (0.0827) (0.0788) 
Constant 11.03*** 3.399*** 2.933*** 5.455*** 
(0.541) (0.695) (0.643) (0.553) 
Observations 19,740 19,740 19,460 19,740 
r2_p 0.441 0.385 0.433 0.214 
Correctly Predicted p(FTA)=FTA 91.46% 96.89% 95.72% 99.63% 
Correctly Predicted FTA=1* 43.29% 15.93% 11.54% 2.89% 
Correctly predicted FTA=0 97.84% 99.85% 99.32% 99.63% 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Pseudo_r2 calculated as 1 minus the ratio of the log likelihood value for estimated model and that predicted by a 
model with just an intercept (like in BB2004). 
Values are for the different base years. Column (1): 1970; Wave 1: 1970; Wave 2: 1985; Wave 3, 1995. 
*Sum of new agreements across different waves is larger than that of agreements in 2006. This reflects 
agreements that expired 
 
 
 
Sensitivity of results to different specifications of the waves of regionalism 
  
Table A3.4. provides a sensitivity check on the robustness of the economic 
determinants of FTAs using different years to identify the waves of regionalism. The 
results suggest that restricting the last wave so that it incorporates only agreements 
that were signed after 1999 makes a stronger case for arguing that the determinants 
of 21
st
 Century Regionalism are different from the other waves (predictive powers of 
the model fall considerably to only predicting 5% of the agreements in place). 
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Table A3.4: Determinants of FTAs across the different waves of regionalism – 
Full Sample (1960 values) Different temporal coverage of waves 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES FTA in 2006 
FTA: first wave 
1960-1980 
FTA: Second wave 
1980-1999 
FTA: Third 
wave 1999-2006 
NATURAL 1.936*** 1.440*** 1.823*** 1.631*** 
(0.0578) (0.0729) (0.0707) (0.0669) 
REMOTE 0.0573*** 0.133*** 0.203*** -0.0234** 
(0.00726) (0.0189) (0.0133) (0.0100) 
RGDP 0.219*** 0.198*** 0.254*** 0.263*** 
(0.0111) (0.0230) (0.0155) (0.0150) 
RGDPsim 0.114*** -0.0965** 0.453*** 0.101*** 
(0.0257) (0.0456) (0.0491) (0.0332) 
DGDPCAP 0.441*** -0.515** 0.432** 1.000*** 
(0.131) (0.230) (0.206) (0.146) 
SQDGDPCAP -0.223*** 0.0344 -0.219*** -0.306*** 
(0.0443) (0.0701) (0.0691) (0.0365) 
DGDPcapROW -0.638*** -0.0374 0.0989 -0.522*** 
(0.0733) (0.112) (0.0800) (0.0813) 
Constant 10.93*** 3.805*** 6.219*** 5.860*** 
(0.541) (0.692) (0.652) (0.604) 
Observations 19,460 19,460 18,842 18,028 
r2_p 0.439 0.382 0.508 0.272 
Correctly Predicted p(FTA)=FTA 92.78% 98.39% 96.48% 95.86% 
Correctly Predicted FTA=1* 
43.29% 
(781 of 1804) 
14.71% 
(50 of 340) 
37.5% 
(300 of 800) 
4.97% 
(34 of 684) 
Correctly predicted FTA=0 97.84% 99.87% 99.09% 99.45% 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Pseudo_r2 calculated as 1 minus the ratio of the log likelihood value for estimated model and that predicted by a 
model with just an intercept (like in BB2004). 
Values are for the different base years. Column (1): 1970; Wave 1: 1970; Wave 2: 1980; Wave 3, 1999. 
*Sum of new agreements across different waves is larger than that of agreements in 2006. This reflects agreements 
that expired 
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A.3.4 DETERMINANTS OF FTAS – GOVERNANCE MEASURES 
 
It is argued, in the body of the text, that the minimum regulatory quality measure of a 
dyadic observation explains a greater amount of the variance in the formation of new 
FTAs. This could imply that countries aim to engage in FTAs to redress shortfalls in 
bilateral regulatory quality. It then becomes relevant to look into the degree to which 
measures of governance and the probability of engaging in an FTA are related. In the 
figure below such a relationship is plotted through a regression of the predicted 
values from a ‘traditional’ (Baier and Bergstrand 2004) FTA formation model 
against the regulatory quality variable observed from a dyadic observation. To allow 
for non-linearities, the squared and cubed terms are also introduced
342
. The shape 
that emerges sees the probability of engaging in an FTA, at low levels of regulatory 
quality, initially falling. Once a certain threshold is passed it then rises only to fall 
subsequently at high levels of regulatory quality. Such a relationship between these 
variables supports the idea that there is a non monotonic relationship between 
regulatory quality and FTA formation. It is also supportive of the idea that at lower 
levels, once a threshold has been passed, the probability of signing a trade agreement 
is rising so that countries may wish to engage in trade agreements to redress lower 
regulatory quality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
342
 This is done for all countries that do not share an agreement in 1995. The fitted values are obtained 
from regressing a ‘traditional’ FTA formation equation. The R-squared is 0.084 
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Figure A3.4: Non-monotonic relationship between regulatory quality and FTA 
formation. 
 
 
 
The figure below then plots the relationship between the difference in regulatory 
quality and the fitted values from a traditional FTA formation model
343
. Another 
non-monotonic relationship also emerges. This one suggest that low differences in 
regulatory quality see the probability of an FTA rising, however a rising difference in 
regulatory quality is then associated with a falling probability of FTA formation till 
another threshold is reached were, at very high differences, the probability of 
engaging in an FTA rises. This provides further support to the story that sees 
countries engaging in FTAs in an effort to redress shortfalls in regulatory quality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
343
 For some reason Stata is unable to plot the values from an LPM model with 15,000 observations so 
the figure uses data from 2003 to 2008 for the graph. Nevertheless the data used for the estimation of 
the fitted values is the entire sample. 
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
1 2 3 4 5
posreg_qual_o
FTAs and Regulatory Quality
293 
 
Figure A3.5: Non-monotonic relationship between difference in regulatory 
quality and probability of FTA 
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A3.5. DETERMINANTS OF FTAS – SIMULTANEITY IN USING TRADE BASED 
MEASURES 
 
Using First-Differences to capture the impact of trade flows on the formation of 
FTAs is an adequate method of dealing with biases arising from unobserved 
heterogeneity provided that the source of these biases is dyadic in nature and time 
invariant. However dealing with simultaneity using similar specifications is a little 
bit more complicated.  
 
Simultaneity biases arise from the positive impact of FTAs on trade flows (see 
previous essay of this thesis for a justification of this assertion). Using changes in 
trade flows between 2008 and 1995 to predict FTA formation will not deal with these 
biases because these changes will be affected by the presence of an FTA. This will 
lead to upward biases in the coefficients of interest. Avoiding these biases requires 
estimating this model using changes in trade flows before the conclusion of an 
agreement. But because the switch into an agreement happens for different countries 
at different periods in time, then one has to think carefully how to treat changes in 
trade flows between countries that have not signed an agreement.  
 
Consider a world of three countries; Mexico, Germany and Indonesia, where the 
impact of trade flows on the conclusion of an FTA is addressed through a first 
difference model. Such an approach would control for the unobserved bilateral 
characteristics that cause Mexico to trade more or less with Germany or Indonesia by 
limiting the variance in trade flows to changes in these rather than to differences in 
levels. However, because the conclusion of an agreement between Mexico and 
Germany, in 2001, is likely to positively affect changes in trade flows, then one 
should use changes in trade flows before the conclusion of said agreement to 
eliminate simultaneity biases. So, in this instance, an appropriate estimation of the 
role of trade flows on the formation of new FTAs would take first differences 
between 2000 and 1995 and see whether Mexico’s trade with Germany grew at a 
faster rate than Mexico’s trade with Indonesia. But now imagine that Mexico had 
delayed signing NAFTA and only entered into an agreement with Canada in 1997. 
This would imply that cut off point for the FD model should no longer be the year 
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2000 but rather earlier so as to avoid simultaneity in the impact of this agreement on 
Mexican and Canadian trade. 
 
The introduction of more agreements then further complicates things hence the 
choice of the cut-off point cannot be easily made. Although the incidence of 
simultaneity should fall with earlier cut-off points as the probability of increasing pre 
FTA flows increases. Table A3.5, provides a robustness check for different cut-off 
points to those provided in the body of the text. The first column uses first 
differences between values from 1997 and 1995. Column (2) and three see the cut-
off point a little later in 1998 and 1999 respectively.  
 
Table A3.5: Robustness of FD model to different cut-off points. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables 1997-1995 1998-1995 1999-1995 
dRGDP 0.534* 0.886*** 0.294** 
(0.277) (0.223) (0.124) 
dRGDPsim 0.986*** 0.603** 0.386** 
(0.312) (0.247) (0.180) 
dDGDPCAP -1.092*** -0.673** -0.553* 
(0.401) (0.288) (0.324) 
dSQDGDPCAP 0.751*** 0.527*** 0.417*** 
(0.166) (0.108) (0.0869) 
dDGDPcapROW -2.836*** -3.079*** -3.035*** 
(0.726) (0.539) (0.359) 
dminreg_qual 1.972*** 2.176*** 1.585*** 
(0.284) (0.296) (0.224) 
dlnintimps_bvsbil_o 0.385*** 0.483*** 0.408*** 
(0.0785) (0.0751) (0.0697) 
Constant -1.003*** -0.753*** -0.796*** 
(0.102) (0.105) (0.0988) 
Observations 1,074 1,074 1,076 
r2_p 0.103 0.137 0.143 
Robust standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A3.6. MARGINAL EFFECTS FOR CROSS-SECTIONAL ESTIMATIONS 
Table A3.6. Marginal Effects for results in Table 3.4, Determinants of new FTAs – Measures of Governance 2008 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
NATURAL 0.140*** 0.124*** 0.174*** 0.231*** 0.222*** 0.185*** 0.210*** 
  (0.0254) (0.0233) (0.0244) (0.0287) (0.0263) (0.0243) (0.0233) 
REMOTE 0.0299*** 0.0301*** 0.0280*** 0.0259*** 0.0224*** 0.0280*** 0.0276*** 
  (0.00547) (0.00546) (0.00586) (0.00619) (0.00623) (0.00610) (0.00633) 
RGDP -0.0385*** -0.0386*** -0.0262*** -0.0193* -0.0135 -0.0186* -0.0153 
  (0.00852) (0.00821) (0.00962) (0.0100) (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0107) 
RGDPsim 0.0135 0.00369 0.0438*** 0.0452*** 0.0446*** 0.0450*** 0.0638*** 
  (0.0150) (0.0153) (0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
DGDPCAP 0.231*** 0.230*** 0.342*** 0.337*** 0.300*** 0.319*** 0.322*** 
  (0.0601) (0.0579) (0.0641) (0.0605) (0.0644) (0.0634) (0.0648) 
SQDGDPCAP -0.0535*** -0.0558*** -0.0557** -0.0605*** -0.0225 -0.0285 -0.0272 
  (0.0195) (0.0185) (0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0246) (0.0233) (0.0233) 
DGDPcapROW -0.343*** -0.345*** -0.464*** -0.385*** -0.590*** -0.539*** -0.476*** 
  (0.0535) (0.0504) (0.0750) (0.0726) (0.0883) (0.0812) (0.0751) 
minPol_stab -0.0538** 
  (0.0253) 
minRol 0.189*** 
  (0.0256) 
minVoice_acc 0.276*** 
  (0.0434) 
minctr_corr 0.292*** 
  (0.0304) 
minGov_eff 0.366*** 
  (0.0366) 
minreg_qual 0.403*** 
              (0.0390) 
Observations 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 
r2_p 0.350 0.353 0.398 0.413 0.446 0.450 0.501 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Evaluated at the mean 
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Table A3.7. Marginal Effects for results in Table 3.6, Determinants of new FTAs – Trade based measures 2008 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
NATURAL 0.140*** 0.210*** 0.184*** 0.182*** 0.167*** 0.215*** 0.184*** 
  (0.0254) (0.0233) (0.0250) (0.0243) (0.0251) (0.0242) (0.0266) 
REMOTE 0.0299*** 0.0276*** 0.0258*** 0.0247*** 0.0244*** 0.0260*** 0.0240*** 
  (0.00547) (0.00633) (0.00612) (0.00609) (0.00604) (0.00692) (0.00650) 
RGDP -0.0385*** -0.0153 -0.0449** -0.0534*** -0.0477*** 0.00531 -0.0228 
  (0.00852) (0.0107) (0.0184) (0.0190) (0.0160) (0.0104) (0.0160) 
RGDPsim 0.0135 0.0638*** 0.0619*** 0.0627*** 0.0613*** 0.0413** 0.0413** 
  (0.0150) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0167) (0.0169) 
DGDPCAP 0.231*** 0.322*** 0.313*** 0.317*** 0.305*** 0.395*** 0.376*** 
  (0.0601) (0.0648) (0.0644) (0.0648) (0.0640) (0.0726) (0.0721) 
SQDGDPCAP -0.0535*** -0.0272 -0.0258 -0.0270 -0.0245 -0.0469* -0.0429* 
  (0.0195) (0.0233) (0.0230) (0.0232) (0.0229) (0.0258) (0.0254) 
DGDPcapROW -0.343*** -0.476*** -0.472*** -0.468*** -0.461*** -0.393*** -0.388*** 
  (0.0535) (0.0751) (0.0739) (0.0744) (0.0722) (0.0778) (0.0767) 
minreg_qual 0.403*** 0.403*** 0.404*** 0.414*** 0.462*** 0.467*** 
  (0.0390) (0.0384) (0.0383) (0.0385) (0.0418) (0.0417) 
lnimports_o 0.0329** 
  (0.0143) 
lnintimps_bec_o 0.0410*** 
  (0.0145) 
lnintimps_bvsbil_o 0.0253*** 0.0196** 
  (0.00733) (0.00780) 
minbvswld 1.070*** 0.961*** 
            (0.207) (0.213) 
Observations 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 
r2_p 0.350 0.501 0.506 0.508 0.512 0.522 0.528 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Evaluated at the mean 
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Table A3.8. Marginal Effects for results in Table 3.7, Determinants of new FTAs – FD Estimations Trade based measures (1995-2000) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
dRGDP -0.0623** -0.103*** -0.104*** -0.0222 0.00612 0.0110 
  (0.0296) (0.0331) (0.0329) (0.0285) (0.0292) (0.0282) 
dRGDPsim 0.148*** 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.147*** 0.161*** 0.155*** 
  (0.0407) (0.0396) (0.0396) (0.0396) (0.0390) (0.0395) 
dDGDPCAP -0.111* -0.109* -0.108* -0.122* -0.124* -0.126* 
  (0.0640) (0.0635) (0.0639) (0.0673) (0.0680) (0.0688) 
dSQDGDPCAP 0.0651*** 0.0656*** 0.0665*** 0.0776*** 0.0703*** 0.0769*** 
  (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0173) (0.0187) (0.0175) (0.0184) 
dDGDPcapROW -0.700*** -0.704*** -0.709*** -0.699*** -0.710*** -0.699*** 
  (0.0766) (0.0768) (0.0771) (0.0767) (0.0760) (0.0755) 
dminreg_qual 0.255*** 0.255*** 0.259*** 0.281*** 0.289*** 0.294*** 
  (0.0433) (0.0430) (0.0433) (0.0435) (0.0439) (0.0439) 
dlnimports_o 0.0733*** 
  (0.0223) 
dlnintimps_bec_o 0.0743*** 
  (0.0199) 
dlnintimps_bvsbil_o 0.0913*** 0.0610*** 
  (0.0130) (0.0136) 
dminbvswld 1.486*** 1.014*** 
    (0.193) (0.223) 
Observations 1,090 1,085 1,084 1,080 1,090 1,080 
r2_p 0.129 0.139 0.142 0.176 0.176 0.193 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Evaluated at the mean 
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Table A3.9. Marginal Effects for results in Table 3.8, Determinants of new FTAs – FD Estimations Interdependence (1995-2000) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
dRGDP 0.0133 0.0140 0.0113 0.0630** 0.0593** 0.0416 
  (0.0259) (0.0260) (0.0240) (0.0285) (0.0286) (0.0253) 
dRGDPsim 0.0705** 0.0680* 0.0767** 0.108*** 0.107*** 0.116*** 
  (0.0352) (0.0348) (0.0338) (0.0385) (0.0389) (0.0387) 
dDGDPCAP -0.171** -0.182*** -0.162** -0.160** -0.173** -0.157** 
  (0.0675) (0.0666) (0.0645) (0.0747) (0.0759) (0.0720) 
dSQDGDPCAP 0.0850*** 0.0886*** 0.0835*** 0.0947*** 0.0983*** 0.0942*** 
  (0.0168) (0.0169) (0.0162) (0.0195) (0.0198) (0.0186) 
dDGDPcapROW -0.607*** -0.633*** -0.604*** -0.577*** -0.608*** -0.619*** 
  (0.0787) (0.0789) (0.0761) (0.0823) (0.0842) (0.0852) 
dminreg_qual 0.265*** 0.268*** 0.286*** 0.293*** 0.298*** 0.312*** 
  (0.0439) (0.0448) (0.0428) (0.0453) (0.0464) (0.0437) 
dwexpFTA_o 0.777*** 0.822*** 
  (0.0835) (0.0879) 
dwbvsFTA_o 0.729*** 0.746*** 
  (0.0919) (0.0956) 
dcountFTA_o 0.0188*** 0.0170*** 
  (0.00286) (0.00306) 
dlnintimps_bvsbil_o 0.0750*** 0.0724*** 0.0589*** 
        (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0131) 
Observations 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,052 1,052 1,052 
r2_p 0.207 0.216 0.166 0.238 0.244 0.184 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Evaluated at the mean 
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A3.7: CROSS SECTIONAL INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION  
 
Table A3.10: Instrumental Variable Approach 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Step 1 
(2) 
Step 2 
(3) 
Step 1 
(4) 
Step 2 
(5) 
Step 1 
(6) 
Step 2 
NATURAL 0.824*** 0.118 0.764*** -0.111 1.706*** -0.0824 
  (0.0508) (0.214) (0.0478) (0.241) (0.0992) (0.246) 
REMOTE 0.0529*** 0.0777*** 0.0549*** 0.0367 0.118*** 0.0550* 
  (0.0114) (0.0264) (0.0108) (0.0336) (0.0248) (0.0304) 
RGDP 0.984*** -0.864*** 0.979*** -1.340*** 1.395*** -0.796*** 
  (0.0210) (0.249) (0.0213) (0.310) (0.0411) (0.198) 
RGDPsim 0.0963*** 0.138* 0.0726** 0.149* 0.287*** 0.0835 
  (0.0318) (0.0742) (0.0328) (0.0833) (0.0868) (0.0834) 
DGDPCAP -0.0523 1.137*** -0.0786 1.068*** 0.0679 1.005*** 
  (0.0980) (0.253) (0.105) (0.281) (0.194) (0.272) 
SQDGDPCAP -0.0374 -0.131* -0.0442 -0.0999 -0.165*** -0.0739 
  (0.0262) (0.0776) (0.0281) (0.0853) (0.0492) (0.0848) 
DGDPcapROW 0.110 -1.415*** 0.179 -1.402*** 0.282 -1.405*** 
  (0.109) (0.228) (0.112) (0.256) (0.215) (0.236) 
minreg_qual 0.0815 1.497*** 0.0974 1.687*** -0.361*** 1.882*** 
  (0.0635) (0.146) (0.0707) (0.168) (0.128) (0.205) 
minco2pc 0.0365*** 0.00681 0.0439 
  (0.0130) (0.0139) (0.0269) 
mintellines -0.0198*** -0.0181*** -0.0365*** 
  (0.00391) (0.00421) (0.00873) 
minhealthpc -0.000130* -0.000204*** -0.000330** 
  (6.72e-05) (7.12e-05) (0.000166) 
minfk -1.426*** -0.675* -2.323*** 
  (0.373) (0.374) (0.732) 
lnimports_o 0.856*** 
  (0.270) 
lnintimps_bec_o 1.355*** 
  (0.332) 
lnintimps_bvsbil_o 0.560*** 
  (0.153) 
Constant -38.23*** 40.88*** -39.00*** 61.77*** -56.76*** 40.17*** 
  (0.962) (9.995) (0.977) (12.82) (1.996) (8.483) 
Observations 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,090 
R-squared 0.790 0.778 0.660 
Correctly Pred 
p(FTA)=FTA 83.21% 80.83% 81.38% 
Correctly Predicted 
FTA=1 57.98% 60.43% 54.91% 
Correctly predicted 
FTA=0   93.98%   89.53%   92.67% 
Robust standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A3.10. shows the results obtained from estimating the impact of the trade 
variables on the probability of an FTA being formed through an IV approach. The 
first step in each regression uses a cross sectional gravity model to create a set of 
predicted values that are inserted in a second step FTA formation equation. A 
justification for the use of a gravity model to estimate total trade and intermediate 
trade flows can be found in the previous essay of this thesis. The results confirm the 
positive effects of trade flows on the probability that a trade agreement is concluded 
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between two countries. A priori, the Wald test is passed and hence the instruments 
should be valid (i.e. correlated with the trade flow measure). However determining 
whether the instruments are correlated of not with the unobserved component of the 
FTA formation equation is more complicated. It seems reasonable to presume that 
Co2 emissions do not currently influence the desirability of an agreement. Similarly 
the coverage of telephone lines or a government’s expenditure on health should not 
influence a country’s decision to engage in trade agreements. The table below shows 
the correlation between the instruments proposed and the new FTA measure that is 
the dependent variable in the estimation. It reveals that the instruments used are not 
statistically correlated with the outcome variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
